Finding my Drumbeat: Applying Lessons Learned from Remo Ruffini to Understanding Astrophysical Transients
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This is the lessons learned powerpoint from the InSPIRE teams participation in the Department of Energy's Clean Energy to Communities Program.
Historically, regulatory barriers have precluded nuclear plant safety-related (SR) Instrumentation and Control (I&C) system modernizations. These barriers have been largely addressed by industry and United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts, including development of the License Amendment Request (LAR) Alternate Review (AR) process for digital I&C upgrades. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) are supporting a SR I&C pilot upgrade at the Limerick Generating Station (LGS) to demonstrate this process and capturing associated lessons learned for the benefit of industry. In 2021, a paper summarizing lessons learned as captured in INL/EXT-20-59809, Safety Related Instrumentation & Control Pilot Upgrade Initial Scoping Phase Implementation Report and Lessons Learned was presented at the 12th NPIC & HMIT conference. It is recommended that readers of this paper review reference 1 or the associated Nuclear Journal paper for context. This paper summarizes activities performed and lessons learned for the conceptual design phase and portions of the detailed design phase as captured in INL/RPT-23-XXXX, “Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Pilot Upgrade: Conceptual - Detailed Design Phase Report and Lessons Learned.” The portions of the effort covered by reference 2 include conceptual design phase activities from December 2020, through completion in November 2021, and detailed design activities through September 2022. These efforts and associated detailed documentation in reference 3 are intended to support similar industry upgrades as a foundation stone for a Digital Transformation that will improve plant safety, reliability, and operational performance while lowering plant total cost of ownership.
This paper presents lessons learned regarding fabricating packaging systems from the perspective of a design authority (DA). Capturing and implementing lessons learned is critical for an organization to reduce systematic project risk and thereby promote the likelihood of project success. This paper defines the design authority as the organization responsible for technical design, resolving technical design issues, quality assurance program, and maintenance of the packaging system license. A package system is defined as the packaging, its contents, and auxiliary equipment. Packages are certified by the NRC under 10 CFR 71[1] for transportation by ground. The following lessons learned subjects are presented in the paper: quality assurance, interpretation of drawing dimensional requirements, execution of manufacturing processes, hardware dimensional inspection, and leakage rate testing. All discrepancies presented in this paper have been resolved as described in the appropriate final data package. All described package systems are in compliance with their Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and certificate of conformance requirements. The intent of this paper is to identify opportunities for improving the outcome of future projects and to mitigate fabrication challenges proactively. (authors)
This report captures lessons learned, best practices, and frequently asked questions with responses gleaned from the experiences of early adopters of the LMP RIPB process. Interviews were conducted in late 2019 with five non-LWR design organizations to gather their feedback on the application of the LMP RIPB process under real production conditions. The overall feedback from the reactor developers is that the LMP RIPB process can be successfully implemented with material benefits to the designer. As with any new processes, numerous challenges and questions were relayed by the designers. These challenges have been translated into lessons learned and best practices. Those two sections address both technical and organizational aspects of implementing the LMP RIPB process. Questions that were asked by multiple designers were turned into “frequently asked questions” and responses were provided by the LMP team.
ExxonMobil Research and Engineering Company, via a technical services agreement, engages Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to provide general industry knowledge, best practices, and lessons learned in cellulosic ethanol plant design, project execution, and operations. INL will also assess publicly proposed cellulosic plant designs. The scope of work will be accomplished in three tasks: Task 1, Communicate industry knowledge; Task 2, Present high-level lessons learned; Task 3, Provide an engineering assessment of publicly proposed ethanol plant designs. This Task 1 report provides a high-level summary of general industry knowledge, best practice, and lessons learned in biomass feedstock logistics and integration with bioconversion processes.
