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NASA NTRS2024

International Space Station Satellite Deployment: Jettison Policy and Best Practices for Satellite Payload Developers

The International Space Station (ISS) deploys dozens of small satellites into Low Earth Orbit (LEO) each year. This presentation and associated paper cover the ISS Jettison Policy requirements and review/approval process, as well as best practices for satellite Payload Developers who have satellites manifested for deployment from ISS. Specifically, topics will include ISS Jettison Policy requirements to limit generation of orbital debris, limit risk of collision with ISS, and limit risk of collision with ISS visiting vehicles. The paper will include details on the ISS Program jettison candidate analysis and approval process, timelines for data submittal to ISS Program, resources for small satellite developers, and design & analysis recommendations for small satellite developers to maximize their likelihood of successful deployment from ISS. New Station deploy capabilities and ways the ISS Program addresses and facilitates innovations in small satellite technology, including propulsion systems, deorbit devices, constellation development, and novel tech demos, will also be explored. The 2024 session topic that best fits this abstract is Orbital Debris, SSA & STM. The ISS Jettison Policy intends to quantify and control the risks of deploying and operating small satellites, not only to ensure the safety of the humans flying in space, but also to preserve the orbital environment for world space activities and enable the significant benefits brought by such utilization. The ISS Program is committed to working with smallsat providers to address their challenges and enable safe, accessible, innovative missions. The Policy has grown with the industry, with each deploy yielding hard-earned lessons learned that improve our process – not only for the next deploy campaign, but with applicability and adaptability for future applications in LEO and beyond.

Jettison Policy↗
NASA NTRS2006

The New Jettison Policy for the International Space Station

During more than seven years of operations by the International Space Station (ISS), approximately three dozen pieces of debris were released and subsequently cataloged by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN). The individual mass of these objects ranged from less than 1 kg to 70 kg. Although some of these debris were separated from the ISS accidentally, some were intentionally cast-off, especially the larger items. In addition, small operational satellites are candidates for launch from the ISS, such as the TNS-O satellite deployed from ISS in March 2005. Recently an official ISS Jettison Policy was developed to ensure that decisions to deliberately release objects in the future were based upon a complete evaluation of the benefits and risks to the ISS, other resident space objects, and people on the Earth. The policy identifies four categories of items which might be considered for release: (1) items that pose a safety issue for return on-board a visiting vehicle, (2) items that negatively impact ISS utilization, return, or on-orbit stowage manifests, (3) items that represent an EVA timeline savings, and (4) items that are designed for jettison. Some of the principal issues to be addressed during this evaluation process are the potential for the object to recontact the ISS within the first two days after jettison, the potential of the object to breakup prior to reentry, the ability of the SSN to track the object, and the risk to people on Earth from components which might survive reentry. This paper summarizes the history of objects released from ISS, examines the specifics of the ISS jettison policy, and addresses the overall impact of ISS debris on the space environment.

Johnson, Nicholas L.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Risk Management of Jettisoned Objects in LEO

The construction and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS) has led to the release of many objects into its orbital plane, usually during the course of an extra-vehicular activity (EVA). Such releases are often unintentional, but in a growing number of cases, the jettison has been intentional, conducted after a careful assessment of the net risk to the partnership and to other objects in space. Since its launch in 1998 the ISS has contributed on average at least one additional debris object that is simultaneously in orbit with the station, although the number varies widely from zero to eight at any one moment. All of these objects present potential risks to other objects in orbit. Whether it comes from known and tracked orbiting objects or from unknown or untrackable objects, collision with orbital debris can have disastrous consequences. Objects greater than 10cm are generally well documented and tracked, allowing orbiting spacecraft or satellites opportunities to perform evasive maneuvers (commonly known as Debris Avoidance Maneuvers, or DAMs) in the event that imminent collision is predicted. The issue with smaller debris; however, is that it is too numerous to be tracked effectively and yet still poses disastrous consequences if it intercepts a larger object. Due to the immense kinetic energy of any item in orbit, collision with debris as small as 1cm can have catastrophic consequences for many orbiting satellites or spacecraft. Faced with the growing orbital debris threat and the potentially catastrophic consequences of a collision-generated debris shower originating in an orbit crossing the ISS altitude band, in 2007 the ISS program manger asked program specialists to coordinate a multilateral jettison policy amongst the ISS partners. This policy would define the acceptable risk trade rationale for intentional release of a debris object, and other mandatory constraints on such jettisons to minimize the residual risks whenever a jettison was accepted. Although ISS-related debris often presents untenable risks to the EVA crew, IVA crew, or to a departing cargo vehicle for a controlled disposal, such released objects also present a ballistic nuisance to the visiting vehicle traffic, and a potential fragmentation threat to the hundreds of other functional and debris objects whose perigees lie below the ISS orbital altitude. Thus, every such jettison decision is a conscious risk trade.

