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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Concept of Operations (ConOps) of an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM)

The growth of new emerging operations involving Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) necessitates developing a perspective for an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS). This perspective advances from the National Academies report on IASMS and its recommendation for developing a Concept of Operations (ConOps) for IASMS. A ConOps has been developed for In-time System-Wide Safety Assurance (ISSA) from which the IASMS ConOps pivots to provide a robust scope commensurate with the broad vision defined by the National Academies. The IASMS ConOps focuses on emerging operations and spans innovations in Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) and an increasingly complex ecosystem comprised of a widening mix of vehicles and technologies, Urban Air Mobility (UAM) with industry-federated services, traditional operations, as well as new supersonic aircraft and space launch systems.The challenge for the IASMS ConOps is to be broad to encompass innovations in the coming years and decades while agile to ensure levels of safety compatible with operational and certification requirements of the National Airspace System (NAS). The IASMS ConOps interweaves increasing complexity of operational safety capabilities and unlocking UAS Maturity Levels (UMLs). The relationships between increased complexity of automation and automated systems, fewer operators who are not as traditionally higher skilled, more complex operational environments, and aviation operations management with mixed aircraft and equipage pose a multi-dimensional space for IASMS capabilities essential for safety assurance and risk management. Instantiating IASMS capabilities and how they would be integral to AAM operations and increasing maturity of UAM could be accomplished through a series of Safety Demonstrators. These Safety Demonstrators could provide increased understanding and insight into use of controls for risk mitigation, means of compliance for certification, and operational experience with safety services such as in relation to contingency management. The IASMS capabilities can be viewed as initially residing with the vehicle, airspace, and Supplemental Data Service Provider (SDSP). For example, vehicle capabilities include communications including the command and control link, Remote Identification (ID), conflict advisory/alerting, and UAS system monitoring. These capabilities monitor and assess data such as battery health, aircraft state, and human performance. Complexity of ISAMS capabilities depends on a number of factors. These factors are intendedonly as a notional categorization with the purpose being to reflect the complexity of the AAM ecosystem that would drive up the complexity of ISSA capabilities including systems, sensors, models, standards, and controls. Factors could include the Vehicle Flight Management, Environment, Airspace, and Contingency Management. Each of these factors can be comprised of multiple sub-factors that contribute to increasing complexity. For example, Airspace at a lower level of complexity could be dedicated to UTM operations that are unmonitored, and at a higher level of complexity could involve mixed UTM and ATM operations. The IASMS concept includes safety services that provide data and information to different participants in AAM. The roles and responsibilities of participants can be defined using the Responsible-Accountable-Consulted-Informed (RACI) analysis. For example, for the safety service involving the Remote ID, the Operator would be accountable for providing the data, the Vehicle would be responsible for transmitting it, and the USS, SDSP, Vertiports, FIMS (FAA), and Public Entities such as safety services would be informed by receiving the data. The IASMS ConOps identifies the capabilities needed for risk mitigation and safety assurance in the increasingly complex national airspace. The ConOps serves as a pathway for engaging with industry to gain operational experience including through the Safety Demonstrator series, the RACI analysis, and operational complexity factors. The ConOps serves to integrate these different perspectives to build a cohesive and cogent approach to an AAM safety management system.

In-Time Aviation Safety Management System↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach for Defining IASMS Services, Functions, and Capabilities