This panel focused on challenges and lessons learned in radioactive waste packaging, transportation, compliance, and receipt for fabricators of radioactive waste packaging. World-wide companies are urged to participate. Participants provided their perspectives and suggestions on how to increase efficiencies through eliminating inconsistencies between specifications and other requirements to provide products at a reasonable cost and enhance communication to enable better service. Panelists with presentations: PACTEC (Bill Smart); Waste Packaging Strategy and Challenges at Whiteshell (Miles Smith); Challenges and Lessons Learned in Radwaste Packaging, Transportation, Compliance and Receipt (Dan Payne)
This document describes lessons learned during my nearly 20 years of experience in International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) meetings and in the development of several evaluations employing the IPEN/MB-01 reactor. The evaluations cover a wide range of possible configurations at the reactor core of this facility. Most of the evaluations are related to critical configurations, although two of them concern subcritical measurements. Examples of the evaluations submitted and approved for ICSBEP publication are the critical configurations employed in the standard core; critical configurations employing heavy reflectors composed of stainless steel, nickel, and carbon steel; and critical configurations employing the standard fuel rods and fuel rods composed of UO 2 -Gd 2 O 3 , among several others. Additionally, this document addresses good practices for the development of ICSBEP evaluations; the intention is to help beginners who are going to start evaluations for ICSBEP. The sections of the ICSBEP evaluation are described and illustrated with several examples.
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC), a Jacobs owned company, is making significant progress demolishing the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), which has long been known as one of the most hazardous buildings in the DOE Environmental Management Complex (DOE Complex). The facility is located on the Hanford Site and produced plutonium metal during the Cold War. Production was stopped in 1989, the facility was formally shut down in 1996, and material processing was completed in 2004. After approximately 25 years of demolition preparations, open-air demolition of the main portions of the Hazard Category II nuclear facility began in November 2016. To prepare the PFP for demolition, CHPRC employees performed some of the most hazardous work across the DOE Complex. In addition to extensive demolition preparations, including a wide-reaching communication strategy across the Hanford Site, CHPRC implemented robust controls and monitoring during demolition, and when necessary, adjusted demolition practices and sequence to maintain employee safety and project efficiency. Demolition of the main PFP building began in November 2016. The technical complexity, high hazards and radiological concerns have all led to a difficult demolition environment. Following a spread of contamination at the project site beyond the radiological boundaries in December 2017, work was halted and a recovery plan was generated to allow the demolition work to continue. After the implementation of additional controls and concurrence from regulatory agencies and DOE, the demolition was ready to resume work and reinitiated in August 2018. There are a number of lessons learned from the demolition activities and recovery plan process. This paper allows CHPRC and DoE's Richland Operations Office (RL) to share lessons learned and progress to date with other challenging and hazardous projects across the DOE Complex. Understanding the risk acceptance level is critical to execution of any open-air demolition project and is unique to each facility. Four key lessons learned from this project include: 1) plan execution issues, 2) stakeholder communication issues, 3) watching for summit fever and 4) minimizing exposed contaminated surfaces during demolition. (authors)
This report summarizes the key contributions and lessons learned from SNL experience in technical reviews of Controls awardees in the DOE SPA program from 2013 - 2020. The purpose of this report is to provide observations and technical suggestions that are likely to be beneficial to the WEC industry as a whole. Over the course of the SPA FOA program, SNL has engaged in technical review for a total of 5 different Controls awardees. The awardees represent a diversity of WEC devices and the application of different control design approaches. The report begins with a summary of key performance metrics results reported by the 5 Controls awardees. This is followed by a summary of observations and lessons learned distilled from the technical reviews of the awardees . The report concludes with a list of general technical suggestions for future WEC controls projects.
The Microreactor Applications Research Validation and Evaluation (MARVEL) project is intended to be amongst the first U.S. advanced reactor demonstrations in four decades. By virtue of being sponsored directly by the U.S. Department of Energy, the reactor is intended to benefit the broader nuclear community by exercising design processes, safety reviews, and supply chains. This project is intent on publicly documenting key lessons learned along the way toward demonstration. Building on a 2024 report that focused on lessons learned from the design and project management phase, this 2025 edition focuses on findings from the MARVEL guard vessel fabrication and primary coolant apparatus test (PCAT) testing.
