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Software has been developed to function onboard the International Space Station (ISS) to help safeguard human health by detecting compounds of concern in the cabin atmosphere, both in identity and concentration.
The year 2017 marked the celebration of the 30th anniversary of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Hailed as an outstanding example of international cooperation for environmental protection, the Montreal Protocol, signed on September 16th, 1987, became the first international treaty to achieve universal ratification in 2010. This Protocol has halted the destruction of the ozone layer by controlling the production and consumption of ozone-depleting substances (ODSs).
International Space Station (ISS) is crucial to its continuous operation. Off-nominal situations can arise from virtually any aspect of ISS operations. One situation of particular concern is the inadvertent release of a chemical into the ISS atmosphere. In sufficient quantities, a chemical release can render the ISS uninhabitable regardless of the chemical s toxicity as a result of its effect on the hardware used to maintain the environment. This is certainly true with system chemicals which are integral components to the function and purpose of the system. Safeguards, such as design for minimum risk, multiple containment, hazard assessments, rigorous safety reviews, and others, are in place to minimize the probability of a chemical release to the ISS environment thereby allowing the benefits of system chemicals to outweigh the risks associated with them. The thermal control system is an example of such a system. Heat generated within the ISS is transferred from the internal thermal control system (ITCS) to the external thermal control system (ETCS) via two, single-barrier interface heat exchangers (IFHX). The ITCS and ETCS are closed-loop systems which utilize water and anhydrous ammonia, respectively, as heat-transfer fluids. There is approximately 1200 lbs. (208 gallons) of anhydrous ammonia in the ETCS circulating through the two heat exchangers, transferring heat from the ITCS water lines. At the amounts present in the ETCS, anhydrous ammonia is one system chemical that can easily overwhelm the station atmosphere scrubbing capabilities and render the ISS uninhabitable in the event of a catastrophic rupture. Although safeguards have certainly minimized the risk of an ammonia release into the Station atmosphere, credible release scenarios and controls to manage these scenarios are examined.
As we complete the preparations for the fourth Hubble Space Telescope (HST) servicing mission, we note an anniversary approaching: it was 30 years ago in July that the first HST payload safety review panel meeting was held. This, in turn, was just over a year after the very first payload safety review, a Phase 0 review for the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite and its Inertial Upper Stage, held in June of 1977. In adapting a process that had been used in the review and certification of earlier Skylab payloads, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) engineers sought to preserve the lessons learned in the development of technical payload safety requirements, while creating a new process that would serve the very different needs of the new space shuttle program. Their success in this undertaking is substantiated by the fact that this process and these requirements have proven to be remarkably robust, flexible, and adaptable. Furthermore, the payload safety process has, to date, served us well in the critical mission of safeguarding our astronauts, cosmonauts, and spaceflight participants. Both the technical requirements and their interpretation, as well as the associated process requirements have grown, evolved, been streamlined, and have been adapted to fit multiple programs, including the International Space Station (ISS) program, the Shuttle/Mir program, and most recently the United States Constellation program. From its earliest days, it was anticipated that the payload safety process would be international in scope, and so it has been. European Space Agency (ESA), Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), German Space Agency (DLR), Canadian Space Agency (CSA), Russian Space Agency (RSA), and many additional countries have flown payloads on both the space shuttle and on the ISS. Our close cooperation and long-term working relationships have culminated in the franchising of the payload safety review process itself to our partners in ESA, which in turn will serve as a roadmap for extending the franchise to other Partners.
With the growth in urban air mobility systems and the increasing reliance on interconnected technologies, ensuring the security of these complex infrastructures has become critical. As cities evolve into smart urban centers, the vulnerability to cyber threats escalates, possibly endangering citizens’ safety and the efficiency of transportation networks. In response to these challenges, this paper presents a study on implementing a Host-Based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) tailored explicitly to urban mobility environments’ unique demands. This study explores the design, development, and deployment of the proposed HIDS, focusing on its adaptability to monitor the hybrid nature of the urban mobility environment. Leveraging machine learning algorithms and anomaly detection techniques, the HIDS is equipped to continuously monitor and analyze the behavior of individual host systems, vehicles, and devices, thereby providing a proactive approach to threat detection. Implementing a HIDS is a pivotal strategy for enhancing cyber resiliency, as it gives an organization granular visibility into internal system activities, enables rapid detection and response to anomalous behavior and cyber threats, and fortifies the organization’s overall cybersecurity posture. In conclusion, this paper highlights the significance of host-based intrusion detection in urban mobility environments and underscores the necessity of tailored security solutions to safeguard against emerging cyber threats.
