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DOE OSTI2025

Proceedings for the Workshop on Applied Nuclear Data Activities 2025

The 2025 Workshop for Applied Nuclear Data Activities (WANDA) covered four topic areas in nuclear data: Nuclear Data and Deterrence, Nuclear Data Prioritization for Fusion, High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium and Novel Moderators for Advanced Reactors, and Data Preservation and Data Workflows. The intention of this workshop is to connect different communities that are invested in nuclear data and have their own unique sets of needs for the purposes of sharing information, fostering collaboration in areas of shared interest, and leveraging synergistic capabilities. The attendance of federal program managers at these workshops is essential in creating awareness of the needs of their respective communities and in providing information to better guide funding investments. In each of these topical sessions, a general description of the nuclear data needs and/or capabilities was presented, along with discussions of existing capabilities that could be leveraged, potential synergistic needs or resources, and challenges that must be overcome for the application space to progress. There are many synergistic nuclear data needs among these application spaces. The discussion largely focused on increasing the accuracy of the nuclear data and better quantifying the data uncertainties that have the greatest impact on applications. The full-day session on data processing and data workflows was by nature intended to be synergistic and applicable to all technical sessions at WANDA. A notable common theme that was highlighted across all sessions was the need for accelerated delivery of nuclear data products across complex and time-consuming workflows.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Data Driven Analysis for Modernization Program Management

NNSA is responsible for managing national nuclear security missions: ensuring a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent; supplying nuclear fuel to the Navy; and supporting the nation’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts. However, over half of NNSA’s facilities are more than 40 years old, and roughly one-third date back to the Manhattan Project. To execute its critical nuclear security missions, NNSA is making large investments to modernize its nuclear production capabilities. This ramp up represents NNSA’s largest modernization effort since the Cold War. Given the scale of these efforts, NNSA’s Office of Secondary Stage Production Modernization has implemented data driven techniques to prioritize investments and inform strategic decision making. NNSA, with support from its site managing contractors, has developed and implemented an integrated schedule and risk management system to address the issues and limitations with the traditional approach. The multi-year integrated schedules are key to identifying program linkages and managing large portfolios comprised of many different projects and efforts. In conjunction with the integrated schedule, a new program risk management system has also been developed and implemented, which manages program risks and opportunities, along with specific mitigation strategies to reduce or eliminate the risks per timelines that are tracked in the integrated schedule. This paper is supplemented with a follow-on presentation on effective management of program material and throughput modeling.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

LANSCE 21st Century Deterrence

The LANSCE accelerator is an important tool in the assessment and certification of the nation’s nuclear stockpile. LANSCE provides critical materials and nuclear data needed to develop a predictive capability for the performance of nuclear weapons. As the stockpile ages, materials are replaced, and manufacturing processes change, it is critical that we understand how these changes impact device performance. Dynamic proton radiography and neutron diffraction are ideally suited to contribute to this need. These capabilities are essential to enabling the NNSA labs to become more responsive and agile in advancing the deterrent of the future.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Operational Focused Data Analytics for Optimizing Radiation Portal Monitor-Based Nuclear Smuggling Detection Systems at Global Ports of Entry

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence has deployed a fleet of radiation portal monitors (RPMs) across the world at global ports of entry including seaports, airports, and land border crossings. These RPMs are integrated into radiation detection systems (RDS) that also include fixed cameras, optical character recognition (OCR) systems, primary scanning systems (e.g., X-ray or gamma-ray), and secondary scanning systems (e.g., spectroscopic radiation portal monitors, portable radiation detection systems). The data from these sensing technologies is collected at the Central Alarm Station (CAS) where servers and computers reside to control and operate the system. Operators utilize the data collected by the CAS and declared cargo information to make decisions on how to respond to an alarm.This work explores the use of CAS-located data, looking at both the sensor data streams and operator inputs, to perform analysis which supports customs and border protection agencies to improve training capability and operational effectiveness. We focus on analyzing site level effectiveness and behavior by rolling up CAS-located data collected from individual occurrences. To-date, more than 15 sites (e.g., seaports, airports, border crossings) have been analyzed in this manner with the goal of understanding system operations to verify effectiveness and recommend potential improvements. This work first aims to provide background information on relevant CAS-located data sources and our current operational system analytics process including example results. After summarizing our current analytic techniques, we discuss how the future data analytics systems can provide key benefits to improving operational performance while minimizing the burden these detection systems place on operators.

Kuhn, Michael↗

DOE OSTI2020

Co-op at Sandia National Laboratories (July - December 2019, Final Report)

This co-op was performed at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) within the Weapon Surety Engineering 11 Department (9435), which is a customer-focused organization that provides engineering and system analysis expertise to ensure a safe deterrent throughout the entire weapon lifecycle. Engineers in 9435 develop a deep knowledge in both component and system function to support rigorous evaluation and mitigation of potential failure modes. They operate across multiple engineering disciplines (mechanical, electrical, computer, materials and systems engineering) with opportunities to develop crossdisciplinary capability. The team supports a variety of stockpile systems and is part of the product teams during development, design and production, as well as advanced concept and exploratory efforts. 9435 engineers use their extensive component and system knowledge, as well as experimental data and modeling, to ensure products function as intended with assured safety. Members of the department learn the function of multiple components, how those components integrate within the system and apply surety principles and processes to ensure a safe, secure, reliable, and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2024

OSCAR-Mike: Why not ATAK?

The Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) is evaluating methods to increase the probability that international partners will detect radioactive materials. One proposed method to accomplish this goal is to improve communications within teams operating in challenging environments. The goal of these improvements would be to enable remote monitoring of detection equipment, share data among end users in the field and subject matter experts, and integrate data from radiation detectors with other types of sensors and camera systems. Accomplishing this goal has the potential to improve the capabilities of currently deployed NSDD equipment. During FY 2021, Oak Ridge National Laboratory demonstrated some core and expanded capabilities of the Android Team Awareness Kit (ATAK), a situational awareness application developed by the US Department of Defense, to enable precision targeting, navigation, and data sharing. During FY 2022, Oak Ridge National Laboratory developed software requirements for an NSDD team awareness kit–based system. The requirements were developed by liaising with NSDD management and subject matter experts to determine NSDD’s needs and by reviewing available software and hardware solutions with US Department of Defense team awareness kit program managers and developers and radiation detection equipment vendors.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear forensics: How science helps stop the trafficking of nuclear materials

Nuclear forensics is an essential activity in support of national counter-nuclear smuggling operations, as it can be used to provide unique and useful data to law enforcement for the prosecution of criminal nuclear smugglers and traffickers. Nuclear forensics can also be used to determine the origin of nuclear materials that have fallen out of regulatory control, allowing for the identification of weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the safeguarding of nuclear materials, while also generating a deterrent effect through attribution to the legal and responsible owners of nuclear materials out of regulatory control. This article describes the benefits of a nuclear forensics capability to any country in possession of nuclear materials, and describes how nuclear forensics can support an investigation into the origin of interdicted nuclear materials, using a case study of a nuclear materials interdiction in Australia to describe how nuclear forensics works in practice.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

DOE OSTI2025

Stockpile Stewardship and Nuclear Testing: A Technical Assessment

Since 1992, the United States has retained confidence in its nuclear weapon stockpile without performing any tests that produce nuclear yield. Instead, it has invested in a stockpile stewardship program (SSP) based on the same approach that was validated through fifty years of experience during the nuclear testing era. As the test moratorium continues and new information becomes available, it is both necessary and appropriate to periodically revisit the question of whether or not nuclear testing should resume. In a recent article by Dr. Mark Schneider, he asserts that the United States should return to nuclear testing to address the issues that negatively affect our country’s nuclear deterrent. A serious, technically informed evaluation of the most significant of the issues Dr. Schneider has raised is provided in this paper. The conclusion of this evaluation is that the strategy of a well-funded SSP coupled with rigorous assessments to identify if there is a specific need for a nuclear test is sound and cost-effective approach. Any decision otherwise needs to take into careful consideration all the classified SSP successes and data pertaining to the particular issues in question.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2022

ASC FY2023 Implementation Plan Revision 0

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Advanced Simulation and Computing: ASC FY24 Implementation Plan

The DOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is an integrated technical program for maintaining the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The SSP incorporates nuclear test data, computational modeling and simulation, and experimental facilities to advance understanding of nuclear weapons. The suite of data analyzed comes from activities including previous nuclear tests, stockpile surveillance, experimental research, and development and engineering programs. This integrated national program requires the continued use of experimental facilities and the computational capabilities to support the SSP missions. These component parts, in addition to an appropriately scaled production capability, enable NNSA to support stockpile requirements. The ultimate goal of the SSP, and thus of the Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) program, is to ensure that the U.S. maintains a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent. The ASC program is a cornerstone of the SSP, providing simulation capabilities and computational resources to support the annual stockpile assessment and certification process, study advanced nuclear weapons design and manufacturing processes, analyze accident scenarios and weapons aging, and provide the tools to enable stockpile Life Extension Programs (LEPs) and the resolution of Significant Finding Investigations (SFIs). This work requires a balance of resources, including technical staff, hardware, simulation software, and computer science solutions. The ASC program focuses on increasing the predictive capabilities in a three-dimensional (3D) simulation environment while maintaining support to the SSP. The Program continues to improve its unique tools for understanding and solving progressively more difficult stockpile problems (sufficient resolution, dimensionality, and scientific details), and quantifying critical margins and uncertainties. Resolving each issue requires increasingly difficult analyses because the aging process has progressively moved the stockpile further from the original test base. While the focus remains on the U.S. nuclear weapons program, where possible, the Program also enables the use of high-performance computing (HPC) and simulation tools to address broader national security needs, such as foreign nuclear weapon assessments and nuclear counterterrorism. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) calls for NNSA to “deliver a modern, adaptive nuclear security enterprise based on an integrated strategy for risk management, production-based resilience, science and technology innovation, and workforce initiatives.” Furthermore, “NNSA will establish a Science and Technology Innovation Initiative to accelerate the integration of science and technology (S&T) throughout its activities.” Executing this strategy necessitates the continued emphasis on developing and sustaining high-quality scientific and engineering staff, as well as supporting computational and experimental capabilities. These components constitute the foundation of the nuclear weapons program. The continued success of the SSP and LEPs is predicated upon the ability to credibly certify the stockpile, without a return to underground nuclear tests (UGTs). Shortly after the nuclear test moratorium entered into force in 1992, the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) was established to provide an extensive simulation capability to underpin stockpile certification. While computing and simulation have always been essential to the success of the nuclear weapons program, the program goal of ASCI was to execute NNSA’s vision of using these tools in support of the stockpile stewardship mission. The ASCI program was essential to the successful demonstration of the SSP, providing critical nuclear weapons simulation and modeling capabilities. ASCI officially evolved into the ASC program in fiscal year (FY) 2005, but the mission remains essentially the same: provide the simulation and computational capabilities that underpin the ability to maintain a safe, secure, effective nuclear weapon stockpile, without returning to underground nuclear testing. The capabilities that the ASC program provides at the national laboratories play a vital role in the nuclear security enterprise and are necessary for fulfilling the stockpile stewardship and life extension requirements outlined for NNSA. The Program develops modern simulation tools that provide insights into stockpile aging issues, provide the computational and simulation tools that enable designers and analysts to certify the current stockpile and life-extended nuclear weapons, and inform the decision-making process when any modifications in nuclear warheads or the associated manufacturing processes are deemed necessary. Furthermore, ASC is enhancing the predictive simulation capabilities that are essential to evaluate weapons effects, design experiments, and ensure test readiness. The ASC program continues to improve its unique tools to solve stockpile problems— with a focus on sufficient resolution, dimensionality, and scientific detail—to enable Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties (QMU) and to resolve the increasingly difficult analyses needed for stockpile stewardship. The needs of the Stockpile Management and Production Modernization programs (formerly Directed Stockpile Work) also drive the requirements for simulation and computational resources. These requirements include planned LEPs, stockpile support activities, and mitigation efforts against the potential for technical surprise. All of the weapons within the current stockpile are in some stage of the life extension process. The simulation and computational capabilities are crucial for successful execution of these life extensions and for ensuring NNSA can certify these life-extended weapons without conducting a UGT.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2024

Advanced Simulation and Computing: FY25 Implementation Plan

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2021

Advanced Simulation and Computing (FY22 Implementation Plan Rev 0)

The DOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is an integrated technical program for maintaining the safety, surety, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The SSP incorporates nuclear test data, computational modeling and simulation, and experimental facilities to advance understanding of nuclear weapons. The suite of data analyzed comes from activities including stockpile surveillance, experimental research, and development and engineering programs. This integrated national program requires the continued use of experimental facilities and the computational capabilities to support the SSP missions. These component parts, in addition to an appropriately scaled production capability, enable NNSA to support stockpile requirements. The ultimate goal of the SSP, and thus of the Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program, is to ensure that the U.S. maintains a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent. Specific work activities and scope contained in this Implementation Plan (IP) represent the full-year annual operating plan for FY22. The Initial IP, effective , should be consistent with the Department’s Base Table when operating under a Continuing Resolution (CR). The final IP, effective date TBD, is consistent with the final, enacted appropriation.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2022

A Machine Learning Method for the Forensics Attribution of Separated Plutonium

Plutonium (Pu) source attribution would be a powerful tool to support nuclear nonproliferation efforts. This capability to find the source of a Pu sample would act as a deterrent to smuggling efforts, and also help regulatory agencies verify declared nuclear activities. Work at Texas A&M University yielded a nuclear forensics methodology, which is capable of determining separated Pu’s reactor of origin, fuel burnup, and the time since irradiation (TSI)—three parameters of interest. The methodology used a set of ten intra-element isotopic ratios found in separated Pu, which was compared to a library of isotopic ratio values produced using neutronics simulations for reactors of interest. By calculating the probability that unknown Pu sample’s isotopic ratio set matched a set in the library, the methodology could predict the three parameters of interest of the sample. One shortcoming of this methodology was an inability to correctly attribute spoofed Pu, where Pu sourced from two different reactors or two different fuel burnup levels are mixed. A new methodology to rectify this vulnerability using machine learning (ML) technique is developed, instead of the maximum likelihood calculation previously used and the results are satisfactory. The ML approach leverages the existing simulated data for training the algorithm, but use them efficiently by only using intra-element isotope ratios that contribute to the attribution one of the three parameters at a time. Previously, all isotope ratios were used to attribute all three parameters together. The new methodology attributes the Pu parameters in three steps, one for each parameter, rather than resolving all of the three parameters simultaneously like the previous maximum likelihood approach. First, a support vector machine classifier with a set of seven isotopic ratios finds the reactor of origin and a set of regression models trained using gaussian process predicts the burnup with a different set of seven isotopes. Finally, TSI is calculated analytically using decay equations. Thus far, the new methodology is capable of attributing pure Pu samples and has been validated using experimental data. The next step will to be augment the classifier training data set with spoofed Pu data.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