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At least 19 records

Investigation of RF Emissions From Wireless Networks as a Threat to Avionic Systems

The paper focuses on understanding and obtaining preliminary measurements of radiated field (RF) emissions of laptop/wireless local area network (WLAN) systems. This work is part of a larger research project to measure radiated emissions of wireless devices to provide a better understanding for potential interference with crucial aircraft avionics systems. A reverberation chamber data collection process is included, as well as recommendations for additional tests. Analysis of measurements from devices under test (DUTs) proved inconclusive for addressing potential interference issues. Continued effort is expected to result in a complete easily reproducible test protocol. The data and protocol presented here are considered preliminary.

Salud, Maria Theresa P.↗

Threats and countermeasures for network security

In the late 1980's, the traditional threat of anonymous break-ins to networked computers was joined by viruses and worms, multiplicative surrogates that carry out the bidding of their authors. Technologies for authentication and secrecy, supplemented by good management practices, are the principal countermeasures. Four articles on these subjects are presented.

Denning, Peter J.↗

Software To Secure Distributed Propulsion Simulations

Distributed-object computing systems are presented with many security threats, including network eavesdropping, message tampering, and communications middleware masquerading. NASA Glenn Research Center, and its industry partners, has taken an active role in mitigating the security threats associated with developing and operating their proprietary aerospace propulsion simulations. In particular, they are developing a collaborative Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) Security (CORBASec) test bed to secure their distributed aerospace propulsion simulations. Glenn has been working with its aerospace propulsion industry partners to deploy the Numerical Propulsion System Simulation (NPSS) object-based technology. NPSS is a program focused on reducing the cost and time in developing aerospace propulsion engines

Blaser, Tammy M.↗

Recognition of partially occluded threat objects using the annealed Hopefield network

Recognition of partially occluded objects has been an important issue to airport security because occlusion causes significant problems in identifying and locating objects during baggage inspection. The neural network approach is suitable for the problems in the sense that the inherent parallelism of neural networks pursues many hypotheses in parallel resulting in high computation rates. Moreover, they provide a greater degree of robustness or fault tolerance than conventional computers. The annealed Hopfield network which is derived from the mean field annealing (MFA) has been developed to find global solutions of a nonlinear system. In the study, it has been proven that the system temperature of MFA is equivalent to the gain of the sigmoid function of a Hopfield network. In our early work, we developed the hybrid Hopfield network (HHN) for fast and reliable matching. However, HHN doesn't guarantee global solutions and yields false matching under heavily occluded conditions because HHN is dependent on initial states by its nature. In this paper, we present the annealed Hopfield network (AHN) for occluded object matching problems. In AHN, the mean field theory is applied to the hybird Hopfield network in order to improve computational complexity of the annealed Hopfield network and provide reliable matching under heavily occluded conditions. AHN is slower than HHN. However, AHN provides near global solutions without initial restrictions and provides less false matching than HHN. In conclusion, a new algorithm based upon a neural network approach was developed to demonstrate the feasibility of the automated inspection of threat objects from x-ray images. The robustness of the algorithm is proved by identifying occluded target objects with large tolerance of their features.

Kim, Jung H.↗

Ensuring Flexibility and Security in SDN-Based Spacecraft Communication Networks Through Risk Assessment

Software-defined networking (SDN) has enabled elastic networking and resource distribution in cloud computing. The centralization and separation of the Control Plane also offers a high degree of network configurability and management, which can be used to mitigate and manage threats to the network. Space communication networks have historically been restricted and circuit switching in these networks has been a manual process. This study evaluates the potential role of SDN in space communication networks from a networking security standpoint. The evaluation covers the networking security needs of spacecraft missions and their associated assets. The results from the evaluation lead to a risk assessment that identifies vulnerabilities in an SDN-based communications architecture. Security challenges introduced into the network from integrating SDN are also considered. A risk register summarizes the severity of the attack outcomes, as well as occurrence likelihood. The study identifies Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks as a new threat (presently unmitigated by existing security controls) that would be prevalent in an SDN-based space communication environment. A Mininet-based emulation testbed is built to demonstrate the susceptibility of spacecraft flight software to a flooding DoS attack when on an interconnected SDN-managed network. This type of attack would be highly consequential to mission assets, and therefore SDN-based space communications would need to be resilient to such attacks. Future work will need to be performed to fully characterize DoS attack methods that can apply to the space communication scenario, as well as to devise a comprehensive DoS-resilient solution.

