Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “PRA Analysis”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records

A Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) of Human Space Missions for the Advanced Integration Matrix (AIM)

The Advanced Integration Matrix (AIM) Project u7ill study and solve systems-level integration issues for exploration missions beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO), through the design and development of a ground-based facility for developing revolutionary integrated systems for joint human-robotic missions. This paper describes a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) of human space missions that was developed to help define the direction and priorities for AIM. Risk analysis is required for all major NASA programs and has been used for shuttle, station, and Mars lander programs. It is a prescribed part of early planning and is necessary during concept definition, even before mission scenarios and system designs exist. PRA cm begin when little failure data are available, and be continually updated and refined as detail becomes available. PRA provides a basis for examining tradeoffs among safety, reliability, performance, and cost. The objective of AIM's PRA is to indicate how risk can be managed and future human space missions enabled by the AIM Project. Many critical events can cause injuries and fatalities to the crew without causing loss of vehicle or mission. Some critical systems are beyond AIM's scope, such as propulsion and guidance. Many failure-causing events can be mitigated by conducting operational tests in AIM, such as testing equipment and evaluating operational procedures, especially in the areas of communications and computers, autonomous operations, life support, thermal design, EVA and rover activities, physiological factors including habitation, medical equipment, and food, and multifunctional tools and repairable systems. AIM is well suited to test and demonstrate the habitat, life support, crew operations, and human interface. Because these account for significant crew, systems performance, and science risks, AIM will help reduce mission risk, and missions beyond LEO are far enough in the future that AIM can have significant impact.

Jones, Harry W.↗

Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) of a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) Dynamic Positioning System (DPS)

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has been utilized by NASA in a variety of space oriented projects. It has served as one of the primary risk identification and ranking tools. Recent developments in the oil and gas industry have presented opportunities for NASA to lend their PRA expertise to both ongoing and developmental projects within the industry. As a result, NASA has entered into an agreement with Anadarko Petroleum Company (APC) to collaboratively develop PRAs for different aspects of the subsea drilling and completion process of well development. This paper documents how PRA was applied to estimate the probability that a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) equipped with a generically configured Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) loses location and needs to initiate an emergency disconnect. Since this project was in essence a pilot project, the PRA described in this paper is intended to be generic such that the vessel meets the general requirements of an International Maritime Organization (IMO) Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)/Circ. 645 Class 3 dynamically positioned vessel. The results of this analysis are not intended to be applied to any specific drilling vessel, although provisions were made to allow the analysis to be configured to a specific vessel if required.

Thigpen, Eric B.↗

A Prognostic Launch Vehicle Probability of Failure Assessment Methodology for Conceptual Systems Predicated on Human Causal Factors

Create an improved method to calculate reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle system prior to fabrication by using historic data of actual root causes of failures. While failures have unique "proximate causes", there are typically a finite amount of common "root causes". Heretofore launch vehicle reliability evaluation typically hardware-centric statistical analyses, while most root causes of failures are been shown to be human-centric. A method based on human-centric root causes can be used to quantify reliability assessments and focus proposed actions to mitigate problems. Existing methods have been optimistic in their projections of launch vehicle reliability compared to actuals. Hypothesis: reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle can be more accurately evaluated based on a rational, probabilistic approach using past failure assessment teams' findings predicated on human-centric causes."Human Reliability Analysis Methods Selection Guidance for NASA"Chandler F.T., et al., NASA HQ/OSMA study group, July 2006. Outside HRA experts from academia, other federal labs, and the private sector. 50 system reliability methods considered, fourteen selected for further study, four finally selected as best suited for human spaceflight. Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) + Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) enabled incorporating effects and probabilities of human errors. While four down-selected methods deemed appropriate for failure assessment, it did not appear that these methods could be concisely applied to perform major system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy."Engineering a Safer World", Detailed, comprehensive study external to NASA Leveson N. G., MIT, 2011.Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP). All-encompassing accident model based on systems theory analyzed accidents after they occurred and created approaches to prevent occurrence in developing systems not focused on failure prevention per se, but rather reducing hazards by influencing human behavior through use of constraints, hierarchical control structures, and process models to improve system safetySystem Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) addresses predictive part of problem (a "hazard analysis"). Includes all causal factors identified in STAMP: "...design errors, software flaws, component interaction accidents, cognitively complex human decision-making errors, and social organizational and management factors contributing to accidents" can guide design process rather than require it to exist before-hand did not appear capable of concise application for system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy.

