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Powered By PRAS features the Probabilistic Resource Adequacy Suite (PRAS), an open-source, research-oriented collection of tools for analyzing the resource adequacy of bulk power systems. PRAS performs low-fidelity, high-speed simulations of multi-region power system operations, considering hundreds of thousands of years of unplanned resource outages to quantify the risk and potential nature of energy supply shortfalls in probabilistic terms.
PrAs is Halite, Rock Salt structured and crystallizes in the cubic Fm-3m space group. The structure is three-dimensional. Pr3+ is bonded to six equivalent As3- atoms to form a mixture of corner and edge-sharing PrAs6 octahedra. The corner-sharing octahedral tilt angles are 0°. All Pr–As bond lengths are 3.05 Å. As3- is bonded to six equivalent Pr3+ atoms to form a mixture of corner and edge-sharing AsPr6 octahedra. The corner-sharing octahedral tilt angles are 0°.
PrAs is Tetraauricupride structured and crystallizes in the tetragonal P4/mmm space group. The structure is three-dimensional. Pr3+ is bonded in a body-centered cubic geometry to eight equivalent As3- atoms. All Pr–As bond lengths are 3.22 Å. As3- is bonded in a body-centered cubic geometry to eight equivalent Pr3+ atoms.
NREL's Probabilistic Resource Adequacy Suite (PRAS) was developed for use in renewable integration studies, to assess the resource adequacy of large interconnected power systems with potentially significant interregional transfers of power. This presentation provides an overview of the tool and the methods it uses to solve multi-regional transmission and storage dispatch problems in a computationally-efficient manner.
The Probabilistic Resource Adequacy Suite, or PRAS, is a software package for studying power system resource adequacy. It allows the user to simulate power system operations under a wide range of operating conditions, in order to study the system’s risk of failing to meet demand due to a resource shortfall, and identify the time periods and regions in which that risk occurs. This reports documents version 0.6 of the tool.
The Probabilistic Resource Adequacy Suite, or PRAS, is a software package for studying power system resource adequacy. It allows the user to simulate power system operations under a wide range of operating conditions, in order to study the system's risk of failing to meet demand due to a resource shortfall, and identify the time periods and regions in which that risk occurs. This reports documents version 0.8 of the tool.
This study examines the impact of reserve margin-based reliability assessment, as commonly used in capacity expansion models, on planning resource-adequate power systems under high penetrations of solar photovoltaics (PV). As a generation resource, PV is operationally different from the conventional dispatchable resources for which most capacity expansion models were designed. The question this study attempts to answer is whether large amounts of PV on a system (in this case, the Western Interconnection of North America) would bias the results of conventional reserve margin-based capacity expansion modeling towards an over- or under-provisioning of resource adequacy. This analysis used NREL’s Resource Planning Model (RPM) for capacity expansion modeling and NREL’s Probabilistic Resource Adequacy Suite (PRAS) for resource adequacy assessment. RPM uses a reserve margin requirement to enforce resource adequacy. PRAS, a collection of tools for studying the resource adequacy of power systems and the adequacy contributions of individual resources on a probabilistic basis, was used to compute multiple resource adequacy metrics across a number of simulated scenarios and system representations with differing regional detail. In all cases, including high PV penetrations (up to 33% annual generation from PV, interconnection-wide), RPM was able to produce resource-adequate systems as measured by normalized expected unserved energy and loss-of-load expectation results from PRAS. The accuracy of reserve margin approaches depends heavily on the underlying assumptions informing the capacity credit assigned to variable and energy-limited resources, particularly when such resources are abundant in the modeled system. RPM’s standard methodology for estimating variable and flexible resources’ capacity contributions, which is based on the top 100 hours of net load, did not appear to systematically undervalue or overvalue variable generation relative to a more rigorous equivalent firm capacity assessment using PRAS, although both over- and under-valuations were observed in specific scenarios. In the worst cases, the top 100 hour method underestimated the equivalent firm capacity of PV by two percentage points, and overestimated the equivalent firm capacity of PV by five percentage points. Calculating capacity contributions based on the top 10 hours of net load systematically underestimated equivalent firm capacities at more modest PV penetrations, but was often a better approximation of equivalent firm capacity than the existing 100-hour approach in scenarios with higher PV penetrations.
