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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2004

Holistic Design for Total Product Well Being

Recent hardware development work at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center creates and argument for the use of a holistic design approach as opposed to a piece part design approach. A piece part design approach being one where individual pieces are developed to their finished state having to meet certain interface and human engineering requirements without much consideration to the final product as a whole. A holistic design approach being one where the final product is evaluated early and frequently during the design process, and individual parts are developed with consideration to how they interact a whole,and how they interact with the user and environment. Examples from the development of the Materials Science Research Rack - 1 will illustrate: a design failure due to piece part design; a design save, due to a failure of piece part design, but saved by evaluating the design holistically; and a design success due to a holistic design approach.

Adams, Chris W.↗
NASA NTRS2008

A Holistic Approach to Systems Development

Introduces a Holistic and Iterative Design Process. Continuous process but can be loosely divided into four stages. More effort spent early on in the design. Human-centered and Multidisciplinary. Emphasis on Life-Cycle Cost. Extensive use of modeling, simulation, mockups, human subjects, and proven technologies. Human-centered design doesn t mean the human factors discipline is the most important Disciplines should be involved in the design: Subsystem vendors, configuration management, operations research, manufacturing engineering, simulation/modeling, cost engineering, hardware engineering, software engineering, test and evaluation, human factors, electromagnetic compatibility, integrated logistics support, reliability/maintainability/availability, safety engineering, test equipment, training systems, design-to-cost, life cycle cost, application engineering etc. 9

Wong, Douglas T.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Holistic and Pragmatic Standards Processes Enable Interdisciplinary Science

Open, interdisciplinary science inevitably relies heavily on standards. Standards are those often unseen agreements that we take for granted when systems and processes are working fine. Yet standards work is perpetual, laborious, and sometimes contentious, especially for standards to work across diverse disciplines. Standards development, maintenance, and implementation is a complex, ongoing socio-technical process. NASA has developed a progressively open science policy and strategy that calls for the establishment of a data standards process reaching across the five diverse divisions of the Science Mission Directorate. This is a delicate exercise. We, therefore, seek to apply a holistic yet pragmatic approach to developing and maintaining a standards process. We adopt an ecological philosophy that focuses on the interactions within the data ecosystem and how standards facilitate those interactions. We couple high-level analysis with on the ground experimentation. We began by 1) mapping information ecosystem components (e.g. data centers, missions, services, protocols, users), 2)establishing how the components interact (e.g. sharing (meta)data, funding, personnel exchange), and 3) modelling system dynamics (e.g. creation of products from multiple data centers, redundant processes, shared services). The goal is to apply understanding of the ecosystem to real world applications (e.g. planning a new mission, implementing new policy requirements, improving process efficiency, etc.). We have also conducted studies of historical standardization efforts, documenting lessons learned and cautionary tales. We then contrast this more abstract work with real examples. We reviewed and assessed multiple existing standards development processes both within and external to NASA. We now work to implement an initial test process which can be further optimized. We seek to define a consistent approach for assigning persistent identifiers for research objects, especially for the purposes of citation. The experience from this relatively ‘simple’ test case adds a pragmatic perspective on how researchers and engineers actually work. This presentation will review the details of this methodology, our initial findings, and how they might apply to other interdisciplinary standardization efforts.

Mark A Parsons↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Holistic Approach to Procedures

Aviation is a dynamic industry which is constantly changing. These changes require the continuous update of people’s knowledge and skills. A fundamental part of that knowledge and skill is procedures, because procedures form the backbone of aviation operations. On the flightdeck, on the ramp, and in the maintenance shop, procedures and checklists help support pilots, line crews, and mechanics in performing their work effectively, efficiently, and thus -- safely. To design effective and efficient procedures and checklists, one must take into account the full operational context within which these procedures are embedded. This context is defined by the requirements of the technology, the capabilities and limitations of the human operators, and the constraints and affordances of the operational environment. The complexity of this context arises from the interactions of the human, machine, and environment. Procedures are in place to govern those interactions. We present a model of that operational context, namely THE Model (Technology, Human, Environment in the context of a Mission), that lays a foundation for the analysis of each of these elements and their interactions. But procedures have their limitations, and there are risks involved in over-proceduralizing. To understand these limitations and risks, and to determine when to proceduralize and when not, we present the 4P Framework (Practice, Procedures, Policies, Philosophy) as a holistic approach to procedures. This approach brings together the understanding of human behavior, of organizational and operational factors, and of the technologies involved.

