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Panel Session 4 and 15: Japan Fukushima Daiichi D and D Update and Technological Challenges at Japan Fukushima Daiichi D and D and Update on Nuclear Overview and Development in Japan - Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Sessions 4 and 15 represent a two-part panel series that discusses progress and challenges associated with cleanup at Fukushima. Severe limitations on availability of original panelists from Japan due to strict restrictions put in place to alleviate the spread of coronavirus necessitated changes to both panels. The result was a significantly modified panel for Session 04 (shown above) and the elimination of all panelists for Session 15. The 4 and 15 Panel Sessions provide an overview of activities related to both the progress and challenges of cleanup and decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (NPS) in Japan. Five panelists discussed perspectives of the cleanup following a Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) video showing the progress on site since the devastating Great East Earthquake and tsunami that caused the explosions at three of the six reactors on the site. Three of the five panelists discussed on-going work being performed for the effort, while the other two provided expert perspectives of on strategic efforts at the site. The panel was attended by over 80 technologists and policy makers spanning the globe and was opened by Dr. Monica Regalbuto of Idaho National Laboratory and a short video provided by TEPCO. The video described changes at the site that spanned the cleanup efforts from stabilizing water intrusion into the contaminated reactor buildings to construction of new administrative facilities. The video explained the processes underway to retrieve spent fuel rods and challenges in retrieval of the compromised fuel debris. The video highlighted working condition improvements that included establishment of rest housing and a small convenience store on the site, and the rollback of protective equipment around the site due to decreases contamination. Panelists with presentations: Revision of 'the Mid-and-Long-Term Road-map towards the Decommissioning of TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station' (Paul Dickman); Sharing UK experience at Fukushima Daiichi (Adrian Simper); SRNL Japan (Andrew Fellinger); ABLE's Initiative to Dismantle the Exhaust Stack (Daniel Walter); JAEA R and D in Fukushima (Tokio Fukahori); TEPCO - Overview and Update of the Fukushima Decommissioning Process (Monica Regalbuto); Toshiba's Involvement in the Decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (Yasuhiro Yuguchi); Remote Dismantling of the Exhaust Stack At Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS (Takashi Okutsu)

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Risk communication with Fukushima residents affected by the Fukushima Daiichi accident at whole-body counting

After the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, the Tokai Research and Development Center of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) have had direct dialogue as risk communication with Fukushima residents who underwent whole-body counting examination (WBC). The purpose of the risk communication was to exchange information and opinions about radiation in order to mitigate Fukushima residents' anxiety and stress. Two kinds of opinion surveys were performed: one survey evaluated residents' views of the nuclear accident itself and the second survey evaluated the management of WBC examination as well as the quality of JAEA's communication skills on risks. It appears that most Fukushima residents seem to have reduced their anxiety level after the direct dialogue. The results of the surveys show that Fukushima residents have the deepest anxiety and concern about their long-term health issues and that they harbor anger toward the government and TEPCO. On the other hand, many WBC patients and patients' relatives have expressed gratitude for help in reducing their feelings of anxiety.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

The Role of the Consequence Management Home Team in the Fukushima Daiichi Response

The Consequence Management Home Team (CMHT) is a U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration asset and played an important role in the U.S. response effort to the Fukushima Daiichi accident, ranging from the early days of the response to a continued involvement in supporting late phase efforts. Each stage of their work had distinct characteristics in terms of management of incoming data streams and creation of products. The CMHT assisted a variety of response organizations with modeling; radiological operations planning; field monitoring techniques; and the analysis, interpretation, and distribution of radiological data. In the Fukushima Daiichi response, the CMHT grew to include a broader range of support than was historically planned. Through their work, the social and economic impacts of a nuclear or radiological incident were minimized. The CMHT was an integral component of the response in Japan and acted as the central point from which all of the data and products flowed.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Atmospheric dispersion modeling: Challenges of the Fukushima Daiichi response

