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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2019

Hyperspectral vegetation identification at a legacy underground nuclear explosion test site

The detection, location, and identification of suspected underground nuclear explosions (UNEs) are global security priorities that rely on integrated analysis of multiple data modalities for uncertainty reduction in event analysis. Vegetation disturbances may provide complementary signatures that can confirm or build on the observables produced by prompt sensing techniques such as seismic or radionuclide monitoring networks. For instance, the emergence of non-native species in an area may be indicative of anthropogenic activity or changes in vegetation health may reflect changes in the site conditions resulting from an underground explosion. Previously, we collected high spatial resolution (10 cm) hyperspectral data from an unmanned aerial system at a legacy underground nuclear explosion test site and its surrounds. These data consist of visible and near-infrared wavebands over 4.3 km 2 of high desert terrain along with high spatial resolution (2.5 cm) RGB context imagery. In this work, we employ various spectral detection and classification algorithms to identify and map vegetation species in an area of interest containing the legacy test site. Here, we employed a frequentist framework for fusing multiple spectral detections across various reference spectra captured at different times and sampled from multiple locations. The spatial distribution of vegetation species is compared to the location of the underground nuclear explosion. We discover a difference in species abundance within a 130 m radius of the center of the test site.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2023

Tommy Morris’ Comments on Nuclear Explosive Safety

Nuclear explosives and weapon systems require special consideration because of their political and military importance, their destructive power, and the potential consequences of an accident. The special consideration translates into specific requirements promulgated by Department of Energy (DOE) O 452.1E “Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety,” and Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3150.02 “DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) W-Division Nuclear Explosive Safety Office mission is to coordinate LANL participation in Nuclear Explosive Safety Studies (NESS) and Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies (NWSS); to provide qualified members and advisors to the studies; to liaise with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the DoD, other national laboratories, the Nevada Test Site, and Pantex Plant with regards to nuclear explosive and weapon system safety. These orders and directives define nuclear detonation as an energy release through a nuclear process, during a period of time on the order of 1 microsecond, in an amount equivalent to the energy released by detonating 4 or more pounds of trinitrotoluene (TNT).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Low-frequency Electromagnetic Detection Limits of Underground Nuclear Explosions

Underground nuclear explosions produce a broadband electromagnetic signal that can propagate to the surface at some distance. We perform a logistic regression on historical electromagnetic detections to calculate a probabilistic detection curve for prediction of the propagation distance for any given underground nuclear explosion. The curve predicts positive detections at scaled ranges of 2414.6, 2025.7, 1908.3, and 1672.4 m/ktonne 1/3 at probabilities of 50, 90, 95 and 99%, respectively. For a theoretical 100 ktonne underground nuclear explosion these scaled ranges translate to absolute ranges of 11.2, 9.4, 8.9, and 7.8 km at probabilities of 50, 90, 95 and 99%, respectively. We also motivate a need for improved electromagnetic sensor design and deployment by extending the detection analysis using the quoted signal-to-noise ratio of two and noise amplitude of 10 pT along with attenuation relationships that go as 1/r to 1/r 3 . We find that reducing the noise floor by a factor often could extend the detection limit to approximately 5 to 25 km/ktonne 1/3 , which translates to 24 to 112 km for a theoretical 100 ktonne underground nuclear explosion.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2017

A review of the developments of radioxenon detectors for nuclear explosion monitoring

Developments in radioxenon monitoring since the implementation of the International Monitoring System are reviewed with emphasis on the most current technologies to improve detector sensitivity and resolution. The nuclear detectors reviewed include combinations of plastic and NaI(Tl) detectors, high purity germanium detectors, silicon detectors, and phoswich detectors. The minimum detectable activity and calibration methods for the various detectors are also discussed.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2019

Migration of noble gas tracers at the site of an underground nuclear explosion at the Nevada National Security Site

As part of an underground gas migration study, two radioactive noble gases and two stable tracer gases were injected into a nuclear explosion test chimney and allowed to migrate naturally. Soil gas samples were collected from a series of boreholes and a range of depths from the shallow subsurface (3 meters) to deeper levels (~160 meters) over a period of eleven months. These samples have provided insights into the development and evolution of the subsurface plume and constrained the relative migration rates of the radioactive and stable gas species. Analysis of the samples concluded that the stable tracer SF6 was consistently enriched in the subsurface samples relative to the radiotracer 127Xe, but the ratios of SF6 and 37Ar remained similar throughout the samples.

Johnson, Christine M.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Quantitative Encapsulation and Homogeneity Assessment of Sol–Gel Based Nuclear Explosive Debris Simulants

Nuclear explosive debris simulants are an important material in training and validating aspects of post-detonation nuclear forensic processes. Realistic simulants should replicate several aspects of nuclear explosive debris such as the size, shape, color, density, and chemical and radiological properties. Silica particles produced via sol-gel synthesis have recently been found to successfully reproduce many of these parameters including the controllable incorporation of radionuclide content. However, to be useful as a benchmarking material for validation and verification of laboratory methodologies, radionuclide content from batch-to-batch must be reproducible. Here, in this work, we explore the variance in radionuclide distribution incorporated into sol-gel benchmarking materials with respect to sample subdivision. Results will help inform the sample sizes required to minimize variance between samples.