procedures↗
NASA NTRS2004

Towards On-Line Services Based on a Holistic Analysis of Human Activities

Very often computer scientists view computerization of services in terms of the logistics of human-machine interaction, including establishing a contract, accessing records, and of course designing an interface. But this analysis often moves too quickly to tactical details, failing to frame the entire service in human terms, and not recognizing the mutual learning required to define and relate goals, constraints, and the personalized value of available services. In particular, on-line services that "computerize communication" can be improved by constructing an activity model of what the person is trying to do, not just filtering, comparing, and selling piece-meal services. For example, from the customer s perspective the task of an on-line travel service is not merely to establish confirmed reservations, but to have a complete travel plan, usually integrating many days of transportation, lodging, and recreation into a happy experience. The task of the travel agent is not merely "ticketing", but helping the customer understand what they want and providing services that will connect everything together in an enjoyable way.

Clancey, William J.↗
NASA NTRS2006

A Holistic Approach for Risk Management During Design

In this paper, an approach for the identification, assessment, mitigation and continuous management of risks during the process of designing a space mission is presented. This approach has been developed by observing the risk patterns that occur at the Project Design Center of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (TeamX) which develops conceptual, concurrent design of Space Missions. TeamX develops an end-to-end conceptual design of a Space Mission in a matter of one or two weeks. As the risk chair in TeamX, the author has had the opportunity to observe the risk patterns that occur during design over the course of many design sessions. This paper introduces an abstraction and generalization of those patterns. Risk is defined as anything that can go wrong, along with its approximate likelihood and consequence. The indicators, and causes, and effects of these risks are cross cutting across the multiple levels of people and processes involved in the design, and the actual design product itself.

reliability analysis↗
NASA NTRS2013

Towards Bridging the Gaps in Holistic Transition Prediction via Numerical Simulations

The economic and environmental benefits of laminar flow technology via reduced fuel burn of subsonic and supersonic aircraft cannot be realized without minimizing the uncertainty in drag prediction in general and transition prediction in particular. Transition research under NASA's Aeronautical Sciences Project seeks to develop a validated set of variable fidelity prediction tools with known strengths and limitations, so as to enable "sufficiently" accurate transition prediction and practical transition control for future vehicle concepts. This paper provides a summary of selected research activities targeting the current gaps in high-fidelity transition prediction, specifically those related to the receptivity and laminar breakdown phases of crossflow induced transition in a subsonic swept-wing boundary layer. The results of direct numerical simulations are used to obtain an enhanced understanding of the laminar breakdown region as well as to validate reduced order prediction methods.

Choudhari, Meelan M.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Stellar Characterization Necessary to Define Holistic Planetary Habitability

It is a truism within the exoplanet field that “to know the planet, you must know the star.” This pertains to the physical properties of the star (i.e. mass, radius, luminosity, age, multiplicity), the activity and magnetic fields, as well as the stellar elemental abundances which can be used as a proxy for planetary composition. In this white paper, we discuss important stellar characteristics that require attention in upcoming ground- and space-based missions, such that their processes can be understood and either detangled from that of the planet, correlated with the presence of a planet, or utilized in lieu of direct planetary observations.

