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Nuclear Testing is underway at the Advanced Test Reactor to qualify the Reflector VII. This work reports on completed tests, NT-1 - 5.
We analyzed the Zn isotopic compositions of nuclear debris samples from atmospheric and underground nuclear tests. Samples from the site of atmospheric tests exhibit a range of Zn isotopic fractionation (δ 66 Zn JMC-Lyon = 0.23–0.86 ‰) while samples from underground tests exhibit Zn isotopic compositions with minimal variation among samples and from terrestrial igneous rock standards (δ 66 ZnJMC-Lyon = 0.28–0.39 ‰). In conclusion, the larger range of δ 66 Zn JMC-Lyon observed in atmospheric test samples relative to underground test samples is likely the result of the open system characteristics of atmospheric nuclear tests and the closed system characteristics of underground nuclear tests.
Objectives of the Optimal and Nominal Nuclear-Testing Programs: Define optimal and nominal nuclear-testing programs; Discuss underground development for nuclear operations; Discuss underground nuclear operations, safety, and health; Compare drift complexes of optimal and nominal testing programs; Compare drift complexes for nuclear testing and commercial production; Discuss a potential future look of underground development and operations.
In 1996, negotiations between the National Nuclear Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan (NNC), the U.S. Defense Special Weapons Administration (DSWA) and the U.S. Department of Energy led to an agreement for a joint series of experiments at the former Soviet nuclear test site Semipalatinsk (STS). These experiments had a dual purpose: to close holes and tunnels originally created for the purpose of testing nuclear weapons, and to characterize explosive sources at a former nuclear test site. This report covers the recovery of legacy data from the experiments conduct in 1997 and 1998. Two teams collected data. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), in collaboration with the NNC, collected the near-source (local) data out to approximately 20 km. Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory (LDEO), with funding from Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLNL), also in collaboration with NNC, collected regional data, 200 – 1000 km distant, leveraging the KZ regional seismic network that LDEO had recently installed in collaboration with NNC. The two teams also worked together to some extent, regarding instrumentation and planning. This report primarily addresses the near-source data collected by the LANL/NNC team.
A series of physics tests were conducted in 2022 for the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) after the sixth Core Internals Changeout (CIC) in 2021. These tests verify nuclear characteristics of the new reflector and shim mechanisms and are validation cases for core models. This work describes the results of these tests and compares the physics tests with those performed previously in ATR and updates previous work reporting on planning for nuclear testing and on preliminary results of several low-power tests. This work also identifies unique characteristics of ATR that result in the need for unique tests.
The response to the effects of nuclear detonations is supported by models that describe the evolution of the nuclear fireball and cloud and the associated transport of active debris. Validation of those descriptions relies on data from the nuclear test operations. Video records of those events offer a rich source of information that was exploited to a limited extent in historic analyses. Computer vision and machine learning techniques are powerful tools that can be used to increase the number of measurements that can be obtained from those films. In this work, we apply computer vision techniques to automatically track the temporal evolution of the nuclear fireball. In particular, we apply You Only Look Once 11 (YOLO11) and Segment Anything Model 2 (SAM2) in combination with minimal human intervention to digitized versions of the original nuclear test films. As part of the proposed workflow, the YOLO11 model is applied to films to determine bounding boxes for the fireball within each frame. These are then used as inputs to SAM2, which uses image segmentation to determine the fireball boundaries and their temporal evolution. We assess the accuracy of our approach by using it to determine the energy released during the Trinity nuclear test and comparing the results with previous analyses based on manual measurements.
A series of physics tests were planned for the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) after the sixth Core Internals Changeout (CIC) in 2021. These tests verify nuclear characteristics of the new reflector and shim mechanisms and are validation cases for core models. This work describes planning for these tests and compares the physics tests with those performed previously in ATR. This work also identifies unique characteristics of ATR that result in the need for unique tests.
In a geopolitical environment once again dominated by Great Power competition, the stakes of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent also returned to the forefront of national security. Yet, as nearly thirty years have passed without the United States conducting a nuclear test, there exists considerable uncertainty on how quickly, or even if, the United States could resume nuclear testing—a key component of a credible deterrent. However, there remains a legal requirement, with origins in hard-earned Cold War lessons, for the nation to return to underground nuclear testing if called upon to do so. This paper provides an overview of nuclear testing, the nation’s current state of preparedness, and offers recommendations on how to improve its test readiness posture.
