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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Progress on Advancing the Robotic Air-slot Volumetric Inspection System (RAVIS) for Hanford Under-tank Inspection - 20519

The 27 in-service double-shell tank (DST) systems at Hanford provide interim storage for nearly 56 million gallons of nuclear and hazardous chemical legacy waste. The safe and reliable storage of the waste is critical to the site's extended cleanup mission. While in service, the leak integrity of the DSTs must be demonstrated to satisfy the Washington Administrative Code, inform decisions on tank management, and gauge fitness for continued service beyond originally intended design lives. The carbon steel plates and welds that comprise DST primary tank sidewalls and lower knuckles are routinely 'sampled' for volumetric non-destructive testing using ultrasonic inspection technology to determine whether corrosion pitting, cracking, or general corrosion are occurring that could compromise tank leak integrity. However, the carbon steel plates and welds that comprise the bottoms of primary tanks have not been thoroughly inspected since the DSTs were constructed (i.e., since 1968-1986) due to limited physical access to the exterior tank bottoms. The Robotic Air-slot Volumetric Inspection System, or 'RAVIS,' is being engineered to overcome the challenge of tank bottom in-service inspection. The system will be deployed under primary tanks within the small cooling channels/air-slots in the refractory pads upon which the tanks rest and will use ultrasonic guided wave inspection technology to volumetrically inspect physically inaccessible regions that make up ∼90% of a tank bottom, as well as regions that are physically accessible from the air-slots but comprise only ∼10% of a tank bottom. This paper describes the air-slot sensor and robotic deployment system and focuses on the testing approach and methods that are being applied to support (1) design feedback and performance acceptance (requirement verification) and (2) performance repeatability/reliability assessments (qualification) to ensure the RAVIS is prepared for successful inservice inspections of primary tank bottoms. Test progress made against the test plan, the results of 2019 testing, and the future outlook are included. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Development of an Innovative Inspection Tool for Superheater Tubes in Fossil Fuel Power Plants

Fossil fuel power plants are complex systems containing multiple components that require periodic health monitoring. Failures in these systems can lead to increased downtime for the plant, reduction of power, and significant cost for repairs. Inspections of the plant’s superheater tubes are typically manual, laborious, and extremely time-consuming. This is due to their small diameter size (between 1.3 and 7.6 cm) and the coiled structure of the tubing. In addition, the tubes are often stacked close to each other, limiting access for external inspection. This paper presents the development and testing of an electrically powered pipe crawler that can navigate inside 5 cm diameter tubes and provide an assessment of their health. The crawler utilizes peristaltic motion within the tubes via interconnected modules for gripping and extending. The modular nature of the system allows it to traverse through straight sections and multiple 90° and 180° bends. Additional modules in the system include an ultrasonic sensor for tube thickness measurements, as well as environmental sensors, a light detecting and ranging (LiDAR) sensor, and camera. Furthermore, these modules utilize a gear system that allows for 360° rotation and provides a means to inspect the entire internal circumference of the tubes.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2023

Toward Autonomous Field Inspection of CSP Collectors With a Polarimetric Imaging Drone

We developed a polarimetric imaging drone to perform field inspections of heliostats and carried out field tests at Sandia’s National Solar Thermal Test Facility (NSTTF). The preliminary results show that Degree of Linear Polarization (DOLP) and Angle of Polarization (AOP) images greatly enhanced the edge detection results compared with the conventional visible images, supporting fast and accurate detection of heliostat mirror edges and cracks. The system holds the promise to enable future automated detection of heliostats optical errors and mirror defects.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Double-Shell Tank Primary Bottom Visual Inspection Results - 20025