stellar elemental abundances↗
NASA NTRS2021

Towards a holistic sulfate-water-O2 triple oxygen isotope systematics

Triple oxygen isotope (∆^(17)O with δ^(18)O) signals of H2O and O2 found in sulfate of oxidative weathering origin offer promising constraints on modern and ancient weathering, hydrology, atmospheric gas concentrations, and bioproductivity. However, interpretations of the sulfate-water-O2 system rely on assuming fixed oxygen-isotope fractionations between sulfate and water, which, contrastingly, are shown to vary widely in sign and amplitude. Instead, here we anchor sulfate-water-O2 triple oxygen isotope systematics on the homogeneous composition of atmospheric O2 with empirical constraints and modeling. Our resulting framework does not require a priori assumptions of the O2- versus H2O-oxygen ratio in sulfate and accounts for the signals of mass dependent and mass independent fractionation in the ∆^(17)O and δ^(18)O of sulfate's O2-oxygen source. Within this framework, new ∆^(17)O measurements of sulfate constrain ~2.3Ga Paleoproterozoic gross primary productivity to between 6 and 160 times present-day levels, with important implications for the biological carbon cycle response to high CO2concentrations prevalent on the early Earth.

sulfate, oxygen isotopes, atmospheric oxygen, sulf↗
NASA NTRS2022

Firefly: The Case for a Holistic Understanding of the Global Structure and Dynamics of the Sun and the Heliosphere

This white paper presents the current knowledge gaps in understanding how magnetic fields control solar (and by extension, stellar) activity in timescales from minutes to years and discusses a transformative observational approach to fill those gaps. The solar activity drives space weather as the result of dynamic magnetic fields forming in the solar interior and evolving continuously until reaching levels of complexity in the atmosphere that trigger eruptions. However, we do not fully understand how solar and, more generally, stellar magnetic fields are generated and how they evolve through the eruptive states. The major obstacle is our reliance on observations from a single viewpoint, particularly in the ecliptic plane. This vantage point can only provide limited information for (i) understanding the generation of solar magnetic fields deep in the convection zone; (ii) determining the origin of the solar cycle and predicting its timing and strength; (iii) explaining the causes of solar activity and their triggers; (iv) reliably predicting when and how CMEs will impact Earth and other planets; (v) fathoming the structure and dynamics of the corona as it creates the heliosphere; (vi) understanding the energization and transport of energetic particles; etc.

Nour E. Raouafi↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

JETT3: A Holistic, Integrated Analog for Artemis Lunar Surface Exploration

Since 1972, NASA astronauts have performed hundreds of Extravehicular Activities (EVAs) in support of Skylab, Space Shuttle and International Space Station missions. Not since Apollo, however, have EVAs been driven by discovery-based principles of scientific exploration. Upcoming Artemis missions are challenged to build on lessons learned from Apollo, merging 50 years of EVA experience with the planetary science community’s expertise in the remote surface exploration of Mars. The highest-fidelity preparation for Artemis includes both operational and scientific underpinning to represent the complete, complex picture of lunar surface operations. The Joint EVA & Human Surface Mobility Test Team (JETT) is an interdisciplinary team providing such an environment for collaborative analog testing. JETT builds upon prior analog campaigns (e.g., [1, 2]) to provide high-fidelity environments for hardware and concept of operations development. Sponsored by the NASA EVA & Human Surface Mobility Program (EHP), JETT includes representatives from EHP, NASA Engineering, the Science Mission Directorate (SMD), Human Health & Performance, and the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD). JETT tests evaluate NASA reference designs for EVA (e.g., suits and tools), address gaps and risks for Artemis lunar surface operations, develop capabilities for EVA and science tasks, enable technology maturation, and provide training for Artemis EVA operations. JETT3, the final JETT field test of FY22, occurred Oct 3-11, 2022 in the San Francisco Volcanic Field north of Flagstaff, AZ. The test focused on developing the Artemis concept of operations and systems, including integrating an Artemis-like Science Team into a NASA Flight Control Team (FCT) to plan and execute a series of simulated lunar EVAs in an environment analogous to Artemis 3.

