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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2026

The Trajectory of Recent Solid State Fusion Results

Both NASA and Google have explored and funded Low Energy Nuclear Reaction (LENR) aka Solid-State Fusion or Lattice Confinement Fusion (LCF) research. NASA has funded efforts since 1989, and Google Research began in 2014. Google, and researchers initially-funded by Google, published significant scientific papers in Nature, Nature Communications and the Journal of Applied Physics. NASA began a significant set of LENR-triggering programs in 2012 resulting in papers in Physical Review C, the Journal of Electroanalytical Chemistry and the Journal of Condensed Matter Nuclear Science. Both NASA and Google engaged researchers across fields of nuclear physics, chemistry, electrochemistry, material science and more. NASA built upon early novel gas pumping experiments then followed the patented work of the US Navy SPAWAR (US8,419,919, “System and Method to Generate Particles”) and experiments with the Naval Surface Warfare Centers. Google supported researchers at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), the University of British Columbia (UBC), MIT and others. This resulted in patent applications and two granted patents (US10264661B2, “Target structure for enhanced electron screening” and US10566094B2 “Enhanced electron screening through plasmon oscillations”). These separate efforts, unknown to the researchers at the time, provided the impetus for the DoE ARPA-E LENR program followed by the DARPA DSO “Mechanisms for Amplification of Fusion Reaction Rates in Solids” (MARRS) program. This document briefly describes the overlapping NASA and Google Research efforts in plasma loading and electron screening emphasizing the results of the latest paper in Nature Communications. The papers and patents cited are listed.

electron screening↗
NASA NTRS2002

Research Reports: 2001 NASA/ASEE Summer Faculty Fellowship Program

For the thirty-seventh consecutive year, a NASA/ASEE (American Society for Engineering Education) Summer Faculty Fellowship Program was conducted at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). The program was conducted by The University of Alabama in Huntsville and MSFC during the period May 29 - August 3, 2001. Operated under the auspices of the American Society for Engineering Education, the MSFC program, as well as those at other NASA Centers, was sponsored by the University Affairs Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC. The basic objectives of the programs, which are in the thirty-seventh year of operation nationally, are (1) to further the professional knowledge of qualified engineering and science faculty members; (2) to stimulate an exchange of ideas between participants and NASA; (3) to enrich and refresh the research and teaching activities of the participants' institutions; and (4) to contribute to the research objectives of the NASA Centers. The Faculty Fellows spent ten weeks at MSFC engaged in a research project compatible with their interests and background and worked in collaboration with a NASA MSFC colleague. This document is a compilation of Fellows' reports on their research during the summer of 2001.

Avionics↗
NASA NTRS1994

Summary of NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Program activities

A summary of NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Program Activities is presented. The NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Program represents a unified NASA wide effort with the overall objective of providing NASA with the policy and posture which will increase the safety, performance, and reliability of space power systems. The specific objectives of the program are to: enhance cell/battery safety and reliability; maintain current battery technology; increase fundamental understanding of primary and secondary cells; provide a means to bring forth advanced technology for flight use; assist flight programs in minimizing battery technology related flight risks; and ensure that safe, reliable batteries are available for NASA's future missions.

