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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Building Intelligence with Layered Defense Using Security-Constrained Optimization and Security Risk Detection (BUILD-SOS): A Probabilistic Approach

In this project, we employ a layered protection strategy incorporating advanced optimization and detection techniques using a probabilistic approach. The probabilistic approach is not only applied when detecting cyber attacks, but also incorporated in control strategies, which greatly increases the attacking difficulties. Hackers need to understand both probabilistic detection algorithms and uncertainty modeling methods in control in order to execute any effective attacks. The end-to-end solutions enable us to provide Building Intelligence with Layered Defense using Security-Constrained Optimization and Security Risk Detection (BUILD-SOS).

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
NASA NTRS2014

Asteroid, Lunar and Planetary Regolith Management A Layered Engineering Defense

During missions on asteroid and lunar and planetary surfaces, space systems and crew health may be degraded by exposure to dust and dirt. Furthermore, for missions outside the Earth‐Moon system, planetary protection must be considered in efforts to minimize forward and backward contamination. This paper presents an end‐to‐end approach to ensure system reliability, crew health, and planetary protection in regolith environments. It also recommends technology investments that would be required to implement this layered engineering defense.

Wagner, Sandra↗
DOE OSTI2025

Tale of Two Domains: Cyber - Physical

As devices and systems continue to modernize and adopt integrated circuits, the use of cyber technology to deploy an application is the expectation. This deployment through cyber assets brings new cyber risk and cybersecurity is the practice of managing this risk. Cyber-risk is constantly changing due to the speed of technology advancement and the changing quality of the adversary. Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) mitigates cyber-risk through engineering controls where as the traditional practice of cybersecurity mitigates cyber-risk through cybersecurity controls. By clearly defining the cyber-physical boundary, engineering controls and cybersecurity controls can clearly demonstrate their complementary nature to provide layered defenses and successfully mitigate cyber-risk through independent controls. In this paper, a layered model of device decomposition of the the cyber-physical boundary is presented to provide clarity where engineering controls are used to reduce cyber-risk within the physics, functional materials, electronic, or integrated circuit layers and where cybersecurity controls are used to reduce cyber-risk within the machine code and application layers. By implementing both traditional cybersecurity controls and engineering controls, a more holistic approach to cybersecurity is achieved in protecting modern devices and systems, as well as a clear awareness in identifying, documenting, and authorizing the system’s cybersecurity protection scheme is achieved.

42 - ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Supporting Risk-informed Decision-making During Reactor Accidents

Uncertainty in severe accident evolution and outcome is driven by event bifurcations that represent distinctive challenges to defensive layers and tend to promote the emergence of discrete classes of core damage and accident risk. This discrete set of "attractor" states arise from the complex networks of competing physical phenomena and conditional event cascades occurring as the overall system degrades – a process that yields increasing degrees of freedom and accident progression pathways. Characterization of these event spaces has proven elusive to more traditional data interrogation methods, but proves tractable by application of more advanced data collection and machine learning approaches. Through application of these approaches we demonstrate a conceptual framework that enables real-time/robust, risk-informed decision-making support to improve accident mitigation and encourage “graceful exits” during low probability, extreme events limiting accident consequences. In this analysis, we simulated over 8,000 short-term station blackout (STSBO) accidents with the state-of-the-art integral severe accident code, MELCOR, and demonstrate the potential for ML approaches to predict simulation outcomes. We chose to pair ML tools with interpretable and mechanistic event trees for the considered STSBO accident space to predict the likelihood of future event paths along the tree. In addition to the current state of the system, we use information from recent trajectories of temperature, pressure, and other physical features, combining both the current state and past trajectories to forecast future event paths. Finally, we simulate the random injection of variable amounts of water to quantify the efficacy of available actions at reducing risks along the many branches in the event tree. We identify scenarios and windows of opportunity to mitigate risk as well as scenarios in which such actions are unlikely to alter the accident end-state.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

