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At least 19 records

Unmaking the Bomb: A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation

Achieving nuclear disarmament, stopping nuclear proliferation, and preventing nuclear terrorism are among the most critical challenges facing the world today. Unmaking the Bomb proposes a new approach to reaching these long-held goals. Rather than considering them as separate issues, the authors—physicists and experts on nuclear security—argue that all three of these goals can be understood and realized together if we focus on the production, stockpiling, and disposal of plutonium and highly enriched uranium—the fissile materials that are the key ingredients used to make nuclear weapons. The authors describe the history, production, national stockpiles, and current military and civilian uses of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and propose policies aimed at reducing and eventually eliminating these fissile materials worldwide. These include an end to the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons, an end to their use as reactor fuels, and the verified elimination of all national stockpiles.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nuclear disarmament verification via resonant phenomena

Nuclear disarmament treaties are not sufficient in and of themselves to neutralize the existential threat of the nuclear weapons. Technologies are necessary for verifying the authenticity of the nuclear warheads undergoing dismantlement before counting them toward a treaty partner’s obligation. In this work, we present a concept that leverages isotope-specific nuclear resonance phenomena to authenticate a warhead’s fissile components by comparing them to a previously authenticated template. All information is encrypted in the physical domain in a manner that amounts to a physical zero-knowledge proof system. Using Monte Carlo simulations, the system is shown to reveal no isotopic or geometric information about the weapon, while readily detecting hoaxing attempts. This nuclear technique can dramatically increase the reach and trustworthiness of future nuclear disarmament treaties.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Redefining the U.S. Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament, Analysis and Reflections

With Lewis Dunn’s paper on nuclear disarmament diplomacy, we are inaugurating a new monograph series under the auspices of the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The series will explore complex emerging challenges in the emerging security environment as they bear on issues of deterrence, assurance, and strategic stability. Our goal is to explore these issues deeply enough to provide significant new understanding that is technically informed and policy relevant. Our premise is that thoughtful students of international security affairs continue to value such in-depth analysis as a way to help make sense of the large flow of data and opinion that reaches all of us on a daily basis. Our ambition is to generate four to six such papers per year on especially salient topics. The views expressed in these papers are those of the author and should not be attributed to the Center, the Laboratory, or the U.S. government. This inaugural paper addresses one of the key questions facing national leadership seven to eight years after President Obama’s April 2009 remarks in Prague and his commitment to take practical steps towards the long-term goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons. In the interim, some important steps have been taken. But there have also been many disappointments. The new presidential administration will face a security landscape quite different from that of eight years ago and must reassess U.S. priorities and approaches. As Lewis Dunn argues, some will be tempted to walk away entirely from the disarmament agenda, while others will advocate even more forcefully for unilateral U.S. steps to further reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons in its posture. Dr. Dunn sets out his own vision of how to adapt and carry forward the disarmament agenda, in a manner informed by developments in the security environment that point to a continuing role for nuclear deterrence. The result is both fresh and compelling.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

International Legal Framework for Denuclearization and Nuclear Disarmament -- Present Situation and Prospects

This thesis is the culminating project for my participation in the OECD NEA International School of Nuclear Law. This paper will begin by providing a historical background to current disarmament and denuclearization treaties. This paper will discuss the current legal framework based on current and historical activities related to denuclearization and nuclear disarmament. Then, it will propose paths forward for the future efforts, and describe the necessary legal considerations. Each treaty or agreement will be examined in respect to its requirements for: 1) limitations and implementation; 2) and verification and monitoring. Then, lessons learned in each of the two areas (limitations and verification) will be used to construct a proposed path forward at the end of this paper.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Lessons from Past Nuclear Disarmament: What Worked What Did Not

This report studies the efforts of the international community and the United States to verif)/ the denuclearization of various countries: Ukraine, South Africa, Iraq, Taiwan, and Libya. In doing so, it considers the verification of nuclear warhead destruction and the accounting of nuclear materials. Each case study contributes to the understanding we have of which verification procedures worked and which did not and what factors contributed to that success and which did not. The most important factor contributing to successful verification is the cooperation of the subject country. If a country has made the strategic decision to cooperate, then it is possible that verification can be successful. If the country chooses not to cooperate, verification might rest on random and unpredictable events. This unpredictability of verification is politically unacceptable. Even if verification is judged to be successful by the implementing agencies, outsiders can cast doubts on it by pointing out small and potentially unavoidable errors in material amounts verified. It is vitally important to systematically preserve forensic evidence, especially shipping and receiving records to avoid just such issues. Historically, such records are the most important evidence in verifying denuclearization. Technology is far less important than forensic analysis of records. It does play a supporting role in verifying some declarations but there can be an enormous delay in drawing conclusions caused by the necessity to analyze statistically large samples of materials. The confidence one gets from such analysis can be delayed well past the time it is politically significant. The most important advance in technology would be to accelerate that sample analysis process.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Optimizing a detection system for fissile material in nuclear disarmament verification

