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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

A Dynamic Risk Framework for the Physical Security of Nuclear Power Plants

This paper describes ongoing work within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability pathway at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to optimize the security and cost of nuclear power plants. It introduces the dynamic risk assessment tool developed at INL, Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD). EMRALD is leveraged to optimize the security posture of a nuclear power plant by integrating force-on-force (FOF) simulations and operator mitigation actions, including dynamic and flexible coping strategies (FLEX). To illustrate the methodology, four attack scenarios are modeled in a commercially available FOF simulation tool using a hypothetical nuclear power plant facility. The simulation results provide valuable insights into possible attack outcomes, as well as the probabilistic risk of a core damage event given these outcomes. Safety mitigation procedures are modeled in EMRALD dependent on the attack outcomes by considering human operator uncertainties. The results demonstrate that the number of armed responders can be optimized, while still maintaining the same protection level as the initial security posture. The proposed modeling and simulation framework of integrating FLEX equipment with FOF models enables the nuclear power plants to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security system.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

DOE-NE LWRS Integrated Program Plan - Physical Security Pathway

Domestic nuclear power is facing increased financial pressures from a variety of areas and there is pressure on these utilities to reduce their cost of operation. Currently, about 20%-30% of all on-site personnel are related to physical security. The LWRS Program recognized that R&D related to physical security could play a role in providing nuclear utilities technical and staffing efficiency options to meet their physical security commitments, but utilities often lack the technical basis or the ability to create the technical basis to realize or implement these efficiencies; towards this end, the LWRS Program created the Physical Security Pathway in September 2019. The pathway performs R&D to develop methods, tools, and technologies to optimize and modernize a nuclear power facility’s security posture. The pathway will: (1) conduct research on risk-informed techniques for physical security that account for a dynamic adversary; (2) apply advanced modeling and simulation tools to better inform physical-security scenarios and reduce uncertainties in force-on-force modeling; (3) assess benefits from proposed enhancements and novel mitigation strategies and explore changes to best practices, guides, or regulation to enable modernization; and (4) enhance and provide the technical basis for stakeholders to employ new security methods, tools, and technologies.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Physical & Cyber Security Modeling Interfacing Through Dante and ARCADE

Physical security is increasingly facing new threats from cyber attackers, for which there is little research in the way of characterizing this threat. This report discusses the efforts to combine cyber and physical security modeling tools to investigate this novel combinatorial threat space. To accomplish this, the Dante force-on-force modeling and simulation software and the Advanced Reactor Cyber Analysis and Development Environment (ARCADE) were integrated. Dante provides a 3D environment which models the physical world, while ARCADE provides the cyber and control systems world.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Defensive Cybersecurity Architecture Design Using Force-on-Force Cyber-Physical Modeling

Currently, nuclear power plant physical security systems are highly dependent on air-gaps as a protective measure against cyber-threats. Cyber-physical threats become more likely as advanced cyber-threat capabilities to jump air-gaps transition into common use. Defending against the emerging threat of cyber-enabled physical intrusions is poorly understood. The consequence of these cyber-physical attacks has no quantitative analysis method to inform risk-informed, performance-based cybersecurity approaches. By modifying the physical security simulation tool Dante, cyber-physical threat consequence was able to be analyzed on a notional facility. The results of this analysis are used to design a Defensive Cybersecurity Architecture (DCSA) for the physical security system to produce example resilience measures for this notional facility. A DCSA defines security levels to provide a graded approach for defending plant functions, and security zones for trusted communication between systems. This approach can be applied to real world systems to produce physical protection systems and response measures that are resilient to cyber-physical threats.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

INTEGRATION OF FLEX EQUIPMENT AND OPERATOR ACTIONS IN PLANT FORCE-ON-FORCE MODELS WITH DYNAMIC RISK ASSESSMENT

The overall operation and maintenance cost to protect nuclear power plants accounts for approximately 7% of the total cost of power generation, with labor accounting for half of this cost. In the current research, from interaction with utilities and other stakeholders, it was determined that physical security forces account for nearly 20% of the entire workforce at several nuclear power plants. Labor costs continue to rise in the U.S., so any measures to reduce the cost of operating a nuclear power plant will need to include a reduction in labor. The physical security pathway within the DOE’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability program aims to lower the cost of physical security through directed research into modeling and simulation, application of advanced sensors or deployment of advanced weapons. This report presents a modeling and simulation framework for integrating Diverse and Flexible Mitigation Capability (FLEX) portable equipment performance with Force on Force models of a plant’s physical security posture. The generic framework is described in detail, followed by a case study of modeling an adversarial attack aimed at causing a radiological release by sabotaging the plant’s power supply and its ultimate heat sink capabilities at a hypothetical nuclear power plant. Two different FLEX deployment strategies, series and parallel, are modeled with distinct timelines. The results of the adversarial attack modeled in a commercial Force on Force tool are integrated with the FLEX deployment model in INL’s dynamic modeling tool EMRALD. Monte Carlo simulation is used to model the distribution of the timeline in FLEX deployment strategies. The results demonstrate that, even in the extreme case of a successful adversarial attack, deployment of FLEX equipment can result in a significantly high likelihood of preventing radiological release. The modeling and simulation framework integrating FLEX equipment with Force on Force models enables the nuclear power plants to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Methodology and Application of Physical Security Effectiveness Based on Dynamic Force-on-Force Modeling