Williams, Craig H.↗

Constellation Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA): Design Consideration for the Crew Exploration Vehicle

Managed by NASA's Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, a pilot probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) of the NASA Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) was performed in early 2006. The PRA methods used follow the general guidance provided in the NASA PRA Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners'. Phased-mission based event trees and fault trees are used to model a lunar sortie mission of the CEV - involving the following phases: launch of a cargo vessel and a crew vessel; rendezvous of these two vessels in low Earth orbit; transit to th$: moon; lunar surface activities; ascension &om the lunar surface; and return to Earth. The analysis is based upon assumptions, preliminary system diagrams, and failure data that may involve large uncertainties or may lack formal validation. Furthermore, some of the data used were based upon expert judgment or extrapolated from similar components~systemsT. his paper includes a discussion of the system-level models and provides an overview of the analysis results used to identify insights into CEV risk drivers, and trade and sensitivity studies. Lastly, the PRA model was used to determine changes in risk as the system configurations or key parameters are modified.

Prassinos, Peter G.↗

Assessment and Control of Spacecraft Charging Risks on the International Space Station

Electrical interactions between the F2 region ionospheric plasma and the 160V photovoltaic (PV) electrical power system on the International Space Station (ISS) can produce floating potentials (FP) on the ISS conducting structure of greater magnitude than are usually observed on spacecraft in low-Earth orbit. Flight through the geomagnetic field also causes magnetic induction charging of ISS conducting structure. Charging processes resulting from interaction of ISS with auroral electrons may also contribute to charging albeit rarely. The magnitude and frequency of occurrence of possibly hazardous charging events depends on the ISS assembly stage (six more 160V PV arrays will be added to ISS), ISS flight configuration, ISS position (latitude and longitude), and the natural variability in the ionospheric flight environment. At present, ISS is equipped with two plasma contactors designed to control ISS FP to within 40 volts of the ambient F2 plasma. The negative-polarity grounding scheme utilized in the ISS 160V power system leads, naturally, to negative values of ISS FP. A negative ISS structural FP leads to application of electrostatic fields across the dielectrics that separate conducting structure from the ambient F2 plasma, thereby enabling dielectric breakdown and arcing. Degradation of some thermal control coatings and noise in electrical systems can result. Continued review and evaluation of the putative charging hazards, as required by the ISS Program Office, revealed that ISS charging could produce a risk of electric shock to the ISS crew during extra vehicular activity. ISS charging risks are being evaluated in ongoing ISS charging measurements and analysis campaigns. The results of ISS charging measurements are combined with a recently developed detailed model of the ISS charging process and an extensive analysis of historical ionospheric variability data, to assess ISS charging risks using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods. The PRA analysis (estimated frequency of occurrence and severity of the charging hazards) are then used to select the hazard control strategy that provides the best overall safety and mission success environment for ISS and the ISS crew. This paper presents: 1) a summary of ISS spacecraft charging analysis, measurements, observations made to date, 2) plans for future ISS spacecraft charging measurement campaigns, and 3) a detailed discussion of the PRA strategy used to assess ISS spacecraft charging risks and select charging hazard control strategies

Koontz, Steve↗

Introduction to the IMPACT Probabilistic Risk and Tradespace Analysis Tool for Medical System Design

