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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Portable Industrial Control Systems Simulator (Final Report)

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are more integrated than they have ever been before, but also the division between IT (Information Technology) and OT (Operational Technology) is becoming a grey area. As the integration of IT and OT occurs more often, cyber attack will also increase. Cyber attacks on Critical Infrastructure can be highly detrimental to society, notably via compromised Industrial Control Systems (ICS). Virtual and physical simulation has been used in medical fields, mathematics, architecture, aeronautics, space, and many more. Virtualization & Simulation in a lab environment is ideal because there is a need for the ability to test theories and designs is a safe and cost-effective way without risking equipment damage or, more importantly, human life. Furthermore, OT and ICS are some of the most difficult systems to use for research and development. They are either committed to operations or widely expensive to set up in a life-like environment. Virtualization and simulation will allow these otherwise accessible systems to be a test bed for the training, development, and research of SRNL customers or engineers and scientists at SRNL. This will allow the testbed to fit into a small form factor and interact with a simulator with minimum hardware components for easy transports and replication effort within the environment.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Living-off-the-land Techniques Unlikely to Supplant Energy Sector-Focused OT-Specific Malware

Despite increased reports of energy sector-focused threat actors using living-off-the-land (LOTL) techniques, it is unlikely LOTL techniques will wholly supplant malware in energy sector operational technology (OT)-focused cyber operations. Threat actors leverage LOTL techniques to access energy sector networks, abstracting process information and maintaining persistence. Although threat actors using LOTL techniques have successfully interrupted energy sector industrial control environments, designed features of OT-specific malware likely increase the cyber-physical impact of an attack and delay recovery of critical functions and services. Malicious actors will very likely continue to use LOTL techniques for stealth, while designing malware to bolster final impacts on cyber-physical systems in energy sector OT environments.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought. The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop various cybersecurity tools, trainings, and reports to aid federal facility managers – and other building owners and operators – in better applying frameworks and lessons learned from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), risk management framework (RMF), DOE’s cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2), and a wide variety of industry best practices and guidance documents (i.e., NIST 800 series, Department of Defense United Facilities Criteria). This set of tools, collectively known as the FEMP Facility-Related Control System Cyber Toolkit (FRCS Cyber Toolkit)2, is focused on cybersecurity concerns from facility-related control systems and other operational technology (OT), such as industrial control systems (ICS). The FRCS Cyber Toolkit can be applied across six of the sixteen critical infrastructure sectors designated by the Department of Homeland Security, including government facilities, healthcare and public health, commercial facilities (e.g., public assembly, offices, lodging), financial services (e.g., banking and insurance), emergency services (e.g., fire and police stations), and information technology. With increasingly converged IT and OT systems, it is crucial to address OT cybersecurity considerations and assess how the seam of these two systems could impact the overall cybersecurity posture of a facility. The objective of this report is to provide an overview of the best possible method to use FRCS Cyber Toolkit (section 2.0) and distilled cybersecurity best practices for the federal facilities to address growing non-linear cyber threats (section 3.0). Recommendations in this document are aggregated from several NIST and other documents (see Appendix A for additional details).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Towards 5G-Enabled Operational Technology for Process Monitoring and Network Slicing

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are deployed to monitor physical processes in critical cyber-enabled services like power generation. However, CPS ecosystems are typically designed without robust security. While it is important to ensure optimal performance of the Operational Technology (OT) environments, security cannot be overlooked. To modernize traditional OT services, 5G technology is being integrated. 5G technology offers low latency and high availability, making it a suitable infrastructure for managing and monitoring physical processes. How-ever, integrating 5G mechanisms into large-scale OT networks introduces new implementation and performance challenges. Therefore, this paper presents a 5G-enabled CPS architecture (5G-CPS) that describes the necessary components, services, and communication protocols and conducts feasibility study to integrate 5G technology in industrial control system networks to understand the performance merits. The 5G-CPS architecture aims to minimize implementation and operational challenges associated with integrating 5G technology into constrained OT.