This report describes the research and development being performed at INL towards a dynamic modeling and simulation framework to enable physical security optimization at commercial nuclear power plants. The framework is based on the dynamic modeling tool EMRALD and is demonstrated for applications that can result in physical security optimization. Two main applications are presented: 1. Integrating FLEX portable equipment performance with FOF models of a plant’s physical security posture, and 2. Location optimization of bullet resistant enclosure. The generic framework for modeling FLEX portable equipment is described in detail, followed by a case study modeling an adversarial attack aimed at causing a radiological release by sabotaging the plant’s power supply and its ultimate heat sink capabilities at a hypothetical PWR. Two distinct FLEX deployment strategies, series and parallel, are modeled with distinct timelines. The results of the adversarial attack modeled in a commercial FOF tool, AVERT, are integrated with the FLEX deployment model in EMRALD. Monte Carlo simulation is used to model the distribution of the timeline in FLEX deployment strategies. Thermal-hydraulic analysis of FLEX performance is performed in RELAP5 and integrated with the EMRALD simulations to provide more realistic timelines in the models. The results demonstrate that, even in the extreme case of a successful adversarial attack, deployment of FLEX equipment can result in a significantly high likelihood of preventing radiological release. The modeling and simulation framework of integrating FLEX equipment with FOF models enables the NPPs to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security. The objective of location optimization of BRE is to determine the best location in the plant for a new BRE being planned by the plant to enhance their physical security effectiveness. The plant physical security FOF model is integrated with EMRALD that performs Monte Carlo simulation to run different attack scenarios and a discrete set of potential BRE locations. Sensitivity analysis is used to determine the most effective location for the BRE. The optimization approach can be extended to wide applications such as location optimization of remotely operated weapons and other strategic fixed assets.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

A Dynamic Risk Framework for the Optimization of Physical Security Posture of Nuclear Power Plants

This paper describes an ongoing work within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability pathway at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to optimize security and cost of nuclear power plants. It introduces the dynamic risk assessment tool developed at INL, Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD). EMRALD was leveraged to optimize the security posture of a nuclear power plant by integrating force-on-force (FOF) simulations and operator mitigation actions including the dynamic and flexible coping strategies (FLEX). To illustrate the methodology, four attack scenarios were modeled in a commercially available FOF simulation tool using a hypothetical nuclear power plant facility. The simulation results provide valuable insights into possible attack outcomes, as well as the probabilistic risk of core damage event given these outcomes. Safety mitigation procedures were modeled in EMRALD dependent on the attack outcomes by considering human operator uncertainties. The results demonstrate that the number of armed responders can be optimized, while still maintaining the same protection level as the initial security posture. The proposed modeling and simulation framework of integrating FLEX equipment with FOF models enables the nuclear power plants to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security system.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Evaluation of Physical Security Risk for Potential Implementation of FLEX using Dynamic Simulation Methods

The requirements for United States nuclear power plants to maintain a large onsite physical security force contribute to their large operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Physical Security Pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. This pathway will analyze and minimize the conservatisms built into current security postures in order to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within this pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force (FOF) modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrated them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This document provides an overview of lessons learned in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available FOF simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific FOF models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System or Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations, and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report documents the results of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. The purpose of this study was to verify that results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and to refine our guidance of the use of the framework. Such an assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants. NOTE: The work performed in this report is based on a generic EMRALD model with actual plant data used for the analysis. However, only the generic model and general results of the analysis are in the report. No plant’s sensitive information is discussed in this report. The discussion shows examples of insights that can be obtained from the MASS-DEF methodology.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

METHODOLOGY AND APPLICATION OF PHYSICAL SECURITY EFFECTIVENESS BASED ON DYNAMIC FORCE-ON-FORCE MODELING

This paper describes ongoing work within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to optimize security and cost of nuclear power plants (NPPs). It reviews the conservatisms in conventional physical security posture and regulations. It introduces the dynamic risk assessment tool developed at INL, Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD). The dynamic assessment methodology leverages EMRALD to process results of force-on-force (FOF) simulations and crediting safety mitigation actions from probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models as well as diverse and flexible coping strategies (FLEX) mitigation strategies. Timing information from these simulations are compared against the available time to perform mitigations obtained from Reactor Excursion and Leak Analysis Program (RELAP5) simulations. To illustrate the methodology, a station blackout (SBO) attack scenario was modeled in commercially available FOF simulation tools. The simulation results provide valuable insights into possible attack outcomes and as the probabilistic risk of a core damage event given these outcomes. Safety mitigation procedures were modeled in EMRALD, and were dependent on the attack outcomes by considering human operator uncertainties. RELAP5 simulations incorporating human and hardware uncertainties were performed to estimate the distribution of time-to-core damage. The results demonstrate that, even in the extreme case of a successful adversarial attack, plant mitigation strategies provide significantly high-likelihood of preventing radiological release. The proposed modeling and simulation framework of integrating FLEX equipment with FOF models enables the NPPs to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Methodology and Tool for the Physical Security Analysis of Micro and Advanced Reactors