In arms control treaties, verification plays a crucial role in detecting non-compliance, deterring future violations, and building trust between state parties. Neutron interrogation that induces fission reactions in fissile isotopes and measures the resulting fission neutrons, could be employed for this purpose. This study aims to develop a system which can determine the presence of fissile material while intrinsically protecting information. In this paper, we focus on optimizing the system for discriminating between an enriched uranium block from a depleted uranium (DU) block. The system was built and we report on benchmark measurements with DU and 16% enriched uranium blocks. Furthermore, the Excalibur (Experiment for Calibration with Uranium) neutron source, a neutron spectrometer (redBubble Technology Industries (BTI) N-Probe), and superheated droplet detectors were used for these measurements. MCNP simulations provided insights into detector responses to fissile materials with varying isotopic compositions, confirming that the system functioned as designed.

Active neutron interrogation↗

Verification of Arms Control Treaties with Resonance Phenomena

Nuclear disarmament treaties remain insufficient to neutralize the existential threat of the nuclear weapons. Technologies are necessary for verifying the authenticity of the nuclear warheads undergoing dismantlement before counting them toward a treaty partner’s obligation. Here we present a review of concepts involving isotope-specific resonance processes, Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence (NRF) [1] and Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) [2, 3], used to authenticate a warhead’s fissile components by comparing them to a previously authenticated template. All information is encrypted in the physical domain by the addition of an encrypting filter to the target, leading to measurements with an outcome similar to an equation with two unknowns. Using Monte Carlo simulations and experiments we show that the measurements readily detect hoaxing attempt, while no vital isotopic or geometric information about the weapon is released. These nuclear techniques can be used to dramatically increase the reach and trustworthiness of future nuclear disarmament treaties.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A disarmament agenda

Three members of an independent multinational body that analyzes issues related to nuclear disarmament, arms control, and nonproliferation share their views.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

On Theories of Change: Rethinking the Ban Treaty and Disarmament Strategies

A week before Israel bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Rafael Grossi had lunch with the Financial Times. In the interview, Grossi expressed both optimism and pessimism about the nuclear landscape: he was hopeful about prospects for diplomacy, including with Iran. But he also expressed longer-term concerns about a proliferation cascade and rising nuclear risks, in particular, Russia’s nuclear threats amidst the war in Ukraine. “In the past, this was quite taboo,” he said, “but now people talk about tactical nuclear weapons like something which could be contained or permissible.” Given subsequent events in Iran, along with the expiration of New START in 2026 and expanding nuclear arsenals in Russia and China, pessimism would seem to trump hope for prospects for nuclear disarmament.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Integrating nuclear weapons stockpile management and nuclear arms control to enable significant stockpile reductions

In his 2009 Prague speech and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, President Barack Obama committed the United States to take concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. There is an inherent tension between these two goals that is best addressed through improved integration of nuclear weapons objectives with nuclear arms control objectives. This article reviews historical examples of the interaction between the two sets of objectives, develops a framework for analyzing opportunities for future integration, and suggests specific ideas that could benefit the nuclear weapons enterprise as it undergoes transformation and that could make the future enterprise compatible with a variety of arms control futures.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Nuclear Warhead Verification: A Review of Attribute and Template Systems

Verification of current nuclear arms control treaties between United States and Russia relies primarily on the verification of delivery vehicles. Warheads are counted indirectly via the delivery vehicles that they are associated with. As states move to lower numbers of nuclear weapons in their arsenals, verification will likely pose complex challenges. Most importantly, future nuclear disarmament treaties may place limits on the total number of nuclear weapons in the arsenals. Their verification would require inspections of individual nuclear warheads without revealing secret information. By confirming the authenticity of nuclear warheads and perhaps also of warhead components we show the verification challenge for future reductions in the nuclear arsenals. Our paper provides an overview of the development of verification systems, and highlights the challenges and the opportunities for future research in this area.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Verifying disarmament: scientific, technological and political challenges

There is growing interest in, and hopes for, nuclear disarmament in governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) around the world. If a nuclear-weapon-free world is to be achievable, verification and compliance will be critical. VerifYing disarmament would have unprecedented scientific, technological and political challenges. Verification would have to address warheads, components, materials, testing, facilities, delivery capabilities, virtual capabilities from existing or shutdown nuclear weapon and existing nuclear energy programs and material and weapon production and related capabilities. Moreover, it would likely have far more stringent requirements. The verification of dismantlement or elimination of nuclear warheads and components is widely recognized as the most pressing problem. There has been considerable research and development done in the United States and elsewhere on warhead and dismantlement transparency and verification since the early 1990s. However, we do not today know how to verifY low numbers or zero. We need to develop the needed verification tools and systems approaches that would allow us to meet this complex set of challenges. There is a real opportunity to explore verification options and, given any realistic time frame for disarmament, there is considerable scope to invest resources at the national and international levels to undertake research, development and demonstrations in an effort to address the anticipated and perhaps unanticipated verification challenges of disarmament now andfor the next decades. Cooperative approaches have the greatest possibility for success.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