A Cybersecurity Testbed for Smart Buildings

Smart buildings are equipped with a plethora of cyber-physical systems, such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices and building automation systems. These devices, especially in commercial buildings, use legacy communications and hardware that were not designed with cybersecurity in mind. With increasing cyber threats in recent years, smart buildings have become an increasing target for attacks, but not enough published data are available from these incidents to study or replicate the scenarios to defend buildings. As part of the U.S. Department of Energy-funded project focusing on developing the Building Intelligence with Layered Defense Using Security-Constrained Optimization and Security Risk Detection (BUILD-SOS) platform, we developed a cybersecurity test bed for smart buildings. This test bed includes a building simulation tool, virtual devices, emulated operational technology networks, and remote hardware-in-the-loop. Using this test bed, we performed different cyberattacks on the smart building model and collected both physical building data, to understand the impacts on the building, and network data, to aid in separating mechanical faults from cyberattacks during the detection. This test bed is a significant tool in protecting smart buildings from cyberattacks because it can aid in both cybersecurity analysis and the evaluation of other cyberattack detection tools by testing the tools in a secure environment without impacting the building operations.

cyber-physical systems↗
DOE OSTI2024

A Cybersecurity Testbed for Smart Buildings

Smart buildings are equipped with a plethora of cyber-physical systems, such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices and building automation systems. These devices, especially in commercial buildings, use legacy communications and hardware that were not designed with cybersecurity in mind. With increasing cyber threats in recent years, smart buildings have become an increasing target for attacks, but not enough published data are available from these incidents to study or replicate the scenarios to defend buildings. As part of the U.S. Department of Energy-funded project focusing on developing the Building Intelligence with Layered Defense Using Security-Constrained Optimization and Security Risk Detection (BUILD-SOS) platform, we developed a cybersecurity test bed for smart buildings. This test bed includes a building simulation tool, virtual devices, emulated operational technology networks, and remote hardware-in-the-loop. Using this test bed, we performed different cyberattacks on the smart building model and collected both physical building data, to understand the impacts on the building, and network data, to aid in separating mechanical faults from cyberattacks during the detection. This test bed is a significant tool in protecting smart buildings from cyberattacks because they can aid in both cybersecurity analysis and the evaluation of cyberattack detection tools by testing the tools in a secure environment without impacting the building operations.

alfalfa↗
DOE OSTI2020

A data analytical approach for assessing the efficacy of Operational Technology active defenses against insider threats

In recent years, the need for Operational Technology (OT) defenses has been recognized, serving as an additional line of defense when Information Technology (IT) defenses are bypassed. This is no longer considered an uncommon possibility when dealing with advanced persistent threat (APT) actors expected to be state-sponsored and receiving insider assistance. In these extreme adversarial situations, OT defenses aim to provide another layer of defense for the system, introduced directly at the physical process level, as described by the sensors data, the system model, and control actions. Just like IT defenses, two schools of thought, i.e., passive and active defenses, have emerged to address this challenge. In active defenses, representing the focus of this paper, known signatures, synthesized based on the system's unique characteristics, are inserted into the system. In contradistinction, passive methods rely solely on observing system behavior in search of patterns of normal behavior with deviations thereof representing abnormal behavior. In their most sophisticated implementations, both passive and active defenses rely on the use of data analytics to identify the patterns and synthesize the observed and/or inserted signatures. Past research has shown that passive defenses may be bypassed by APT actors relying on data analytics and their intimate knowledge of the system to evade detection by respecting the patterns identified by the defenders. Here this manuscript explores the use of active defenses under the assumption that the attacker has privileged access to the system, including access to the system's model and sensors data. Specifically, this manuscript assesses the ability of active defenses to remain invisible to the attackers, and discusses the associated challenges that must be addressed to ensure their resiliency against APT actors.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Risk-Informed Performance-Based Methodology to Manage Fire Protection Systems in Nuclear Facilities