A pressing need for the Double-Shell Tank Integrity Program at Hanford is of the ability to inspect the bottom of the tanks. Though the DSTs' annulus spaces (the space between the internal and external tank walls) have been inspected visually since 1992 and with Ultrasonic Testing (UT) since 1996, inspections of the tank bottoms have been able to be conducted due to limitations of available technology, omitting about 40 percent of the tank surface below the maximum fill level from routine inspection. Visual inspections of the tank annulus have been conducted up to five times in some DSTs and portions of the annulus space for all of the DSTs has been inspected twice with UT. This region includes the walls of the primary tank and secondary liner along with accessible portions of the secondary liner bottom. Due to this lack of technology, the degradation of the primary tank bottom in Tank AY-102 was undetected until the tank leaked into its annulus space, confirmed in 2012. Since that time, WRPS has been working with the nondestructive examination community and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, to evaluate potential technologies to conduct these challenging remote inspections. Recent work has included the development, testing, and deployment of several remote visual inspection technologies to observe the condition of the primary tank bottom of the DSTs by leveraging air distribution slots in the refractory pad on which it rests. Robotic solutions to conduct this inspection were developed with a detailed understanding of the physical configuration and operational logistics. Understanding and subsequent communication of these details to vendors within the robotics and nondestructive examination community was a critical component to the successful production of these new tools. Throughout the FY16-FY18 years, vendors from nondestructive examination community were solicited for ideas to meet the tank bottom inspection challenge. Two tank bottom visual inspection solutions were then pursued to meet that challenge. Both tools were successfully deployed at Tank AP-107, and provided valuable visuals, never before obtained from the under tank environment of a double-shell tank. While there are minor opportunities for improvement identified with each system, general outcomes were overwhelmingly positive. Both systems were successfully able to navigate the refractory air slot pattern from the outer edge to the tank center and record video footage. The micro-crawler provided high quality and very stable footage through the air slot pattern, but took longer to deploy into the slots and traverse through them than the alternative system. The push-pull tethered camera was able to navigate all seven of its target air slots in a matter of a few hours, which included deployment, movement between slot entrances, and complete removal of the system from the annulus environment. Through these air slots, new information was gained about the tank bottom and refractory pad condition of tank AP-107, AP-106, AP-108, and AN-102. While some debris was noted in the air slots, including sand, chipped refractory, and construction materials, the refractory was found to be structurally stable and adequately supporting the primary tank bottom through the full diameter of the tank. Primary tank bottom steel exterior was found to be in good condition, free of ongoing or aggressive corrosion conditions. Looking toward the future, robotic access to and visual inspection of refractory air slots and the primary tank bottom steel has now proven viable. Incorporating periodic air slot inspections as a regular practice within the Double-Shell Tank Integrity Program is the next step, allowing trending of any changes in condition. As ultrasonic testing infrastructure was leveraged to complete the initial system deployments described in this report, it makes sense to adopt that same strategy for ongoing periodic examinations and deploy these primary tank bottom inspection tools alongside ultrasonic testing operations. Development of visual inspection tools to evaluate the primary tank bottom region of the double-shell tanks was planned as the first stage of inspection. Continued development of volumetric sensors and incorporation of these inspection tools into Hanford's ongoing Double-Shell Tank Integrity Program are the next steps, seeking to continuously expand understanding of asset integrity and remaining useful life. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Autonomous Aerial Power Plant Inspection in GPS-denied Environments