With the growth in Urban Air Mobility systems and the increasing reliance on interconnected technologies, ensuring the security of these complex components has become critical. As cities evolve into smart urban centers, the vulnerability to cyber threats escalates, possibly endangering citizens safety and the efficiency of transportation networks.In response to these challenges, this paper presents a study on the need for cyber resilient techniques within future air traffic environments. It will pay specific attention to the implementation of a Host-Based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) utilizing Atomic OSSEC software, tailored specifically to a NASA simulation of an UrbanAirMobility environments’ unique demands. Further, this study seeks to outline the rational for NASA’s recommendation for a HIDS in such environments. It explores the design, development, and deployment of the proposed HIDS, focusing on its adaptability to monitor the hybrid nature of the Urban Air Mobility environment. Leveraging machine learning algorithms and anomaly detection techniques, the HIDS is equipped to continuously monitor and analyze the behavior of individual host systems, vehicles, and devices, thereby providing a proactive approach to threat detection. Implementing a HIDS is a pivotal strategy for enhancing cyber resiliency, as it gives an organization granular visibility into internal system activities, enables rapid detection and response to anomalous behavior and cyber threats, and fortifies the organizations overall cybersecurity posture. Finally, this study aims to provide recommendations and include learned takeaways that the Urban Air Mobility industry should consider. In brief, this paper highlights the significance of host-based intrusion detection in UrbanAirMobility environments and underscores the necessity of tailored security solutions to safeguard against emerging cyber threats.
Global agriculture puts heavy pressure on planetary boundaries, posing the challenge to achieve future food security without compromising Earth system resilience. On the basis of process-detailed, spatially explicit representation of four interlinked planetary boundaries (biosphere integrity, land-system change, freshwater use, nitrogen flows) and agricultural systems in an internally consistent model framework, we here show that almost half of current global food production depends on planetary boundary transgressions. Hotspot regions, mainly in Asia, even face simultaneous transgression of multiple underlying local boundaries. If these boundaries were strictly respected, the present food system could provide a balanced diet (2,355 kcal per capita per day) for 3.4 billion people only. However, as we also demonstrate, transformation towards more sustainable production and consumption patterns could support 10.2 billion people within the planetary boundaries analysed. Key prerequisites are spatially redistributed cropland, improved water–nutrient management, food waste reduction and dietary changes. Adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals by all nations in 2015 is the first ever commitment to a world development path that safeguards the stability of the Earth system as a prerequisite for meeting universal human standards1. The longstanding challenge of achieving food security through sustainable agriculture is particularly acute in this context as world agriculture is a leading cause for the current transgressions of multiple planetary boundaries (PBs) globally and regionally2–5. The PB framework is a comprehensive scientific attempt to synoptically define our planet’s biogeophysical limits to anthropogenic interference. It suggests bounds to nine interacting processes that together delineate a Holocene-like Earth system state. The Holocene is chosen as the reference state as it is the only period known to provide a safe operating space for a world population of several billion people, and according to a precautionary principle, the PBs are set in sufficient distance from processes that may critically undermine Earth system resilience and global sustainability. A challenging question, thus, is whether human development goals such as food security can be met while maintaining multiple PBs along with their subglobal manifestations. Further PB transgressions could jeopardize the chances of providing sufficient food for a world population projected to be wealthier and reach >9 billion by 2050. This conundrum portrays a tradeoff between Earth’s biophysical carrying capacity and humankind’s rising food demand, calling in response for radical rethinking of food production and consumption patterns6–9. Yield gap closures, avoidance of excessive input use, shifts towards less resource-demanding diets, food waste reductions and efficient international trade are crucial options for sustainably increasing the food supply10–15. For example, enhancing water-use efficiency on irrigated and rain-fed farms can triple or quadruple crop yields in low-performing systems, suggesting possible global gains of >20% (ref. 16). Even higher gains appear feasible through globally optimized configurations of the land-use pattern17, and cutting food losses by half could generate food for another billion people18. Thus, collective large-scale implementation of such options could sustain food for a further growing world population19. Yet achieving this within a safe operating space as defined by PBs requires not only a halt to but actually a reversal of existing PB transgressions. Previous studies suggest that such a reconciliation might be possible, but these were based on aggregate representations of PBs (not accounting for the spatial patterns of limits, transgressions and interactions) or considered only one boundary in isolation17,20–23. Here, we systematically quantify to what extent current food production depends on local to global transgressions of the PBs for biosphere integrity, land-system change, freshwater use and nitrogen (N) flows, along with the potential of a range of solutions to avoid these transgressions and still increase food supply (Table 1). To this end, we configured an internally consistent process-based model of the terrestrial biosphere including agriculture (LPJmL) with multiple spatially distributed PBs and their interactions. LPJmL is among the longest-established and best-evaluated biosphere models, showing robust performance regarding simulation of, for example, carbon, water and crop yield dynamics (Supplementary Figs. 1 and 2 and Supplementary Table 1; see ref. 24 for a comprehensive benchmarking and Supplementary Methods for more detail on model evaluations). In principle following established definitions4, we refine the computation of some PBs with respect to their regional patterns and interactions (Methods), providing globally gridded precautionary limits to human interference with the Earth system at a level of great detail. In particular, we account for the evidence that many PBs need to be represented spatially explicitly4 to cover their