Fire protection systems (FPSs) and features are installed in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facilities to protect property (maximum possible fire loss thresholds), life, and nuclear safety (i.e., structures, systems, and components). These FPSs and features are designed and maintained in accordance with the prescriptive guidance provided in applicable building codes and National Fire Protection Association codes and standards. Management, operations, and maintenance activities of FPSs involve significant effort. A DOE facility’s documented safety analysis or other safety basis document could also rely on FPSs to provide either a safety significant or safety class function to mitigate fire hazards and minimize radiological consequences. In some cases, the designation of safety significant or safety class may be determined to provide a layer of defense-in-depth to minimize nuclear safety risks independent of the fire risk. DOE standards allow the use of performance-based design alternatives developed by the fire industry but do not consider the defense-in-depth layers of protection provided in DOE facilities to prevent or mitigate the risks associated with unintended release of radioactive materials into the environment. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory developed a decision-making methodology tailored for DOE non-reactor nuclear facilities to manage FPSs and features by integrating nuclear safety risk insights into a performance-based analysis. This risk-informed, performance-based (RIPB) methodology can be used to provide the technical basis for classifying an FPS as safety class and safety significant, tailoring administrative controls (e.g., technical safety requirements), and ranking the importance of FPSs to prioritize maintenance, upgrades, and replacement activities. The RIPB methodology is a graded approach to inform DOE facility owners and Fire Protection Program managers of the most risk-significant FPSs and equipment, and those systems would be cost-beneficial to relax rigor if there is a need to re-design the FPS coverage or deviate from DOE and National Fire Protection Association standards for those systems that would be less significant. This paper describes the framework used to develop the RIPB methodology and the outcome of implementing this methodology in a use-case nuclear facility. This paper also discusses the impact to DOE policies and standards and the safety margins and defense-in-depth measures credited in nuclear safety assessments in a facility’s documented safety analysis and the benefits of implementing an RIPB methodology in lieu of a prescriptive method to comply with fire protection requirements.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Towards Risk-Informed Performance-Based Emergency Planning: Review of Regulation, Guidance, and Methods

At a fundamental level, nuclear facility safety is built upon the concept of defense-in-depth (DID), which entails multiple, independent layers of protection for public health and safety. Within the DID structure, emergency preparedness (EP) is the last layer of defense and provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Over several decades, the EP regulatory framework has evolved in response to lessons learned from actual events, experience with maintaining and testing EP capabilities, and advances in a wide range of technologies. Furthering this evolution, recent developments in risk-informed performance-based (RIPB) design and licensing approaches provide an opportunity to leverage insights regarding the attributes of the specific facility and site to inform EP.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Defending the Homeland: Growing Foreign Challenges to the U.S. Missile Defense Posture