Inspection of coal-fired power plants is frequently dangerous, includes difficult places to reach, and can turn expensive due to the downtimes and cost of inspection crew. Robotic systems have shown capabilities to address some of these issues, but most of the current robotic inspection technology in power plants is designed for specific components. Conversely, recent advances in machine vision have empowered aerial platforms for long-range, remotely-controlled, GPS-based inspections of industrial plants. This capability has led to wide spread utilization of aerial robots (commonly termed Drones, UVS or UAS) platforms for inspection in less challenging environments where both collision avoidance, and GPS reception are not significant issues. The challenge in adapting airborne technology for power plant inspection lies in internal structures and the complex network of piping, and distribution systems, which impose significant risks for collision and can hinder the reception and transmission of GPS signals. The current state of the art in aerial inspection technology within the energy sector is controlled via radio control, and utilizes GPS-based navigation, for inspection of large-scale plants such as offshore platforms and wind turbine parks. Nevertheless, close-range and autonomous inspection in the GPS-denied environments of power plants has not yet been achieved, as it requires precise guidance and navigation with real-time situational awareness and obstacle avoidance capabilities. This endeavor introduced the use of rotary wing flying robots, due to their station keeping and vertical take-off capabilities for power plant components inspection. To enable close quarter inspection two methods were used. One method uses the 3D CAD (Three-dimensional Computer-Aided Design) model of the asset to inspect to generate the UAV’s inspection path. To acquire, analyze and process the 3D model, first, the STL file is produced to obtain surface points and vectors normal to the surface. Later, by introducing other variables such as wall offset and a controlled trajectory between each outline and each subsequent layer, the flight path is generated. The proposed framework will generate a path that will pass as close as desired from the surface and navigate in intricate environments. A second method, use advanced manufacturing techniques such as CNC (Computer Numerical Control) and additive manufacturing. Once the inspection flight path is obtained, vision-based navigation systems are employed to have the UAV autonomously tracking the provided trajectory. Finally, Artificial Intelligence-enabled developments are in charge of detecting cracks and corrosion in structural components of power plants. The proposed methods are validated in simulations, laboratory and industrial setups, where it is shown that the developed systems acting together enable close-quarter autonomous aerial inspection and mapping in power plant assets. The system can be further improved by adding more sensors to navigate in different GPS-denied environments, with non-homogeneous lighting conditions, dust and in general situations where vision-based systems may fail.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗
DOE OSTI2021

Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range and Nevada Test and Training Range, Nevada for Calendar Year 2020 (Rev. 0)

This report provides the results of the annual post-closure use restriction (UR) inspections at corrective action sites (CASs) located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). This report covers post-closure UR inspections for calendar year 2020, and includes visual inspections and repair activities completed at the following corrective action units (CAUs): • CAU 407, Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR) • CAU 424, Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR) • CAU 453, Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR) • CAU 487, Thunderwell Site (TTR). Note: CAU 400, Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR) (CASs TA-19-001-05PT, Ordnance Disposal Pit; and TA-55-00-TAB2, Ordnance Disposal Pit) no longer requires inspection and reporting, as described in the Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range and Nevada Test and Training Range, Nevada for Calendar Year 2019. Site figures are included in Appendix A. The Post-Closure Inspection Plans and Record of Technical Change modifying the requirements for each UR are included in Appendix B. The Post-Closure Inspection Checklists are included in Appendix C. Field Notes are included in Appendix D. Appendix E, Inspection Photographs, does not include photographs because none were taken during the 2020 post-closure inspections. Appendix F, Post-Closure Vegetation Monitoring Report, does not include any data because vegetation monitoring was not conducted or required at any CAU in 2020. Visual inspections were conducted according to the post-closure requirements outlined in specific CAU and CAS URs, and approved by NDEP. The annual post-closure inspections for CASs associated with CAUs 407, 424, 453, and 487 were conducted on May 20, 2020. No maintenance or repair issues were noted at CAUs 487, or at CASs associated with CAU 424 (except CASs 03-08-002-A304 and 03-08-002-A308). Maintenance items and subsequent repairs include the following: • CAU 407, CAS TA-23-001-TARC (Roller Coaster RadSafe Area): A UR sign was loose and was rehung during the inspection. • CAU 424, CAS 03-08-002-A304 (Landfill Cell A3-4): The northeast monument needed a UR sign. The UR sign was attached to the monument on August 11, 2020. • CAU 424, CAS 03-08-002-A308 (Landfill Cell A3-8): The southeast monument needed additional lava rock. The lava rock was added during the inspection. • CAU 453, CAS 09-55-001-0952 (Area 9 Landfill): Two animal burrows were noted in the western portion of the northern and southern trenches (one burrow per trench). The animal burrows were repaired on August 11, 2020.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Evaluation of H-Canyon Ventilation Exhaust Tunnel Inspection at the Savannah River Site - 20052