Manzo, Michelle↗
NASA NTRS2003

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report: Volume One

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's independent investigation into the February 1, 2003, loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its seven-member crew lasted nearly seven months. A staff of more than 120, along with some 400 NASA engineers, supported the Board's 13 members. Investigators examined more than 30,000 documents, conducted more than 200 formal interviews, heard testimony from dozens of expert witnesses, and reviewed more than 3,000 inputs from the general public. In addition, more than 25,000 searchers combed vast stretches of the Western United States to retrieve the spacecraft's debris. In the process, Columbia's tragedy was compounded when two debris searchers with the U.S. Forest Service perished in a helicopter accident. This report discusses the attributes of an organization that could more safely and reliably operate the inherently risky Space Shuttle, but does not provide a detailed organizational prescription. Among those attributes are: a robust and independent program technical authority that has complete control over specifications and requirements, and waivers to them; an independent safety assurance organization with line authority over all levels of safety oversight; and an organizational culture that reflects the best characteristics of a learning organization. This report concludes with recommendations, some of which are specifically identified and prefaced as "before return to flight." These recommendations are largely related to the physical cause of the accident, and include preventing the loss of foam, improved imaging of the Space Shuttle stack from liftoff through separation of the External Tank, and on-orbit inspection and repair of the Thermal Protection System. The remaining recommendations, for the most part, stem from the Board's findings on organizational cause factors. While they are not "before return to flight" recommendations, they can be viewed as "continuing to fly" recommendations, as they capture the Board's thinking on what changes are necessary to operate the Shuttle and future spacecraft safely in the mid- to long-term.

CAIB↗
NASA NTRS1994

Primary battery design and safety guidelines handbook

This handbook provides engineers and safety personnel with guidelines for the safe design or selection and use of primary batteries in spaceflight programs. Types of primary batteries described are silver oxide zinc alkaline, carbon-zinc, zinc-air alkaline, manganese dioxide-zionc alkaline, mercuric oxide-zinc alkaline, and lithium anode cells. Along with typical applications, the discussions of the individual battery types include electrochemistry, construction, capacities and configurations, and appropriate safety measures. A chapter on general battery safety covers hazard sources and controls applicable to all battery types. Guidelines are given for qualification and acceptance testing that should precede space applications. Permissible failure levels for NASA applications are discussed.

Bragg, Bobby J.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report: Volume Four

Volume IV of the Report contains appendices that were not cited in Volume I. These consist of documents produced by NASA and other organizations, which were provided to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board in support of its inquiry into the February 1, 2003 destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia. The documents are compiled in this volume in the interest of establishing a complete record, but they do not necessarily represent the views of the Board. Volume I contains the Board's findings, analysis, and recommendations. The documents in Volume III through V are also contained in their original color format on the DVD disc in the back of Volume II. Volumes II – VI contain a number of conclusions and recommendations, several of which were adopted by the Board in Volume I. The other conclusions and recommendations drawn in Volumes II – VI do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Board, but are included for the record. When there is conflict, Volume I takes precedence.

NASA↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Revisiting the Soyuz-1 Parachute Failure in the Context of Safety in the Modern Era

The Soyuz‑1 accident remains one of the most consequential parachute related failures in human spaceflight history and provides enduring lessons for modern Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) system design. Occurring during the height of the Cold War and the Space Race, the mission unfolded under extraordinary political and schedule pressure as the Soviet Union sought to maintain its early leadership in space achievements following the death of chief designer Sergei Korolev. Despite unresolved propulsion, electrical, and parachute system deficiencies, Soyuz‑1 proceeded to launch and immediately encountered critical inflight anomalies, including a failed solar panel deployment, attitude control issues, and communication dropouts. Upon reentry, a malfunction in the parachute system, driven by a primary main canopy that failed to deploy, and subsequent entanglement of the reserve main canopy with the primary drogue parachute, resulted in insufficient deceleration and the fatal crash of cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov. Subsequent investigations revealed deep rooted cultural and organizational issues within the Soviet space program, including inadequate testing, suppression of dissent, undocumented last minute design changes, and the absence of integrated parachute system verification. More than 200 design flaws were identified after the accident, and firsthand accounts, including those from Yuri Gagarin, highlighted widespread concern prior to launch. Over time, the Soviet program implemented substantial reforms: systematic design corrections, rigorous process documentation, and an extensive series of drop tests that ultimately transformed the Soyuz system into one of the world’s most reliable human-rated return vehicles. This paper examines the technical architecture of the Soyuz‑1 parachute system, reconstructs the likely deployment sequence and failure mechanism, and analyzes the cultural contributors that shaped the accident. The study draws parallels to modern spacecraft parachute development, emphasizing the critical importance of integrated system testing, transparent engineering culture, and continuous hardware surveillance. These lessons remain directly relevant to today’s NASA and Commercial Crew Programs (CCP), where the Government continues to refine its understanding of aggregate risk and strengthen overall astronaut safety in the face of increasingly complex parachute systems.