Baker, Dylan Z.↗

The spatial distribution of ionospheric threats to WAAS integrity, 2000 – 2019: a systematic analysis

The United States’ Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) broadcasts data to facilitate aircraft navigation. This paper examines the spatial dependence of ionospheric disturbances that have threatened the accuracy and reliability of position estimates derived from these data over the period 2000 – 2019. We address two distinct aspects of this spatial dependence: (1) the geographic distribution of these threats, in particular, in relation to geomagnetic latitude, and (2) the geometric dependence of threats relative to the locations of the receiver sites that comprise the WAAS network. We analyze threat distributions in terms of the various means that WAAS employs to mitigate these threats, including the Extreme Storm Detector, the Moderate Storm Detector, local irregularity detectors, and the ionospheric threat model. Distinct distributions are presented for threats occurring in Solar Cycle 23 and those of Solar Cycle 24. To study the geometric dependence of threats on receiver locations, we use as a metric the distance separating a threat from the centroid of the nearest Ncentroid receivers. Large values of this metric identify threats at or beyond the edge of coverage. We conclude by discussing the implications of our results for WAAS operations.

Altshuler, Eric↗

Cyber-Threat Assessment for the Air Traffic Management System: A Network Controls Approach

Air transportation networks are being disrupted with increasing frequency by failures in their cyber- (computing, communication, control) systems. Whether these cyber- failures arise due to deliberate attacks or incidental errors, they can have far-reaching impact on the performance of the air traffic control and management systems. For instance, a computer failure in the Washington DC Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZDC) on August 15, 2015, caused nearly complete closure of the Centers airspace for several hours. This closure had a propagative impact across the United States National Airspace System, causing changed congestion patterns and requiring placement of a suite of traffic management initiatives to address the capacity reduction and congestion. A snapshot of traffic on that day clearly shows the closure of the ZDC airspace and the resulting congestion at its boundary, which required augmented traffic management at multiple locations. Cyber- events also have important ramifications for private stakeholders, particularly the airlines. During the last few months, computer-system issues have caused several airlines fleets to be grounded for significant periods of time: these include United Airlines (twice), LOT Polish Airlines, and American Airlines. Delays and regional stoppages due to cyber- events are even more common, and may have myriad causes (e.g., failure of the Department of Homeland Security systems needed for security check of passengers, see [3]). The growing frequency of cyber- disruptions in the air transportation system reflects a much broader trend in the modern society: cyber- failures and threats are becoming increasingly pervasive, varied, and impactful. In consequence, an intense effort is underway to develop secure and resilient cyber- systems that can protect against, detect, and remove threats, see e.g. and its many citations. The outcomes of this wide effort on cyber- security are applicable to the air transportation infrastructure, and indeed security solutions are being implemented in the current system. While these security solutions are important, they only provide a piecemeal solution. Particular computers or communication channels are protected from particular attacks, without a holistic view of the air transportation infrastructure. On the other hand, the above-listed incidents highlight that a holistic approach is needed, for several reasons. First, the air transportation infrastructure is a large scale cyber-physical system with multiple stakeholders and diverse legacy assets. It is impractical to protect every cyber- asset from known and unknown disruptions, and instead a strategic view of security is needed. Second, disruptions to the cyber- system can incur complex propagative impacts across the air transportation network, including its physical and human assets. Also, these implications of cyber- events are exacerbated or modulated by other disruptions and operational specifics, e.g. severe weather, operator fatigue or error, etc. These characteristics motivate a holistic and strategic perspective on protecting the air transportation infrastructure from cyber- events. The analysis of cyber- threats to the air traffic system is also inextricably tied to the integration of new autonomy into the airspace. The replacement of human operators with cyber functions leaves the network open to new cyber threats, which must be modeled and managed. Paradoxically, the mitigation of cyber events in the airspace will also likely require additional autonomy, given the fast time scale and myriad pathways of cyber-attacks which must be managed. The assessment of new vulnerabilities upon integration of new autonomy is also a key motivation for a holistic perspective on cyber threats.

