Planetary Protection for the Mars Sample Return Project
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Report of the Workshop for Life Detection in Samples from Mars
The question of whether there is or was life on Mars has been one of the most pivotal since Schiaparellis' telescopic observations of the red planet. With the advent of the space age, this question can be addressed directly by exploring the surface of Mars and by bringing samples to Earth for analysis. The latter, however, is not free of problems. Life can be found virtually everywhere on Earth. Hence the potential for contaminating the Mars samples and compromising their scientific integrity is not negligible. Conversely, if life is present in samples from Mars, this may represent a potential source of extraterrestrial biological contamination for Earth. A range of measures and policies, collectively termed 'planetary protection', are employed to minimise risks and thereby prevent undesirable consequences for the terrestrial biosphere. This report documents discussions and conclusions from a workshop held in 2012, which followed a public conference focused on current capabilities for performing life-detection studies on Mars samples. The workshop focused on the evaluation of Mars samples that would maximise scientific productivity and inform decision making in the context of planetary protection. Workshop participants developed a strong consensus that the same measurements could be employed to effectively inform both science and planetary protection, when applied in the context of two competing hypotheses: 1) that there is no detectable life in the samples; or 2) that there is martian life in the samples. Participants then outlined a sequence for sample processing and defined analytical methods that would test these hypotheses. They also identified critical developments to enable the analysis of samples from Mars.
Life Detection↗
Robotic and Crewed Mars Missions Increasing the Demand for Planetary Protection Technology Needs
Planetary protection (PP) policy seeks to avoid harmful contamination by limiting biological and relevant organic contamination from spacecraft as well as preventing adverse changes to Earth’s biosphere when extraterrestial samples are brought back to Earth. The PP policy at NASA was updated in 2021 (NPR 8715.24) and 2022 (NASA-STD-8719.27) to enable missions by expanding the decades old prescriptive requirements to allow for an option of adopting performance-based requirements that are objectivesdriven, risk-informed and case-assured. In parallel, the final PP knowledge gap workshop was completed representing the international consensus on the key areas to be considered in developing crew PP policy. These knowledge gaps focused on key technology development areas in 1) microbial and human health monitoring, 2) technical and operations needed for contamination control and 3) natural transport of contamination on Mars. As robotic missions start to implement performance-based approaches and research and technology efforts commence to inform crew policy the demand for data quality driven verification and validation in relevant space environments. Examples of the types of testing that is envisioned includes test as you fly validation and verification of decontamination systems in a relevant on-orbit and Mars environment, developing lethality curves of terrestrial organisms to further our understanding of the biocidal impacts of Mars and the space environment, and particle transport model validation and verification. Thus, the PP discipline has identified the need for groundbased space environments to perform preliminary testing as validation and verification of flight systems and to advance the technology readiness level prior to further testing on-orbit or lunar environments to prepare for Mars.
J. Nick Benardini↗
Robotic and Crewed Mars Missions Increasing the Demand for Planetary Protection Technology Needs
Planetary protection (PP) policy seeks to avoid harmful contamination by limiting biological and relevant organic contamination from spacecraft as well as preventing adverse changes to Earth’s biosphere when extraterrestrial samples are brought back to Earth. The PP policy at NASA was updated in 2021 (NPR 8715.24) and 2022 (NASA-STD-8719.27) to enable missions by expanding the decades old prescriptive requirements to allow for an option of adopting performance-based requirements that are objectives-driven, risk-informed and case-assured. In parallel, the final PP knowledge gap workshop was completed representing the international consensus on the key areas to be considered in developing crew PP policy. These knowledge gaps focused on key technology development areas in 1) microbial and human health monitoring, 2) technical and operations needed for contamination control and 3) natural transport of contamination on Mars. As robotic missions start to implement performance-based approaches and research and technology efforts commence to inform crew policy the demand for data quality driven verification and validation in relevant space environments. Examples of the types of testing that is envisioned includes test as you fly validation and verification of decontamination systems in a relevant on-orbit and Mars environment, developing lethality curves of terrestrial organisms to further our understanding of the biocidal impacts of Mars and the space environment, and particle transport model validation and verification. Thus, the PP discipline has identified the need for ground-based space environments to perform preliminary testing as validation and verification of flight systems and to advance the technology readiness level prior to further testing on-orbit or lunar environments to prepare for Mars.
