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Considerations for Regulation and Practical Implementation of Analyses of Inadvertent Human Intrusion - 20169

Recommendations from the International Commission for Radiological Protection (ICRP) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) identify the need to consider potential inadvertent human intrusion into a near-surface radioactive waste disposal facility when developing limits for radionuclide concentrations that can be disposed. The recommendations also provide perspective on expectations for performance criteria and general assumptions for such analyses. Inadvertent human intrusion analyses are conducted to address the potential failure of institutional controls and loss of memory of a disposal facility. The analyses consider potential consequences of human actions that result in unknowingly bringing waste to the surface. Inadvertent human intrusion scenarios consider potential impacts to someone involved in an activity that actually disturbs the waste (e.g., drilling or excavation of a basement) or that exposes the person to emanations from the waste (e.g., radioactive gases) and also for the case where there may be longer term exposures to waste that has been brought to the surface. In practice, inadvertent human intrusion analyses have proven to be a critical consideration for the development of waste classification systems and for the determination of disposal requirements and limitations on wastes that can be disposed at shallow depths. The IAEA implemented a project on Human Intrusion in the context of Disposal of Radioactive waste (HIDRA) to further explore the regulatory expectations and practical implementation of analyses of potential inadvertent human intrusion. The paper begins with a discussion of international recommendations related to consideration of inadvertent human intrusion and then summarizes examples of some topical considerations related to addressing inadvertent human intrusion that are being discussed as part of the second phase of the HIDRA project. The topical considerations are planned to be addressed in a formal IAEA publication. All information in this paper simply reflects on-going project discussions and no formal recommendations are implied for these topical considerations at this time. (authors)

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Considerations of human intrusion in U.S. programs for deep geologic disposal of radioactive waste

Regulations in the United States that govern the permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste in deep geologic repositories require the explicit consideration of hypothetical future human intrusions that disrupt the waste. Specific regulatory requirements regarding the consideration of human intrusion differ in the two sets of regulations currently in effect in the United States; one defined by the Environmental Protection Agency's 40 Code of Federal Regulations part 197, applied only to the formerly proposed geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, and the other defined by the Environmental Protection Agency s 40 Code of Federal Regulations part 191, applied to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico and potentially applicable to any repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste in the United States other than the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain. This report reviews the regulatory requirements relevant to human intrusion and the approaches taken by the Department of Energy to demonstrating compliance with those requirements.

Swift, Peter N.↗

Markers and Beyond: Categorizing Human Intrusion Situations to be Addressed in Sub-surface Marking Concepts - 16378

Concepts for the use of markers in the post-closure phase of deep geological repositories (DGRs), are often designed to prevent 'inadvertent' human intrusion (HI), while it is common practice not to protect against deliberate intrusion (i.e. 'advertent' HI). In the literature, inadvertent HI prevention studies usually combine future human activity scenarios with the assumption that all memory of the DGR has been lost, and analyze what can be done now to make the possible future intruder 'aware' of the associated risks. In this paper, we show that the classical 'advertent'/'inadvertent' duality classification of HI, as used in the performance assessment context, is not ideal to characterize potential HI situations in the RK and M preservation context. We suggest that the relevant HI categories are expanded and refined to 'un/necessary HI', 'un/intentional HI' and 'un/friendly HI'. Along with refining the taxonomy of HI that way, we refine the assumption relating to the loss of memory of the DGR. Different HI situations are likely to arise in different 'loss-of-memory situations'. We analyze the resulting 5 classes of the proposed HI classification and find that 2 hold the classic 'advertent' and 'inadvertent' HI scenarios while 3 are 'new'. We apply the proposed categories to sub-surface marking concepts from the literature and suggest that, in particular, sub-surface marking concepts would benefit from this new approach to HI and loss-of-memory categorization. (authors)

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Assessing the Potential for Inadvertent Human Intrusion at the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This paper recommends an approach to inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) at the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). IHI analysis uses the consequences of an individual inadvertently contacting buried waste to set waste concentration limits for near-surface disposal of low-level radioactive waste (LLW). Regulatory agencies are increasingly applying risk-informed decision-making to LLW waste management (NRC 2006). Risk-informed decision-making combines scientific risk assessment with stakeholder values and perceptions to determine a level of acceptable risk. Risk considers not only the consequences of an event, but also its probability of occurring.