Background: Probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) is a method for estimating risk in complex engineered systems that, at a basic level, focuses on what can go wrong and the likelihood and consequences of those occurrences. NASA has used PRA as an integral component of medical system risk estimation and design for spaceflight. IMPACT (Informing Mission Planning via Analysis of Complex Tradespaces) is a novel tool to meet these goals for exploration missions. Overview: IMPACT performs hundreds of thousands of Monte Carlo simulations of missions to build aggregate pictures of medical risk. These simulations are based on 120 possible medical conditions (the IMPACT Condition List) selected in a consensus-based process because they are of highest likelihood and/or consequence for exploration spaceflight. The conditions are then tied to clinical capabilities which can be used for management (e.g., inserting an IV) and then to over 600 specific resources needed to deliver a capability (e.g., an angiocath or an ultrasound). Different mission profiles can be simulated with user-specified inputs such as mission duration, destination, number of crew and pre-existing medical conditions, and EVA frequency. While the IMPACT evidence base is designed for exploration environments, these user inputs allow the tool to be used across a broad range of missions. IMPACT’s primary outcome metrics include loss of crew life (LOCL, a measure of in-flight mortality due to medical conditions), need for evacuation (RTDC, return to definitive care), and crew disability (TTL, task time lost based on how medical conditions impact the ability to perform over 1000 specific exploration mission crew tasks). In addition to modeling medical risk, IMPACT also accepts user-specified constraints, such as limitations of mass or volume, and will output a recommended clinical capability set and specific medical resources that meet the mission constraints. Discussion: This abstract will provide an introduction to IMPACT and describe the nature of the underlying medical evidence. It will also detail potential use cases for how this tool can be utilized by NASA or commercial spaceflight providers.

Ben Easter↗

Application of Risk Assessment Tools in the Continuous Risk Management (CRM) Process

Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is currently implementing the Continuous Risk Management (CRM) Program developed by the Carnegie Mellon University and recommended by NASA as the Risk Management (RM) implementation approach. The four most frequently used risk assessment tools in the center are: (a) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Hazard Analysis (HA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), and Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA). There are some guidelines for selecting the type of risk assessment tools during the project formulation phase of a project, but there is not enough guidance as to how to apply these tools in the Continuous Risk Management process (CRM). But the ways the safety and risk assessment tools are used make a significant difference in the effectiveness in the risk management function. Decisions regarding, what events are to be included in the analysis, to what level of details should the analysis be continued, make significant difference in the effectiveness of risk management program. Tools of risk analysis also depends on the phase of a project e.g. at the initial phase of a project, when not much data are available on hardware, standard FMEA cannot be applied; instead a functional FMEA may be appropriate. This study attempted to provide some directives to alleviate the difficulty in applying FTA, PRA, and FMEA in the CRM process. Hazard Analysis was not included in the scope of the study due to the short duration of the summer research project.

Paul S. Ray↗

The Challenger tragedy was caused by an Apollo mistake, terminating risk analysis

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment. This led to decreasing understanding of risk. The head of Apollo reliability and safety decided, “Statistics don’t count for anything,” and that risk is reduced by “attention taken in design.” The great and initially unexpected success of Apollo appeared to validate the neglect of PRA. Continuing to neglect the mathematical estimation of risk led Shuttle into a high risk design that produced tragic results. The initial design of the Shuttle emphasized increasing capability and reducing cost without analysis or even mention of risk. A retired NASA official stated, “some NASA people began to confuse desire with reality. … One result was to assess risk in terms of what was thought acceptable without regard for verifying the assessment. … Note that under such circumstances real risk management is shut out.” Not computing risk led to removing launch abort, removing crew escape, selecting less reliable Solid Rocket Boosters, placing the crew compartment next to the rocket boosters, and accepting more stressed shielding tile designs. Accepting these specific risks directly caused the shuttle disasters. The Challenger tragedy is frequently taught as a case of management failure. The focus is on the Challenger launch decision hours before, which is a dramatic example of bad management. However, the true cause of the Challenger disaster occurred decades earlier in the Apollo era. When the easily predictable failures occurred, failure investigations focused on how they might have been avoided. The Shuttle was cancelled after the space station was completed because of its high risk. The ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies was the choice by the Apollo-era NASA administrator to avoid a negative public reaction to realistic risk analysis.