The Department of Energy (DOE) H-Canyon Facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) is operated by Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). The Facility Structural Integrity Program [1] provides a process to inspect, evaluate, and document the conditions of passive safety related structural systems and components, their degradation mechanisms and their impact on the safety envelope. The Structural Integrity Program performs periodic visual inspections to confirm the systems and components can perform their safety function and recommend corrective actions before the function is compromised. The H-Canyon Exhaust Tunnel is part of the H-Canyon Ventilation System and is periodically inspected under the Structural Integrity Program. The Tunnel performs a Safety Class passive design feature function that is available 100% of the time. The underground reinforced concrete Tunnel directs Canyon process air from the Canyon to the Sand Filter System. The radiological and chemical airborne activity coupled with the physical configuration of the tunnel precludes a manned entry into the tunnel to perform the inspection. Unlike active systems that can be subjected to physical testing to confirm capability, qualification calculations, including modeling, is performed to assess passive design feature capabilities relative to operational, accident and natural phenomena hazards events. Input for these calculations come from knowledge of field conditions, design drawings and conservative assumptions. The knowledge of field conditions comes from concrete and soil testing activities as well as inspection data. The use of cameras on crawlers to obtain inspection data and how that data is used in qualification calculations is the focus of this discussion. Remote Tunnel inspections have been performed using cameras on a stick, referred to as pole cameras, prior to Calendar Year 2003 (CY2003). Since CY2003, six camera equipped crawlers have been used. Crawlers have evolved and improved by incorporating lessons learned from the previous inspections. The latest 2019 crawler successfully traveled the entire length of the tunnel between the Canyon and Sand Filter System and captured images that were previously unseen, thus providing key visual data for the Structural Integrity Program report [2]. The inspection data serves as 1) input to qualification calculations, 2) validates current conditions remain bounded by qualification calculations, and 3) documents a record of change over time. This data is vital for the effective evaluation of the tunnel structure and aids with predicting the life cycle service life safety envelope to protect the public, environment, and facility worker. The goal of the 2019 deployment was to use a more robust vehicle to ensure travel over obstacles, perform the inspection with higher resolution cameras, and have the ability to elevate the cameras to view surfaces previously obscured by abandon-in-place ducts in the tunnel. The inspection information will serve to strengthen the input basis for qualification calculations, versus using excessive conservative calculation assumptions. This 2019 inspection was compared with previous crawler visual evidence to identify change over time to project remaining service life and confirm field conditions remain bounded by qualification calculations. The results of the 2019 Exhaust Tunnel inspection continue to improve and provide a firm basis to make sound engineering judgements regarding tunnel capability and approaches in projecting remaining service life with an aging system and component. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Integrating extended reality with inspection systems

An extended reality (“XR”) inspection system for inspecting a target is provided. The XR inspection system includes an inspection system and an XR device. The inspection system includes an inspection main unit and an inspection probe. The inspection main unit collects inspection data from the inspection probe, receives commands input by an inspector using the XR device, performs functions associated with the commands, and sends display data to the XR device. The XR device provides an augmented reality display and sensors. The XR device displays display data received from the inspection main unit, receives commands via the sensors from the inspector, and sends the commands to the inspection main unit.