In this research, the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) provided a wide range of predictions and analyses as part of the response to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident including: daily Japanese weather forecasts and atmospheric transport predictions to inform planning for field monitoring operations and to provide U.S. government agencies with ongoing situational awareness of meteorological conditions; estimates of possible dose in Japan based on hypothetical U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission scenarios of potential radionuclide releases to support protective action planning for U.S. citizens; predictions of possible plume arrival times and dose levels at U.S. locations; and source estimation and plume model refinement based on atmospheric dispersion modeling and available monitoring data.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 Accident Progression Uncertainty Analysis and Implications for Decommissioning of Fukushima Reactors - Volume I.

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has conducted an uncertainty analysis (UA) on the Fukushima Daiichi unit (1F1) accident progression with the MELCOR code. The model used was developed for a previous accident reconstruction investigation jointly sponsored by the US Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). That study focused on reconstructing the accident progressions, as postulated by the limited plant data. This work was focused evaluation of uncertainty in core damage progression behavior and its effect on key figures-of-merit (e.g., hydrogen production, reactor damage state, fraction of intact fuel, vessel lower head failure). The primary intent of this study was to characterize the range of predicted damage states in the 1F1 reactor considering state of knowledge uncertainties associated with MELCOR modeling of core damage progression and to generate information that may be useful in informing the decommissioning activities that will be employed to defuel the damaged reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Additionally, core damage progression variability inherent in MELCOR modeling numerics is investigated.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 ex-vessel prediction: Core melt spreading

Lower head failure and corium-concrete interaction were predicted to occur at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 (1F1) by several different system-level code analyses, including MELCOR v2.1 and MAAP5. Although these codes capture a wide range of accident phenomena, they do not contain detailed models for ex-vessel core melt behavior. However, specialized codes exist for analysis of ex-vessel melt spreading (e.g., MELTSPREAD) and long-term debris coolability (e.g., CORQUENCH). On this basis, an analysis has been carried out to further evaluate ex-vessel behavior for 1F1 using MELTSPREAD and CORQUENCH. Best-estimate melt pour conditions predicted by MELCOR v2.1 and MAAP5 were used as input. MELTSPREAD was then used to predict the spatially-dependent melt conditions and extent of spreading during relocation from the vessel. Lastly, this information was then used as input for the long-term debris coolability analysis with CORQUENCH that is reported in a companion paper.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 Ex-Vessel Prediction: Core-Concrete Interaction

Lower head failure and corium-concrete interaction were predicted to occur at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 (1F1) by several different system-level code analyses, including MELCOR v2.1 and MAAP5. Although these codes capture a wide range of accident phenomena, they do not contain detailed models for ex-vessel core melt behavior. However, specialized codes exist for the analysis of ex-vessel melt spreading (e.g., MELTSPREAD) and long-term debris coolability (e.g., CORQUENCH). On this basis, in this paper an analysis was carried out to further evaluate ex-vessel behavior for 1F1 using MELTSPREAD and CORQUENCH. Best-estimate melt pour conditions predicted by MELCOR v2.1 and MAAP5 were used as input. MELTSPREAD was then used to predict the spatially dependent melt conditions and extent of spreading during relocation from the vessel. The results of the MELTSPREAD analysis are reported in a companion paper. This information was used as input for the long-term debris coolability analysis with CORQUENCH. For the MELCOR-based melt pour scenario, CORQUENCH predicted the melt would readily cool within 2.5 h after the pour, and the sumps would experience limited ablation (approximately 18 cm) under water-flooded conditions. Finally, for the MAAP-based melt pour scenarios, CORQUENCH predicted that the melt would cool in approximately 22.5 h, and the sumps would experience approximately 65 cm of concrete ablation under water-flooded conditions.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Task 3: PNNL Visit by JAEA Researchers to Participate in TODAM Code Applications to Fukushima Rivers and to Evaluate the Feasibility of Adaptation of FLESCOT Code to Simulate Radionuclide Transport in the Pacific Ocean Coastal Water Around Fukushima

Four JAEA researchers visited PNNL for two weeks in February, 2013 to learn the PNNL-developed, unsteady, one-dimensional, river model, TODAM and the PNNL-developed, time-dependent, three dimensional, coastal water model, FLESCOT. These codes predict sediment and contaminant concentrations by accounting sediment-radionuclide interactions, e.g., adsorption/desorption and transport-deposition-resuspension of sediment-sorbed radionuclides.