Complex Networks↗

R2U2: Monitoring and Diagnosis of Security Threats for Unmanned Aerial Systems

We present R2U2, a novel framework for runtime monitoring of security properties and diagnosing of security threats on-board Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). R2U2, implemented in FPGA hardware, is a real-time, REALIZABLE, RESPONSIVE, UNOBTRUSIVE Unit for security threat detection. R2U2 is designed to continuously monitor inputs from the GPS and the ground control station, sensor readings, actuator outputs, and flight software status. By simultaneously monitoring and performing statistical reasoning, attack patterns and post-attack discrepancies in the UAS behavior can be detected. R2U2 uses runtime observer pairs for linear and metric temporal logics for property monitoring and Bayesian networks for diagnosis of security threats. We discuss the design and implementation that now enables R2U2 to handle security threats and present simulation results of several attack scenarios on the NASA DragonEye UAS.

Formal Methods↗

Alleviating Bundle Throughput Constriction for Delay Tolerance Networking (DTN) Bundles with Software-Defined Networking (SDN)

A load-balancing technique is proposed, executed, and tested against a Delay Tolerant Network (DTN) implementation with well-known characteristics. This would prove that transparently inserting software defined networking (SDN) to achieve load balancing without re-configuring the DTN portion is possible. Two routes were taken to alleviate a DTN bottleneck threat. The first used a P4 networking switch. This manual load-balancing test will balance the incoming packets without the users at the end-points knowing that its original packet destination and/or source may have been changed. The second route utilized a High-rate Delay Tolerant Networking (HDTN) receiving node instead of the typical the delay tolerance networking (DTN) implementation used. Bench-marking results of the DTN implementation receiving node and the HDTN receiving node will be compared.

Delay Tolerant Networking (DTN)↗

Structural Chokepoints Determine the Resilience of Agri-Food Supply Chains in the United States

The agricultural and food systems of the United States are critical for ensuring the stability of both domestic and global food systems. Thus, it is essential to understand the structural resilience of the country’s agri-food supply chains to a suite of threats. Here we employ complex network statistics to identify the spatially resolved structural chokepoints in the agri-food supply chains of the United States. We identify seven chokepoints at county scale: Riverside CA, San Bernardino CA, Los Angeles CA, Shelby TN, Maricopa AZ, San Diego CA and Cook IL; as well as seven chokepoints at freight analysis framework scale: Los Angeles–Long Beach CA, Chicago– Naperville IL, New York–New Jersey NJ, New York–New Jersey NY, Remainder of Texas, Remainder of Pennsylvania, and San Jose–San Francisco–Oakland CA. These structural chokepoints are generally consistent through time (2007, 2012, 2017), particularly for processed food commodities. This study improves our understanding of agri-food supply-chain security and may aid policies aimed at enhancing its resilience.

Agriculture↗

Simulating Operation of a Complex Sensor Network

Simulation Tool for ASCTA Microsensor Network Architecture (STAMiNA) ["ASCTA" denotes the Advanced Sensors Collaborative Technology Alliance.] is a computer program for evaluating conceptual sensor networks deployed over terrain to provide military situational awareness. This or a similar program is needed because of the complexity of interactions among such diverse phenomena as sensing and communication portions of a network, deployment of sensor nodes, effects of terrain, data-fusion algorithms, and threat characteristics. STAMiNA is built upon a commercial network-simulator engine, with extensions to include both sensing and communication models in a discrete-event simulation environment. Users can define (1) a mission environment, including terrain features; (2) objects to be sensed; (3) placements and modalities of sensors, abilities of sensors to sense objects of various types, and sensor false alarm rates; (4) trajectories of threatening objects; (5) means of dissemination and fusion of data; and (6) various network configurations. By use of STAMiNA, one can simulate detection of targets through sensing, dissemination of information by various wireless communication subsystems under various scenarios, and fusion of information, incorporating such metrics as target-detection probabilities, false-alarm rates, and communication loads, and capturing effects of terrain and threat.