Aaron L Morris↗
NASA NTRS1989

NASA aerospace battery systems program update

An overview of a battery systems program designed to enhance the safety, reliability, and performance of NASA's aerospace primary and secondary batteries as well as battery power systems is presented. The status of research in all three areas is reviewed. The approach to achieving the program objectives involves increasing the fundamental understanding of primary and secondary cells; providing for improved nickel-cadmium manufacturing process control; providing for the establishment of a NASA standard nickel-hydrogen cell design; establishing specifications, design and operational guidelines for both primary and secondary cells and batteries; providing training relating to the above areas; and opening and maintaining communication lines within NASA and the aerospace battery community.

Manzo, Michelle A.↗
NASA NTRS2010

NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Program: Recommendations for Technical Requirements for Inclusion in Aerospace Battery Procurements

This NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group was chartered within the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). The Battery Working Group was tasked to complete tasks and to propose proactive work to address battery related, agency-wide issues on an annual basis. In its first year of operation, this proactive program addressed various aspects of the validation and verification of aerospace battery systems for NASA missions. Studies were performed, issues were discussed and in many cases, test programs were executed to generate recommendations and guidelines to reduce risk associated with various aspects of implementing battery technology in the aerospace industry. This document contains Part 2 - Volume II Appendix A to Part 2 - Volume I.

Jung, David S.↗
NASA NTRS2010

NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Program: Recommendations for Technical Requirements for Inclusion in Aerospace Battery Procurements

This NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group was chartered within the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). The Battery Working Group was tasked to complete tasks and to propose proactive work to address battery related, agency-wide issues on an annual basis. In its first year of operation, this proactive program addressed various aspects of the validation and verification of aerospace battery systems for NASA missions. Studies were performed, issues were discussed and in many cases, test programs were executed to generate recommendations and guidelines to reduce risk associated with various aspects of implementing battery technology in the aerospace industry. This document contains Part 2 - Volume I: Recommendations for Technical Requirements for Inclusion in Aerospace Battery Procurements of the program's operations.

Jung, David S.↗
NASA NTRS2003

An Overview of the NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Program

The NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Program is an agency-wide effort aimed at ensuring the quality, safety, reliability and performance of flight battery systems for NASA applications. The program provides for the validation of primary and secondary cell and battery level technology advances to ensure their availability and readiness for use in NASA missions. It serves to bridge the gap between the development of technology advances and the realization and incorporation of these advances into mission applications. The program is led by the Glenn Research Center and involves funded task activities at each of the NASA mission centers and JPL. The overall products are safe, reliable, high quality batteries for mission applications. The products are defined along three product lines: 1. Battery Systems Technology - Elements of this task area cover the systems aspects of battery operation and generally apply across chemistries. This includes the development of guidelines documents, the establishment and maintenance of a central battery database that serves a central repository for battery characterization and verification test data from tests performed under the support of this program, the NASA Battery Workshop, and general test facility support. 2. Secondary Battery Technology - l h s task area focuses on the validation of battery technology for nickel-cadmium, nickel-hydrogen, nickel-metal-hydride and lithium-ion secondary battery systems. Standardized test regimes are used to validate the quality of a cell lot or cell design for flight applications. In this area, efforts are now concentrated on the validation and verification of lithium-ion battery technology for aerospace applications. 3. Primary Battery Technology - The safety and reliability aspects for primary lithium battery systems that are used in manned operations on the Shuttle and International Space Station are addressed in the primary battery technology task area. An overview of the task areas supported under this program will be presented.