Coastal Water Model↗

Reactor Design and Decommissioning - An Overview of International Activities in Post Fukushima Era1 - 12396

Accidents at the Fukushima Dai-ichi reactors as a result of the devastating earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011 have not only dampened the nuclear renaissance but have also initiated a re-examination of the design and safety features for the existing and planned nuclear reactors. Even though failures of some of the key site features at Fukushima can be attributed to events that in the past would have been considered as beyond the design basis, the industry as well as the regulatory authorities are analyzing what features, especially passive features, should be designed into the new reactor designs to minimize the potential for catastrophic failures. It is also recognized that since the design of the Fukushima BWR reactors which were commissioned in 1971, many advanced safety features are now a part of the newer reactor designs. As the recovery efforts at the Fukushima site are still underway, decisions with respect to the dismantlement and decommissioning of the damaged reactors and structures have not yet been finalized. As it was with Three Mile Island, it could take several decades for dismantlement, decommissioning and clean up, and the project poses especially tough challenges. Near-term assessments have been issued by several organizations, including the IAEA, the USNRC and others. Results of such investigations will lead to additional improvements in system and site design measures including strengthening of the anti-tsunami defenses, more defense-in-depth features in reactor design, and better response planning and preparation involving reactor sites. The question also arises what would the effect be on the decommissioning scene worldwide, and what would the effect be on the new reactors when they are eventually retired and dismantled. This paper provides an overview of the US and international activities related to recovery and decommissioning including the decommissioning features in the reactor design process and examines these from a new perspective in the post Fukushima -accident era. Accidents at the Fukushima Daiichi reactors in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011 have slowed down the nuclear renaissance world-wide and may have accelerated decommissioning either because some countries have decided to halt or reduce nuclear, or because the new safety requirements may reduce life-time extensions. Even in countries such as the UK and France that favor nuclear energy production existing nuclear sites are more likely to be chosen as sites for future NPPs. Even as the site recovery efforts continue at Fukushima and any decommissioning decisions are farther into the future, the accidents have focused attention on the reactor designs in general and specifically on the Fukushima type BWRs. The regulatory authorities in many countries have initiated a re-examination of the design of the systems, structures and components and considerations of the capability of the station to cope with beyond-design basis events. Enhancements to SSCs and site features for the existing reactors and the reactors that will be built will also impact the decommissioning phase activities. The newer reactor designs of today not only have enhanced safety features but also take into consideration the features that will facilitate future decommissioning. Lessons learned from past management and operation of reactors as well as the lessons from decommissioning are incorporated into the new designs. However, in the post-Fukushima era, the emphasis on beyond-design-basis capability may lead to significant changes in SSCs, which eventually will also have impact on the decommissioning phase. Additionally, where some countries decide to phase out the nuclear power, many reactors may enter the decommissioning phase in the coming decade. While the formal updating and expanding of existing guidance documents for accident cleanup and decommissioning would benefit by waiting until the Fukushima project has progressed sufficiently for that experience to be reliably interpreted, the development of structured on-line sharing of information and especially the creation of an on-line compendium of methods, tools, and techniques by which damaged fuel and other unique situations have been addressed can be addressed sooner and maintained as new problems and solutions arise and are resolved. The IAEA's new 'WEB 2.0 tool' CONNECT is expected to play a significant role in this and related information-sharing activities. The trend in some countries such as the United States has been to re-license the existing reactors for additional twenty years, beyond the original design life. Given the advances in technology over the past four decades, and considering that the newer designs incorporate significant improvements in safety systems, it may not be economical or technically feasible to retrofit enhancements into some of the older reactors. In such cases, the reactors may be retired from service and decommissioned. Overall, the energy demand in the world continues to rise, with sharp increases in the Asian countries, and nuclear power's role in the world's energy supply is expected to continue. Events at Fukushima have led to a re-examination on many fronts, including reactor design and regulatory requirements. Further changes may occur in these areas in the post-Fukushima era. These changes in turn will also impact the world-wide decommissioning scene and the decommissioning phase of the future reactors. (authors)