J Nick Benardini↗
Mars Sample Receiving Facility Research and Development to Enable Preservation, Safe Containment, and Scientific Research of Martian Samples on Earth
NASA and ESA are working together to plan a joint campaign to potentially bring back the first Martian samples to Earth in the early 2030s. On the surface of Mars, the Mars 2020Perseverance Rover is selecting and packaging samples that could be returned to Earth for careful examination by an international team of scientists. In preparation for this historic sample return, advance planning is underway to design and build a Mars Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) in the mid-2020s. In 2022, a Mars Sample Receiving Facility Assessment Study(MSAS) will be conducted to further define construction modality and capability options for a facility in the conterminous United States. Since Mars Sample Return (MSR) is currently categorized as a planetary protection restricted Earth return, this new facility would feature biosafety level 4 (BSL-4)-like high containment to protect Earth’s biosphere from any potential hazard. In addition, the facility also requires integration of cleanroom technologies to mitigate against terrestrial contamination and preserve sample integrity for science investigations. The integration of both clean handling and high containment requires significant technology research and development (R&D) by the mid-2020s to support the definition and planning of a SRF before commencing the site specific design phase. The SRF project will need to solidify the inorganic, organic, and biological contamination control (CC) requirements for the facility. This could entail a translation of Mars 2020 mission CC requirements for geologic material to engineering requirements for surfaces and airborne molecular contamination inside isolators and cleanrooms. In tandem, the project will need to determine precision cleaning and sterilization approaches for cleanrooms, isolators, equipment, and tools. Initial material selections for the facility construction materials, cleanrooms, isolators, and BSL-4 suits/garments are an important activity. The recent construction of the OSIRIS-REx and Hayabusa2 curation cleanroom laboratories greatly benefited from early materials testing, before the design phase, to reduced organic outgassing and particulate shedding inside the laboratory. While the early biohazard investigations in the SRF may deem the samples safe to release to laboratories throughout the world, sterilization methods need to be defined to safely release Martian samples. One key aspect of enabling simultaneous sample containment and cleanliness is the concept of a Double-Walled Isolator (DWI) that ESA has been pursuing. Further R&D is needed about DWIs, sample handling, and instrumentation interfaces before beginning the SRF site specific design phase. A working isolator/DWI engineering model should be developed and fabricated. Isolator sizes, connections, pass-through antechambers, and configurations and basic interfaces with instruments and tools as well as the use of robotic, mechanical, and/or human manipulation need to be considered. Inert high purity gas supply (one-pass or recirculation) and other isolator utilities must be determined. Special accommodations for large instruments (e.g., XCT,SEM, etc.) need to be developed. Techniques for opening the sample tubes packaged by M2020and extracting the headspace gas while keeping samples pristine will be challenging, requiring additional R&D, and engagement of the M2020 project. In addition, careful micromanipulation for subdivision and packaging of samples will also need to be included. These combined R&D activities are important before commencing the SRF design phase to ensure safe biohazard containment, sample preservation, and science integrity for the samples that would be studied in the SRF and in laboratories around the world.
mars sample return↗
Mars Sample Return: Considerations for the Curation of Astromaterials from a Restricted Planet
The joint NASA/ESA Mars Sample Return (MSR) campaign is underway. The Perseverance Rover has already collected a returnable sample suite currently cached at Three Forks and the pairs to these samples are stored on the Rover with more compelling samples planned to be collected. The MSR collection would represent the most geologically diverse astromaterial collection ever returned and should provide information on topics ranging from Martian geological and biological history to Martian environmental hazards and in situ resource utilization to support potential human exploration. Although Jezero Crater and the surrounding area are not Mars special regions, the scientific opinion is that Mars as a whole is of significant interest to the process of chemical evolution and/or the origin of life. Therefore, due to possibility, however remote, that the samples could contain extraterrestrial life, MSR is classified as a Category V: Restricted Earth Return mission by the NASA Planetary Protection Office. As a result of this classification, a MSR Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) must not only provide a pristine environment to ensure samples are protected from terrestrial contamination for scientific investigations, but it must also provide high-containment to isolate the samples from Earth’s biosphere until the samples are deemed safe for release and/or sterilized.