The intent of this paper is to encourage thought on what the Test Site Verification Team (TSVT) might encounter primarily in terms of observable infrastructure when deployed to assess and verify an explosion, and/or a nuclear-testing program, site, or facility. A primary objective is to present the concept of a continuum of nuclear-testing programs between optimal and nominal end members as defined primarily by their observable infrastructure. Key objectives are: 1. Define optimal and nominal nuclear testing programs; 2. Discuss underground development for nuclear operations; 3. Discuss underground nuclear operations, safety, and health; 4. Compare drift complexes of optimal and nominal testing programs; 5. Compare drift complexes for nuclear testing and commercial production; 6. Discuss a potential future look of underground development and operations. A secondary objective is to interpret the intent of the three TSVT verification scenarios, primarily by defining “consistent with” nuclear or non-nuclear or listing criteria that “verify” nuclear or non-nuclear. Before discussing optimal and nominal nuclear testing programs, an understanding of the three verification scenarios is deemed beneficial.
Since 1992, the United States has retained confidence in its nuclear weapon stockpile without performing any tests that produce nuclear yield. Instead, it has invested in a stockpile stewardship program (SSP) based on the same approach that was validated through fifty years of experience during the nuclear testing era. As the test moratorium continues and new information becomes available, it is both necessary and appropriate to periodically revisit the question of whether or not nuclear testing should resume. In a recent article by Dr. Mark Schneider, he asserts that the United States should return to nuclear testing to address the issues that negatively affect our country’s nuclear deterrent. A serious, technically informed evaluation of the most significant of the issues Dr. Schneider has raised is provided in this paper. The conclusion of this evaluation is that the strategy of a well-funded SSP coupled with rigorous assessments to identify if there is a specific need for a nuclear test is sound and cost-effective approach. Any decision otherwise needs to take into careful consideration all the classified SSP successes and data pertaining to the particular issues in question.
The complex postdetonation geologic structures that form after an underground nuclear explosion are difficult to constrain because increased heterogeneity around the damage zone affects seismic waves that propagate through the explosion site. Generally, a vertical rubble-filled structure known as a chimney is formed after an underground nuclear explosion that is composed of debris that falls into the subsurface cavity generated by the explosion. Compared with chimneys that collapse fully, leaving a surface crater, partially collapsed chimneys can have remnant subsurface cavities left in place above collapsed rubble. The 1964 nuclear test HADDOCK, conducted at the Nevada test site (now the Nevada National Security Site), formed a partially collapsed chimney with no surface crater. Understanding the subsurface structure of these features has significant national security applications, such as aiding the study of suspected underground nuclear explosions under a treaty verification. In this study, we investigated the subsurface architecture of the HADDOCK legacy nuclear test using hybrid 2D–3D active source seismic reflection and refraction data. The seismic data were acquired using 275 survey shots from the Seismic Hammer (a 13,000 kg weight drop) and 65 survey shots from a smaller accelerated weight drop, both recorded by ~1000 three-component 5 Hz geophones. First-arrival, P-wave tomographic modeling shows a low-velocity anomaly at ~200 m depth, likely an air-filled cavity caused by partial collapse of the rock column into the temporary postdetonation cavity. A high-velocity anomaly between 20 and 60 m depth represents spall-related compaction of the shallow alluvium. Hints of low velocities are also present near the burial depth (~364 m). The reflection seismic data show a prominent subhorizontal reflector at ~300 m depth, a short-curved reflector at ~200 m, and a high-amplitude reflector at ~50 m depth. Comparisons of the reflection sections to synthetic data and borehole stratigraphy suggest that these features correspond to the alluvium–tuff contact, the partial collapse cavity, and the spalled layer, respectively.
Against the backdrop of international concern about radioactive fallout, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain agreed to a moratorium on nuclear testing. Neither monitored nor enforceable, the moratorium was not much more than a gentleman’s agreement. Nonetheless, it proved remarkedly durable, beginning on October 31, 1958, and lasting until September 1961. After France began nuclear testing in 1960, followed by the shooting down of an American U-2 spy plane over Soviet air space, and a failed summit meeting of international leaders, the Soviet Union resumed testing. The United States followed shortly thereafter.