T. E. Caswell↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

JETT3: A Holistic, Integrated Analog for Artemis Lunar Surface Exploration

Since 1972, NASA astronauts have performed hundreds of Extravehicular Activities (EVAs) in support of Skylab, Space Shuttle and International Space Station missions. Not since Apollo, however, have EVAs been driven by discovery-based principles of scientific exploration. Upcoming Artemis missions are challenged to build on lessons learned from Apollo, merging 50 years of EVA experience with the planetary science community’s expertise in the remote surface exploration of Mars. The highest-fidelity preparation for Artemis includes both operational and scientific underpinning to represent the complete, complex picture of lunar surface operations. The Joint EVA & Human Surface Mobility Test Team (JETT) is an interdisciplinary team providing such an environment for collaborative analog testing. JETT builds upon prior analog campaigns (e.g., [1, 2]) to provide high-fidelity environments for hardware and concept of operations development. Sponsored by the NASA EVA & Human Surface Mobility Program (EHP), JETT includes representatives from EHP, NASA Engineering, the Science Mission Directorate (SMD), Human Health & Performance, and the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD). JETT tests evaluate NASA reference designs for EVA (e.g., suits and tools), address gaps and risks for Artemis lunar surface operations, develop capabilities for EVA and science tasks, enable technology maturation, and provide training for Artemis EVA operations. JETT3, the final JETT field test of FY22, occurred Oct 3-11, 2022 in the San Francisco Volcanic Field north of Flagstaff, AZ. The test focused on developing the Artemis concept of operations and systems, including integrating an Artemis-like Science Team into a NASA Flight Control Team (FCT) to plan and execute a series of simulated lunar EVAs in an environment analogous to Artemis 3.

T. E. Caswell↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Holistic DSMC Transport Database for Re-Entry and Ablation Modeling

Hybrid simulation frameworks combining Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) and Direct Simulation Monte Carlo (DSMC) are frequently employed to efficiently perform high-fidelity solutions of environments containing combined continuum/rarified flow. The use of DSMC, a stochastic, particle-based method, is necessary for high-Knudsen flow where continuum-based assumptions governing CFD break down. However, the DSMC methodology is generally very computationally inefficient to model the continuum regime. In a CFD/DSMC hybrid approach, obtaining an accurate, high-fidelity solution hinges on the consistent treatment of transport properties and the used thermo-chemical models employed within the two solvers. In principle, in regions where CFD and DSMC are both employed, the same gas mixture under the same conditions should have the same properties, regardless of simulation type. Observed differences should be due to non-equilibrium processes, rather than differences in physical models. While the transport models governing CFD and DSMC simulations are starkly different, they can effectively be linked via their use of reduced Chapman-Enskog collision integrals. In CFD, these integrals are typically stored as fitted polynomial expressions and used to directly compute gas transport properties via mixing rules or the full Chapman-Enskog formulation. In DSMC, they can be used to derive the collision parameters needed for the phenomenological collision cross-section models that govern particle interactions, via a Nelder-Mead optimization scheme. The goal of this work is to provide a unified DSMC transport database encompassing the vast majority of known gas species encountered during atmospheric entry, on Earth or any other Solar body. This goal is largely possible due to recently performed ab-initio quantum chemistry calculations. Combined with other high-fidelity literature sources, the planned database will consist of collision integral data for over 200 neutral and ionized species and over 17000 binary collisions. From these collision integrals, Nelder-Mead optimization is used to compute Variable Soft Sphere (VSS) collision model parameters for DSMC, fitted from 300 K to 20000 K. Initial comparisons of transport properties of relevant equilibrium gas mixtures show great agreement between CFD and DSMC-derived results. The completed database will be able to be readily applied to model binary collisions of any gas mixture containing the included species over the specified temperature range, making it a valuable tool for future planetary probe modeling efforts. An example is shown below. Equilibrium mixture transport properties for a 19-species Titan atmospheric model [4] are computed using both fitted VSS parameters and the original CFD collision integral values. Deviations in computed properties between the two approaches is less than 5% for the entire temperature range.

M R Gosma↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