Mars Sample Return↗
Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series: Workshop 2
Numerous NASA reports and studies have identified Planetary Protection (PP) as an important part of any Mars sample return mission. The mission architecture, hardware, on-board experiments, and related activities must be designed in ways that prevent both forward- and back-contamination and also ensure maximal return of scientific information. A key element of any PP effort for sample return missions is the development of guidelines for containment and analysis of returned sample(s). As part of that effort, NASA and the Space Studies Board (SSB) of the National Research Council (NRC) have each assembled experts from a wide range of scientific fields to identify and discuss issues pertinent to sample return. In 1997, the SSB released its report on recommendations for handling and testing of returned Mars samples. In particular, the NRC recommended that: a) samples returned from Mars by spacecraft should be contained and treated as potentially hazardous until proven otherwise, and b) rigorous physical, chemical, and biological analyses [should] confirm that there is no indication of the presence of any exogenous biological entity. Also in 1997, a Mars Sample Quarantine Protocol workshop was convened at NASA Ames Research Center to deal with three specific aspects of the initial handling of a returned Mars sample: 1) biocontainment, to prevent 'uncontrolled release' of sample material into the terrestrial environment; 2) life detection, to examine the sample for evidence of organisms; and 3) biohazard testing, to determine if the sample poses any threat to terrestrial life forms and the Earth's biosphere. In 1999, a study by NASA's Mars Sample Handling and Requirements Panel (MSHARP) addressed three other specific areas in anticipation of returning samples from Mars: 1) sample collection and transport back to Earth; 2) certification of the samples as non-hazardous; and 3) sample receiving, curation, and distribution. To further refine the requirements for sample hazard testing and the criteria for subsequent release of sample materials from quarantine, the NASA Planetary Protection Officer convened an additional series of workshops beginning in March 2000. The overall objective of these workshops was to develop comprehensive protocols to assess whether the returned materials contain any biological hazards, and to safeguard the purity of the samples from possible terrestrial contamination. This document is the report of the second Workshop in the Series. The information herein will ultimately be integrated into a final document reporting the proceedings of the entire Workshop Series along with additional information and recommendations.
Rummel, John D.↗
Mars Sample Return (MSR) Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) Assessment Study (MSAS)
The Mars Sample Return (MSR) campaign, initiated in 2020 with the launch of the Per-severance Rover, is an international partnership be-tween NASA and the European Space Agency (ESA) to return Martian geological samples to Earth for scientific study in the early 2030s. Not only is MSR the first mission to bring samples back to Earth from an-other planet, it is the first time since Apollo 14to have a mission classified as a Category V: Restricted Earth Return by the NASA Planetary Protection Office due to the possibility that the samples could harbor extra-terrestrial life. As a result of this classification, the Sample Receiving Facility (SRF)must not only pro-vide a pristine environment to ensure samples are protected from terrestrial contamination for scientific investigations, it must also provide high-containment (biosafety level 4 [BSL-4]-equivalence)to isolate the samples from Earth’s biosphere until the samples are deemed safe for release and/or sterilized.
Mars Sample Return↗
Lessons Learned in Designing A Proposed Ultraviolet Sterilization System for Space
This paper presents a number of lessons learned while designing a proposed sterilization system for Mars Sample Return. This sterilization system is needed to inactivate any potentially hazardous Mars material on the exterior surface of the vessel containing sealed sample tubes filled with Mars rock cores, regolith and atmosphere. These returned samples would provide information on the geologic history of Mars, the evolution of its climate and the potential for ancient life. Mars Sample Return is categorized at Planetary Protection Category V Restricted Earth Return, so it is required to protect the Earth–Moon system from the biological impact of returning samples from Mars to Earth. This article reviews lessons learned in the development of a particular engineering implementation to support the protection of the Earth–Moon biosphere: the use of in situ ultraviolet LED illumination. The details of the biological efficacy of this approach or the policy-related impacts are outside of the scope of this manuscript. The lessons learned presented here include establishing design requirements for the system, the selection of a light source, optical design options, contamination control and approaches to thermal and power management.