Manzo, Michelle A.↗
NASA NTRS1990

NASA aerospace flight battery systems program

The major objective of the NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Program is to provide NASA with the policy and posture to increase and ensure the safety, performance and reliability of batteries for space power systems. The program plan has been modified in the past year to reflect changes in the agency's approach to battery related problems that are affecting flight programs. Primary attention in the Battery Program is being devoted to the development of an advanced nickel-cadmium cell design and the qualification of vendors to produce cells for flight programs. As part of a unified Battery Program, the development of a nickel-hydrogen standard and primary cell issues are also being pursued to provide high performance NASA Standards and space qualified state-of-the-art primary cells. The resolution of issues is being addressed with the full participation of the aerospace battery community.

Manzo, Michelle A.↗
NASA NTRS1990

NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Program

The major objective of the NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Program is to provide NASA with the policy and posture to increase and ensure the safety, performance and reliability of batteries for space power systems. The program plan has been modified in the past year to reflect changes in the agency's approach to battery related problems that are affecting flight programs. Primary attention in the Battery Program is being devoted to the development of an advanced nickel-cadmium cell design and the qualification of vendors to produce cells for flight programs. As part of a unified Battery Program, the development of a nickel-hydrogen standard and primary cell issues are also being pursued to provide high-performance NASA Standards and space qualified state-of-the-art primary cells. The resolution of issues is being addressed with the full participation of the aerospace battery community.

Manzo, Michelle A.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Crewed Space Vehicle Battery Safety Requirements

This requirements document is applicable to all batteries on crewed spacecraft, including vehicle, payload, and crew equipment batteries. It defines the specific provisions required to design a battery that is safe for ground personnel and crew members to handle and/or operate during all applicable phases of crewed missions, safe for use in the enclosed environment of a crewed space vehicle, and safe for use in launch vehicles, as well as in unpressurized spaces adjacent to the habitable portion of a space vehicle. The required provisions encompass hazard controls, design evaluation, and verification. The extent of the hazard controls and verification required depends on the applicability and credibility of the hazard to the specific battery design and applicable missions under review. Evaluation of the design and verification program results shall be completed prior to certification for flight and ground operations. This requirements document is geared toward the designers of battery systems to be used in crewed vehicles, crew equipment, crew suits, or batteries to be used in crewed vehicle systems and payloads (or experiments). This requirements document also applies to ground handling and testing of flight batteries. Specific design and verification requirements for a battery are dependent upon the battery chemistry, capacity, complexity, charging, environment, and application. The variety of battery chemistries available, combined with the variety of battery-powered applications, results in each battery application having specific, unique requirements pertinent to the specific battery application. However, there are basic requirements for all battery designs and applications, which are listed in section 4. Section 5 includes a description of hazards and controls and also includes requirements.

Jeevarajan, Judith A.↗
NASA NTRS1992

NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Program: An Update

The major objective of the NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Program is to provide NASA with the policy and posture to increase and ensure the safety, performance, and reliability of batteries for space power systems. The program was initiated in 1985 to address battery problems experienced by NASA and other space battery users over the previous ten years. The original program plan was approved in May 1986 and modified in 1990 to reflect changes in the agency's approach to battery related problems that are affecting flight programs. The NASA Battery Workshop is supported by the NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Program. The main objective of the discussions is to aid in defining the direction which the agency should head with respect to aerospace battery issues. Presently, primary attention in the Battery Program is being devoted to issues revolving around the future availability of nickel-cadmium batteries as a result of the proposed OSHA standards with respect to allowable cadmium levels in the workplace. The decision of whether or not to pursue the development of an advanced nickel-cadmium cell design and the qualification of vendors to produce cells for flight programs hinges on the impact of the OSHA ruling. As part of a unified Battery Program, the evaluation of a nickel-hydrogen cell design options and primary cell issues are also being pursued to provide high performance NASA Standards and space qualified state-of-the-art cells. The resolution of issues is being addressed with the full participation of the aerospace battery community.

Manzo, Michelle A.↗