Jennings, Esther↗

Portable Integrated Wireless Device Threat Assessment to Aircraft Radio Systems

An assessment was conducted on multiple wireless local area network (WLAN) devices using the three wireless standards for spurious radiated emissions to determine their threat to aircraft radio navigation systems. The measurement process, data and analysis are provided for devices tested using IEEE 802.11a, IEEE 802.11b, and Bluetooth as well as data from portable laptops/tablet PCs and PDAs (grouping known as PEDs). A comparison was made between wireless LAN devices and portable electronic devices. Spurious radiated emissions were investigated in the radio frequency bands for the following aircraft systems: Instrument Landing System Localizer and Glideslope, Very High Frequency (VHF) Communication, VHF Omnidirectional Range, Traffic Collision Avoidance System, Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System, Microwave Landing System and Global Positioning System. Since several of the contiguous navigation systems were grouped under one encompassing measurement frequency band, there were five measurement frequency bands where spurious radiated emissions data were collected for the PEDs and WLAN devices. The report also provides a comparison between emissions data and regulatory emission limit.

Salud, Maria Theresa P.↗

A Survey of Cyber Threat

Multiple companies are competing to develop human-crewed and unmanned aerial vehicles to provide flight in urban environments. With the growth of aerial systems and future airborne vehicle networks and the need to enable secure data exchange and service interactions within Urban Air Mobility (UAM) environments, cybersecurity has come to the forefront as a topic, highlighting the need to protect these networks from cyber-attacks. This paper will identify potential threats, vulnerabilities, and weaknesses of UAM environments, that could lead to system compromises and disruptions.

Cyber Security↗

Scalable Asset Discovery, Vulnerability Scanning, and Penetration Testing for Remote Sites and Wireless Spectrums Utilizing an Embedded Linux Plug - PwniPlug and the Raspberry Pi B+ as a Sample Pen Test

All devices attached to the NASA KSC network are subject to security vulnerability scanning and/or penetration testing. In today's changing environment, vulnerable and/or unprotected systems can easily be overlooked. Systems that are not properly managed can become a potential threat to the operational integrity of our systems and networks. This includes all NASA (internal and external) information systems within NASA KSC Internet Protocol (IP) address space, and NASA KSC facilities. The Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) recommends that all NASA Centers and information systems be subject to penetration testing on a regular interval in accordance with the guidelines identified by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). (ITS-HBK-2810.04-02A) Protecting information and equipment at NASA is an area of increasing concern. In addition to the CPU's on the network; Supervisory, Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are especially vulnerable because these systems have lacked standards, use embedded controllers with little computational power and informal software, are connected to physical processes, have few operators, and are increasingly also being connected to corporate networks. The scope of work is comprised of several individual components which together build upon previous work by Drew Branch, NASA KSC Intern. The Pwn Plug is the selected COTS (Commercial-Off-The-Shelf) device chosen to test simplification of mandatory IT Security tasks. The device will be utilized to provide services to NASA KSC and enable an assessment of infrastructure soundness and regulatory compliance in an efficient, economical, and business responsive manner. The Pwn Plug is designed as a pen testing appliance which provides a hardware platform that can support commercial penetration testing efforts at significantly reduced costs. The expected outcomes are: 1) External Penetration Testing, 2) Social Engineering, 3) Procedural Documentation, 4) Recommended Remediation Action Plan, 5) System Retest & Remediation Attestation and 6) Final Reports, out briefing and Presentation. Due to physical and material constraints beyond intern and mentor control, the project was redefined as a working pen-test scenario. Limitations of lab availability and tools dictated an academic exercise. This report was developed within the scenario guidelines suggested by the project mentor. The guidelines were to be creative in developing a Pen Test program for a client.

Penetration Testing↗

An Overview of Ground-Based Radar and Optical Measurements Utilized By the Nasa Orbital Debris Program Office

For over 30 years, the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO) has led the characterization of orbital debris (OD) too small to be tracked by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN), yet which may pose the greatest threat to human spaceflight and robotic missions. Measurements from specialized sensors, including ground-based radars and telescopes capable of detecting smaller objects, provide the foundation for developing statistical models to describe the current state and future evolution of the OD environment from low Earth orbit (LEO) to geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO). Since 1990, the ODPO has partnered with the U.S. Department of Defense and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory (MIT/LL) to collect data using the Haystack Ultrawideband Satellite Imaging Radar (HUSIR) – formerly Haystack – to characterize OD in LEO with a sensitivity of approximately 5 mm at 1000 km altitude. In addition, since 1993, the Goldstone Orbital Debris Radar, operated by NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, has provided data on OD as small as approximately 2-3 mm for altitudes below 1000 km, some of the most sensitive ground-based measurements achievable at these altitudes. Recently, collaborations with the 18 th Space Control Squadron of the U.S. Space Force have also provided the ODPO with special datasets from the Space Fence to extend coverage below the historical SSN limit of 10 cm and to characterize individual breakup events in LEO. For GEO altitudes, the Eugene Stansbery Meter Class Autonomous Telescope (ES-MCAT), a joint NASA-Air Force Research Laboratory project that reached full operational capability in 2021, collects data on debris smaller than 1 m and provides coverage of debris in historically under-sampled high-altitude orbital regimes. This paper summarizes the radar and optical sensors utilized by the ODPO, their unique capabilities, and recent datasets and applications for statistical sampling of the dynamic OD environment.