Laboratory research can expose workers to a wide variety of chemical hazards. Researchers must not only take personal responsibility for their safety but also inevitably rely on coworkers to also work safely. The foundations for protocols, requirements, and behaviors come from our history and lessons learned from others. For that reason, here, a recent incident is examined in which a researcher suffered hydrofluoric acid (HF) burns while working with an inorganic digestion mixture of aqueous HF (8%) and nitric acid (HNO 3 , 58%). HF education is critical for workers because delays in treatment, improper treatment, and delay of symptoms are all factors in unfavorable outcomes in case reports. Furthermore, while the potential severity of the incident was elevated due to bypassed engineered controls and lack of proper personal protective equipment, only minor injuries were sustained. We discuss the results of a causal analysis of the incident that revealed areas of improvement in protocols, personal protective equipment, and emergency response that could help prevent similar accidents from occurring. We also present simple improvements that anyone can implement to reduce the potential consequences of an accident, based upon our lessons learned.
Evaluating interventions through long-term human mobility data: initial methods and lessons learned. The tool generated a rich dataset for research and evaluation of behavior that would otherwise be unobserved. The data enabled robust energy estimation of the program. Practice revealed a need for further refinement to reduce participant data input burden.
Lessons Learned: Bandwagon science can miss key physics; Bandwagon scientists cling to their bandwagon, oftentimes denying fundamental physics; and, Better approach: Be aware of the physical limitations of a paradigm. What assumptions have been made? How can this be different in Nature?; Be cognizant of alternative models; Encourage the development of those models; and, Although validation is important, fundamental physics forms the basis for Occam’s razor, not whether a toy model fits the data well.
The Microreactor Applications Research Validation and Evaluation (MARVEL) project is intended to be among the first U.S. advanced reactor demonstrations in four decades. By virtue of being sponsored directly by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the reactor is expected to benefit the broader nuclear community by exercising design processes, safety reviews, and supply chains. This project is committed to publicly documenting key lessons learned along the way toward demonstration. Building on a 2025 report that focused on lessons learned from guard vessel fabrication and Primary Coolant Apparatus Test (PCAT) testing (Abou-Jaoude et al. 2025), this 2026 edition captures findings spanning structural fabrication, quality assurance (QA), reactivity control system (RCS) assembly, fuel fabrication and shipment, safety basis development, balance-of-plant design, and overall reactor design.
This report covers key lessons learned for the rapid decarbonization of power systems, emphasizing best practices in planning, building, and operating power systems. This report is the result of a collaborative effort among various Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM) workstreams and partner initiatives: 21st Century Power Partnership (21CPP); Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage (CCUS); Global Power System Transformation Consortium (G-PST), a partner to CEM; Industrial Deep Decarbonization Initiative (IDDI); International Energy Agency Digital Demand-Driven Electricity Networks Initiative (IEA 3DEN), a partner to CEM; International Smart Grid Action Network (ISGAN); Long Term Scenarios for the Energy Transition (LTES); Nuclear Innovation: Clean Energy Future (NICE Future); Super-Efficient Equipment and Appliance Deployment (SEAD). The contents are not intended to be comprehensive of all power sector topics, and there may be overlap between content in each section due to the nature of this first-of-its-kind collaborative effort to deliver unified messaging on power sector decarbonization to energy ministers. This work is intended to complement other work at the Clean Energy Ministerial and offers options for consideration, not specific policy recommendations.
From the mid-1980s to the present, the Department of Energy (DOE) has developed, tested, and deployed diverse bioremediation strategies for chlorinated volatile organic compounds (cVOCs). A systematic review of these projects after decades of activity provides an opportunity to identify crosscutting themes and lessons learned. The knowledge provided by a DOE bioremediation retrospective represents a resource to support current and future bioremediation operations, and future decisions related to cVOC bioremediation. This systematic review examined the design, objectives, performance and outcomes for remediation projects at DOE sites including Savannah River, Hanford, Idaho, Mound and Pinellas. The results were used to identify emergent themes to provide actionable insights. The bioremediation retrospective technical team first developed standardized criteria to support the systematic review. Then, the evaluation was performed using a sequential process that was informed by local technical experts who identified and provided the structured information that served as the basis for the evaluation. The participation of these experts was invaluable to the effort. Importantly, DOE cVOC bioremediation efforts were implemented based on the foundational knowledge developed by U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) strategic and applied environmental technology development and certification programs, as well as technical, policy and regulatory guidance from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Interstate Technology and Regulatory Council (ITRC), U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), industry, and universities. To maximize the value of the DOE cVOC bioremediation retrospective, the systematic review strategy focused on identifying important DOE-specific experiences, trends and lessons learned that would extend the knowledge available from these other key entities.