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy requested that Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory conduct a Congressionally directed study on homeland missile defense, pursuant to Section 1692 of the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. In accordance with the statutory language, this study considers whether the security benefits obtained by deployment of homeland missile defenses of the United States are undermined or counterbalanced by adverse reactions of potential adversaries, and considers the effectiveness of homeland missile defense efforts of the United States to deter the development of ballistic missiles. Almost a half-century has elapsed since the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and almost two decades since the former withdrew. Since withdrawing, the United States has sought to develop and deploy a layered missile defense system to defend against regional threats to U.S. and allied interests abroad and to counter limited threats to the U.S. homeland. As such, missile defense supports key national defense policy objectives. Protecting the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and partners. Deterring attacks against the United States, its allies, and partners. Assuring allies an strengthening U.S. diplomatic activities in peacetime and crisis. We offer five key findings: 1. The primary benefit of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is the protection it provides the U.S. homeland against a limited but evolving rogue-state missile threat. While this system has never been tested in combat, it appears thus far to have effectively paced North Korea’s development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In the absence of such a defensive capability, the United States would likely have been more heavily exposed to North Korean actions, would have operated at a much higher-risk posture, and would have had less negotiating room with which to navigate coercive tactics and crises. Its allies would have been more concerned about U.S. willingness in time of crisis and war to run the risks of protecting them. The GMD system also serves as a hedge against Iranian breakout. 2. Potential adversaries continue to develop long-range ballistic missiles despite deployment of a U.S. homeland missile defense system. This includes both rogue states and major power rivals whose long-range missile programs predated the deployment of U.S. missile defenses. While North Korea has continued its long-range missile developments and achieved an intercontinental capability, Iran has not yet reached this threshold. The broader proliferation of long-range missiles anticipated in the late 1990s has not materialized. 3. While Russia has used the existence of a U.S. homeland missile defense system as a justification for its substantial and continuing weapon modernization program, neither Russian force modernization nor the limited U.S. homeland missile defense system has altered the strategic balance. Russia has long considered U.S. missile defenses—both theater and homeland—as directed against its strategic forces and as a capability that could rapidly advance, thereby eroding Russian confidence in its nuclear deterrent. Russia’s political and military actions appear excessive and negatively impact areas such as arms control, but they do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 4. China’s expansion and diversification of nuclear and missile forces has been influenced by its concerns about U.S. homeland missile defense, but those concerns are only one of many factors in China’s force planning. Although China’s actions to preserve and expand its assured retaliation prospects have not fundamentally altered the strategic balance, its buildup and lack of transparency about its force modernization goals are troubling. Taken together, the aggregate pattern of China’s modernization activities over the past two decades strongly suggests a concerted effort to develop a modern military force commensurate with its intended geopolitical status. Whatever China’s legacy concerns over the survivability of its strategic nuclear forces, its ability to overwhelm the GMD system appears intact today and will be further strengthened in the years ahead as it continues its long-term modernization program. China’s political and military actions negatively affect U.S. security interests but do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 5. The basic finding that benefits have not so far been undermined by adverse reactions is a function of circumstances that are increasingly in flux. The existing GMD-centered system is under increasing pressure from the pace and scope of North Korean missile deployments. The proposed “layered” system seeks to mitigate this impending capability gap in the near term and to complement future capabilities, such as the Next Generation Interceptor, when they come online. Given the pace of U.S. missile defense developments since 2000, it is possible that adversary advances in capability will outpace the U.S. system’s ability to adapt. Additionally, because this layered system is in principle more readily scaled, it will almost certainly be viewed skeptically by China and Russia. In a context of growing great-power security competition, the Department of Defense (DoD) should consider undertaking a broader net assessment of the U.S., Russian, and Chinese force balance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cyber-Informed Engineering Workbook: SCADA (VoltVAR)

This case study workbook provides a hypothetical project to support discussion and application of Cyber-Informed Engineering principles. Participants in the workshop are encouraged to use the workbook to capture insights and lessons learned.

42 - ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Multilevel Cybersecurity for Photovoltaic Systems

The motivation behind this project is to protect critical infrastructure in electric power generation pertaining to solar photovoltaic (PV) systems. This growing renewable energy resource is becoming a more vital part of the nation’s energy portfolio, particularly since it has achieved grid-parity to existing generation methods in terms of cost. It is thus vital that steps be taken to ensure the cybersecurity of these assets. The project goal was to devise a multilevel cybersecurity solution to address PV security gaps at the inverter and system levels, and field test the solution under the supervision and review of a US-based solar inverter manufacturer and PV installer/operator. A two-level cyberattack defense approach was formulated whereby the first level, the solar inverter level, hardens individual devices and achieves a deeply cyber-secure inverter. The inverter level security involves a multi-layer defense-in-depth approach for securing the inverter while also providing data for the system level algorithms. The second level, the system level, addresses intrusion detection and restoration involving an ensemble of inverters and relevant systems.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Modernization of Technical Requirements for Licensing of Advanced Non-Light Water Reactors: Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Evaluation of Defense-in-Depth Adequacy