Aguayo, Jared M.↗
DOE OSTI2026

Equipment Assessment Guide: A Technical Inspection and Hardening Guide for Devices in Power Grid Operations

This Equipment Assessment Guide, developed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL), provides a comprehensive framework designed to enhance the security of operational technology (OT) devices within power grid operations. The guide outlines essential steps for asset owners to conduct technical inspections and harden vulnerable hardware and firmware components commonly found in embedded systems. It focuses on components frequently targeted by cyber threats, offering valuable identification techniques for locating and recognizing critical components on devices. Additionally, the guide presents recommended secure configurations aimed at minimizing exposure and reinforcing defenses, along with impact analysis that highlights the potential consequences for grid operations if components are compromised. By implementing the recommendations outlined in this guide, asset owners can significantly enhance their cybersecurity posture, reduce the attack surface of field-deployed devices, and improve the resilience of grid services against emerging cyber threats.

42 - ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Exponential Backoff and Its Security Implications for Safety-Critical OT Protocols over TCP/IP Networks

The convergence of Operational Technology (OT) and Information Technology (IT) networks has become increasingly prevalent with the growth of Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) applications. This shift, while enabling enhanced automation, remote monitoring, and data sharing, also introduces new challenges related to communication latency and cybersecurity. Oftentimes, legacy OT protocols were adapted to the TCP/IP stack without an extensive review of the ramifications to their robustness, performance, or safety objectives. To further accommodate the IT/OT convergence, protocol gateways were introduced to facilitate the migration from serial protocols to TCP/IP protocol stacks within modern IT/OT infrastructure. However, they often introduce additional vulnerabilities by exposing traditionally isolated protocols to external threats. This study investigates the security and reliability implications of migrating serial protocols to TCP/IP stacks and the impact of protocol gateways, utilizing two widely used OT protocols: Modbus TCP and DNP3. Our protocol analysis finds a significant safety-critical vulnerability resulting from this migration, and our subsequent tests clearly demonstrate its presence and impact. A multi-tiered testbed, consisting of both physical and emulated components, is used to evaluate protocol performance and the effects of device-specific implementation flaws. Through this analysis of specifications and behaviors during communication interruptions, we identify critical differences in fault handling and the impact on time-sensitive data delivery. The findings highlight how reliance on lower-level IT protocols can undermine OT system resilience, and they inform the development of mitigation strategies to enhance the robustness of industrial communication networks.

DNP3↗
DOE OSTI2022

User-Focused Tools to Enhance IT/OT Cyber Resilience within the Power Grid

The power grid is undergoing several changes that are increasing its complexity as nexuses between electric-gas, transmission-distribution, and energy-communications continue to become increasingly critical. This system is heavily dependent on communication infrastructure and controls, and it relies on humans in operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT) roles to manage the increasing breadth, depth, and speed of data. Many technical challenges have presented themselves and will need to be addressed to provide reliable grid operations. With increased reliance on distributed controls and communication infrastructure, cybersecurity becomes an inherent requirement. When considering current cyber-physical security solutions for the power grid, one can notice a clear divide between information technology and operation technology networks. However, in real-life applications, these networks are interdependent. This work presents results of interviews with key utility cybersecurity personnel, analyzes the results, and makes recommendations towards solution of existing technical and operational challenges realized. Existing workflows are presented, wireframe interviews are discussed, and tool requirements are described. The existence of easy-to-implement solutions, based on existing energy management systems, highlight the potential for real-life applications.

cybersecurity, resilience, user-centered design, p↗
DOE OSTI2025

Deny-by-Default Network Port Security: SPaRC Technical Bulletin #002

Operational Technology (OT) networks [e.g., industrial control systems (ICS) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems] have unique cyber security challenges due to their decades long service life, high availability requirements, and limited visibility. OT networks often take credit for being “air gapped” (i.e. disconnected from the Internet) and all devices within the OT network can “talk” to each other—even if they should not. This SPaRC Technical Bulletin describes how the unique limitations of OT networks can become strengths when it comes to cybersecurity.

Cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2022

Modular Security Apparatus for Managing Distributed Cryptography for Command-and-Control Messages on Operational Technology Networks (Module-OT)

Module-OT is a bump- in- the- wire solution acting as a secure conduit for data between devices or systems across a network. Using the latest in open-source cryptographic libraries, all defined communications undergo authentication, authorization, and encryption. The core system can be easily installed through industry standard processes, and the use of popular open-source packages allows for it to be customizable customized by the developer community or deployed in unique embedded environments.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Enhancing Security and Resiliency in Operational Technology Environments Through Network Slicing and Federated Learning