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Severe Accident Research Directions after Fukushima

The accidents at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station in March of 2011 renewed interest globally in the nature, causes, and health and economic consequences of severe accidents involving core damage and containment impairment. As a result of these accidents, research has been conducted into the modeling and phenomenological understanding of the accidents at Fukushima and the response and effectiveness of mitigating measures such as emergency water injection, primary system depressurization and containment venting actions. An important example of this is the jointly conducted OECD-NEA organized Benchmark of the Fukushima Accidents (BSAF project) where accident reconstruction analyses using computer codes such as MELCOR and MAAP are ongoing. Even prior to the Fukushima accidents, the Sandia/NRC sponsored State of Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) foreshadowed the accidents in Japan where long-term and short-term station blackout accidents in boiling water reactors with Mark-1 containment were analyzed showing striking similarities to the accidents at Fukushima. These analyses also highlighted important differences in our prior understanding, in particular the importance of suppression pool thermal stratification and the extraordinary operation of the Fukushima Unit-2 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system, prompting addition research into both of these areas. Additionally, the focus of the world's major computer codes on modeling the Fukushima accidents in the BSAF effort, led to several 'Crosswalk' comparisons between code predictions, highlighting subtle but important modeling differences between the codes and identifying areas where modeling improvements can be made. Collectively, these research areas are aimed at improving our understanding of severe accident progression and real-world response of safety related systems and components, and should lead to improved accident response and mitigation capabilities in the future. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Fukushima Daiichi—A Case Study for BWR Instrumentation and Control Systems Performance During a Severe Accident, Rev 1

This report provides an assessment of the performance of various instrumentation and control (I&C) and monitoring systems, with a focus on the first few days of the Fukushima Daiichi accident starting on March 11, 2011. Similar to what occurred at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) accident in 1979, operator responses were challenged when information on key parameters was lost, erroneous, or misleading. While numerous improvements in instrumentation capabilities have been made since the TMI-2 event, the accident at Fukushima Daiichi suggests the potential for further improvement. The objective of this research is to review the performance of the Fukushima Daiichi Units 1–3 instrumentation systems that could have helped ensure that plant operators and emergency responders had relevant, accurate, and timely knowledge of plant conditions as they managed the accident response. As was the case with TMI-2, forensic analyses of plant instrumentation failures will be a long-term effort. As an introduction to this long-term research, this report focuses on the information available in the control room during the accident and illustrates the challenges to operators in their understanding of plant conditions during the progression of the accident. I&C systems monitor the success or failure of achievement of light water reactor safety principles in which the protection of the reactor fuel, reactor coolant system, and reactor containment is accomplished. This report (1) provides an overview of the safety principles; (2) notes parameters associated with the boiling water reactor (BWR)/3 and BWR/4 protection, actuation, and monitoring systems as they relate to the achievement of these principles; (3) presents data from past research on predicted instrumentation performance during severe accidents, and (4) assesses performance of the key I&C and monitoring systems associated with BWR/3 and BWR/4 reactors like those at Fukushima Daiichi. Lessons learned or potential improvements associated with the performance of these systems in the context of severe accidents are delineated. As background information, an overview of key BWR/3- and BWR/4-Mark I reactor designs (BWR/3 and BWR/4 with a Mark I containment) reactor protection, engineered safety features actuation, and accident monitoring systems is provided. A brief description of plant safety systems used to prevent or mitigate reactor accidents is also provided. This background information provides context for the brief discussion of previous research that has been conducted on BWR severe accidents and for the discussion of the accident sequences, which led to core damage at Fukushima Daiichi Units 1–3. The progression of the accident sequences at Fukushima Daiichi Units 1–3 occurred very much as predicted in prior severe accident research conducted in the United States and internationally, given the complete station blackout that occurred when the tsunami generated by one of the most powerful earthquakes ever recorded rolled onshore.