Recently the International Space Station (ISS) has incorporated more Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) in the decision making process for significant issues. Future PRAs will have major impact to ISS and future spacecraft development and operations. These PRAs will have their foundation in the current complete ISS PRA model and the current PRA trade studies that are being analyzed as requested by ISS Program stakeholders. ISS PRAs have recently helped in the decision making process for determining reliability requirements for future NASA spacecraft and commercial spacecraft, making crew rescue decisions, as well as making operational requirements for ISS orbital orientation, planning Extravehicular activities (EVAs) and robotic operations. This paper will describe some applications of the ISS PRA model and how they impacted the final decision. This paper will discuss future analysis topics such as life extension, requirements of new commercial vehicles visiting ISS.
This report builds upon the body of work sponsored by the Department of Energy (DOE) Light-Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Flexible Power Operation and Generation (FPOG) program that presented generic probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) for the addition of a heat extraction system (HES) to light-water reactors to support the co-location of a high temperature hydrogen electrolysis facility (HTEF). Probabilistic and deterministic hazards assessments and risk analyses are leveraged throughout this report. Several improvements and new analyses are included in this report. First, higher amounts of detail in the specifications of the generic HTEFs are used to produce scaled results for a 100, 500, and 1000 MW nominal hydrogen production facility. An additional hazard assessment of 1000 kg of hydrogen storage is performed. The facility hazards and footprint are assessed to determine the safe distance required for placement near the nuclear power plant (NPP). Second, specific designs for corresponding HESs for the different levels of support required by the HTEFs are analyzed in the PRA model. Third, a hazards analysis of the specified HTEFs leads not only to effects of the quantified risk assessment for the NPP, but also qualitative hazards assessment for the community. Finally, a seismic analysis and a high winds analysis have each been added to the PRA. The results investigate the applicability of the potential licensing approaches which do not require a full United States (U.S.) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing review. The PRAs are generic and include listed assumptions. The HTEF design built for this project has further eliminated many conservative assumptions from the prior PRAs in this series. The PRA results indicate that the 10 CFR 50.59 licensing approach is justified due to the minimal increase in initiating event frequencies for all design basis accidents, with none exceeding 7.7%. The PRA results for core damage frequency and large early release frequency support the use of NRC Regulation Guide 1.174 as further risk information that supports a change without a full licensing amendment review. The hazard analyses and PRA confirm the need for engineered blast barriers of storage tanks and the common production header leaving the HTEF. The hazards analyses and PRA also confirm with high confidence that using the assumptions of design in this report that the safety case for licensing an HES addition and an HTEF sited with its unprotected high-pressure stage components 187 meters from the NPP’s transmission towers (the most fragile structure, system, and component) is strong.
Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) are performed for projects or programs where the consequences of failure are highly undesirable. PRAs primarily address the level of risk those projects or programs posed during operations. PRAs are often developed after the design has been completed. Design and operational details used to develop models include approved and accepted design information regarding equipment, components, systems and failure data. This methodology basically validates the risk parameters of the project or system design. For high risk or high dollar projects, using PRA methodologies during the design process provides new opportunities to influence the design early in the project life cycle to identify, eliminate or mitigate potential risks. Identifying risk drivers before the design has been set allows the design engineers to understand the inherent risk of their current design and consider potential risk mitigation changes. This can become an iterative process where the PRA model can be used to determine if the mitigation technique is effective in reducing risk. This can result in more efficient and cost effective design changes. PRA methodology can be used to assess the risk of design alternatives and can demonstrate how major design changes or program modifications impact the overall program or project risk. PRA has been used for the last two decades to validate risk predictions and acceptability. Providing risk information which can positively influence final system and equipment design the PRA tool can also participate in design development, providing a safe and cost effective product.
