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NASA NTRS2011

Applications of the International Space Station Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model

Recently the International Space Station (ISS) has incorporated more Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) in the decision making process for significant issues. Future PRAs will have major impact to ISS and future spacecraft development and operations. These PRAs will have their foundation in the current complete ISS PRA model and the current PRA trade studies that are being analyzed as requested by ISS Program stakeholders. ISS PRAs have recently helped in the decision making process for determining reliability requirements for future NASA spacecraft and commercial spacecraft, making crew rescue decisions, as well as making operational requirements for ISS orbital orientation, planning Extravehicular activities (EVAs) and robotic operations. This paper will describe some applications of the ISS PRA model and how they impacted the final decision. This paper will discuss future analysis topics such as life extension, requirements of new commercial vehicles visiting ISS.

Grant, Warren↗

NASA NTRS2013

PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessments) Participation versus Validation

Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) are performed for projects or programs where the consequences of failure are highly undesirable. PRAs primarily address the level of risk those projects or programs posed during operations. PRAs are often developed after the design has been completed. Design and operational details used to develop models include approved and accepted design information regarding equipment, components, systems and failure data. This methodology basically validates the risk parameters of the project or system design. For high risk or high dollar projects, using PRA methodologies during the design process provides new opportunities to influence the design early in the project life cycle to identify, eliminate or mitigate potential risks. Identifying risk drivers before the design has been set allows the design engineers to understand the inherent risk of their current design and consider potential risk mitigation changes. This can become an iterative process where the PRA model can be used to determine if the mitigation technique is effective in reducing risk. This can result in more efficient and cost effective design changes. PRA methodology can be used to assess the risk of design alternatives and can demonstrate how major design changes or program modifications impact the overall program or project risk. PRA has been used for the last two decades to validate risk predictions and acceptability. Providing risk information which can positively influence final system and equipment design the PRA tool can also participate in design development, providing a safe and cost effective product.

DeMott, Diana↗

NASA NTRS2010

The Importance of HRA in Human Space Flight: Understanding the Risks

Human performance is critical to crew safety during space missions. Humans interact with hardware and software during ground processing, normal flight, and in response to events. Human interactions with hardware and software can cause Loss of Crew and/or Vehicle (LOCV) through improper actions, or may prevent LOCV through recovery and control actions. Humans have the ability to deal with complex situations and system interactions beyond the capability of machines. Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is a method used to qualitatively and quantitatively assess the occurrence of human failures that affect availability and reliability of complex systems. Modeling human actions with their corresponding failure probabilities in a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) provides a more complete picture of system risks and risk contributions. A high-quality HRA can provide valuable information on potential areas for improvement, including training, procedures, human interfaces design, and the need for automation. Modeling human error has always been a challenge in part because performance data is not always readily available. For spaceflight, the challenge is amplified not only because of the small number of participants and limited amount of performance data available, but also due to the lack of definition of the unique factors influencing human performance in space. These factors, called performance shaping factors in HRA terminology, are used in HRA techniques to modify basic human error probabilities in order to capture the context of an analyzed task. Many of the human error modeling techniques were developed within the context of nuclear power plants and therefore the methodologies do not address spaceflight factors such as the effects of microgravity and longer duration missions. This presentation will describe the types of human error risks which have shown up as risk drivers in the Shuttle PRA which may be applicable to commercial space flight. As with other large PRAs of complex machines, human error in the Shuttle PRA proved to be an important contributor (~12 percent) to LOCV. An existing HRA technique was adapted for use in the Shuttle PRA, but additional guidance and improvements are needed to make the HRA task in space-related PRAs easier and more accurate. Therefore, this presentation will also outline plans for expanding current HRA methodology to more explicitly cover spaceflight performance shaping factors.

Hamlin, Teri↗

NASA NTRS2016

Towards a Methodology and Tooling for Model-Based Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)

A Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) aims to identify and assess potential risks to system technical performance requirements for the purpose of furnishing risk insights into project decisions. PRAs have traditionally been conducted manually using software with an isolated data model. As system complexity rises it becomes difficult to ensure consistency between a PRA, the evolving system design, and other engineering analyses; the techniques for conducting PRAs must evolve to meet this challenge. This work presents progress towards a methodology and tooling for conducting a PRA by leveraging data in the system model, embedded for other purposes and analyses, to conduct a PRA. An approach for identifying the appropriate probabilistic equation for each risk scenario from a standard library is presented, which is a significant step towards the quantification of the likelihood of a risk scenario occurrence. The final calculation of the likelihood of occurrence is left as an item of future work. We also present the development of preliminary tooling to carry out the methodology on a well-formed system model. The information needed to conduct the PRA is embedded in a consistent manner in a system model, so the model-based PRA can be regularly executed as the system model changes. The ability to modify the PRA in concert with lifecycle evolution affords a project the opportunity to track the extent to which system modification impacts compliance with requirements. These aspects of this model-based PRA methodology make it capable of managing risk in increasingly complex technical systems.