Assuring safety in the NAS with the inclusion of new entrants, such as Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), will require overcoming unique safety challenges that result from combining innovative technologies with novel airspace concepts for moving people and cargo using autonomous vehicles. The focus of the In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) is to overcome AAM’s safety assurance challenges. The IASMS Concept of Operations (ConOps) describes an interconnected set of services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) designed to manage operational risks, identify unknown risks, and inform system designs. This paper describes an approach for defining SFCs based on technology trends in research, assessment of known and unknown risks in voluntary safety reports, and causal and contributing factors in aviation accidents and incidents. This approach would identify potential SFCs that further expand the Monitor, Assess, and Mitigate (M-A-M) functionality that represents the enabling framework of the IASMS. Safety implications that will result from integration of AAM in the transformation of the National Airspace System (NAS) were addressed in National Academies committees reports on AAM and IASMS. Development of a ConOps for IASMS was a top recommendation and can be represented as a reframing of safety assurance that builds on real-time alerting such as the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, and adds the more encompassing in-time temporal parameter in recognition of the different timelines for collecting and assessing safety data for risk mitigations. For example, mining for safety trends from data sources such as the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing system occurs over a longer time period. Research on AAM operations poses that SFCs can be designed to monitor the safety margin appropriate for AAM including with regards to the distance between current flight parameters and nominal ideal conditions. These in-time comparisons will become more complex as the density of operations increases at least in certain areas and can include planned and actual 4D trajectory, and in-time comparisons having implications on conflict modeling and prediction including expected and actual departure time, fix/waypoint crossing times, and arrival time. These comparisons would be integrated as part of SFCs that redefine and inform new safety margin. An increased safety margin improves management of operational risks while reducing the potential for anomalies. An increased safety margin also has implications for operator confidence in the certainty of its operations and trust in automation. Technology trends in research could be used to refine existing SFCs and define needs for additional SFCs that provide safety improvements to the design and operation of vehicles, airspace design, and operator performance requirements. NASA is developing innovative approaches to safeguard against major accidents and incidents that have occurred in the NAS and those anticipated with the inclusion of envisioned AAM operations. The innovations use operational performance data to monitor, detect, and predict flight variations exceeding safe nominal patterns, such as would be caused by navigational error, severe weather complications, or hijacking of UAS controls. These innovative approaches have high potential to prevent accidents and incidents in the new AAM era. It is anticipated that elements of the innovations will evolve into SFCs for the IASMS. Voluntary safety reports can be monitored to identify anomalies related to design or operational performance risks. Reports could be periodically monitored and assessed for specific topics. Reports might serve as weak signals or precursors indicative of emergent risk such as when combined with other safety information. The architecture could include SFCs that are based on voluntary safety reports recognizing the periodic temporal nature of data analysis. As previously mentioned, aviation accidents with their causal and contributing precursors can inform the need for SFCs in the IASMS. Accidents and incidents at San Francisco International Airport such as Asiana 214 and Air Canada 759 illustrate how combinations of different factors lead to increased risk. These types of precursors and different factors have implications on the types of SFCs that could be needed to monitor and manage different sources and types of design and operational risk. Continuing to assure the safety of AAM as designs and operations gain in complexity can be accompanied by defining SFCs that also increase in complexity. These SFCs can leverage information from findings and recommendations synthesized across on-going research, voluntary safety reports, and accident and incident reports. These SFCs can serve to refine accuracy of algorithms and resolve limitations with current practices. The IASMS architecture represents the framework for the SFCs and their critical role in safety assurance.

In-Time Aviation Safety Management System↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Defining Services, Functions, and Capabilities for an Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS)

NASA’s vision for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) Mission is to help emerging aviation markets to safely develop an air transportation system that moves people and cargo between places previously not served or underserved by aviation. The integration of new operational paradigms and vehicle classes in this system requires a transformation of the National Airspace System (NAS) that includes substantive changes critical for assuring safety. These changes are compelled by unique challenges posed by AAM to the safety management system (SMS). These challenges were assessed by committees of the National Academies in their reports on a vision for an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) and a blueprint for AAM [1,2]. In their description of an IASMS, the top recommendation was development of a concept of operations (ConOps) for IASMS. This paper describes the high-priority recommendations from the National Academies for its IASMS vision and how they are addressed through a distributed system-of-systems architecture. The IASMS architecture is structured on the services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) necessary for In-time System-wide Safety Assurance (ISSA)initially developed for urban air mobility (UAM). The paper then posits where these SFCs would reside across vehicles, airspace, or service suppliers such as Supplemental Data Service Providers (SDSPs), and how SFCs scale with increasing complexity in design and operations of AAM. SFCs are foundational building blocks for a system that targets an individual or family of risks using a Monitor-Assess-Mitigate risk paradigm for anomalies, precursors and trends. An IASMS could be conceived that uses a portfolio of SFCs for AAM in general or prioritizes SFCs for a specific domain or operation.

