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Mark-18A Target Material Recovery Program: Initial Hot Startup

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has been tasked by the National Nuclear Security Administration to recover highly valued isotopes from irradiated Mark-18A (Mk-18A) targets. The Savannah River Site (SRS) has sixty-five Mk-18A targets available for the recovery of the high valued materials. The Mk-18A targets were manufactured with Pu-242 then irradiated under high neutron flux in K-Reactor at the SRS from 1968 to 1978. The sixty-five Mk-18A targets are currently stored in the SRS L-Area Basin and will be removed one at a time and individually transported to SRNL. Upon receipt at SRNL, the Mk-18A target material will be removed from the confinement, dissolved, chemically separated, and calcined to a stable oxide. The flowsheet is designed to recover the plutonium as well as the trivalent actinides. The original targets were manufactured with varying quantities of Pu-242, ranging from 5.2 grams to 121.5 grams. Taking a graded approach to process start up, the lowest loaded target (FT-80-03) was selected as the first target to be received and processed at SRNL. As operational experience and knowledge is gained from processing targets, higher loaded targets will be selected for processing to increase the quantities of valuable isotopes recovered. Due to dose concerns, the receipt and processing of the Mk-18A targets is performed in the SRNL Shielded Cells Facility. The targets are stored in a double J-can confinement in the L-Area Basin. A specially designed cask was procured for transport of the targets from L-Area to SRNL. Once received at SRNL, the targets are loaded into the back of Cell 7 and resized as they enter the cell. The resized targets (1/4 length) are then processed one at a time through the following processes: caustic dissolution and filtration, acidic dissolution and filtration, elutable Reillex anion exchange, diglycolamide (DGA) resin extraction, and DGA calcination. This processing results in two product streams. The first is an aqueous plutonium solution which is removed from the shielded cells and taken to a glovebox for further purification and conversion to an oxide. The second is a calcined oxide product containing the Am and Cm as well as other lanthanide fission products which is removed from the shielded cells using a bagless transfer system. Both materials are packaged for shipment to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). This paper will discuss the operating experience, lessons learned, and results from initial process hot startup.

Armstrong, Christopher [Savannah River National La↗

Mark-18A Cold Runs

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) is tasked by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to recover highly valued isotopes from irradiated Mark-18A (Mk-18A) targets. The Savannah River Site (SRS) has sixty-five Mk-18A targets available for the recovery of the high valued materials. The sixty-five Mk-18A targets are currently stored in the L-Area Basin and will be removed one at a time and individually transported to SRNL. Upon receipt at SRNL, the Mk-18A target material will be removed from the confinement, dissolved, chemically separated, and calcined to a stable oxide. The flowsheet is designed to recover the plutonium as well as the trivalent actinides. The remaining unrecovered material will be discarded to the high activity drain (HAD) system in SRNL. A specially designed cask was procured for transport of the targets from L-Area to SRNL. Once received at SRNL, the targets will be loaded into the back of Cell 7 and resized as they enter the cell. The resized targets (1/4 lengths) will then be processed one at a time through the following processes: caustic dissolution and filtration; acidic dissolution and filtration, Reillex anion exchange, diglycolamide (DGA) cation exchange; and DGA calcination. This processing will result in two product streams. The first is an aqueous plutonium solution which will be removed from the shielded cells and taken to a glovebox for further purification and conversion to an oxide. The second is a calcined oxide containing the Am and Cm as well as other lanthanide fission products which will be removed from the shielded cells using a bagless transfer system. Both materials will be packaged for shipment to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). All equipment to carry out this process was designed, procured or fabricated, and installed in a mock-up facility (716-4A) at SRS to allow for simulation testing in a non-radioactive area. This equipment was then dismantled and transferred from 716-4A to 773-A and installed in the SRNL Shielded Cells. After installation in the shielded cells facility testing was performed using water followed by surrogates and cold chemicals. Issues were identified during these evaluations, including equipment issues as well as technical challenges. Many of the issues were rectified during performance of the cold runs, and the remaining have a resolution identified. Table ES-1 provides a summary of all issues identified during the cold run operations, as well as the status and identified resolutions to outstanding issues.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Reduced Neutralization Feasibility Study for H-Canyon Accelerated Basin De- Inventory (ABD) Program