Harry W. Jones↗

Trade Studies of Space Launch Architectures using Modular Probabilistic Risk Analysis

A top-down risk assessment in the early phases of space exploration architecture development can provide understanding and intuition of the potential risks associated with new designs and technologies. In this approach, risk analysts draw from their past experience and the heritage of similar existing systems as a source for reliability data. This top-down approach captures the complex interactions of the risk driving parts of the integrated system without requiring detailed knowledge of the parts themselves, which is often unavailable in the early design stages. Traditional probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) technologies, however, suffer several drawbacks that limit their timely application to complex technology development programs. The most restrictive of these is a dependence on static planning scenarios, expressed through fault and event trees. Fault trees incorporating comprehensive mission scenarios are routinely constructed for complex space systems, and several commercial software products are available for evaluating fault statistics. These static representations cannot capture the dynamic behavior of system failures without substantial modification of the initial tree. Consequently, the development of dynamic models using fault tree analysis has been an active area of research in recent years. This paper discusses the implementation and demonstration of dynamic, modular scenario modeling for integration of subsystem fault evaluation modules using the Space Architecture Failure Evaluation (SAFE) tool. SAFE is a C++ code that was originally developed to support NASA s Space Launch Initiative. It provides a flexible framework for system architecture definition and trade studies. SAFE supports extensible modeling of dynamic, time-dependent risk drivers of the system and functions at the level of fidelity for which design and failure data exists. The approach is scalable, allowing inclusion of additional information as detailed data becomes available. The tool performs a Monte Carlo analysis to provide statistical estimates. Example results of an architecture system reliability study are summarized for an exploration system concept using heritage data from liquid-fueled expendable Saturn V/Apollo launch vehicles.

Mathias, Donovan L.↗

Structural Health Monitoring Analysis for the Orbiter Wing Leading Edge

This viewgraph presentation reviews Structural Health Monitoring Analysis for the Orbiter Wing Leading Edge. The Wing Leading Edge Impact Detection System (WLE IDS) and the Impact Analysis Process are also described to monitor WLE debris threats. The contents include: 1) Risk Management via SHM; 2) Hardware Overview; 3) Instrumentation; 4) Sensor Configuration; 5) Debris Hazard Monitoring; 6) Ascent Response Summary; 7) Response Signal; 8) Distribution of Flight Indications; 9) Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA); 10) Model Correlation; 11) Impact Tests; 12) Wing Leading Edge Modeling; 13) Ascent Debris PRA Results; and 14) MM/OD PRA Results.

Yap, Keng C.↗

Method and system for dynamic probabilistic risk assessment

The DEFT methodology, system and computer readable medium extends the applicability of the PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment) methodology to computer-based systems, by allowing DFT (Dynamic Fault Tree) nodes as pivot nodes in the Event Tree (ET) model. DEFT includes a mathematical model and solution algorithm, supports all common PRA analysis functions and cutsets. Additional capabilities enabled by the DFT include modularization, phased mission analysis, sequence dependencies, and imperfect coverage.

Dugan, Joanne Bechta↗

The Challenger disaster was caused by an Apollo decision

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment.

Harry W Jones↗

The Challenger Tradgedy was Caused by an Apollo Mistake, Terminating Risk Analysis

NASA’s attitude toward risk changed drastically between the Apollo and Space Shuttle design. [1]Apollo engineers were seriously alarmed about riskbecause of the fatal Apollo 1 fire and the fact that the estimated probability of another fatal accident was extremely high. The predictions were so appalling thatmanagement terminated risk analysis to avoid public apprehension. Because risk analysis was not done, the Space Shuttle design accepted excessively high andunknown risk. The immediate cause of the Challengertragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in coldweather that impaired the O-ring seals, but the fundamental cause was the high risk of the shuttle design. Before Challenger, management asserted that the probability of a fatal accident was 1 in 100,000.Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a shuttle failure.