Bacon, John B.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Orbital Debris: A Policy Perspective

A viewgraph presentation describing orbital debris from a policy perspective is shown. The contents include: 1) Voyage through near-Earth Space-animation; 2) What is Orbital Debris?; 3) Orbital Debris Detectors and Damage Potential; 4) Hubble Space Telescope; 5) Mir Space Station Solar Array; 6) International Space Station; 7) Space Shuttle; 8) Satellite Explosions; 9) Satellite Collisions; 10) NASA Orbital Debris Mitigation Guidelines; 11) International Space Station Jettison Policy; 12) Controlled/Uncontrolled Satellite Reentries; 13) Return of Space Objects; 14) Orbital Debris and U.S. National Space Policy; 15) U.S Government Policy Strategy; 16) Bankruptcy of the Iridium Satellite System; 17) Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC); 18) Orbital Debris at the United Nations; 19) Chinese Anti-satellite System; 20) Future Evolution of Satellite Population; and 21) Challenge of Orbital Debris

Johnson, Nicholas L.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Review of Existing Policies Affecting the Jettison of Waste in Low Earth Orbit and Deep Space

The management of waste generated onboard spacecraft during future long-duration deep-space missions will require different solutions from those currently implemented on the International Space Station which consist exclusively of collecting, storing, and returning the waste to Earth. Alternative options for managing spacecraft waste are to process it for recycling and recovery of resources, and to jettison it overboard in a solid form (such as a compacted tile) or in a gaseous form after torrefaction or other trash-to-gas technologies. The waste generated during a deep-space mission is derived mainly from spacecraft logistics supplies, food and beverage residues, personal or scientific items used by the crew, human metabolic waste, and unused spare components. Uncontained and unprocessed trash is a potential health hazard and a habitat volume liability, which makes onboard long-term storage an inefficient and non-optimal option. However, the jettison of solid, processed waste appears to be an effective solution for crewed deep-space missions, leading not only to volume reduction and habitat safening, but also to considerable mass savings in the spacecraft’s propulsion system. However, the disposal of trash overboard also creates a navigation hazard for spacecraft and the potential risk of contamination of planetary bodies, interfering with the search for life. This paper investigates the requirements covered by existing policies that could affect the jettison concept of operations and system design.

Jettison↗
NASA NTRS2006

Generalized Separation of an Object Jettisoned from the ISS

The International Space Station (ISS) Program faces unprecedented logistics challenges in both upmass and downmass. Some items employed on the ISS exterior present significant technical issues for a controlled de-orbit on either the shuttle or an expendable supply vehicle. Such manifest problems arise due to structural degradation, insufficient containment of hazardous pressures or contents, excessive size, or some combination of all of these factors. In addition, the mounting hardware and other flight service equipment to manifest the returned equipment must itself be launched, competing with other upmass. EVA techniques and equipment to successfully contain and secure such problematic equipment result in numerous significant risks to the spacewalking crews and cost and schedule risks to the program. The ISS Program office has therefore developed a policy that advises the jettison of the most problematic objects. Such jettisoned items join a small family of nearly co-planar orbital debris objects that threaten the ISS on several timescales, besides threatening all satellites with perigee below the ISS orbit and the general human population on Earth. This analysis addresses the governing physics and the ensuing risks when an object is jettisoned. It is shown that there are four time domains which must be considered, each with its own inherent problems, and that a ballistic solution is usually possible that satsfies all constraints in all domains.

Bacon, Jack↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Planetary Protection Strategy of the Earth Return Orbiter–Capture, Containment & Return System in the Context of the Mars Sample Return Campaign

The Mars Sample Return Campaign aims at bringing back to Earth the rock and atmospheric samples that the rover Perseverance has started to collect on the surface of Mars with the goal of analyzing them in a facility built specifically for this purpose to answer questions about the habitability of Mars. The Campaign consists of several missions, including the Earth Return Orbiter–Capture, Containment & Return System (ERO-CCRS), which will capture the samples previously put in Martian orbit, contain them in redundant containers to ensure that no unsterilized particles are released, and return them to Earth through a parachute-less entry vehicle. Both NASA and ESA policies address the United Nations’ Outer Space Treaty by addressing potential harm from material returned from solar system bodies beyond the Earth-Moon system. In the conduct of Mars Sample Return, the two agencies have agreed to apply approaches consistent with their own standards to campaign elements each provides. This work presents the overall strategy for both forward and backward planetary protection for the ERO-CCRS mission. Specifically, for forward planetary protection, CCRS is not required to meet specific bioburden requirements as a Category III mission provided the ERO (1) meets orbital lifetime requirements during orbiter operations and (2) any elements jettisoned at Mars meet orbital lifetime requirements. CCRS is required to be built in ISO-8 or better cleanrooms and, by agreement with ERO, be compatible with direct bioburden verification methods. For backward planetary protection, the overall approach includes building robust, highly reliable systems to prevent inadvertent release of unsterilized Mars material through redundant containment vessels and particle transport analyses. Ongoing work to define verification approaches and quantify containment assurance levels for specific sample return systems will also be discussed, along with how those data will inform launch approval for ERO-CCRS.

Giuseppe Cataldo↗