Keene, Lionel↗
DOE OSTI2024

Gamma-Ray and Cosmic Ray Muon Modalities for Cargo Inspection

Screening and inspection of cargo containers are two essential methods to nondestructively examine the contents of shipment. These methods enable the detection of illicit transportation of unauthorized materials such as nuclear and radioactive materials, explosives, drugs, and so on, typically at borders or secure facilities. Although high-energy X-ray transmission is a standard system and is widely used for cargo inspection, the inherent challenges of high false-positive rates and high attenuation factors necessitate the development of complementary techniques that can increase the detection efficiency and accuracy in large and dense materials. Gamma-rays, which possess higher penetration characteristics because of their high energy, offer an alternative nonintrusive modality for cargo scanning. They represent a promising inspection method when compared to X-rays for three reasons: (1) improved ability to detect nuclear and radioactive materials, (2) higher inspection throughput rates, and (3) lower false-positive rates. Currently, there are two main gamma-ray inspection techniques, active and passive interrogation. Active interrogation can be further grouped into (1) gamma-ray transmission imaging and (2) neutron-induced gamma-ray emission detection. Gamma-ray transmission imaging utilizes differences in material densities for mapping the shipment contents and detecting anomalies. It is analogous to the X-ray transmission method; however, the high-energy photons make it more difficult to shield against, which enables more efficient performance in large and dense material inspection. Neutron-induced gamma-ray emission inspection is designed for the detection of nuclear and radioactive material because those materials emit characteristic gamma-rays when they are activated by neutron absorption. On the other hand, passive interrogation techniques rely on high-efficiency detectors to detect radiation emitted from hidden special nuclear or other radioactive materials. Similar to passive interrogation, cosmic ray muon monitoring and imaging are relatively new techniques that do not require external radioactive sources. These techniques have received attention as a potential next-generation radiographic probe to identify illicit transportation of nuclear and radioactive materials in cargo containers. Cosmic ray muons have unique features, (1) much higher energies than X-rays or gamma-rays (on the order of 10−1—104 GeV), (2) enhanced penetration capability, and (3) natural occurrence, thereby eliminating the need for induced radiation sources. These features enable cosmic ray muons to be utilized for detection of special nuclear materials in high-background-noise environments. By analyzing incoming and outgoing muon trajectories, scattering angles, and energies, it has been shown that it would be possible to locate hidden and well-shielded materials in cargo containers via three-dimensional muon tomography images or signal analysis. Gamma-rays, cosmic ray muons, and other nonintrusive cargo inspection modalities are complementary to each other, allowing them to address various cargo inspection conditions (i.e., scanning time, cost, radiation exposure level, and types of target materials). This chapter presents a detailed review of the theoretical fundamentals and technical principles behind the current gamma-ray and cosmic ray muon modalities for cargo inspection. Additionally, critical assessments and suggestions for the future directions to advance the use of gamma and muon modalities are discussed.

Bae, Junghyun↗
DOE OSTI2020

Enabling human–infrastructure interfaces for inspection using augmented reality

Decaying infrastructure maintenance cost allocation depends heavily on accurate and safe inspection in the field. New tools to conduct inspections can assist in prioritizing investments in maintenance and repairs. The industrial revolution termed as “Industry 4.0” is based on the intelligence of machines working with humans in a collaborative workspace. Contrarily, infrastructure management has relied on the human for making day-to-day decisions. New emerging technologies can assist during infrastructure inspections, to quantify structural condition with more objective data. However, today’s owners agree in trusting the inspector’s decision in the field over data collected with sensors. If data collected in the field is accessible during the inspections, the inspector decisions can be improved with sensors. New research opportunities in the human–infrastructure interface would allow researchers to improve the human awareness of their surrounding environment during inspections. This article studies the role of Augmented Reality (AR) technology as a tool to increase human awareness of infrastructure in their inspection work. The domains of interest of this research include both infrastructure inspections (emphasis on the collection of data of structures to inform management decisions) and emergency management (focus on the data collection of the environment to inform human actions). This article describes the use of a head-mounted device to access real-time data and information during their field inspection. The authors leverage the use of low-cost smart sensors and QR code scanners integrated with Augmented Reality applications for augmented human interface with the physical environment. This article presents a novel interface architecture for developing Augmented Reality–enabled inspection to assist the inspector’s workflow in conducting infrastructure inspection works with two new applications and summarizes the results from various experiments. The main contributions of this work to computer-aided community are enabling inspectors to visualize data files from database and real-time data access using an Augmented Reality environment.

Maharjan, D.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program (AMCAP) Material Test Reactor (MTR) (Fuel Inspection Program Report)