Planetary Protection↗
Mars Sample Return (MSR) Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) Assessment Study (MSAS)
NASA, in partnership with the European Space Agency (ESA), is seeking to return Martian geological and atmospheric samples to Earth for scientific study in the early 2030s. Due to the possibility that the samples could contain extraterrestrial life, Mars Sample Return (MSR) is classified as a Category V: Restricted Earth Return mission by the NASA Planetary Protection Office. As a result of this classification, a MSR Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) must not only provide a pristine environment to ensure samples are protected from terrestrial contamination for scientific investigations, it must also provide high-containment (biosafety level 4 [BSL-4]-equivalence) to isolate the samples from Earth’s biosphere until the samples are deemed safe for release and/or sterilized. The nominal utilization period for a SRF is anticipated to be 2-5 years and is intended to enable curation activities, biohazard assessment, select early science activities, and the rapid release of samples to the scientific community. However, to account for possible delays in schedule or the identification of extant life, this anticipated period of time must be flexible to accommodate schedule extensions and contingency plans. Due to requirements for high-level biological containment and cleanliness, a traditional receiving/curation facility cannot be utilized for MSR. Therefore, beginning in 2022, NASA Johnson Space Center is performing a MSR SRF Assessment Study (MSAS) to investigate the most optimal facility modality for a MSR SRF, as well as start to define programmatic early estimate of costs and schedules before the initial design phase begins. NASA is partnering with industry contractors (architectural and engineering firms with BSL-4 and cleanroom technology experience, as well as other contracted infrastructure and construction specialists) along with selected experts from NASA, ESA, existing U.S. BSL-4 facilities, and other U.S. government agencies, to carry out the assessment study. The MSAS should also aid in the future refinement of the science requirements (e.g., contamination control, equipment accommodations) before site-specific design would commence. As part of the MSAS, NASA is planning to assess an array of possibilities for a MSR SRF. One of the main considerations is the facility modality and whether an existing BSL-4 facility can be utilized (for some or all functions); or, if new constructure would be required, would a traditional fixed facility or a modular facility the best choice. MSAS will also investigate the ability of the modalities to accommodate two different facility capability endmembers: 1) a minimal facility focusing on biohazard assessment and curation tasks with a small footprint, and 2) an enhanced facility with additional capabilities to enable expedited processing and the completion of time-sensitive and (some) sterilization-sensitive science. The assessment is intended to generate information that will inform the selection of facility modalities for high-level conceptual design development. While the assessment study will focus on SRF requirements for accommodating curation, science, and sample safety assessment infrastructure, it will also consider an array of other factors, such as ease of access for international users, decommissioning, repurposing, future sale or lease following MSR’s use of the facility, and uncontained preparatory laboratory spaces. Upon completion of the study, the preferred modality and refined requirements would be utilized for site-specific design but will not be finalized until NASA’s completion of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process.
A.D. Harrington↗
MSR Curation Technology Development – Developing Protocols for Pre-Basic Characterization Measurements
The joint NASA/ESA Mars Sample Return (MSR) campaign could deliver to Earth the first pristine Mar-tian rock and regolith samples, collected by the Mars2020 science mission, Perseverance. In preparation for their arrival, the NASA/ESA Joint Curation Office (JCO) within the Sample Receiving Project (SRP) is developing curation technology needed to perform initial characterization of the samples while isolating samples from the Earth’s biosphere and protecting the samples from terrestrial contamination. (RSTA; Fig. 1). The Mars Sample Return Planning Group 2 (MSPG2) identified methods for achieving an array of potential science objectives for MSR outlined by the International MSR Objectives and Samples Team (iMOST) [1]. One category of methods, called Pre-Basic Characterization, recommends potential analyses that would happen before the Returnable Sample Tube Assemblies (RSTA; Figure 1) are opened: 1) Magnetometer & Magnetic Susceptibility; 2) X-ray Computed Tomography (XCT) Scanner [2]. To be in compliance with planetary protection requirements, and to limit the amount of time sample tubes are out-side of an isolated contamination-controlled environment, secondary containment is necessary. A Sample Tube Isolation Container (STIC) and Secondary Outer Containment Case (SOCC) is currently being developed at NASA JPL under the direction of the SRP JCO.