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Considerations Related To Human Intrusion In The Context Of Disposal Of Radioactive Waste-The IAEA HIDRA Project

The principal approaches for management of radioactive waste are commonly termed ‘delay and decay’, ‘concentrate and contain’ and ‘dilute and disperse’. Containing the waste and isolating it from the human environment, by burying it, is considered to increase safety and is generally accepted as the preferred approach for managing radioactive waste. However, this approach results in concentrated sources of radioactive waste contained in one location, which can pose hazards should the facility be disrupted by human action in the future. The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA) agree that some form of inadvertent human intrusion (HI) needs to be considered to address the potential consequences in the case of loss of institutional control and loss of memory of the disposal facility. Requirements are reflected in national regulations governing radioactive waste disposal. However, in practice, these requirements are often different from country to country, which is then reflected in the actual implementation of HI as part of a safety case. The IAEA project on HI in the context of Disposal of RadioActive waste (HIDRA) has been started to identify potential areas for improved consistency in consideration of HI. The expected outcome is to provide recommendations on how to address human actions in the safety case in the future, and how the safety case may be used to demonstrate robustness and optimize siting, design and waste acceptance criteria within the context of a safety case.

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Role of Human Intrusion in Decision-Making for Radioactive Waste Disposal - Results of the IAEA HIDRA Project - 16287

Disposal of radioactive waste aims to protect people and the environment from the potential hazards of the materials by removing the wastes from the human environment. This approach is considered desirable to dispersal of the waste in the environment. However, the waste becomes concentrated in one location, which poses potential hazards should the waste become disturbed at a future date. For radioactive waste, it is generally expected that in preparing safety cases for such disposal facilities, the possibility of the wastes being inadvertently disturbed at some point in the future and the potential consequences of such an intrusion need to be considered. Potential inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) has a role in the decision-making and the safety case throughout the lifecycle of a disposal facility. In 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) formally initiated a project entitled 'Human Intrusion in the Context of Disposal of Radioactive Waste' (HIDRA) to provide insights regarding the role of IHI for these decisions and to provide a common framework for consideration of IHI as part of development of a safety case for a disposal facility. HIDRA was implemented with a series of annual plenary meetings involving participants from more than 20 countries organised into three working groups. The working groups addressed: societal factors, stylised scenarios, and protective measures. The project resulted in a general approach with specific suggestions for consideration of IHI during the lifecycle of a disposal facility. From a general perspective, it was emphasized that IHI is a contributing factor to the safety case, but does not outweigh considerations related to safety of operations and long-term performance for the normal evolution of the facility. (authors)

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Influencing future exploratory drilling rates-a potential approach for the waste isolation pilot plant - 15307

The Department of Energy/Carlsbad Field Office (DOE/CBFO) is responsible for managing activities related to the disposal of TRU and TRU-mixed waste in the geologic repository at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The WIPP Compliance Certification Application had a reference concerning natural resources at the site of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. This reference suggested that resources could be withdrawn from under the repository area from a distance and not affect the integrity of the repository. This would not eliminate, but would certainly diminish, the rate of exploratory drilling in the distant future. Currently the only scenarios that result in releases from the repository are human intrusion scenarios, without human intrusion radioactive releases to the accessible environment are essentially zero for the very long term future. (authors)

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There is Nothing Here for You: Passive Institutional Controls and Preemptive Resource Exploitation - 16197

The Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) is required by Title 40 CFR Part 191.14(c) and Title 40 CFR Part 194.43 to develop a Passive Institutional Controls (PICs) program to prevent the likelihood for future human intrusion into the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The purpose of this paper is to explore how the exploitation of resources under nuclear waste repositories as a part of PICs could reduce the risk of future human intrusion. The WIPP, located in the northern Permian Basin near Carlsbad, New Mexico, is a geologic repository for the permanent isolation of defense-related transuranic waste. In 1995, a series of geophysical surveys by the New Mexico Bureau of Mines and Mineral Resources estimated the total hydrocarbon reserves underneath the WIPP, which included a 16-section area plus a one mile buffer. Since that time the Delaware Basin well database has been maintained to closely monitor hydrocarbon extraction activities. The database was used in compiling relevant oil and gas extraction data retrieved from The New Mexico Oil Conservation Division. The volume of hydrocarbons extracted from 1995 to the present suggests that if current extraction growth trends continue (as historic market and production data indicate they will), all known crude oil reserves under the WIPP, obtainable through current extraction technology, will be depleted within approximately 10 years, i.e., by 2026. This is well before the anticipated WIPP closure and start of the Active Institutional Controls (AICs) program called for in 40 CFR Part 194.41(b). In addition, gas resources, although more difficult to forecast, are not expected to last beyond 2137. Title 40 CFR 194.33 states, 'Inadvertent and intermittent intrusion by drilling for resources... is the most severe human intrusion scenario'. This human intrusion scenario is the feature, event, and process (FEP) that performance assessment (PA) has identified as having the most significant impact on radionuclide releases during the 10,000 year regulatory period for the WIPP. Title 40 CFR 194.43 requires a PICs program which contains '... [records] in the international archives that would likely be consulted by individuals in search of unexploited resources'. Due to political, social, and economic motivators for resource exploration and exploitation, the potential future absence of hydrocarbon resources under the WIPP is important in deterring possible human intrusion. To minimize the risk of future human intrusion, it may be necessary to consider actively removing as many of the exploitable hydrocarbon resources under and around a nuclear waste repository as is practicable before the end of the period of AICs (i.e., 100 years after closure of the repository). Additionally, communicating the absence of hydrocarbon resources under a nuclear repository should take a prominent role in any PICs program. Due to its high-cost nature, exploratory drilling of any kind currently involves cost/benefit analysis. If in the future the economic realities of resource exploration remain similar to today, and future oil companies know the resources for a particular area have already been heavily exploited, hypothetically, they would become less motivated to drill in that area. They would instead opt to explore an area with better prospects. It is important then that the remaining hydrocarbon reserves be clearly stated and prominently displayed. In essence we should communicate the message, loud and clear, 'There is nothing here for you'. (authors)

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International Implementation of IAEA's Borehole Disposal Concept for Sealed Radioactive Sources - 18545

With funding from the Government of Canada, and support from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Office of International Program and many others, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is supporting the field deployment of the Borehole Disposal Concept (BDC) for secure disposal of radioactive sources in Ghana, the Philippines and Malaysia. This is a first-of-its-kind implementation. Though small in volume, disused sealed radioactive sources can be intensively radioactive and create a significant safety and security liability for the majority of the 168 Member States in the IAEA. Millions of sealed radioactive sources have been manufactured since 1901, and it is estimated that hundreds of thousands are now unwanted. The irony is that some of the countries with the smallest inventories have the greatest difficulties managing their radioactive wastes. The BDC was originally conceptualized in an IAEA-study undertaken by the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (NECSA) for countries with small inventories of disused sealed radioactive sources. There are multiple, passive engineered and natural barriers in the BDC design, including an inner stainless-steel capsule (which holds the wastes), an inner cement containment barrier, an outer stainless steel container and outer backfill cement, as well as the surrounding geosphere. In common subsurface geochemical environments, these barriers will isolate the wastes from the biosphere, provide effective containment and ensure long-term safety. To greatly limit the likelihood of inadvertent human intrusion (safety), and deliberate human intrusion (security), these waste packages will be disposed of in a narrow diameter borehole (26 cm) at depths greater than 30 m. This type of borehole disposal creates an exceptionally small footprint, removes the wastes from normal human surficial activities, and isolates the waste packages from near-surface processes. Over the past 20 years, the IAEA, NECSA and many others have advanced the BDC on the shoulders of the IAEA's broader work supporting safe and secure disposal of radioactive wastes and management of sealed radioactive sources. With recent funding and support from many others, the IAEA has assisted Ghana, Malaysia and the Philippines in assessing their inventories and conditioning their disused sealed radioactive sources, in drilling investigation boreholes and characterizing their proposed sites, and in designing their disposal systems. These countries plan to place the uppermost waste package at depths greater than 100 m. While activities in the Philippines remain focused on-site characterization, Ghana is in the latter stages of developing their Safety Case for operational and 'post-closure' safety and Malaysia has completed their Safety Case and submitted a license application to construct and operate a BDC facility. Though this paper identifies the support provided to Member States by the IAEA, it is the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission and the Malaysian Nuclear Agency that are responsible for the safety and security of the disposals and that have been responsible for carrying-out their disposal programs. Once the BDC is licensed by the relevant national regulatory bodies, these first-of-a-kind disposal approaches will provide a template for other countries to safely dispose of their disused sealed radioactive sources - permanently eliminating their safety and security liabilities. (authors)