An alternative approach to Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) and Nuclear Material Processing was developed for future H-Canyon (HCAN) and L-Area operations that involves a paradigm shift from current HCAN, Concentrate, Storage, and Transfer Facility (CSTF), and Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) operations. The alternative, referred to as Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD), requires that all Domestic and Foreign Research Reactor SNF currently at the Savannah River Site (SRS) will be dissolved, stored, and then transferred to CSTF without recovery of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). Concentrated nitric acid is utilized to dissolve aluminum spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) in HCAN. The vessels and piping in HCAN are fabricated from 304L stainless steel and are ideally suited to handle the acidic waste stream. However, as the waste is transferred to the CSTF and DWPF, it will contact the carbon steel waste tanks in CSTF. In order to prevent corrosion of the carbon steel, the acidic waste is neutralized (i.e., pH adjusted over 11) by the addition of sodium hydroxide (NaOH). The NaOH is added until the final solution contains 1.2 M excess -OH. Additionally, if the waste is not neutralized to a pH greater than 11, then aluminum hydroxide (Al(OH) 3 ) would form, and solids may form in the piping as it is transferred to CSTF. This document presents an analysis of the influence of reducing the excess caustic that is added to the neutralization tanks on the corrosion protection scheme primarily for the CSTF waste tanks. The implications to HCAN and DWPF were also assessed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Increased Fissile Loading Flowsheet Review

A request was made by H-Canyon Process Engineering to assess the impact of blending dissolved, neutralized Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) with future sludge batches and their impact on downstream processing facilities including the Concentration, Storage and Transfer Facilities (CSTF), the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF), the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF), Saltstone, and the Effluent Treatment Facility (ETF). The purpose of this change is to accelerate the deinventory of SNF which is currently stored in the L-Area Disassembly Basin. The addition of SNF increases the mass of fissiles in each future sludge batch, due to their high enrichment. This high enrichment has the potential to complicate the programs to eliminate criticality events in the downstream processing facilities and will increase the number of canisters produced by DWPF because of the SNF mass increase. A separate report addressed the impacts to glass. The review and subsequent calculations were based on average predicted compositions of Accelerated Basin Deinventory (ABD) slurry, average compositions for predicted future sludge batches, average past salt batches and average past recycle batches to predict the feeds that will be processed in SWPF, DWPF, Saltstone, the 2H evaporator and ETF. Each of the processes was evaluated for potential issues.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Increased Fissile Loading Flowsheet Review

A request was made by H-Canyon Process Engineering to assess the impact of blending dissolved, neutralized Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) with future sludge batches and their impact on downstream processing facilities. The purpose of this change is to accelerate the deinventory of SNF which is currently stored in the L-Area Disassembly Basin.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Evaluation of the Potential for Precipitation of Solids during Storage of Non-Aluminum SNF Solutions

Non-aluminum clad spent nuclear fuels (NASNF) stored in the L-Area basin will be dissolved in H-Canyon using the 6.3D electrolytic dissolver. The solutions will be stored in either the hot or warm canyon until the preparation of a sludge batch for the Defense Waste Processing Facility. Spent nuclear fuel solutions could be stored for 1-2 years before transfer to the H-Area Tank Farm depending on the interval between sludge batches. The solution level in the storage tanks will be maintained; therefore, precipitation of solids due to evaporation is not an issue. However, the precipitation of solids from completely dissolved SNF due to solution instabilities has been observed during intermediate storage of solutions generating hydrated oxides.The presence of fissile material in these solids is generally associated with zirconium molybdate, which is known to act as a host lattice for Pu and can carry the actinides upon precipitation. The formation of zirconium molybdate solids which carry fissile material is a potential concern for the storage of NASNF solutions. To address this concern, the Savannah River National Laboratory performed a literature review to identify knowledge gaps which may require experimental work to determine if the formation of solids is a concern during storage of these solutions. Based on the literature review, the precipitation of zirconium molybdate solids from the Campaign 1 NASNF solutions during intermediatestorage is expected. This conclusion is supported by the identification of zirconium molybdate solids found on the H-Canyon 6.1D Dissolver MK-12 insert spacer. The formation of the zirconium molybdate solids is attributed to hydrolysis and radiolytic processes in the nitric acid solution. As the molybdate solids form, U and Pu can substitute for Zr in the crystal lattice resulting in co-precipitation. Generally, the Pu substitutes directly into the crystal lattice during precipitation while the U associated with the molybdate solids more likely absorbs from the solution. The U in the NASNF solutions is present as uranyl nitrate, a 2+ cation which will not substitute as easily into the molybdate crystal lattice for the Zr 4+ ion.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NASNF Processing and Packaging Technical Study

The ABD program will require development of a strategy for the dispositioning the Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel (NASNF), some of which will be very challenging to handle and dissolve as described in this report. Not all the NASNF is suitable for processing through the electrolytic dissolver. The strategy may involve dissolution of the majority of the NASNF inventory in the electrolytic dissolver combined with some other disposition alternative(s) for the fraction that is not suitable for electrolytic dissolution. This report highlights the risks and challenges associated with the baseline approach of using the electrolytic dissolver to process all of the NASNF. In addition, the characteristics of the NASNF and how those characteristics relate to the risks associated with electrolytically dissolving the specific fuel types.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