This work proposes a dynamic evaluation methodology to relax the conservatism in physical security evaluation, by leveraging an ongoing work in the Light Water Reactor Sustainability pathway. This methodology is implemented in a dynamic risk assessment tool named Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD). The work extends EMRALD’s capability to support a sandbox feature where analysts can easily create attack scenarios and modify advanced/small modular reactor (A/SMR) security and safety features using templates. This approach saves time and cost since the analysis does not require creating detailed computer-aided design models, as is commonly required in commercial force-on-force software tools. EMRALD is completely free to use at https://emraldapp.inl.gov. We have developed basic templates including physical barriers, intrusion sensors, physical areas, and safety actions, that can be downloaded from EMRALD’s GitHub site: https://github.com/idaholab/EMRALD. These templates use generic data commonly used for training purposes, which do not reflect any actual operating nuclear reactor. Users may adjust the data in the templates with their own dataset and/or create new templates in EMRALD. The proposed methodology combines security and safety by assessing sabotage effects up to the radiological consequence to the public instead of merely the core damage state. This practice follows the industry standard for advanced non-light-water reactors currently proposed for endorsement by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The combination of security and safety is expressed in an achievability-consequence chart. EMRALD can be used to generate data for this chart. A hypothetical case study using a representative sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) facility is presented in this report to demonstrate this methodology. This case study does not contain any actual nuclear plant information. This work will benefit A/SMR vendors and utilities to implement security by design during the reactor design iteration phase, such that they do not have to perform upgrades and retrofits to the reactor after it is installed to improve its physical protection system. The tool may also be used to analyze domestic or foreign reactor designs to support the International Nuclear Security Techniques for Advanced Reactors (INSTAR) bilateral missions. Future works are planned to implement the methodology on a reference SFR reactor and a reference high-temperature gas-cooled reactor to obtain insights and lessons-learned for the A/SMR community.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Plant-specific Model and Data Analysis using Dynamic Security Modeling and Simulation

The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large on-site physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized in order to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This document provides an update on the progress in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available force-on-force simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework or MASS-DEF. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report documents the results of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report does not contain any plant's sensitive information and/or Safeguards Information. The purpose of this study was to verify that results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and to refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

An Evaluation of The Dynamic Physical Security Risk Assessment Methodology for Fleet-Wide Applications

The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large onsite physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This integrated process for physical security analysis is named Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF). This document provides an update on the progress in applying the MASS-DEF process to an operating commercial nuclear power plant as well as additional industry feedback regarding use of the tool for other physical security risk-informed topics. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, and integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5 or MAAP. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report is an update the progress of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report also provides an update to the procedural guidance for the MASS-DEF process and an overview of the generic models available for use by utilities. This report does not contain any plant’s sensitive information and/or safeguards information. This study’s purpose was to verify that the results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Enabling Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Physical Security Using EMRALD and MAAP (Presentation)

The optimization of physical security in nuclear power plants requires sophisticated methodologies that integrate operator actions and plant behavior through advanced simulation tools. Idaho National Laboratory has developed the Modeling and Analysis for Safety and Security using the Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF) methodology, an approach that integrates force-on-force simulations, dynamic probabilistic risk assessment, and thermal hydraulics modeling to enhance security planning while reducing costs. A reduced order model for thermal hydraulic simulations performed by the Modular Accident Analysis Program (MAAP) was developed to evaluate reactor core behavior during attack scenarios. MAAP simulations are computationally intensive and must be run in a secure environment, complicating analysis and validation. By pre-computed scenario outcomes for a small number of modified parameters, the reduced order model significantly decreases the computational cost and enables offsite review of the results.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Enabling Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Physical Security Using EMRALD and MAAP

The optimization of physical security in nuclear power plants requires sophisticated methodologies that integrate operator actions and plant behavior through advanced simulation tools. To address this, Idaho National Laboratory [JL2.1]has developed the Modeling and Analysis for Safety and Security using the Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF) methodology, an approach that integrates force-on-force simulations, dynamic probabilistic risk assessment, and thermal-hydraulics modeling [JL3.1]to enhance security planning while reducing costs. We developed a tool that produces reduced order models using thermal hydraulic simulations from the Modular Accident Analysis Program (MAAP) [1]. These models can quickly evaluate reactor core behavior during attack simulations, and in so doing, address two barriers of traditional methods: (1) MAAP simulations are computationally intensive, and (2) attack scenarios must be run in a secure environment, which complicates analysis and validation. By precomputing scenario outcomes for a small number of modified parameters, the reduced order model significantly decreases the computational cost and enables offsite review of the results.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