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A Preliminary Performance Assessment for Salt Disposal of High-Level Nuclear Waste - 12173

A salt repository is one of the four geologic media currently under study by the U.S. DOE Office of Nuclear Energy to support the development of a long-term strategy for geologic disposal of commercial used nuclear fuel (UNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW). The immediate goal of the generic salt repository study is to develop the necessary modeling tools to evaluate and improve the understanding of the repository system response and processes relevant to long-term disposal of UNF and HLW in a salt formation. The current phase of this study considers representative geologic settings and features adopted from previous studies for salt repository sites. For the reference scenario, the brine flow rates in the repository and underlying interbeds are very low, and transport of radionuclides in the transport pathways is dominated by diffusion and greatly retarded by sorption on the interbed filling materials. I-129 is the dominant annual dose contributor at the hypothetical accessible environment, but the calculated mean annual dose is negligibly small. For the human intrusion (or disturbed) scenario, the mean mass release rate and mean annual dose histories are very different from those for the reference scenario. Actinides including Pu-239, Pu-242 and Np-237 are major annual dose contributors, and the calculated peak mean annual dose is acceptably low. A performance assessment model for a generic salt repository has been developed incorporating, where applicable, representative geologic settings and features adopted from literature data for salt repository sites. The conceptual model and scenario for radionuclide release and transport from a salt repository were developed utilizing literature data. The salt GDS model was developed in a probabilistic analysis framework. The preliminary performance analysis for demonstration of model capability is for an isothermal condition at the ambient temperature for the near field. The capability demonstration emphasizes key attributes of a salt repository that are potentially important to the long-term safe disposal of UNF and HLW. The analysis presents and discusses the results showing repository responses to different radionuclide release scenarios (undisturbed and human intrusion). For the reference (or nominal or undisturbed) scenario, the brine flow rates in the repository and underlying interbeds are very low, and transport of radionuclides in the transport pathways is dominated by diffusion and greatly retarded by sorption on the interbed filling materials. I-129 (non-sorbing and unlimited solubility with a very long half-life) is the dominant annual dose contributor at the hypothetical accessible environment, but the calculated mean annual dose is negligibly small that there is no meaningful consequence for the repository performance. For the human intrusion (or disturbed) scenario analysis, the mean mass release rate and mean annual dose histories are very different from those for the reference scenario analysis. Compared to the reference scenario, the relative annual dose contributions by soluble, non-sorbing fission products, particularly I-129, are much lower than by actinides including Pu-239, Pu-242 and Np-237. The lower relative mean annual dose contributions by the fission product radionuclides are due to their lower total inventory available for release (i.e., up to five affected waste packages), and the higher mean annual doses by the actinides are the outcome of the direct release of the radionuclides into the overlying aquifer having high water flow rates, thereby resulting in an early arrival of higher concentrations of the radionuclides at the biosphere drinking water well prior to their significant decay. The salt GDS model analysis has also identified the following future recommendations and/or knowledge gaps to improve and enhance the confidence of the future repository performance analysis. - Repository thermal loading by UNF and HLW, and the effect on the engineered barrier and near-field performance. - Closure and consolidation of salt rocks by creep deformation under the influence of thermal perturbation, and the effect on the engineered barrier and near-field performance. - Brine migration and radionuclide transport under the influence of thermal perturbation in generic salt repository environment, and the effect on the engineered barrier and near-field performance and far-field performance. - Near-field geochemistry and radionuclide mobility in generic salt repository environment (high ionic strength brines, elevated temperatures and chemically reducing condition). - Degradation of engineer barrier components (waste package, waste canister, waste forms, etc.) in a generic salt repository environment (high ionic strength brines, elevated temperatures and chemically reducing condition). - Waste stream types and inventory estimates, particularly for reprocessing high-level waste. (authors)

