Mars Odyssey mapping orbit determination
This paper presents the orbit determination strategy employed by the Odyssey navigation team, as well as the major navigation challenges and accomplishments.
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This paper presents the orbit determination strategy employed by the Odyssey navigation team, as well as the major navigation challenges and accomplishments.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
The twin Mars Exploration Rovers, Spirit and Opportunity, were launched on June 10, 2003(dagger), and July 8, 2003, from Cape Canaveral, Florida. Spirit and Opportunity were targeted for landings at Gusev Crater (arrival on January 4, 2004) and Meridiani Planum (arrival on January 25, 2004). The primary navigation challenge was to deliver each spacecraft to the desired atmospheric entry interface point with sufficient accuracy such that each lander would touch down within a specified landing ellipse (about 70 km x 5 km) determined to be safe for landing and also judged to be scientifically interesting. In order to achieve landing within the target ellipse, precise control of the inertial entry flight path angle (FPA) at atmospheric entry was required. The maximum allowable errors in FPA following TCM-5 (trajectory correction maneuver #5) at Entry (E) - 2 days were +/-0.12(deg) (3(sigma)) for Spirit and +/-0.14(deg) (3(sigma)) for Opportunity. Achieving these entry delivery accuracies necessitated significant improvements to the interplanetary avigation system used for MER. These improvements included new processes and software for orbit determination, propulsive maneuver design, and entry, descent, and landing (EDL) trajectory simulation. The actual achieved atmospheric entry accuracies for Spirit and Opportunity significantly exceeded the requirements. At the navigation data cutoff for the TCM-5 final design, the orbit determination FPA knowledge error was +/-0.028(deg) (3(sigma) ) for Spirit and +/-0.035(deg) (3(sigma)) for Opportunity. Because of exceptionally accurate navigation performance, TCM-5 (E - 2 days) and TCM-6 (E - 4 hours) were canceled for both Spirit and Opportunity. The actual landing locations (determined from in-situ Doppler tracking between the MER rovers and the Mars Odyssey orbiter) differed from the target landing points by 10.1 km (downtrack) for Spirit and 24.6 km (downtrack) for Opportunity. The majority of the landing position offsets for both landers was primarily caused by variations in atmosphere and spacecraft aerodynamic modeling from what was predicted. The amount of the landing position offset caused by navigation-only errors was only 3.3 km (uptrack) for Spirit and 9.7 km (downtrack) for Opportunity.
This paper will discuss the orbit determination processes and results of Mars Odyssey from launch to orbit insertion at Mars.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
The twin Mars Exploration Rovers, Spirit and Opportunity, were launched on June 10, 2003, and July 8, 2003, from Cape Canaveral, Florida. Spirit and Opportunity were targeted for landings at Gusev Crater (arrival on January 4, 2004) and Meridiani Planum (arrival on January 25, 2004). The primary navigation challenge was to deliver each spacecraft to the desired atmospheric entry interface point with sufficient accuracy such that each lander would touch down within a specified landing ellipse (about 70 km x 5 km) determined to be safe for landing and also judged to be scientifically interesting. In order to achieve landing within the target ellipse, precise control of the inertial entry flight path angle (FPA) at atmospheric entry was required. The maximum allowable errors in FPA following TCM-5 (trajectory correction maneuver #5) at Entry (E) -2 days were +/-0.12 deg(3 sigma) for Spirit and +/-0.14 deg(3 sigma) for Opportunity. Achieving these entry delivery accuracies necessitated significant improvements to the interplanetary navigation system used for MER. These improvements included new processes and software for orbit determination, propulsive maneuver design, and entry, descent, and landing (EDL) trajectory simulation. The actual achieved atmospheric entry accuracies for Spirit and Opportunity significantly exceeded the requirements. At the navigation data cutoff for the TCM-5 final design, the orbit determination FPA knowledge error was 0.028 deg(3 sigma) for Spirit and 0.035 deg(3 sigma) for Opportunity. Because of exceptionally accurate navigation performance, TCM-5 (E - 2 days) and TCM-6 (E - 4 hours) were canceled for both Spirit and Opportunity. The actual landing locations (determined from in-situ Doppler tracking between the MER rovers and the Mars Odyssey orbiter) differed from the target landing points by 10.1 km (downtrack) for Spirit and 24.6 km (downtrack) for Opportunity. The majority of the landing position offsets for both landers was primarily caused by variations in atmosphere and spacecraft aerodynamic modeling from what was predicted. The amount of the landing position offset caused by navigation-only errors was only 3.3 km (uptrack) for Spirit and 9.7 km (downtrack) for Opportunity.