The growing convergence of Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) within Industry 4.0 environments has introduced new demands on industrial network infrastructure. As cyber-physical systems become increasingly interconnected, ensuring the secure, timely, and efficient exchange of critical data is essential. This thesis explores how network slicing, a method of creating isolated virtual network segments, can be applied within OT environments to address challenges such as latency, security, and resource allocation. The first research question addressed in this thesis is: How can OT networks take advantage of NFV and SDN technology to become cyber resilient? This study examines the operational, security, and architectural implications of introducing network slicing into traditionally static OT infrastructures such as Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and SCADA. Through simulated deployments and case studies, the research demonstrates how slicing enables better isolation between critical and non-critical services, thereby improving response time, throughput, and security in sensitive environments. The second question considers: How to dynamically implement network slicing and take advantage of network resources towards integrating decentralized machine learning? In response, this thesis proposes a framework that combines Software-Defined Networking (SDN), Network Function Virtualization (NFV), and Federated Learning (FL) to enable real-time analytics while maintaining data locality. The proposed approach reduces the burden on centralized infrastructure and minimizes privacy risks by supporting on-site training of models across distributed OT nodes, coordinated through dynamically allocated network slices. The third focus explores: How slicing helps to increase the resiliency of OT networks through the orchestration of a dynamic DMZ? To answer this, the thesis presents a method for creating and managing Dynamic Demilitarized Zones (DMZs) using network slicing. This enables flexible and automated isolation of sensitive subsystems during threat scenarios or high-risk operations. Coupled with intelligent orchestration and containerized security services, the dynamic DMZ significantly enhances the system's ability to respond to cyber incidents without halting production. Ultimately, this thesis contributes a comprehensive architecture that blends network slicing with machine learning, secure segmentation, and automation, paving the way for resilient, adaptive, and intelligent OT environments. Performance evaluations across multiple scenarios show improvements in system reliability, threat response time, model accuracy, and resource utilization, providing a strong foundation for future industrial automation systems.

Rodiles Delgado, Brian G↗
DOE OSTI2021

Advance Reactor Operational Technology Architecture Categorization

Seven generation III+ and generation IV nuclear reactor types, based on twelve reactor concepts surveyed, are examined using functional decomposition to extract relevant operational technology (OT) architecture information. This information is compared to existing nuclear power plants (NPPs) OT architectures to highlight novel and emergent cyber risks associated with next generation NPPs. These insights can help inform operational technology architecture requirements that will be unique to a given reactor type. Next generation NPPs have streamlined OT architectures relative to the current generation II commercial NPP fleet. Overall, without compensatory measures that provide sufficient and efficient cybersecurity controls, next generation NPPs will have increased cyber risk. Verification and validation of cyber-physical testbeds and cyber risk assessment methodologies may be an important next step to reduce cyber risk in the OT architecture design and testing phase. Coordination with safety requirements can result in OT architecture design being an iterative process.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cybersecurity Anomaly Detection in SCADA-Assisted OT Networks Using Ensemble-Based State Prediction Model

The cybersecurity threats of power system gradually grow due to the increased sophisticated interactions between Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) networks. False data injection attack (FDIA) that aims to compromise the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) measurement and disturb the system operation is one of such cyber threats. Such attacks can potentially lead to significant operational issues at the control centers and substations, and hence, result in severe physical consequences. To avoid catastrophic failure across the power grid resulting from these attacks, it is essential to arm the OT network with real-time vulnerability assessment tools. To this end, this paper outlines various drawbacks of the Purdue architecture model to defend against cyberattacks in the OT network. Furthermore, a novel ensemble-based state prediction model is proposed to detect cybersecurity anomalies in SCADA assisted OT networks. The proposed model uses control center level generation and load forecasts, scheduled, and forced outages, power flow solutions, and the substation level historical data. The hypothesis of the proposed scheme relies on the fact that additional control center and substation data can hardly be accessed and compromised by attackers. One of the vital features of the proposed scheme is an hour-ahead prediction of the operational feasibility of the SCADA measurement range at the control center and substation in real time helps in detecting anomalies in measurements across both substation and the control center.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

I Can't Patch My OT Systems! A Look at CISA's KEVC Workarounds & Mitigations for OT