The Orion spacecraft will replace the space shuttle and will be the first human spacecraft since the Apollo program to leave low earth orbit. This vehicle will serve as the cornerstone of a complete space transportation system with a myriad of mission requirements necessitating rendezvous to multiple vehicles in earth orbit, around the moon and eventually beyond . These goals will require a complex and robust vehicle that is, significantly different from both the space shuttle and the command module of the Apollo program. Historically, orbit operations have been accomplished with heavy reliance on ground support and manual crew reconfiguration and monitoring. One major difference with Orion is that automation will be incorporated as a key element of the man-vehicle system. The automated system will consist of software devoted to transitioning between events based on a master timeline. This effectively adds a layer of high level sequencing that moves control of the vehicle from one phase to the next. This type of automated control is not entirely new to spacecraft since the shuttle uses a version of this during ascent and entry operations. During shuttle orbit operations however many of the software modes and hardware switches must be manually configured through the use of printed procedures and instructions voiced from the ground. The goal of the automation scheme on Orion is to extend high level automation to all flight phases. The move towards automation represents a large shift from current space shuttle operations, and so these new systems will be adopted gradually via various safeguards. These include features such as authority-to-proceed, manual down modes, and functional inhibits. This paper describes the contrast between the manual and ground approach of the space shuttle and the proposed automation of the Orion vehicle. I will introduce typical orbit operations that are common to all rendezvous missions and go on to describe the current Orion automation architecture and contrast it with shuttle rendezvous techniques and circumstances. The shuttle rendezvous profile is timed to take approximately 3 days from orbit insertion to docking at the International Space Station (ISS). This process can be divided into 3 phases: far-field, mid-field and proximity operations. The far-field stage is characterized as the most quiescent phase. The spacecraft is usually too far to navigate using relative sensors and uses the Inertial Measurement Units (IMU s) to numerically solve for its position. The maneuvers are infrequent, roughly twice per day, and are larger than other burns in the profile. The shuttle uses this opportunity to take extensive ground based radar updates and keep high fidelity orbit states on the ground. This state is then periodically uplinked to the shuttle computers. The targeting solutions for burn maneuvers are also computed on the ground and uplinked. During the burn the crew is responsible for setting the shuttle attitude and configuring the propulsion system for ignition. Again this entire process is manually driven by both crew and ground activity. The only automatic processes that occur are associated with the real-time execution of the burn. The Orion automated functionality will seek to relieve the workload of both the crew and ground during this phase
In preparation for missions to Mars that will involve the return of samples, it is necessary to prepare for the safe receiving, handling, testing, distributing, and archiving of martian materials here on Earth. Previous groups and committees have studied selected aspects of sample return activities, but a specific protocol for handling and testing of returned -=1 samples from Mars remained to be developed. To refine the requirements for Mars sample hazard testing and to develop criteria for the subsequent release of sample materials from precautionary containment, NASA Planetary Protection Officer, working in collaboration with CNES, convened a series of workshops to produce a Protocol by which returned martian sample materials could be assessed for biological hazards and examined for evidence of life (extant or extinct), while safeguarding the samples from possible terrestrial contamination. The Draft Protocol was then reviewed by an Oversight and Review Committee formed specifically for that purpose and composed of senior scientists. In order to preserve the scientific value of returned martian samples under safe conditions, while avoiding false indications of life within the samples, the Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) is required to allow handling and processing of the Mars samples to prevent their terrestrial contamination while maintaining strict biological containment. It is anticipated that samples will be able to be shipped among appropriate containment facilities wherever necessary, under procedures developed in cooperation with international appropriate institutions. The SRF will need to provide different types of laboratory environments for carrying out, beyond sample description and curation, the various aspects of the protocol: Physical/Chemical analysis, Life Detection testing, and Biohazard testing. The main principle of these tests will be described and the criteria for release will be discussed, as well as the requirements for the SRF and its personnel.