Schreiner, Samuel S.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Artemis Missions Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) & Reliability Assessment Overview

To show how NASA’s Moon-to-Mars (M2M) program can use hardware reliability assessments and comprehensive Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) to estimate risk of future missions and manage risk via safety and mission success requirements from the top down, so that this risk can be balanced with other program metrics like cost and schedule. These PRAs and reliability assessments can be used during the concept, design, and operational phases of development. This presentation also provides some thoughts on how the NASA process can be utilized for a lunar surface power grid development.

PRA↗

NASA NTRS2009

Johnson Space Center's Risk and Reliability Analysis Group 2008 Annual Report

The Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate s Risk and Reliability Analysis Group provides both mathematical and engineering analysis expertise in the areas of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) analysis, and data collection and analysis. The fundamental goal of this group is to provide National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) decisionmakers with the necessary information to make informed decisions when evaluating personnel, flight hardware, and public safety concerns associated with current operating systems as well as with any future systems. The Analysis Group includes a staff of statistical and reliability experts with valuable backgrounds in the statistical, reliability, and engineering fields. This group includes JSC S&MA Analysis Branch personnel as well as S&MA support services contractors, such as Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) and SoHaR. The Analysis Group s experience base includes nuclear power (both commercial and navy), manufacturing, Department of Defense, chemical, and shipping industries, as well as significant aerospace experience specifically in the Shuttle, International Space Station (ISS), and Constellation Programs. The Analysis Group partners with project and program offices, other NASA centers, NASA contractors, and universities to provide additional resources or information to the group when performing various analysis tasks. The JSC S&MA Analysis Group is recognized as a leader in risk and reliability analysis within the NASA community. Therefore, the Analysis Group is in high demand to help the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) continue to fly safely, assist in designing the next generation spacecraft for the Constellation Program (CxP), and promote advanced analytical techniques. The Analysis Section s tasks include teaching classes and instituting personnel qualification processes to enhance the professional abilities of our analysts as well as performing major probabilistic assessments used to support flight rationale and help establish program requirements. During 2008, the Analysis Group performed more than 70 assessments. Although all these assessments were important, some were instrumental in the decisionmaking processes for the Shuttle and Constellation Programs. Two of the more significant tasks were the Space Transportation System (STS)-122 Low Level Cutoff PRA for the SSP and the Orion Pad Abort One (PA-1) PRA for the CxP. These two activities, along with the numerous other tasks the Analysis Group performed in 2008, are summarized in this report. This report also highlights several ongoing and upcoming efforts to provide crucial statistical and probabilistic assessments, such as the Extravehicular Activity (EVA) PRA for the Hubble Space Telescope service mission and the first fully integrated PRAs for the CxP's Lunar Sortie and ISS missions.

Valentine, Mark↗

NASA NTRS2010

2009 Space Shuttle Probabilistic Risk Assessment Overview

Loss of a Space Shuttle during flight has severe consequences, including loss of a significant national asset; loss of national confidence and pride; and, most importantly, loss of human life. The Shuttle Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) is used to identify risk contributors and their significance; thus, assisting management in determining how to reduce risk. In 2006, an overview of the SPRA Iteration 2.1 was presented at PSAM 8 [1]. Like all successful PRAs, the SPRA is a living PRA and has undergone revisions since PSAM 8. The latest revision to the SPRA is Iteration 3. 1, and it will not be the last as the Shuttle program progresses and more is learned. This paper discusses the SPRA scope, overall methodology, and results, as well as provides risk insights. The scope, assumptions, uncertainties, and limitations of this assessment provide risk-informed perspective to aid management s decision-making process. In addition, this paper compares the Iteration 3.1 analysis and results to the Iteration 2.1 analysis and results presented at PSAM 8.

Hamlin, Teri L.↗

NASA NTRS2014

Using Generic Data to Establish Dormancy Failure Rates

Many hardware items are dormant prior to being operated. The dormant period might be especially long, for example during missions to the moon or Mars. In missions with long dormant periods the risk incurred during dormancy can exceed the active risk contribution. Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) need to account for the dormant risk contribution as well as the active contribution. A typical method for calculating a dormant failure rate is to multiply the active failure rate by a constant, the dormancy factor. For example, some practitioners use a heuristic and divide the active failure rate by 30 to obtain an estimate of the dormant failure rate. To obtain a more empirical estimate of the dormancy factor, this paper uses the recently updated database NPRD-2011 [1] to arrive at a set of distributions for the dormancy factor. The resulting dormancy factor distributions are significantly different depending on whether the item is electrical, mechanical, or electro-mechanical. Additionally, this paper will show that using a heuristic constant fails to capture the uncertainty of the possible dormancy factors.

Reistle, Bruce↗

NASA NTRS2018

Synthesizing a New Launch Vehicle Failure Probability Based on Historical Flight Data

New launch vehicles have historically had significantly higher failure rates in early flights than what has been predicted using Probabilistic Risk Assessment - PRA. This is because PRAs typically model a mature vehicle where a significant portion of the early failure probability contributors have been eliminated due to testing and improvements after actual field operation. To capture a more accurate early flight failure probability estimate, this paper develops a method that estimates ascent failure probability starting with the first flight based on historical launch vehicle records. With new launch vehicles being developed, such as the Space Launch System - SLS, a PRA model must be extended to cover early flight failure probability contributions that are either not covered in the mature-vehicle PRA or are underestimated. These failure probability contributions include design errors, quality control deficiencies, installation errors, and environmental impacts. There are also failure dependencies due to systemic errors that still exist due to limited entire-system testing.