K Ellis↗
NASA NTRS2024

Assessment of Some IASMS-relevant Data Sources for Aviation Safety

An In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) [1,2] is a set of services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) necessary for monitoring known hazards and emergent risks, assessing safety data for anomalies, precursors, and trends, mitigating hazards that reach safety thresholds, and assuring efficacy of controls in mitigating hazards. An IASMS will continually monitor the NAS to collect data on the status of aircraft, air traffic management systems, weather, and airports. Within the NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) System-Wide Safety (SWS) project’s technical challenge called In-time Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS) for Commercial Aviation Operations, which we often refer to as Technical Challenge 6 (TC-6), we have performed an assessment of several aviation data sources we have found that are relevant to assessing the safety of the National Airspace System (NAS) in the context of an IASMS. This assessment includes understanding the nature of the data themselves and using some data analytics tools on these data to show how they can be used to identify potential safety issues. We also describe how the data and analytics are part of a system that can allow for other data and analytics to be performed and for the results to be visualized for use by appropriate operators to identify potential safety issues and develop mitigations. This report is a step toward the ultimate goal of TC-6, which is to develop a prototype IASMS system that demonstrates the potential of an IASMS and inspire operators to build analogous systems to make the best possible use of the significant investments that they make in collecting, storing, and managingdata related to their operations.

aviation safety↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach for Identifying IASMS Services, Functions, and Capabilities From Data Sources

Assuring safety in the NAS with the inclusion of new entrants that are part of Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) will require overcoming unique safety challenges that result from combining innovative technologies with novel airspace concepts for moving people and cargo using semi-autonomous/autonomous vehicles. Overcoming these AAM safety assurance challenges is the focus of the In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS). The IASMS Concept of Operations (ConOps) describes an interconnected set of services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs)designed to manage operational risks, identify unknown risks, and inform system design to mitigate risk. This paper describes a broad approach for identifying SFCs involving technology trends in research, assessment of known and unknown risks in safety reports, and causal and contributing factors in aviation accidents and incidents. This approach leverages these sources to identify potential SFCs that enable the Monitor, Assess, and Mitigate (M-A-M)functionality that represents the enabling framework of the IASMS.

Kyle Ellis↗
NASA NTRS2023

Concept of Operations for an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) for Upper E Airspace

The National Airspace System undergoes continuous change including in the Upper Class E airspace involving increasingly complex operations and a widening diversity of vehicles. To secure a safe future system, the National Academies recommended an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) that is extensible to Upper E. Current Air Traffic Management is not cost-effective to scale for future Upper E operations and diversity of vehicles so the Federal Aviation Administration developed an Upper E Traffic Management ConOps to safely integrate the diverse operations and vehicles having different performance characteristics and flight missions without disrupting current operations including space launch and reentry, suborbital flights, supersonic and hypersonic flights, slow moving or stationary unmanned balloons, and long endurance fixed wing vehicles that are slow, stationary, or high speed. IASMS integrates state-of-the-art predictive modeling with reactive and proactive analytics to detect hazards and mitigate risk precursors for Upper E operators. IASMS identifies emergent safety risks exposed by transformation of the NAS with new and increasingly complex operations. Safety intelligence will also expand the data available and offer insight to new approaches for implementing safety improvements to mitigate risk with more seamless “in-time” integration across the policy, risk management, safety assurance, and promotion pillars of SMS.

