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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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12 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1999

The Conference Proceedings of the 1999 Air Transport Research Group (ATRG) of the WCTR Society

In this paper, we develop a model with which allows us to measure not only the changes in equilibrium outcomes and welfare consequences of liberalizing a bilateral air transport agreement, but also the distribution of the gains and losses to carriers and consumers of each bilateral country and those of the third foreign countries. Our model also allows to measure the effects of changes in a bilateral agreement on the amount of traffic diversion between the direct bilateral routes and the indirect routes via a third country. We also provide an extension of our model to a case of oligopoly market outcome (Coumot Nash equilibrium). In our model, quality aspects are treated in the framework of hedonic price theory by specifying the quality-adjusted price (quantity) as a multiplication of the observed price (quantity) by the reciprocal quality index function (the quality index function). Numerical simulations were conducted to measure the effects of changing the following major policy levers in a bilateral air transport agreement: 1) Removing price regulation while retaining frequency and entry restrictions; 2) Removing price and entry regulation while retaining frequency restrictions; 3) Removing frequency regulations while retaining price and entry regulations; 4) Removing frequency and entry regulations while retaining price regulation; 5) Removing price and frequency regulations while retaining entry restriction; and 6) Removing all price, frequency and entry regulations (de facto, open skies).

Zhang, Anming↗
NASA NTRS1969

Nonzero-sum differential games.

Differential games theory with nonzero sum for application to economic analysis, discussing Nash equilibrium, minimax and noninferior strategies set

Ho, Y. C.↗
NASA NTRS1974

Algebraic Riccati equations in zero-sum differential games

The procedure for finding the closed-loop Nash equilibrium solution of two-player zero-sum linear time-invariant differential games with quadratic performance criteria and classical information pattern may be reduced in most cases to the solution of an algebraic Riccati equation. Based on the results obtained by Willems, necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of solutions to these equations are derived, and explicit conditions for a scalar example are given.

Johnson, T. L.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Time-Extended Payoffs for Collectives of Autonomous Agents

A collective is a set of self-interested agents which try to maximize their own utilities, along with a a well-defined, time-extended world utility function which rates the performance of the entire system. In this paper, we use theory of collectives to design time-extended payoff utilities for agents that are both aligned with the world utility, and are "learnable", i.e., the agents can readily see how their behavior affects their utility. We show that in systems where each agent aims to optimize such payoff functions, coordination arises as a byproduct of the agents selfishly pursuing their own goals. A game theoretic analysis shows that such payoff functions have the net effect of aligning the Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimal solution and world utility optimum, thus eliminating undesirable behavior such as agents working at cross-purposes. We then apply collective-based payoff functions to the token collection in a gridworld problem where agents need to optimize the aggregate value of tokens collected across an episode of finite duration (i.e., an abstracted version of rovers on Mars collecting scientifically interesting rock samples, subject to power limitations). We show that, regardless of the initial token distribution, reinforcement learning agents using collective-based payoff functions significantly outperform both natural extensions of single agent algorithms and global reinforcement learning solutions based on "team games".

Tumer, Kagan↗
NASA NTRS2013

AGATE: Adversarial Game Analysis for Tactical Evaluation

AGATE generates a set of ranked strategies that enables an autonomous vehicle to track/trail another vehicle that is trying to break the contact using evasive tactics. The software is efficient (can be run on a laptop), scales well with environmental complexity, and is suitable for use onboard an autonomous vehicle. The software will run in near-real-time (2 Hz) on most commercial laptops. Existing software is usually run offline in a planning mode, and is not used to control an unmanned vehicle actively. JPL has developed a system for AGATE that uses adversarial game theory (AGT) methods (in particular, leader-follower and pursuit-evasion) to enable an autonomous vehicle (AV) to maintain tracking/ trailing operations on a target that is employing evasive tactics. The AV trailing, tracking, and reacquisition operations are characterized by imperfect information, and are an example of a non-zero sum game (a positive payoff for the AV is not necessarily an equal loss for the target being tracked and, potentially, additional adversarial boats). Previously, JPL successfully applied the Nash equilibrium method for onboard control of an autonomous ground vehicle (AGV) travelling over hazardous terrain.