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Nuclear, Land marker for a Waste Isolation Site: International Architecture Competition - 18240

The design and construction of a nuclear waste marker must include many architectural considerations. Very little research has been conducted by architects to address this issue to date. Historically, the task of designating a nuclear waste site has been a discussion predominantly contained within the scientific and engineering communities. In an effort to engage architects within this dialogue, arch out loud hosted the NUCLEAR competition as an international, architectural investigation into the design of a nuclear waste site marker. The NUCLEAR competition asks participants to design a marker to designate the site of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) located near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The marker will be meant to be a means of passive institutional controls (PICs) to deter inadvertent human intrusion upon the site and should last 10,000 years. The NUCLEAR competition defined the purpose of the nuclear waste site marker as a means to communicate the danger of inadvertent intrusion from future generations. The competition requires that entries must be both legible in communication and durable in their construction. The competition brief challenged participants to consider how customs and languages will evolve over time and to predict what motivations future generations might have for digging at the site. Other background information was provided about the site such as how waste was stored and how the unique geology of the site seals the waste. The 1993 Sandia National Laboratories report titled Expert Judgment on Markers to Deter Inadvertent Human Intrusion into the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant [1] was referenced along with the 1992 WIPP Land Withdrawal Act [2], interviews with WIPP scientists [3] involved with the WIPP PICs program and the Nuclear Energy Agency Records Knowledge and Memory working group. Competition participants were given digital 3-D Computer-Aided Design models for reference that included the underground storage portion of the site, existing buildings and the 16-square-mile site boundary identified in the 1992 WIPP Land Withdrawal Act [2]. This paper will: - Provide a detailed description of the submitted proposals including graphic analysis of the visualizations, diagrams, technical drawings, jury comments and statements. - Catalogue and identify the consistent themes within all submissions with possible categories including: 1) overall architectural form and language, 2) integration of written language and symbols within architecture, 3) use of technology and robotics, 4) construction methods and materials. (authors)

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A Salt Repository Concept for CSNF in 21-PWR Size Canisters