V Tu↗
The Antaeus Project - An orbital quarantine facility for analysis of planetary return samples
A design is presented for an earth-orbiting facility for the analysis of planetary return samples under conditions of maximum protection against contamination but minimal damage to the sample. The design is keyed to a Mars sample return mission profile, returning 1 kg of documented subsamples, to be analyzed in low earth orbit by a small crew aided by automated procedures, tissue culture and microassay. The facility itself would consist of Spacelab shells, formed into five modules of different sizes with purposes of power supply, habitation, supplies and waste storage, the linking of the facility, and both quarantine and investigation of the samples. Three barriers are envisioned to protect the biosphere from any putative extraterrestrial organisms: sealed biological containment cabinets within the Laboratory Module, the Laboratory Module itself, and the conditions of space surrounding the facility.
Sweet, H. C.↗
Life Beyond the Planet of Origin and Implications for the Search for Life on Mars
Outer space is vast, cold, devoid of matter, radiation filled with essentially no gravity. These factors present an environmental challenge for any form of life. Earth's biosphere has evolved for more than 3 billion years shielded from the hostile environment of outer space by the protective blanket of the atmosphere and magnetosphere. Space is a nutritional wasteland with no liquid water and readily available organic carbon. Moving beyond a life's planet of origin requires a means for transport, the ability to withstand transport, and the ability to colonize, thrive and ultimately evolve in the new environment. Can life survive beyond its home planet? The key to answering this question is to identify organisms that first have the ability to withstand space radiation, space vacuum desiccation and time in transit, and second the ability to grow in an alien environment. Within the last 60 years space technology allowed us to transport life beyond Earth's protective shield so we may study, in situ, their responses to selected conditions of space. To date a variety of microbes ranging from viruses, to Bacteria, to Archaea, to Eukarya have been tested in the space environment. Most died instantly, but not all. These studies revealed that ultraviolet radiation is the near-term lethal agent, while hard radiation is the long-term lethal agent when the organism is shielded from ultraviolet radiation. In fact, bacterial spores, halophilic cyanobacteria and Archaea as well as some lichens survive very well if protected from ultraviolet radiation [1]. Some microbes, then, may be able to survive the trip in outer space to Mars on a spacecraft or in a meteorite. Once on Mars can a terrestrial microbe survive? Although the conditions on Mars are not as harsh as those in space, they are not hospitable for a terrestrial microbe. Studies, however, have shown that certain microbes that can survive in space for several years may also be able to survive on Mars if protected from ultraviolet radiation [1]. Laboratory simulation experiments using a mock-up of the Phoenix lander have shown that microbes transported to the surface of Mars on a spacecraft come off the spacecraft and mix into the Martian regolith [2]. Additionally, studies simulating Martian dust storms demonstrate that microbes can survive in the Martian wind blown dust and be scattered across the Martian surface away from the spacecraft. Would these microbes that may survive on Mars metabolize and propagate? Growth requires liquid water, a carbon source and an energy source. Survival on Mars also requires protection from ultraviolet radiation. In the cold, dry environment of Mars the probability of microbial metabolism and growth at or just beneath the surface is extremely low. Although the probability is low, Mars may be contaminated with potentially live terrestrial organisms. In light of that statistic we must be extremely diligent and cautious in our search for Martian life. If we are not cautious we may find life on Mars and it may be a contaminant from Earth.
Survival in Space↗