This report details an expansion of the original two generic probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) for the addition of a heat extraction system (HES) to a light-water reactor, one for a pressurized-water reactor and one for a boiling-water reactor. The new material in this revision includes a new HES design, direct electrical coupling of the nuclear power plant to the High-Temperature Electrolysis Facility (HTEF), and a smaller 100-MWt HTEF analysis. The results investigate the applicability of the potential licensing approaches, which do not require a full United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing review. The PRAs are generic and include some assumptions. We eliminated many conservative assumptions from the preliminary pressurized-water reactor PRA report using design data for both the HES and HTEF. The PRA results indicate that the 10 CFR 50.59 licensing approach is justified due to the minimal increase in initiating event frequencies for all design basis accidents, with none exceeding 5.6%. The PRA results for core damage frequency and large early release frequency support the use of RG 1.174 as further risk information that supports a change without a full licensing amendment review. Further insights provided through hazard analyses and sensitivity studies confirm with high confidence that the safety case for licensing an HES addition and an HTEF sited 1.0 km from the nuclear power plant is strong and that the placement of a HTEF at 0.5 km is also a viable case. Site-specific information can alter these conclusions.
Resource adequacy concerns may be very different in electricity systems that have higher levels of solar and storage, requiring changes to existing planning models. This study explores a novel approach to evaluating resource adequacy under future scenarios with higher solar and storage in the Southeast U.S. It uses NREL’s Probabilistic Resource Adequacy Suite (PRAS), a collection of probabilistic resource adequacy modeling tools, and compares results when interacting PRAS and a portfolio planning tool with a more traditional modeling approach. The results suggest that traditional models perform reasonably well with lower levels of solar PV, but at higher levels of solar probabilistic tools better capture the changes in resource adequacy concerns—such as winter energy availability—associated with higher solar systems. This is the final study in the Preparing Southeast Markets for Reliable and Affordable Integration of Solar into Operations and Planning project. Two prior reports can be found at: Solar and Storage Integration in the Southeastern United States: Economics, Reliability, and Operations. https://emp.lbl.gov/publications/solar-and-storage-integration Solar and Wind Forecast Error Reserve Sharing in a Multi-Utility Region. https://eta-publications.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/multiutility_fe_reserve_sharing_final.pdf
Human performance is critical to crew safety during space missions. Humans interact with hardware and software during ground processing, normal flight, and in response to events. Human interactions with hardware and software can cause Loss of Crew and/or Vehicle (LOCV) through improper actions, or may prevent LOCV through recovery and control actions. Humans have the ability to deal with complex situations and system interactions beyond the capability of machines. Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is a method used to qualitatively and quantitatively assess the occurrence of human failures that affect availability and reliability of complex systems. Modeling human actions with their corresponding failure probabilities in a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) provides a more complete picture of system risks and risk contributions. A high-quality HRA can provide valuable information on potential areas for improvement, including training, procedures, human interfaces design, and the need for automation. Modeling human error has always been a challenge in part because performance data is not always readily available. For spaceflight, the challenge is amplified not only because of the small number of participants and limited amount of performance data available, but also due to the lack of definition of the unique factors influencing human performance in space. These factors, called performance shaping factors in HRA terminology, are used in HRA techniques to modify basic human error probabilities in order to capture the context of an analyzed task. Many of the human error modeling techniques were developed within the context of nuclear power plants and therefore the methodologies do not address spaceflight factors such as the effects of microgravity and longer duration missions. This presentation will describe the types of human error risks which have shown up as risk drivers in the Shuttle PRA which may be applicable to commercial space flight. As with other large PRAs of complex machines, human error in the Shuttle PRA proved to be an important contributor (~12 percent) to LOCV. An existing HRA technique was adapted for use in the Shuttle PRA, but additional guidance and improvements are needed to make the HRA task in space-related PRAs easier and more accurate. Therefore, this presentation will also outline plans for expanding current HRA methodology to more explicitly cover spaceflight performance shaping factors.
A Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) aims to identify and assess potential risks to system technical performance requirements for the purpose of furnishing risk insights into project decisions. PRAs have traditionally been conducted manually using software with an isolated data model. As system complexity rises it becomes difficult to ensure consistency between a PRA, the evolving system design, and other engineering analyses; the techniques for conducting PRAs must evolve to meet this challenge. This work presents progress towards a methodology and tooling for conducting a PRA by leveraging data in the system model, embedded for other purposes and analyses, to conduct a PRA. An approach for identifying the appropriate probabilistic equation for each risk scenario from a standard library is presented, which is a significant step towards the quantification of the likelihood of a risk scenario occurrence. The final calculation of the likelihood of occurrence is left as an item of future work. We also present the development of preliminary tooling to carry out the methodology on a well-formed system model. The information needed to conduct the PRA is embedded in a consistent manner in a system model, so the model-based PRA can be regularly executed as the system model changes. The ability to modify the PRA in concert with lifecycle evolution affords a project the opportunity to track the extent to which system modification impacts compliance with requirements. These aspects of this model-based PRA methodology make it capable of managing risk in increasingly complex technical systems.
To show how NASA’s Moon-to-Mars (M2M) program can use hardware reliability assessments and comprehensive Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) to estimate risk of future missions and manage risk via safety and mission success requirements from the top down, so that this risk can be balanced with other program metrics like cost and schedule. These PRAs and reliability assessments can be used during the concept, design, and operational phases of development. This presentation also provides some thoughts on how the NASA process can be utilized for a lunar surface power grid development.
Common cause failures (CCFs) have been recognized as significant risk contributors in probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) for commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs) since 1980s. A series of reports including those of United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations (NUREGs) have been published from late 1980s to early 2000s to provide guidelines for performing CCF event data analysis and modeling CCF in PRA. However, there are still some issues existed in CCF modeling and CCF parameter estimations. One of such issues is the modeling of multiple common-cause component group (CCCG) for the same component in a PRA model. This paper exams the CCCG definition and the requirements from the PRA standard, investigates the CCCG modeling practices and issues existing in PRAs, and presents systematic approaches and guidelines to model CCCG in PRA properly and consistently.
Probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) have benefitted the safe operation of the U.S. reactor fleet over many decades. Risk insights from these PRAs have provided information from many different perspectives, from what is most important to maintain at a facility to a better understanding of how to address new information regarding safety issues. The methods and tools that have supported the creation and enhancement of PRA models were established through multiple decades of research, from the 1970s starting with the WASH-1400 Reactor Safety Study through comprehensive plant-specific models in use today. Because PRA models are being used to support such a diverse array of plant decisions, they are now being applied to analyze an increasing number and diverse set of aspects of the plant, which are well beyond the initial efforts envisioned in the 1970s. These demands on PRA methods and tools have led to challenges in terms of further expansion of the use of PRA and raised the potential for future research into how to address these challenges to ensure continued nuclear safety. In addition to the PRA needs, the domain of computer science has led to advances in computational approaches that may serve to help nuclear power plant PRA applications. These newer technologies have great potential to improve the effectiveness and economics of PRA and are being considered for exploration of potential benefits to the PRA and nuclear-power communities.
A digital twin (DT) is a digital model or a collection of models of a physical entity. DTs in the nuclear arena can be used from plant design through decommissioning. Decisions are typically a priori or made offline. Risk-informed decision making is identifying what can go wrong, its frequency, and the consequences of its failure. Ideally risk-informed decision making reflects the current state of the plant and provides a decision in real time. Traditionally, probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) evaluate the failures of safety systems, the risk of core damage, and the offsite dose as the consequence. However, this DT evaluates the decisions on the control side rather than the protection side. It uses the same risk methods to probabilistically inform the decision-making process but in a different way. Rather than evaluating the risk of core damage, this DT evaluates the likelihood of avoiding a trip set point while maintaining plant safety. Performance-based assessments are identified via its probabilistic evaluation of operational alternatives based on system status. Because the purpose of the control system is to maintain system variables within prescribed operating ranges, upsets or challenges that can exceed a trip set point resulting in a plant transient and a challenge to plant mitigating systems based on actual plant conditions, are evaluated to safely maintain the plant within the operating ranges. The probabilistic portion of the model is autonomously and automatically adjusted, and the metric of interest (i.e. likelihood of avoiding a trip set point) is recalculated. The digital representation of the physical system (i.e. the DT) performs a deterministic performance–based assessment of the probabilistically identified alternatives identified to validate the probabilistic assessment. A decision-making algorithm selects the appropriate option based on the probabilistic and deterministic assessments and transmits a control signal to a component(s) to initiate a corrective action or informs an operator of its decision.