The AMCAP MTR Fuel Inspection Program, a special inspection program comprised of four inspection campaigns, examined a total of ten (10) pre-selected aluminum-clad, aluminum-based fuel core spent nuclear fuel assemblies (ASNF) stored in the L Area Disassembly Basin (L Basin) at the Savannah River Site. A full description of the inspections and the results are reported. The fuel had been stored in bundled-tube storage (Vertical Tube Storage) for periods of 18 to 21 years. The prior service experience of the individual 10 assemblies varies, but all included irradiation followed by wet storage at international research reactor sites prior to shipment to the US and storage in L Basin. The 10 assemblies were expected to be among the “worst"’ in terms of prior corrosion damage of the entire inventory of the direct-bundle-stored ASNF in L Basin. The inventory of MTR ASNF in L Basin will continue to be stored in the bundled-tube configuration or in slug-storage buckets with inserts pending retrieval for ultimate disposition. The MTR fuel inspections focused on collecting information for characterization of the material condition of the ASNF considering various types of aluminum fuel corrosion degradation of its assembled materials in water storage. A custom-designed Fuel Inspection Table was used to stage the fuel for remote, enhanced visual examination (close-up video imaging & recording) with controlled lighting and positioning that enables reproducibility of imaging conditions. The inspections were conducted by fuel subject matter expert staff from Spent Fuel Project Engineering (SFPE) and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). Stills captured from the video records were used to compare the corrosion evolution from previous records, as available. This evaluation of the inspection results including the comparison to the previous inspection results demonstrate that the water quality and the storage configuration of ASNF in L Basin do not cause aggressive corrosion degradation of the fuel; mitigation of the prior corrosion degradation of the fuel also appears to have been achieved with the good water quality conditions of L Basin. Recommendations are made for future inspection of the fuel to trend corrosion degradation and demonstrate continued safe wet storage of the ASNF in L Basin. The next fuel examination is recommended to be performed in 5 years.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

43-0434 Bridge Inspection Report 2022

This report covers the inspection findings for the Routine Inspection of the Omega Bridge conducted on September 23-25, 2022 and the Fracture Critical Member (FCM) Inspection conducted on June 26-27, 2021. Note that due to complications with the under-bridge access unit, portions of the Routine Inspection and the entire FCM Inspection could not be completed in 2022. As a result, the superstructure condition reported herein is based on the 2021 inspection whereas the deck and substructure conditions are based on the 2022 inspection. The superstructure condition will be updated when the inspection is completed in 2023. The inspections were completed according to the standards referenced in EXHIBIT “D” SCOPE OF WORK AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS including the National Bridge Inspection Standards (23 CFR Part 650, dated 12/14/2004) and other FHWA, NMDOT, and AASHTO codes and standards.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Automated Inspection of Criticality Control Overpacks for Surplus Plutonium Disposition: Qualification Update – 25313

In an effort to reduce the amount of nuclear waste in South Carolina, the Department of Energy (DOE) tasked the Savannah River Site (SRS) with diluting and disposing of the amount of plutonium in the state. This process involves the movement and shipment of over 100,000 criticality control overpacks (CCOs) throughout the project lifespan, lending itself to the use of automation to reduce worker radiation exposure and more efficiently utilize human capital. Due to the large scope, this overarching process was broken down into several different “automation projects” to be developed. The first opportunity pursued was the receipt and inspection of empty CCO drums coming into SRS, identified as Automation Project 1 (AP1), and is the focus of this paper. AP1 was developed to unpack incoming CCOs and inspect them for unwanted foreign objects and any damage to the drum or its contents. This process is accomplished by the combination of an automated guided vehicle (AGV) that delivers CCOs to a robotic arm which uses a suite of custom tools to disassemble a CCO, inspect the inside and outside of the CCO and its inner criticality control container (CCC), reassemble the CCC and CCO, and apply a tamper indicating device (TID) to the inspected drum. In past years, the robotic work cell had been developed in a small-scale testing facility for proof-of-concept. This year, major improvements were made to the robotic work cell to perform the process, including integration into the final facility where CCOs will be inspected. Other technical improvements include the implementation of sensor feedback and safety relays into the control system to allow the state of the work cell to be better tracked, and additional development of the TID application process to complete the robotic inspection. Further enhancements were made to the robotic vision processes and robot pathing, as well as development on a computer vision inspection process to detect inspection criteria anomalies in CCOs. In addition to developmental improvements, the work cell underwent a six-month testing period to ensure the project requirements were met. Results of this testing period demonstrate the work cell’s capability to meet project throughput goals at an acceptable level, successfully document the status of each CCO inspected, and reduce the toll on technical operations’ human power by two thirds. At the time of this paper, the work cell is capable of autonomously handling up to eight CCOs with an AGV, delivering CCOs to and from the robot work cell, and having a robotic arm perform a full receipt and inspection procedure on each CCO. Moving forward, repeatability will be improved so that these CCOs can be run back-to-back seamlessly, as well as improving the system to handle more significant edge cases and failure modes.