The Tonlé Sap Lake and river basin in central Cambodia provide critical ecosystem services to the region, including fisheries, agricultural irrigation, hydropower, and biodiverse habitats. Deforestation, increased pumping for farming, and effects of climate change such as droughts and forest fires threaten the health of the lake and food security in the region. This project built upon the previous term through a partnership with Conservation International (CI), the Cambodian Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology, and the Tonlé Sap Authority to assess ecosystem vitality and implement CI’s Freshwater Health Index (FHI) tool, in an effort to prioritize resource expenditure and highlight areas of concern. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and related travel restrictions, partners had not been able to readily collect in situ data for the past year, which make up the majority of FHI inputs. To help fill this data gap, we developed a methodology for using Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment (GRACE) satellite data to calculate groundwater storage depletion, and a Python Application Programming Interface for processing and formatting remotely-sensed data for the Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) model. We then used SWAT to model nutrient flows and of phosphorous, nitrogen and suspended sediments amounts in the basin from October 2000 to December 2020. These outputs served as inputs for the FHI and provided policy makers with robust monitoring information to aid decision-making in the area and safeguard the lake’s vital fisheries and biodiversity.
Space sustainability is crucial for the continuation of humanity's exploration and utilization of space. NASA recognizes the imperative of maintaining a sustainable space operating environment to safeguard the future of space activities. On April 9, 2024, NASA released its first part of an integrated Space Sustainability Strategy focused on the domain of earth orbit, with future volumes to address impacts of space operations on earth itself; cislunar space, including the Lagrange points and the lunar surface; and deep space, including other celestial bodies. This commitment extends to ensuring the safety of astronauts conducting operations in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), as well as enabling missions to the Moon and Mars. Moreover, sustainable space practices are essential for the uninterrupted operation of NASA's robotic science missions, which monitor Earth's changes and probe the mysteries of the universe. The strategy sets out a set of goals, the first of which is to establish a framework for assessing space sustainability at NASA, addressing the absence of a universally accepted framework with key metrics that promotes understanding of how metrics are interconnected. This framework will provide a basis for evaluating the sustainability of orbital activities, with metrics informed by input from the domestic and international space community. Objectives under this goal include defining key parameters affecting space sustainability, determining tolerable levels of risk, and annually publishing NASA's effect on space sustainability, including compliance with orbital debris mitigation standards. The subsequent goals build upon this foundation, identifying effective actions for enhancing space sustainability, incentivizing adoption of these actions through technology development and policy changes, and ensuring coordination with the global space community. An organizational change within NASA is also proposed to facilitate day-to-day coordination and accountability for space sustainability efforts. By pursuing these goals, NASA aims to strengthen the technical foundations of and continue to set an example for sustainable space operations. Regular evaluation of NASA mission performance in context with meeting sustainability objectives will ensure alignment with evolving challenges in the space operating environment.