Cross, Robert B.↗

NASA NTRS2018

Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) of a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) Dynamic Positioning System (DPS)

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has been utilized by NASA in a variety of space oriented projects. It has served as one of the primary risk identification and ranking tools. Recent developments in the oil and gas industry have presented opportunities for NASA to lend their PRA expertise to both ongoing and developmental projects within the industry. As a result, NASA has entered into an agreement with Anadarko Petroleum Company (APC) to collaboratively develop PRAs for different aspects of the subsea drilling and completion process of well development. This paper documents how PRA was applied to estimate the probability that a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) equipped with a generically configured Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) loses location and needs to initiate an emergency disconnect. Since this project was in essence a pilot project, the PRA described in this paper is intended to be generic such that the vessel meets the general requirements of an International Maritime Organization (IMO) Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)/Circ. 645 Class 3 dynamically positioned vessel. The results of this analysis are not intended to be applied to any specific drilling vessel, although provisions were made to allow the analysis to be configured to a specific vessel if required.

Thigpen, Eric B.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Valuing Rigor in the Risk Management Process

NASA, as an organization, takes risk management (RM) seriously, and for most projects, the risk management process is exemplar. There can be challenges, though, with defining RM processes. For example, many different risk analysis methodologies are available, they can be applied with varying degrees of rigor, and they can have different value depending on how projects use them. In particular, risk analysis methodologies vary considerably in the level of quantitative detail, with more probabilistic techniques encouraged in some situations. We discussed these processes and methodologies with ten project managers (PM) at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). Our intent was not to prove with some level of statistical significance that some are more helpful than others, but rather to obtain a general understanding of how projects are identifying, and thinking, about risks. This paper describes some of the available risk processes and methodologies, and provides some insights about the benefits that can gained from their use. We provide an in-depth discussion of one quantitative methodology, Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs), and conclude with a few insights from observed best practices.

Dillon, Robin L.↗

NASA NTRS2019

"Making Safety Happen" Through Probabilistic Risk Assessment at NASA

NASA is using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) as one of the tools in its Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) tool belt to identify and quantify risks associated with human spaceflight. This paper discusses some of the challenges and benefits associated with developing and using PRA for NASA human space programs. Some programs have entered operation prior to developing a PRA, while some have implemented PRA from the start of the program. It has been observed that the earlier a design change is made in the concept or design phase, the less impact it has on cost and schedule. Not finding risks until the operation phase yields much costlier design changes and major delays, which can result in discussions of just accepting the risk. Risk contributors identified by PRA are not just associated with hardware failures. They include but are not limited to crew fatality due to medical causes, the environment the vehicle and crew are exposed to, the software being used, and the reliability of the crew performing required actions. Some programs have entered operation prior to developing a PRA, and while PRA can still provide a benefit for operations and future design trades, the benefit of implementing PRA from the start of the program provides the added benefit of informing design and reducing risk early in program development. Currently, NASA’s International Space Station (ISS) program is in its 20th year of on-orbit operations around the Earth and has several new programs in the design phase preparing to enter the operation phase all of which have active (or living) PRAs. These programs incorporate PRA as part of their Risk-Informed, Decision-Making (RIDM) process. For new NASA human spaceflight programs discussion begins with mission concept, establishing requirements, forming the PRA team, and continues through the design cycles into the operational phase. Several examples of PRA related applications and observed lessons are included.

Applications↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Use of Preliminary PRA to Inform Decisions During Initial NASA Gateway Development

How do you use Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to support a program in development before designs are even known? Traditional PRAs require detailed design information and early in a program life cycle such information is not available. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) developed a preliminary PRA for the Gateway Program based upon NASA reference designs utilizing data and models from pervious PRA studies as surrogates for the Gateway systems. Gateway will be a lunar outpost that supports missions to the moon and includes several elements/modules developed by NASA and International Partners. NASA SMA began supporting Gateway in fall 2017 during initial formulation and continues to support the Gateway Program today. This paper will explore how the NASA SMA developed preliminary PRA was used to inform Gateway Program decisions with specific examples provided.

PRA↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Use of Preliminary PRA to Inform Decisions During Initial NASA Gateway Development

How do you use Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to support a program in development before designs are even known? Traditional PRAs require detailed design information and early in a program life cycle such information is not available. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) developed a preliminary PRA for the Gateway Program based upon NASA reference designs utilizing data and models from previous PRA studies as surrogates for the Gateway systems. Gateway will be a lunar outpost that supports missions to the moon and includes several elements/modules developed by NASA and International Partners. NASA SMA began supporting Gateway in fall 2017 during initial formulation and continues to support the Gateway Program today. This paper will explore how the NASA SMA developed preliminary PRA was used to inform Gateway Program decisions with specific examples provided.

PRA↗