Spivey, Nicholas↗
DOE OSTI2022

What, why and when to go virtual: An international analysis of early adopters of virtual building energy codes inspections

To meet greenhouse gas reduction targets, several countries are pursuing more ambitious policies in their buildings and construction sectors, such as introducing zero net energy/carbon building codes. Countries often report not having enough qualified staff for performing building energy code inspections and many are exploring faster, easier, and more reliable methods to check the compliance of buildings with their codes. Building inspections are a critical element for ensuring code compliance and they have traditionally been performed in person. However, in-person inspections can be labor and travel intensive, costly, and prone to human error. In this paper, the authors explore how virtual inspections, particularly in light of the recent COVID-19 pandemic, have impacted processes for building code compliance checks in jurisdictions and communities around the world. Here, the authors collected data on four key parameters (time and financial savings, scope of inspections, changing practices and technological innovation, and benefits to consumers) from six jurisdictions and communities in five countries (Australia, Canada, Singapore, United Arab Emirates, and the United States) to analyze the impacts of virtual inspections on code compliance checks. The analysis found the greatest value from virtual inspections in geographically dispersed regions and for cities experiencing rapid building construction. The study also explored emerging technologies that are being piloted for virtual inspections. Although many of these technologies hold promise, more resources and capacity are needed to make them viable for use in building energy code inspections.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2020

History of Ultrasonic Inspection of High-Level Waste Tanks at SRS - 20220

The Liquid Waste Disposition Projects (LWDP) Structural Authority and Inspection Engineering Support Group has teamed with the Materials Science and Technology Non-destructive Evaluation Group of Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to implement a comprehensive In-Service Inspection (ISI) program for the High-Level Waste (HLW) tanks in the sites tank farms. The purpose of this program is to demonstrate the structural and leak integrity of the tanks to maintain the function of waste containment throughout the desired service life. Four types of waste tanks were constructed at Savannah River Site (SRS) from 1951 thru 1981 to store radioactive nuclear waste from the separations process. The Type I, II and III are carbon steel cylindrical tanks with varying degrees of access to the side walls and very limited access to the tank bottom. The tanks contain 750,000 to 1.3 million gallons of waste and are buried or backfilled with soil. The tanks are 75'-85' in diameter and 24'-33' from tank bottom to the tank roof. Inspection of the HLW tanks is made difficult by radiation, contamination, and small access openings. Through the years these challenges have been overcome by progressive improvements to programs and equipment resulting in the sophisticated wall crawler Ultrasonic Testing (UT) technology of today. A formal inspection program was developed and put in service in 1972. UT thickness measurements were first made in 1967 and 1969 of selected waste tanks using an analog-type instrument to measure the thickness of the carbon steel walls. Routine inspections for thinning were performed from 1972-1985 and then discontinued because no thinning had been observed and this technique could not detect pitting or cracking. UT inspections resumed in 1994 using a sophisticated robotic wall crawler with UT technology capable of detecting thinning, cracking and pitting. The current program focuses on the newer Type III tanks that are used primarily for storage. The program was upgraded in 2003 to include selected regions of the tank wall, secondary wall and annulus floor on a 7 to 10-year frequency. The facility is currently in its third cycle of tank inspections. Thus far, there have been no reportable indications of service induced degradation. This result provides assurance that the chemistry control program has been effective at mitigating corrosion and that the tanks remain structurally sound even after more than 40 years of service. This paper will present the UT technology first used at SRS and the evolution to the current systems and their capabilities. Additionally, plans for equipment upgrades that will improve the extent of inspection will be discussed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