Huntsberger, Terrance L.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Theory of Collective Intelligence

In this chapter an analysis of the behavior of an arbitrary (perhaps massive) collective of computational processes in terms of an associated "world" utility function is presented We concentrate on the situation where each process in the collective can be viewed as though it were striving to maximize its own private utility function. For such situations the central design issue is how to initialize/update the collective's structure, and in particular the private utility functions, so as to induce the overall collective to behave in a way that has large values of the world utility. Traditional "team game" approaches to this problem simply set each private utility function equal to the world utility function. The "Collective Intelligence" (COIN) framework is a semi-formal set of heuristics that recently have been used to construct private utility. functions that in many experiments have resulted in world utility values up to orders of magnitude superior to that ensuing from use of the team game utility. In this paper we introduce a formal mathematics for analyzing and designing collectives. We also use this mathematics to suggest new private utilities that should outperform the COIN heuristics in certain kinds of domains. In accompanying work we use that mathematics to explain previous experimental results concerning the superiority of COIN heuristics. In that accompanying work we also use the mathematics to make numerical predictions, some of which we then test. In this way these two papers establish the study of collectives as a proper science, involving theory, explanation of old experiments, prediction concerning new experiments, and engineering insights.

Nash equilibrium↗
NASA NTRS2011

Deep Metastable Eutectic Nanometer-Scale Particles in the MgO-Al2O3-SiO2 System

Laboratory vapor phase condensation experiments systematically yield amorphous, homogeneous, nanoparticles with unique deep metastable eutectic compositions. They formed during the nucleation stage in rapidly cooling vapor systems. These nanoparticles evidence the complexity of the nucleation stage. Similar complex behavior may occur during the nucleation stage in quenched-melt laboratory experiments. Because of the bulk size of the quenched system many of such deep metastable eutectic nanodomains will anneal and adjust to local equilibrium but some will persist metastably depending on the time-temperature regime and melt/glass transformation.

Reitmeijer, Frans J. M.↗
NASA NTRS1983

Io's atmosphere - Pressure control by regolith cold trapping and surface venting

A new model for the basal pressure of Io's atmosphere is developed. This model takes into account the previously ignored fact that much of Io's surface has very high porosity, typically about 90 pct. Such porosity allows efficient subsurface cold trapping of atmospheric gases which tends to keep ambient surface pressures very low. SO2 is the only gas identified on Io, and the basal pressures for atmospheric models are usually pegged to local surface temperature via the SO2 vapor pressure equilibrium curve. Near Io's subsolar point the pressure in equilibrium with a surface SO2 frost deposit is about 1/10,000,000th bar. Porous surface models of the type developed invoke equilibrium with the colder, subsurface permafrost (at about 3-cm depth) and yield pressures of about 1/10 to the 12th bar. The subsurface cold trapping model explains many but not all observations relevant to Io's atmosphere. The new subsurface cold trapping model and the earlier surface frost equilibrium model, when taken together, provide lower and upper limits, respectively, on the basal SO2 pressure of Io's atmosphere.

Matson, D. L.↗
NASA NTRS2000

What Controls the Arctic Lower Stratosphere Temperature?

The temperature of the Arctic lower stratosphere is critical for understanding polar ozone levels. As temperatures drop below about 195 K, polar stratospheric clouds form, which then convert HCl and ClONO2 into reactive forms that are catalysts for ozone loss reactions. Hence, the lower stratospheric temperature during the March period is a key parameter for understanding polar ozone losses. The temperature is basically understood to be a result of planetary waves which drive the polar temperature away from a cold "radiative equilibrium" state. This is demonstrated using NCEP/NCAR reanalysis calculations of the heat flux and the mean polar temperature. The temperature during the March period is fundamentally driven by the integrated impact of large scale waves moving from the troposphere to the stratosphere during the January through February period.

Newman, Paul A.↗
NASA NTRS1962

BUCKLING OF INITIALLY IMPERFECT AXIALLY COMPRESSED CYLINDRICAL SHELLS

The effects of imperfections on the buckling strength of pressurized cylinders under axial compression are studied. The imperfection factor is considered in the finite-deflection compatibility equation, as well as in the equilibrium equation. A new relation to express the imperfection as an explicit exponential function of pressure and radius thickness ratio is proposed. A method for finding the exponential function is described, and the solution for the critical stress is found in a fairly simple form. The relation of decrease of stability with respect to magnitude of imperfections if found.

CYLINDRICAL SHELL↗
NASA NTRS2001

What Controls the Arctic Lower Stratosphere Temperature?

The temperature of the Arctic lower stratosphere is critical for understanding polar ozone levels. As temperatures drop below about 195 K, polar stratospheric clouds form, which then convert HCl and ClONO2 into reactive forms that are catalysts for ozone loss reactions. Hence, the lower stratospheric temperature during the March period is a key parameter for understanding polar ozone losses. The temperature is basically understood to be a result of planetary waves which drive the polar temperature away from a cold "radiative equilibrium" state. This is demonstrated using NCEP/NCAR reanalysis calculations of the heat flux and the mean polar temperature. The temperature during the March period is fundamentally driven by the integrated impact of large scale waves moving from the troposphere to the stratosphere during the January through February period. We will further show that the recent cold years in the northern polar vortex are a result of this weakened wave driving of the stratosphere.

Newman, Paul A.↗