This document supports the work contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 18-04 “Risk-Informed Performance-Based Technology Inclusive Guidance for Advanced Reactor Licensing Basis Development” Revision 0. NEI 18-04 presents a modern, technology-inclusive, risk-informed, and performance-based (TI-RIPB) process for selection of Licensing Basis Events (LBEs); safety classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and associated risk-informed special treatments; and determination of defense-in-depth (DID) adequacy for non-LWRs. The NEI guidance document provides one acceptable means for addressing the aforementioned topics as part of demonstrating a specific design provides reasonable assurance of adequate radiological protection. This report provides the framework and associated methodology guidelines and discussion for establishing, then evaluating, confirming, and documenting the adequacy of defense-in-depth (DID) for advanced non-light-water reactor technologies. It was developed as part of the Licensing Modernization Project led by Southern Company and cost-shared by the United States Department of Energy and has benefited from considerable NRC formal reviews and public workshops. The methodology converts the DID philosophy into a structured process that is implementable, embraces existing United States and international definitions and philosophies of DID that set the foundation for the process. It builds on the DID framework developed in the Department of Energy Next Generation Nuclear Plant Project and earlier works on this subject. The approach to establishing DID adequacy involves the incorporation of DID attributes into the plant capabilities and programmatic elements of DID. The integrated evaluation of DID adequacy includes both quantitative elements to incorporate risk-informed and performance-based (RIPB) considerations and qualitative elements that address uncertainties and limitations in the quantitative models and supporting data. Demonstration of DID adequacy ensures that there are multiple layers of defense for risk-significant challenges to the design and that the plant capabilities and programs that support each layer are provided in a manner that minimizes dependencies among these layers. The focus of this report is assurance of DID adequacy with respect to protection of the public from radiological exposures resulting from accidental releases of radioactive material. While other hazards are not specifically addressed, this methodology is expected to be beneficial for determining DID adequacy for them as well. Risk-informed evaluation of DID considers the integrated performance of all plant SSCs and associated programs to manage daily operational activities, transients, and accidents, including the evaluation of strategies for accident prevention and mitigation. The RIPB LBE scenario methodology used in this evaluation defines the challenges to the plant safety features included in the plant design basis and beyond, and the scope of all deterministic and probabilistic safety evaluations. By examining event sequences across the whole spectrum of LBEs, a systematic assessment of DID can be accomplished.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Chlamydomonas as a model for reactive oxygen species signaling and thiol redox regulation in the green lineage

While the maintenance of redox balance is important for all organisms, the energy balance in the chloroplast is particularly tightly linked to the overall cellular redox status in photosynthetic organisms. Excess light can cause overreduction of the photosynthetic electron transport chain, which, when unchecked, results in the generation of reactive oxygen species (ROS) that can oxidize cellular components including nucleic acids, proteins, and lipids (Li et al., 2009). A photosynthetic cell possesses multiple layers of defense against oxidative stress, such as antioxidant enzymes (Foyer and Noctor, 2005) and alternative electron transfer pathways (Alric and Johnson, 2017). At the same time, ROS can function as important signals that mediate responses to biotic and abiotic stresses (Apel and Hirt, 2004). Reversibly oxidizable small molecules and proteins can serve as ROS sinks and signals and are re-reduced by multiple mechanisms. For example, the ascorbate–glutathione (GSH) cycle is central in controlling ROS levels and regenerating/reducing oxidized cellular redox agents (Figure 1A; reviewed by Foyer and Noctor, 2011). The functions of many proteins can be regulated by the redox state of cysteine residues, such as the formation or reduction of disulfides by thioredoxins (TRX) (Buchanan, 1991) and glutaredoxins (Michelet et al., 2013b; Figure 1, B and C).

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Slow Strain Rate Testing of A537 Tank Wall Material