Two decades after the U.S. Senate declined in 1999 to give its consent to ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the treaty remains in legal and political limbo. Legally, the treaty cannot enter into force without U.S. ratification. However, the Senate’s rejection does not strip the treaty of its force as an element of customary international law or alter the will of other signatories to see it enter into force. Politically, the debate over the virtues and flaws of the treaty remains as strong as ever, with some CTBT advocates pushing energetically for U.S. re-review while some opponents seek ways to “un-sign” the treaty. Meanwhile, despite the Senate’s rejection of the treaty, the United States acts in a manner consistent with its main obligations by maintaining a moratorium on explosive nuclear testing and providing financial support (as well as technical expertise) to the CTBT Organization (CTBTO)—in particular the CTBTO’s International Monitoring System (IMS). The CTBT may well remain in such limbo for a long time to come, unless some catalytic event comes along to re-shape national perceptions and priorities, one way or the other. The treaty’s future, whatever it might be, will be determined in part by how much perspectives might have changed in light of interim developments. Our purpose is to shed light on some of those developments and to assess their relevance. The 1999 ratification debate addressed a large number of issues. Rejection was driven by various policy and technical judgments. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine those technical judgments in light of what has been learned over the following two decades. On some technical matters, there was explicit recognition of extant uncertainties, as well as a conviction and hope that time would dispel them. To be doubly clear, our purpose is not to recommend a way forward on CTBT ratification. The policy judgments of 1999 and 2020 are beyond the scope of this paper. This technical re-examination proceeds as follows. It begins with a short background section to introduce the key technical matters in discussion in the U.S. ratification process. Then it moves systematically through each of those topics with a review of relevant background information, a discussion of key points in debate, an analysis of subsequent experience, and a current assessment. The historical analysis draws on many sources including the primary documents of the Congressional debate, the official article-by-article interpretation by the Department of State, and the statements of key players in the process. We also relied on key technical reports and publications by subject matter experts that have addressed in more detail many of the issues in our focus. These sources include the 2002 and 2012 reports of the National Academy of Sciences as well as publications by senior technical staff of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) who were actively involved in the ratification debate, including then-Laboratory Director Bruce Tarter. We also conducted several interviews with government officials from the 1990s, past laboratory directors, and other members of the scientific community. But, except where individuals are specifically cited by name, the judgments offered here are our own and should not be attributed to any other individual or to LLNL as such.
The Leo Brady Seismic Network (LBSN, originally the Sandia Seismic Network) was established in 1960 by Sandia National Laboratories to monitor underground nuclear tests (UGTs) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly named the Nevada Test Site). The LBSN has been in various configurations throughout its existence, but it has generally been comprised of four to six stations at regional distances (~150–400 km) from the NNSS with approximately evenly spaced azimuthal coverage. Between 1962 and the end of nuclear testing in 1992, the LBSN—and a sister network operated by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories—was the most comprehensive United States source of regional seismic data of UGTs. Approximately 75% of all UGTs performed by the United States occurred in the predigital era. At that time, LBSN data were transmitted as frequency-modulated (FM) audio over telephone lines to a central location and recorded as analog waveforms on high-fidelity magnetic audio tapes. These tapes have been in dry temperature-stable storage for decades and contain the sole record of this irreplaceable data; full waveforms of LBSN-recorded UGTs from this era were not routinely digitized or otherwise published. We have developed a process to recover and calibrate data from these tapes. First, we play back and digitize the tapes as audio. Next, we demodulate the FM “audio” into individual waveforms. We then estimate the various instrument constants through careful measurement of “weight-lift” tests performed prior to each UGT on each instrument. Finally, these coefficients allow us to scale and shape the derived instrument response of the seismographs and compute poles and zeros. Finally, the result of this process is a digital record of the recorded seismic ground motion in a modern data format, stored in a searchable database. To date, we have digitized tapes from 592 UGTs.
The method developed and presented here improves our nuclear explosion monitoring capability by providing a new independent and transportable method to determine the explosive yields of seismically recorded events associated with foreign weapons development. Here we report new independent absolute yield and depth of burial estimates of the North Korean nuclear tests which are commensurate with previously determined source parameters. The key advantage of this method over other methods which estimate absolute explosive yields is that this method does not require any a priori calibration, and can be immediately applied to any region of interest. This method uses the source information obtained from the spectral ratios of envelopes of measured seismic coda waves to invert for model-derived yield and depth of burial. The only requirements of this method are that the region of interest must contain several (> 3) seismic sources which have been well recorded (SNR > 2) by a set of shared stations. For regions with only a few events (~ 3) and/or extremely band-limited observations for which the depth of burial is unknown, an earthquake with a known magnitude may be required to obtain an accurate and robust yield estimate.