Harry W Jones↗

Accounting for Point Estimate Uncertainty in Space Systems Reliability and Risk Analysis

Understanding and accounting for uncertainty in risk analysis is a critical step in the management and communication of risk in engineered systems. The component and system-level analysis to determine the probability of a negative outcome and its consequence is often quantified by a point estimate. Many Program and Enterprise decisions involving technical concerns and issues rely on reliability engineering activities to produce quantified risk analysis to inform the decision making process. At NASA, it is common to use a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) to inform the overall risk to Loss of Mission or Loss of Crew that involves integration across all spacecraft subsystem fault trees to produce an overall probability of mission failure. The point estimate is an estimate of this overall probability and is an immediate result of a fault tree model. It is the result of a model where the probability of each event is taken to be equal to its mean. The value provides an approximation of the overall mean without running any uncertainty calculations (e.g., no sampling). Using only the point estimate can lead to a false sense of precision and the point estimate may not match the resulting mean when uncertainty is taken into consideration. This paper will explore five conditions that can cause the PRA model mean to diverge from the point estimate and will provide engineers and managers insight into the importance of understanding uncertainty in the elements of PRA models.

Paul J Collier↗

Comparative Analysis of Static and Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment

Implementation of risk-informed design allows the design team to thoroughly explore the risks of a system while iterating the operations concept, design, and requirements until the system meets mission objects and is achievable within constraints. To arrive at a space system design that is likely to meet all constraints placed upon mass, cost, performance and risk, the system requirements must be understood and traded against each other as early as the conceptual design phase. Depending on the project phase and the goals of the risk analysis, various PRA methodologies could be used to produce quantitative risk estimates to enable such a process. In order to better understand the applicability, advantages, and limitations of various PRA methodologies, a comparative analysis of three bottom-up, component-based PRA approaches was performed. The three methods examined are a traditional static fault tree, a fault tree hybrid, and a dynamic Monte Carlo simulation. Each approach was used to assess a generic reaction control system (RCS) thruster pod and mission. The methods are assessed in terms of the process of modeling a system, the actionable information produced for the design team, and the overall fidelity of the quantitative risk evaluation generated. The paper also discusses the applicability of each methodology to the different phases of system development.

Probablistic↗

Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) Risk Analysis Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) directorate at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) has applied its knowledge and experience with Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to projects in industries ranging from spacecraft to nuclear power plants. PRA is a comprehensive and structured process for analyzing risk in complex engineered systems and/or processes. The PRA process enables the user to identify potential risk contributors such as, hardware and software failure, human error, and external events. Recent developments in the oil and gas industry have presented opportunities for NASA to lend their PRA expertise to both ongoing and developmental projects within the industry. This paper provides an overview of the PRA process and demonstrates how this process was applied in estimating the probability that a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) operating in the Gulf of Mexico and equipped with a generically configured Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) loses location and needs to initiate an emergency disconnect. The PRA described in this paper is intended to be generic such that the vessel meets the general requirements of an International Maritime Organization (IMO) Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)/Circ. 645 Class 3 dynamically positioned vessel. The results of this analysis are not intended to be applied to any specific drilling vessel, although provisions were made to allow the analysis to be configured to a specific vessel if required.

Thigpen, Eric B.↗

Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) Risk Analysis Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) directorate at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) has applied its knowledge and experience with Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to projects in industries ranging from spacecraft to nuclear power plants. PRA is a comprehensive and structured process for analyzing risk in complex engineered systems and/or processes. The PRA process enables the user to identify potential risk contributors such as, hardware and software failure, human error, and external events. Recent developments in the oil and gas industry have presented opportunities for NASA to lend their PRA expertise to both ongoing and developmental projects within the industry. This paper provides an overview of the PRA process and demonstrates how this process was applied in estimating the probability that a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) operating in the Gulf of Mexico and equipped with a generically configured Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) loses location and needs to initiate an emergency disconnect. The PRA described in this paper is intended to be generic such that the vessel meets the general requirements of an International Maritime Organization (IMO) Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)/Circ. 645 Class 3 dynamically positioned vessel. The results of this analysis are not intended to be applied to any specific drilling vessel, although provisions were made to allow the analysis to be configured to a specific vessel if required.

Thigpen, Eric B.↗

Modeling uncertainty in requirements engineering decision support

One inherent characteristic of requrements engineering is a lack of certainty during this early phase of a project. Nevertheless, decisions about requirements must be made in spite of this uncertainty. Here we describe the context in which we are exploring this, and some initial work to support elicitation of uncertain requirements, and to deal with the combination of such information from multiple stakeholders.

risk analysis↗