The most straightforward concept for disposal of large, heavy packages containing commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF) in a repository in bedded salt, would be to emplace them directly on the floor in emplacement tunnels. In-tunnel axially aligned horizontal emplacement would minimize excavated volume and avoid drilling of large-diameter emplacement boreholes. A similar concept was proposed in Germany for direct disposal of POLLUX ® canisters. The repository would be constructed at a depth of 500 to 1,000 m for isolation from the surface, and for sufficient overburden stress to ensure creep reconsolidation of repository openings. It could entail modular panels of emplacement tunnels arranged on headings oriented in cardinal directions from a central core, to accommodate the estimated 140,000 MTU total U.S. CSNF inventory. To do so, the overall area of the repository layout would be approximately 20 km 2 . Many layouts are possible, but the approach should be modular, excavation should be deferred for as long as possible to avoid maintenance, and the emplacement areas should share support facilities and shafts. Vertical shafts would be used in accordance with mining practice in sedimentary basins. Large diameter shafts would be needed for ventilation exhaust and waste transport, with smaller shafts for waste salt removal, men & materials, and ventilation intake. The spacing between disposal tunnels as estimated from thermal modeling, seeks to limit the maximum average areal thermal load in the panels to 11 W/m 2 to control long-term heat buildup in the host rock. Peak salt temperature would occur within a few years and would be dominated by each waste package locally, simplifying thermal management. There would be some flexibility to decrease the package spacing or increase the emplacement thermal power limit Backfilling emplaced waste packages immediately with mine-run crushed salt would provide shielding and expedite reconsolidation. This arrangement would isolate adjacent waste packages from one another by the intervening backfill, especially after it reconsolidates and its properties approach those of intact salt. After the repository is fully loaded and the performance confirmation program is complete, activities to permanently close the repository would be initiated. During closure operations all openings in the host salt would be backfilled, then shafts would be sealed, and boreholes plugged. Plans for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) show how sealing and plugging could be done. A monitoring program could continue for 50 years or longer after repository closure. With an emplacement thermal power limit of 10 kW per waste package, nearly all the CSNF that is projected to be produced by the current fleet of reactors in the U.S. could be emplaced over a period of approximately 50 years starting in calendar 2048. No barriers to implementation in a reasonable timeframe have been identified from this generic analysis. Engineering challenges include: 1) shaft construction; 2) a very-large capacity shaft hoist; 3) overpack design; 4) a transport-emplacement-vehicle (TEV) for transporting waste packages once they are underground and emplacing them remotely; and 5) remotely operated equipment for emplacing backfill. The method of shaft construction would depend on site-specific conditions, and could involve freezing the subsurface. A shaft hoist with payload capacity of 175 MT seems technically and economically feasible based on development work in Germany, and it would be the largest hoist of its kind. The function of disposal overpacks would be to provide reliable containment during repository operations, which could be accomplished using a corrosion allowance material such as a low-carbon steel. Development effort would be needed to determine overpack thickness (e.g., 7 to 20 cm) that can resist corrosion and loading from salt creep, to rovide containment throughout the repository operational period. The transport-emplacement vehicle (TEV) would be similar to previous concepts, particularly one option proposed for a Yucca Mountain repository. It would move over a rough salt floor on independently driven and steered wheels, and carry heavy shielding in addition to a waste package. By analogy to the safety case for the WIPP in New Mexico, human intrusion is likely to be the dominant mode of radionuclide release from the repository. Treatment of human intrusion for a CSNF repository in salt could depend on promulgation of site-specific changes in the regulations. Radionuclide release and migration would be quite limited for undisturbed conditions. There may be opportunities for improved understanding of salt performance with waste heating, based on future in situ testing in an underground salt research laboratory. This report also discusses a developing area of salt rock mechanics that involves low-stress, low strain-rate creep that might cause large, heavy waste packages to slowly sink. Site-specific sampling, testing, and modeling would be used to determine if the mechanism is important enough to merit consideration in design, or inclusion in performance assessment. Part of engineering design and postclosure safety assessment for a CSNF repository in salt would be to implement a methodology to show that the probability of a criticality event in the repository, when waste packages eventually breach and are flooded, is less than the probability screening threshold for performance assessment. In the methodology, a criticality analysis would be performed for waste packages in the repository, incorporating measures that could be introduced as needed to limit reactivity, for example using fuel selection and loading rules, and crediting the absorption of thermal neutrons by natural chlorine in the environment. A similar analysis has been underway for CSNF stored in dual-purpose canisters. Ideally the strategy would be developed prior to actually loading SNF assemblies into canisters used in waste packages for disposal.

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Delaware Basin Monitoring Annual Report - September 2010

The PA is required by 40 CFR §194.33 to consider disturbed case scenarios that include intrusions into the repository by inadvertent and intermittent drilling for resources. The data provided in this report covers the period from September 1, 2009 to August 31, 2010. The probability of these intrusions is based on a future drilling rate of 46.8 boreholes per square kilometer per 10,000 years which was established for the CCA, Appendix DEL, 52.5 boreholes per square kilometer for the CRA-2004, Appendix DATA, and 58.5 boreholes per square kilometer for CRA-2009, Appendix DATA. These rates are based on consideration of the record of drilling events in the Delaware Basin for the most recent 100-year period. The DOE models multiple types of human intrusion scenarios in the PA. These include both single intrusion events and combinations of multiple boreholes. Two different types of boreholes are considered: (1) those that penetrate a pressurized brine reservoir in the underlying Castile Formation and (2) those that do not. While the presence of pressurized brine under the repository is speculative, it cannot be completely ruled out based on available information. The primary consequence of contacting pressurized brine is the introduction of an additional source of brine beyond that which is assumed to be released into the repository from the Salado Formation. The human intrusion scenario models are based on extensive field data sets collected by the DOE. The DBDSP collects the drilling-related data to be used for future PA calculations. The data have been continuously collected from the time of the 1996 submittal of the CCA and include specific wells drilled during the last year in the New Mexico portion of the Delaware Basin, specifically that of the nine-township area immediately surrounding the WIPP Site.

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