Assuring safety in the NAS with the inclusion of new entrants, such as Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), will require overcoming unique safety challenges that result from combining innovative technologies with novel airspace concepts for moving people and cargo using autonomous vehicles. The focus of the In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) is to overcome AAM’s safety assurance challenges. The IASMS Concept of Operations (ConOps) describes an interconnected set of services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) designed to manage operational risks, identify unknown risks, and inform system designs. This paper describes an approach for defining SFCs based on technology trends in research, assessment of known and unknown risks in voluntary safety reports, and causal and contributing factors in aviation accidents and incidents. This approach would identify potential SFCs that further expand the Monitor, Assess, and Mitigate (M-A-M) functionality that represents the enabling framework of the IASMS. Safety implications that will result from integration of AAM in the transformation of the National Airspace System (NAS) were addressed in National Academies committees reports on AAM and IASMS. Development of a ConOps for IASMS was a top recommendation and can be represented as a reframing of safety assurance that builds on real-time alerting such as the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, and adds the more encompassing in-time temporal parameter in recognition of the different timelines for collecting and assessing safety data for risk mitigations. For example, mining for safety trends from data sources such as the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing system occurs over a longer time period. Research on AAM operations poses that SFCs can be designed to monitor the safety margin appropriate for AAM including with regards to the distance between current flight parameters and nominal ideal conditions. These in-time comparisons will become more complex as the density of operations increases at least in certain areas and can include planned and actual 4D trajectory, and in-time comparisons having implications on conflict modeling and prediction including expected and actual departure time, fix/waypoint crossing times, and arrival time. These comparisons would be integrated as part of SFCs that redefine and inform new safety margin. An increased safety margin improves management of operational risks while reducing the potential for anomalies. An increased safety margin also has implications for operator confidence in the certainty of its operations and trust in automation. Technology trends in research could be used to refine existing SFCs and define needs for additional SFCs that provide safety improvements to the design and operation of vehicles, airspace design, and operator performance requirements. NASA is developing innovative approaches to safeguard against major accidents and incidents that have occurred in the NAS and those anticipated with the inclusion of envisioned AAM operations. The innovations use operational performance data to monitor, detect, and predict flight variations exceeding safe nominal patterns, such as would be caused by navigational error, severe weather complications, or hijacking of UAS controls. These innovative approaches have high potential to prevent accidents and incidents in the new AAM era. It is anticipated that elements of the innovations will evolve into SFCs for the IASMS. Voluntary safety reports can be monitored to identify anomalies related to design or operational performance risks. Reports could be periodically monitored and assessed for specific topics. Reports might serve as weak signals or precursors indicative of emergent risk such as when combined with other safety information. The architecture could include SFCs that are based on voluntary safety reports recognizing the periodic temporal nature of data analysis. As previously mentioned, aviation accidents with their causal and contributing precursors can inform the need for SFCs in the IASMS. Accidents and incidents at San Francisco International Airport such as Asiana 214 and Air Canada 759 illustrate how combinations of different factors lead to increased risk. These types of precursors and different factors have implications on the types of SFCs that could be needed to monitor and manage different sources and types of design and operational risk. Continuing to assure the safety of AAM as designs and operations gain in complexity can be accompanied by defining SFCs that also increase in complexity. These SFCs can leverage information from findings and recommendations synthesized across on-going research, voluntary safety reports, and accident and incident reports. These SFCs can serve to refine accuracy of algorithms and resolve limitations with current practices. The IASMS architecture represents the framework for the SFCs and their critical role in safety assurance.