K Ellis↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

SWS TechTalk: System Modeling in Support of IASMS Definition

Topic: System modeling in support of IASMS definition 1. What is system modeling? 2. What are the building blocks necessary for a formal model of the IASMS concept of operations, or “conops”, and “architectures”? 3. Scenario modeling to support safety demonstrator planning and technology integration The System Wide Safety Tech Talks will offer a great opportunity to keep up on each other’s work and accomplishments, as well as an opportunity to find areas of potential collaboration. The topics of these technical talks will cover any papers, presentations, special trips, or meetings that are a part of SWS.

IASMS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Ontological Approach to Integrate Commercial Space Operations with an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS)

The emergence of commercial space operations (CSO) is one of many Advanced Air Mobility domains that pose major challenges to in-time safety assurance because of the different architectures used by the operators and other agents. The National Academies recognized the need to improve integration of disparate architectures and recommended that an In-time Aviation Safety Management System(IASMS) be developed to provide seamless connectivity across interacting architectures and enable in-time safety assurance. An ontological approach to integrating CSO with IASMS involves in-time Services, Functions, and Capabilities design to manage operational risks and inform changes to design. The resulting integrated architecture provides a common basis for risk management and in-time safety assurance.

K Ellis↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human Interfaces and Management of Information (HIMI) Challenges for “In-time” Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS)

The envisioned transformation of the National Airspace System to integrate an In-time Aviation Safety Management System(IASMS)to assure safety in Advanced Air Mobility(AAM)brings unprecedented challenges to the design of human interfaces and management of safety information. Safety in design and operational safety assurance are critical factors for how humans will interact with increasingly autonomous systems. The IASMS Concept of Operations builds from traditional commercial operator safety management and scales in complexity to AAM. The transformative changes in future aviation systems pose potential new critical safety risks with novel types of aircraft and other vehicles having different performance capabilities, flying in increasingly complex airspace, and using adaptive contingencies to manage normal and non-normal operations. These changes compel development of new and emerging capabilities that enable innovative ways for humans to interact with data and manage information. In-creasing complexity of AAM corresponds with use of predictive modeling, data analytics, machine learning, and artificial intelligence to effectively address known hazards and emergent risks. The roles of humans will dynamically evolve in increments with this technological and operational evolution. The interfaces for how humans will interact with increasingly complex and assured systems designed to operate autonomously and how information will need to be presented are important challenges to be resolved.

Lawrence J Prinzel↗
NASA NTRS2023

An In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) Concept of Operations for Vertiport Design and Operations

The National Airspace System is foreseen to undergo revolutionary change with Urban Air Mobility (UAM) and its use of vertiports to transport passengers and cargo. To assure safety with UAM and more broadly with Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), the National Academies recommended an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) that is extensible to the design and operation of vertiports. Vertiport designs will scale in several dimensions including physical size and infrastructure depending upon location and in the Services, Functions, and Capabilities required for assuring safety with increasingly complex vertiport designs and operations. These operations will be enabled by evolving technologies including electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL) aircraft for passenger-and cargo-carrying commercial transportation. Within this construct, safety hazards and risk mitigations involving predictive data analytics and modeling will be used. Use cases and future challenges are examined to guide maturation of the IASMS ConOps for vertiports.

K Ellis↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) Concept of Operations for Part 139 Airports

Today’s airports are complex multi-faceted ecosystems. Currently, of the 517certificatedairports, 270arerequired to use safety management systems (SMSs) to identify and mitigate known hazards and emergent risks and to voluntarily share safety data with commercial operators and tenants. Airports manage a wide variety of hazards. These traffic hubs have direct responsibilities, such as removing foreign object debris from runways and taxiways and configuring runways to help prevent against incursions and tail strikes during takeoff. To ensure safety in the future NAS, the National Academies recommended an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS). An IASMS will employ services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) to identify and mitigate hazards that are proactively and predictively managed based on data analytics of detected anomalies, precursors, and trends. SFCs would scale with airport complexity and environmental conditions using increasingly automated systems to respond proactively to hazards and, by using integrated data sources and predictive safety analytical methods, discover new, never before seen risks.

Ellis, K↗