At Savannah River Site (SRS), High-Level Waste is stored in below-grade carbon steel tanks. This waste in part consists of sludge, salt cake, and/or supernate. Preparation of this waste for future processing involves dissolution of the salt cake layer. The salt dissolution process can create conditions that leave the carbon steel tanks susceptible to localized corrosion. The salt to be dissolved contains high concentrations of nitrate, that once released, create an environment that may be conducive to pitting corrosion and/or stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of carbon steel. The salt dissolution process also liberates interstitial liquid trapped between the salt crystals. This liquid is initially high in nitrite and hydroxide concentration. High pH and greater ratios of nitrite to nitrate act as inhibitors to minimize corrosion of carbon steel in high nitrate environments. However, as dissolution proceeds, the concentration of nitrate will increase, while the hydroxide and nitrite concentration of the interstitial liquid will deplete and become insufficient to prevent the onset of corrosion attack. Tank blending and the addition of inhibitors are used to ensure adequate concentrations of hydroxide and nitrite. However, this is not desirable during salt dissolution as it can reduce process efficiency and increase the amount of waste that needs processing. This testing program was designed to examine the risk of SCC associated with utilizing the pitting factor (PF) and nitrite/nitrate (NO 2 - /NO 3 - ) ratio limits for handling dissolved salt solutions at an elevated temperature in the carbon steel waste tanks. The previously identified limits are a PF of 1.2 and an NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio of 0.15. The results indicate that as long as the NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio exceeds 0.1 and the PF is above approximately 0.8, there is a discernible safety margin between the open circuit potential (OCP) and the critical cracking potential (CCP) observed during applied potential testing. However, this margin, defined by the difference between the OCP and CCP, is relatively narrow, ranging from 0.1 to 0.25 volts. This small margin raises concerns about potential shifts in OCP during waste retrieval operations, which could inadvertently increase the risk of SCC if the OCP approaches or exceeds the CCP. These results confirm that dissolved salt solutions provide a potent chemistry that, under certain conditions, makes carbon steel susceptible to SCC. The next question to consider is the influence these results have on decisions for storage and retrieval of waste from the tanks. For Type III/IIIA waste tanks, the risk of SCC remains very low. First, and most importantly, the post-weld stress relief of the tanks has reduced the residual stress near the welds. Thus, without the stress component, SCC risk is minimized. The material of construction (A537 Carbon steel) for the Type III/IIIA tanks is superior to the steel in its resistance to SCC than the steel that was utilized for the Type I, II, and IV tanks (A285 carbon steel). From a chemistry control standpoint for a Type III/IIIA tank directly involved with handling dissolved salt solutions, the PF and NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio limits may be utilized wherein chemistry control provides an extra layer of defense against SCC. Chemistry control for a Type III/IIIA tank minimizes the risk for a tank that may receive the dissolved salt solution, particularly if that tank is a Type I, II, or IV waste tank. On the other hand, if the dissolved salt solution is handled by a Type I, II, or IV waste tank the risk of SCC is real. The potent chemistry, absence of stress relief, and inferior material result in a condition that is conducive to cracking. Efforts should be made to either avoid transferring waste that may not meet the PF and NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio criteria to one of these tanks or if it is unavoidable, take measures to minimize the consequences of a leak. As shown by these tests, even if the PF and NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio criteria are met, there is a risk that the tank potential may be disturbed in the positive direction and the risk of SCC increase.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

AI-based Detection and Defense Against Cyberattacks in Distributed Energy Resources

This study will provide comprehensive artificial intelligence (AI)-based solution tools for network security, malware prevention, and sensor data anomaly detection for distributed energy resource (DER) research, development, and demonstration. DER technologies are energy systems (e.g., solar panels, wind turbines, and energy storage systems) that are often connected to the internet and thus vulnerable to cyberattacks. Cybersecurity should be of primary concern for DERs, which is why we propose an integrated multi-layer cyber-defense system for DERs. This system encompasses risk assessments, network security, malware prevention, and detection of anomalies in the sensor data. Implementation of a comprehensive risk assessment with an overview of the model architecture should be the primary step, and should include the potential impact of experiencing, at a given time, one or more cyberattacks on the system. The second step is to ensure that the network security includes firewalls, intrusion detection, and malware prevention. The third step is to provide solution tools that enable sensor data anomaly detection for DERs. By incorporating these considerations into DER research, development, and demonstration, organizations can help ensure the safety and security of their systems and protect against potential cyberattacks.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cyber and Physical Security Analysis of GSI and Noventum Application for IoT Communications

We present our findings of the red team exercise conducted on the device and application developed by Guardian Sensors, Inc. (GSI) and Noventum. The app is used for situational awareness and control of photovoltaics (PV) and microgrid energy systems. The assessments performed are practical case scenarios that assess the risks and vulnerabilities posed by the app through targeted activities that could be engaged by an adversary. The assessment team’s results and recommendations are provided to inform on and mitigate the identified weaknesses to improve secure user authentication, connections, and communications. The recommendations in this report are not intended to be a security panacea but will add the desired defense-in-depth layer to securing communication of such interconnected systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