Alyssa Manis↗

An Overview of Ground-Based Radar and Optical Measurements Utilized By the Nasa Orbital Debris Program Office

For over 30 years, the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO) has led the characterization of orbital debris (OD) too small to be tracked by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN), yet which may pose the greatest threat to human spaceflight and robotic missions. Measurements from specialized sensors, including ground-based radars and telescopes capable of detecting smaller objects, provide the foundation for developing statistical models to describe the current state and future evolution of the OD environment from low Earth orbit (LEO) to geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO). Since 1990, the ODPO has partnered with the U.S. Department of Defense and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory (MIT/LL) to collect data using the Haystack Ultrawideband Satellite Imaging Radar (HUSIR) – formerly Haystack – to characterize OD in LEO with a sensitivity of approximately 5 mm at 1000 km altitude. In addition, since 1993, the Goldstone Orbital Debris Radar, operated by NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, has provided data on OD as small as approximately 2-3 mm for altitudes below 1000 km, some of the most sensitive ground-based measurements achievable at these altitudes. Recently, collaborations with the 18 th Space Control Squadron of the U.S. Space Force have also provided the ODPO with special datasets from the Space Fence to extend coverage below the historical SSN limit of 10 cm and to characterize individual breakup events in LEO. For GEO altitudes, the Eugene Stansbery Meter Class Autonomous Telescope (ES-MCAT), a joint NASA-Air Force Research Laboratory project that reached full operational capability in 2021, collects data on debris smaller than 1 m and provides coverage of debris in historically under-sampled high-altitude orbital regimes. This paper summarizes the radar and optical sensors utilized by the ODPO, their unique capabilities, and recent datasets and applications for statistical sampling of the dynamic OD environment.

Alyssa Manis↗

Envisioning an Optimal Network of Space-Based Lasers for Orbital Debris Remediation

The rapid increase in resident space objects, including satellites and orbital debris, poses a significant threat to the safety and sustainability of space missions. This paper explores orbital debris remediation using a network of collaborative space-based lasers, leveraging laser ablation for momentum transfer on debris. A novel delta-v vector analysis framework quantifies the e↵ects of multiple simultaneous laser-to-debris (L2D) engagements by using vector composition of the imparted delta-v vectors. The paper introduces the Concurrent LocationScheduling Problem (CLSP), which optimizes the placement of laser platforms and the scheduling of L2D engagements to maximize debris remediation capacity. Due to the computational complexity of the CLSP, it is decomposed into two sequential subproblems: (1) optimal laser platform locations are determined using the Maximal Covering Location Problem, and (2) a novel integer linear programming-based approach schedules L2D engagements within the network configuration to maximize remediation capacity. Computational experiments are conducted to evaluate the proposed framework’s e↵ectiveness under various mission scenarios, demonstrating key network functions such as collaborative nudging, deorbiting, and just-in-time collision avoidance. A sensitivity analysis further examines how varying the number and distribution of laser platforms a↵ects debris remediation capacity, providing insights into optimizing the performance of space-based laser networks.

David O Williams Rogers↗

Addressing Software Security

Historically security within organizations was thought of as an IT function (web sites/servers, email, workstation patching, etc.) Threat landscape has evolved (Script Kiddies, Hackers, Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), Nation States, etc.) Attack surface has expanded -Networks interconnected!! Some security posture factors Network Layer (Routers, Firewalls, etc.) Computer Network Defense (IPS/IDS, Sensors, Continuous Monitoring, etc.) Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Software Security (COTS, FOSS, Custom, etc.)

software↗