Microorganisms in our living environments are unavoidable. A community of microbes arrived in space with the delivery of the first element of the International Space Station (ISS), attached to hardware and on the bodies of the humans tasked with the initial assembly missions. The risk that microorganisms could cause adverse effects in the health of both the human occupants of the ISS as well as the physical integrity of the station environment and life support systems has been both a driver and a function of engineering and operational controls. Scientists and engineers at NASA have gone to extensive measures to control microbial growth at levels safe for the crewmembers and the spacecraft environment. Many of these measures were initiated with the design of the spacecraft and its systems. Materials used in the ISS were tested for resistance to fungi, such as mold and a paint with a fungus-killing chemical was also used. Controlling the humidity of the air in the Station is also an effective way of discouraging microbe growth. The breathing air is reconditioned by the Environmental Control Life Support System (ECLSS) prior to distribution, utilizing High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filtration. Requirements restricting the accumulation of water condensate in the air handlers and habitable volume of the ISS were other safeguards added. Water for drinking and food rehydration is disinfected or filtered. A robust in-flight housekeeping regimen for the ISS significantly reduces inappropriate growth of microorganisms and includes a regular cleaning of accessible surfaces with disinfectant wipes. Most of these requirements were suggested by microbiologists to mitigate and possibly prevent many microbiological risks. In addition to these controls, before flight monitoring and analyses of the cabin air, exposed surfaces, water and food, consumables, and crew members are conducted to mitigate microbial risk to the crew and spacecraft. Many microbial risks are much easier to identify and resolve before launch than during space flight. Although the focus has been on prevention of microbiologically related, not all problems can be anticipated. A number of microbial anomalies have occurred on ISS. This paper will discuss the occurrences, root-cause investigations, and mitigation steps taken to remediate the contamination.
On-Orbit Small Debris Tracking and Characterization is a technical gap in the current National Space Situational Awareness necessary to safeguard orbital assets and crew. This poses a major risk of MOD damage to ISS and Exploration vehicles. In 2015 this technology was added to NASA's Office of Chief Technologist roadmap. For missions flying in or assembled in or staging from LEO, the physical threat to vehicle and crew is needed in order to properly design the proper level of MOD impact shielding and proper mission design restrictions. Need to verify debris flux and size population versus ground RADAR tracking. Use of ISS for In-Situ Orbital Debris Tracking development provides attitude, power, data and orbital access without a dedicated spacecraft or restricted operations on-board a host vehicle as a secondary payload. Sensor Applicable to in-situ measuring orbital debris in flux and population in other orbits or on other vehicles. Could enhance safety on and around ISS. Some technologies extensible to monitoring of extraterrestrial debris as well to help accomplish this, new technologies must be developed quickly. The Small Orbital Stereo Tracking Camera is one such up and coming technology. It consists of flying a pair of intensified megapixel telephoto cameras to evaluate Orbital Debris (OD) monitoring in proximity of International Space Station. It will demonstrate on-orbit optical tracking (in situ) of various sized objects versus ground RADAR tracking and small OD models. The cameras are based on Flight Proven Advanced Video Guidance Sensor pixel to spot algorithms (Orbital Express) and military targeting cameras. And by using twin cameras we can provide Stereo images for ranging & mission redundancy. When pointed into the orbital velocity vector (RAM), objects approaching or near the stereo camera set can be differentiated from the stars moving upward in background.
On-Orbit Small Debris Tracking and Characterization is a technical gap in the current National Space Situational Awareness necessary to safeguard orbital assets and crew. This poses a major risk of MOD damage to ISS and Exploration vehicles. In 2015 this technology was added to NASA's Office of Chief Technologist roadmap. For missions flying in or assembled in or staging from LEO, the physical threat to vehicle and crew is needed in order to properly design the proper level of MOD impact shielding and proper mission design restrictions. Need to verify debris flux and size population versus ground RADAR tracking. Use of ISS for In-Situ Orbital Debris Tracking development provides attitude, power, data and orbital access without a dedicated spacecraft or restricted operations on-board a host vehicle as a secondary payload. Sensor Applicable to in-situ measuring orbital debris in flux and population in other orbits or on other vehicles. Could enhance safety on and around ISS. Some technologies extensible to monitoring of extraterrestrial debris as well To help accomplish this, new technologies must be developed quickly. The Small Orbital Stereo Tracking Camera is one such up and coming technology. It consists of flying a pair of intensified megapixel telephoto cameras to evaluate Orbital Debris (OD) monitoring in proximity of International Space Station. It will demonstrate on-orbit optical tracking (in situ) of various sized objects versus ground RADAR tracking and small OD models. The cameras are based on Flight Proven Advanced Video Guidance Sensor pixel to spot algorithms (Orbital Express) and military targeting cameras. And by using twin cameras we can provide Stereo images for ranging & mission redundancy. When pointed into the orbital velocity vector (RAM), objects approaching or near the stereo camera set can be differentiated from the stars moving upward in background.