This study focuses on developing a non-nuclear test facility to help meet the verification and validation (V&V) requirements of a water-cooled small modular reactor (SMR) system. The scaling analysis necessary for reactor system experimentation and assessment model V&V considers various reactor system accident scenarios such as main steam line break (MSLB), steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), and containment condensation and heat transfer. The goal is to identify key physics based phenomena of interest (POI), specific figures of merit (FOMs), and the state of knowledge (SOK) by employing phenomena identification and ranking table (PIRT) studies. Important physics phenomena such as heat transfer, fluid dynamics, structural integrity, and material selection must be addressed when scaling a thermal-hydraulics system. Alongside these considerations, modifications to the facility may be needed to align the scaled system with the available footprint (height and space) of the facility. These modifications may include infrastructure upgrades, changes to the piping layout, implementation of safety measures, and installation of new instrumentation and control systems. The test facility aims to provide a scaled-down version of prototypic facilities for comprehensive V&V activities by overcoming these challenges and making the necessary modifications. This approach minimizes scaling distortion, simulates prototypic plant conditions, and accurately models accident event progressions. Thus, the facility will be capable of adequately modeling a scaled SMR system to support the design, development and licensing needs.
Films from the US’s historic nuclear testing era comprise the only extensive collection of imagery depicting high-yield detonations. These films offer unique insights into the characteristics of flows occurring on scales that are difficult to replicate experimentally, and they are a valuable source of data for the validation of models used to describe nuclear detonations. In recent work, we implemented modern computer vision and machine learning techniques to extract features of the fireball following nuclear detonation. With a training dataset of fireball films, we fine-tuned a You Only Look Once 11 (YOLO11) model to detect and track the fireball. Applied to a video, the outer bounding box produced in each frame by YOLO11 is used as an input prompt to Meta’s Segment Anything Model 2 (SAM2), which is shown to accurately predict the boundary of the fireball over time with high resolution. These state-of-the-art computer vision foundation models exhibit impressive visual accuracy in their results but lack an output of values that robustly quantify uncertainty in scientific applications. In this paper, we develop procedures for uncertainty quantification of extracted fireball features. We outline the application of a parallel attention mechanism to calculate uncertainty ranges that complement and better pose model validation data. This higher quality fireball validation data may serve to improve prognostic models describing nuclear detonations in support of nuclear forensic and emergency response activities.
We report the chemical and isotopic compositions of fallout melt glasses from nuclear tests contain a range of information constraining the physical conditions within the fireball and the mechanisms of fallout formation but historic studies tended to exclude the behavior of stable major and trace elements. Here, we present a large study specifically focused on major and trace element relationships within a population of macroscale fallout samples from a single event. We interpret these data to better constrain how fallout melt glass formation in near surface environments is influenced by that environment and demonstrate how major and trace element abundances can provide useful insights into chemical processes within the fireball. Data confirm that the uranium in the fallout glass population derives from two isotopically distinct endmembers: isotopically enriched uranium (presumably from the weapon), and natural composition uranium that may be a combination of anthropogenic and environmental materials from within the blast zone. The similarity between major and trace element concentrations in fallout and corresponding local soils from the event site confirm the local soils as the most probable source of entrained material into the fireball and the source of carrier material into which the bomb vapor was incorporated. The lack of correlation between major and trace element abundances with size indicates that volatility driven processes, such as condensation from the fireball, do not control the composition of macroscale fallout melt glass. Although the fallout has major and trace element chemical characteristics broadly similar to those of the local, associated soils, some systematic differences are observed between the two populations. Fallout melt glass is depleted in volatile elements such as K, Na, Tl and Pb, consistent with heating to temperatures above ~1000 °C for 3-10 s. This is supported by the results of laser heating experiments performed on rhyolitic soil at temperatures (1600-2200 °C) and timescales (1-120 s) that are broadly relevant to fallout formation conditions. Relative enrichments of metals such as Cu and Co do not correlate with the abundance of uranium, suggesting that fallout also records input of near field anthropogenic materials. Our observations suggest that major chemical features can be related to processing in the fireball and used to inform the thermal-chemical evolution of the system. Ultimately, these data are consistent with a fallout formation mechanism that involves rapid melting of surface materials to form carrier material melts with minor incorporation of bomb vapor and a degree of volumetric volatile loss due to heating.