We examine the state of publicly available information about known exploitable vulnerabilities applicable to operational technology (OT) environments. Specifically, we analyze the Known Exploitable Vulnerabilities Catalog (KEVC) maintained by the US Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to assess whether currently available data is sufficient for effective and reliable remediation in OT settings. Our team analyzed all KEVC entries through July 2025 to determine the extent to which OT environments can rely on existing remediation recommendations. We found that although most entries in the KEVC could affect OT environments, only 13% include vendor workarounds or mitigations as alternatives to patching. This paper also examines the feasibility of developing such alternatives based on vulnerability and exploit characteristics, and we present early evidence of success with this approach.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cyber-CHAMP White Paper

Cyber-CHAMP white paper intern school assignment. Worldwide there is a tremendous shortfall in the cybersecurity workforce. By 2021, researchers have forecasted a deficit of 3.5 million cyber professionals. As workforce capabilities diminished, the world's cybersecurity threats have continued to multiply. Industrial control systems (ICSs) and their operational technology (OT) components became more vulnerable to attack and compromise. When an ICS is compromised, attackers can cause widespread impacts on national security, public health, and safety. This capacity makes ICSs attractive targets, with 90% of surveyed OT organizations reporting a damaging cyberattack in the last two years. To address the risk to ICSs, personnel must be competent in operational best practices and the latest threats. While frameworks for information technology (IT) cybersecurity education have been developed, educational standards for OT cybersecurity are nonexistent.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

HP in Cybersecurity: CyOTE

The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), through the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) Program, worked with energy sector asset owners and operators (AOOs), partners, and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop capabilities for AOOs to independently detect adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) within their operational technology (OT) environments. Unlike the approach taken with commercial security solutions, CyOTE seeks to tie anomalies in cyber operations to a cyber-attack. By stringing together multiple techniques in the OT environment, AOOs can identify attack campaigns with ever decreasing impacts. The CyOTE methodology applies fundamental concepts of perception and comprehension to a universe of knowns and unknowns increasingly disaggregated into observables, anomalies, and triggering events. MITRE’s ATT&CK® Framework for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) is used as a common lexicon to identify a set of triggering events related to three Use Cases – Alarm Logs, Human-Machine Interface (HMI), and Remote Logins – which together account for 87 percent of the techniques commonly used by adversaries. The CyOTE methodology is also appropriate for OT-related anomalies perceived outside the three Use Cases, such as through the energy system itself.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Building Nuclear-Specific Cybersecurity Expertise in Higher Education

The rapid digitalization of nuclear power plants (NPPs) and the deployment of advanced and small modular reactors (A/SMRs) have expanded the cybersecurity attack surface within the nuclear sector. This evolution introduces unique challenges beyond those faced in general information technology (IT), operational technology (OT) and industrial control system (ICS) security, due to nuclear power’s regulatory rigor, safety-critical nature, and operational needs. A pressing workforce gap persists; cybersecurity graduates typically lack nuclear-specific context and retraining them for industry readiness requires 12–18 months, creating a significant burden. This paper addresses this gap by defining the domains of knowledge that nuclear cybersecurity specialists must master, spanning cybersecurity, nuclear engineering, OT/ICS security, and regulatory governance. We propose a curricular framework integrating technical, regulatory, and applied learning components to accelerate workforce readiness. Our approach builds on existing findings that current curricula inadequately integrate nuclear engineering and cybersecurity, shifting the discourse from why specialization is needed to what knowledge must be taught. The recommendations have implications for workforce development and long-term resilience of the nuclear energy sector.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Cyber-physical Architecture For Automated Responses (cyphar) In Adversarial Ot Environments

The ability to react to a malicious attack starts with high fidelity recognition, and with that, an agile response to the attack. The current operational technology (OT) systems for a critical infrastructure may include an intrusion detection system (IDS), but the ability to adapt to an intrusion is a human initiated response. Orchestrators, which are coming of age in the financial sector and allow for levels of automated response, are not prevalent in the OT space. To evolve to such responses in the OT space, a tradeoff analysis is first needed, The tradeoff analysis, which evaluates the mitigation benefits of responses versus the physical affects that result, inform an automated response decision. The intent of this paper is to provide a formulation of a tradeoff analysis and its use in advancing automated, agile responses.

Rieger, CraigG.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE)

The Department of Energy’s Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response Office (CESER) has partnered with Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and energy companies to develop CyOTE. This research initiative addresses cybersecurity threats against operational technology (OT) networks by sharing intelligence about adversarial tactics and techniques with the energy sector. CyOTE improves the sector’s ability to detect anomalous behavior that indicates potential malicious cyber activity in OT networks.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