43-0434 Bridge Inspection Report 2021

The documentation includes the following: 1. 2021 NMDOT Bridge Inspection Report including Element Level Data Collection (in digital formats prepared by NMSU)--conforms to the National Bridge Inspection Standards and AASHTO Manual for Bridge Element Inspection; 2. 2021 Supplemental Report (in digital formats prepared by NMSU)--provides detailed information related to current condition of major bridge components; 3. 2021 Inspection Pictures (in digital format prepared by NMSU); 4. 2021 Delamination Map (in digital format prepared by LANL). During the 2021 inspection, three critical findings were reported to our LANL contact, Mr. Jonathan Stein, by text and/or email on June 26, 2021. 1. The south joint of the bridge had a modular section of the joint that could potentially come loose during the passing of vehicles. This was reported as a critical finding for safety. If the modular section becomes dislodged or deformed it could pose a serious hazard that could result in a punctured tire to vehicles, motorcyclists and/or bicyclist causing drivers/riders to lose control; 2. The bracket plate located at the north end of the bridge on the pedestrian walkway was corroded through and provides little protection to pedestrians and bicyclists. This was reported as a critical finding for safety to prevent injuries to people; 3. The north approach rail has three missing posts. These posts help ensure that traffic is redirected and the energy is absorbed by the rail. This was reported as a critical finding for safety. Additionally, the approach rail is on a curve with a nearby drop off. Immediate repair is recommended. Based on the 2021 inspection, the bridge deck is rated in "fair" condition. The chain drag performed on the deck identified several areas with delamination that are concentrated near the expansion joints, in the closure joint of the deck near the bridge centerline, and at the south end of the northbound lanes. The chain drag performed during the 2021 inspection revealed 215,333 sq. in. (1495 sq. ft) of delaminations and patched areas (not including the sidewalk). This is approximately a 600% increase from 2019. It is recommended that the delaminations and spalls with exposed rebar be repaired. The "delaminated area" map for the 2021 inspection is provided in the supplemental report.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Autonomous aerial flight path inspection using advanced manufacturing techniques

Robotic systems have shown capabilities to perform inspection tasks in dangerous and difficult-to-access environments, such as those found in different components of power plants. However, most of the current robotic inspection technology is designed for specific components. Aerial robots, commonly termed as Drones, have raised an option to inspect a wider range of structural components. Nevertheless, current aerial inspecting technology still relies on a human pilot with limited line of sight, field of view and a reduced perception as the drone flies away, which prevents performing close-quarter inspection in intricate, structurally complex and GPS-denied environments. This work introduces offline inspection path generation methods based on robotics-integrated to manufacturing techniques. One method uses computer-aided manufacturing (CAM) techniques and the other an additive manufacturing (AM) approach to generate the flight path. That is to say, the drone would fly along the path described by a 3D (Three Dimensional) printer’s extruder or a CNC (Computer Numerical Control) machining tool, enabling to fly very close the structure even in physical structures with a complex geometry. Once the trajectories are generated, they are introduced for its validation in the Gazebo robotics simulator. Simulation results demonstrate the proper performance of the method and confirm that this approach can be used for close inspection of structural components.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Spatio-Temporal Assessment of Heavy-Duty Truck Incident and Inspection Data

Vehicular incidents, especially those involving tractor trailers, are increasing in number every year. These events are extremely costly for fleets, in terms of damage or loss of property, loss of efficiency, and certainly in terms of loss of life. Although the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) is responsible for performing inspections, and fleet managers are encouraged to maintain their fleet and participate in regular inspections, it is uncertain whether these inspections are occurring at a frequency that is necessary to prevent incidents. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) of the DOT manages and maintains the Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS) dataset, which contains all incident and inspection data regarding commercial vehicles in the U.S. The purpose of this preliminary analysis was to explore the MCMIS dataset through spatiotemporal analyses, to uncover findings that may hint at potential improvements in the DOT inspection process and highlight location-specific trends in the dataset. These analyses are novel, as previous research using the MCMIS dataset only examined the data at the state or county level, not at a national scale. The results from the analyses pinpointed specific major metropolitan areas, namely Harris County (Houston), Texas, and three of the New York boroughs (Kings, Queens, and the Bronx), which were found to have increasing incident rates during the study period (2016–2020). An overview of potential causal factors contributing to this increase are provided as well as an overview of the inspection process, and suggestions for improvement relative to the highlighted locations in Texas and New York are also provided. Ultimately, it is suggested that the incorporation of advanced technology and automation may prove beneficial in reducing the occurrence of events that lead to incidents and may also help in the inspection process.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