36 - MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2023

Radioxenon Detection for Monitoring Subsurface Nuclear Explosion

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans the testing of nuclear weapons anywhere on the earth (atmospheric, surface, underwater and subsurface). Identification of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, surface, and underwater is relatively straightforward considering a wide range of signatures resulting from such an event. However, for a subsurface explosion, most of the signatures traditionally associated with a nuclear explosion are not readily available. Therefore, the international community has increasingly relied on the atmospheric measurement of noble gases to identify subsurface nuclear weapon explosions. This chapter initially covers the basic principles of subsurface nuclear explosion identification and the importance of detecting radioxenon. This is followed by reviewing some of the early radioxenon detection systems that were developed by research groups around the world in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The detection media employed, results from laboratory and field testing, and some challenges/drawbacks for these systems are detailed. The next section of the chapter is dedicated to innovative detector concepts that have emerged in the past ten to fifteen years using novel detection material, algorithms, and signal readout techniques. The advances achieved in terms of energy resolution, coincidence detection efficiencies, system performance, and the minimum detectable concentration are covered. The final section goes over some of the potential improvements that can be incorporated in the design to enhance detector sensitivity and new detection material that can be explored in the field of radioxenon detection.

Gadey, Harish Reddy↗
DOE OSTI2020

Los Alamos National Laboratory Nuclear Explosives Safety Office - An Overview

Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Groups (NESSG) are convened to evaluate NEOs to determine if positive measures are adequate to meet the Standards as specified in DOE O 452.2E - Nuclear Explosive Safety, DOE O 452.4E – Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons, and NA SD 452.2.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

Transportable absolute yields of underground nuclear explosions. Application to the North Korean nuclear tests

The method developed and presented here improves our nuclear explosion monitoring capability by providing a new independent and transportable method to determine the explosive yields of seismically recorded events associated with foreign weapons development. Here we report new independent absolute yield and depth of burial estimates of the North Korean nuclear tests which are commensurate with previously determined source parameters. The key advantage of this method over other methods which estimate absolute explosive yields is that this method does not require any a priori calibration, and can be immediately applied to any region of interest. This method uses the source information obtained from the spectral ratios of envelopes of measured seismic coda waves to invert for model-derived yield and depth of burial. The only requirements of this method are that the region of interest must contain several (> 3) seismic sources which have been well recorded (SNR > 2) by a set of shared stations. For regions with only a few events (~ 3) and/or extremely band-limited observations for which the depth of burial is unknown, an earthquake with a known magnitude may be required to obtain an accurate and robust yield estimate.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2016

The history and outlook for seismic monitoring of nuclear explosions in the context of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Modern methods of nuclear-explosion monitoring are vastly more capable than they were when underground nuclear testing began in the late 1950s, in part because a cycle of improvements in explosion monitoring in the 1960–80 period led to improvements in monitoring for earthquakes and other phenomena, which then led to a general growth in monitoring assets that in turn has been applied back to explosion monitoring. Practical experiences in nuclear-explosion monitoring, acquired during the era of active testing prior to finalization of the CTBT text in 1996, laid the basis for monitoring in support of this arms-control initiative. This article elaborates on the future of nuclear-test-monitoring technology, which can build upon an additional and remarkable growth of general monitoring assets that began in the 1990s, largely unrelated to the specifics of nuclear-test monitoring. A new cycle of improvements in earthquake monitoring is likely to improve monitoring for explosions. While it is not easy to quantify the degree of monitoring improvement afforded by such new assets, an example from North Korea indicates the improvement can be substantial.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2017

135 Xe measurements with a two-element CZT-based radioxenon detector for nuclear explosion monitoring

Measurement of elevated concentrations of xenon radioisotopes ( 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133 Xe and 135 Xe) in the atmosphere has been shown to be a very powerful method for verifying whether or not a detected explosion is nuclear in nature. These isotopes are among the few with enough mobility and with half-lives long enough to make their detection at long distances realistic. Existing radioxenon detection systems used by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) suffer from problems such as complexity, need for high maintenance and memory effect. To study the response of CdZnTe (CZT) detectors to xenon radioisotopes and investigate whether it is capable of mitigating the afore-mentioned issues with the current radioxenon detection systems, a prototype detector utilizing two coplanar CZT detectors was built and tested at Oregon State University. The detection system measures xenon radioisotopes through beta-gamma coincidence technique by detecting coincidence events be-tween the two detectors. Here in this paper, we introduce the detector design and report our measurement results with radioactive lab sources and 135 Xe produced in the OSU TRIGA reactor. Minimum Detectable Concentration (MDC) for 135 Xe was calculated to be 1.47 ± 0.05 mBq/m 3 .

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