Accident Tolerant Equipment↗

The Accident at Fukushima: What Happened?

At 2:46 PM, on the coast of the Pacific Ocean in eastern Japan, people were spending an ordinary afternoon. The earthquake had a magnitude of 9.0, the fourth largest ever recorded in the world. Avery large number of aftershocks were felt after the initial earthquake. More than 100 of them had a magnitude of over 6.0. There were very few injured or dead at this point. The large earthquake caused by this enormous crustal deformation spawned a rare and enormous tsunami that crashed down 30-40 minutes later. It easily cleared the high levees, washing away cars and houses and swallowing buildings of up to three stories in height. The largest tsunami reading taken from all regions was 40 meters in height. This tsunami reached the West Coast of the United States and the Pacific coast of South America, with wave heights of over two meters. It was due to this tsunami that the disaster became one of a not imaginable scale, which saw the number of dead or missing reach about 20,000 persons. The enormous tsunami headed for 15 nuclear power plants on the Pacific coast, but 11 power plants withstood the tsunami and attained cold shutdown. The flood height of the tsunami that struck each power station ranged to a maximum of 15 meters. The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Units experienced the largest and the cores of three reactors suffered meltdown. As a result, more than 160,000 residents were forced to evacuate, and are still living in temporary accommodation. The main focus of this presentation is on what happened at the Fukushima Daiichi, and how station personnel responded to the accident, with considerable international support. A year after the Fukushima Daiichi accident, Japan is in the process of leveraging the lessons learned from the accident to further improve the safety of nuclear power facilities and regain the trust of society. In this connection, not only international organizations, including IAEA, and WANO, but also governmental organizations and nuclear industry representatives from various countries, have been evaluating what happened at Fukushima Daiichi. Support from many countries has contributed to successfully stabilizing the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. International cooperation is required as Japan started along the long road to decommissioning the reactors. Such cooperation with the international community would achieve the decommissioning of the damaged reactors. Finally, recovery plans by the Japanese government to decontaminate surrounding regions have been started in order to get residents back to their homes as early as possible. Looking at the world's nuclear power industry, there are currently approximately 440 reactors in operation and 60 under construction. Despite the dramatic consequences of the Fukushima Daiichi catastrophe it is expected that the importance of nuclear power generation will not change in the years to come. Newly accumulated knowledge and capabilities must be passed on to the next generation. This is the duty put upon us and which is one that we must embrace.

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Criticality safety control of fuel debris produced by the accident of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants - technical development in Japan from 2012 and the future

Full text of publication follows: On 11 March 2011, Japan was attacked by the '2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake'. It was the greatest earthquake ever recorded around Japan. It caused big tsunami and it also attacked Tohoku sea coast area severely and violently. Approximately 16,000 people passed away and still about 2,600 people are lost by the earthquake and the tsunami. This extraordinary natural disaster affected the society of Japan deeply. But more serious problem is the severe accident occurred in Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants (1FNPP) after the earthquake and tsunami attack. By the tsunami after the earthquake, because of loss of ultimate heat sink (LUHS), three reactors of 1FNPP were damaged and the intact fuel became fuel debris. After the accident, Government of Japan setup the council for the decommissioning of TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and it released the general plan for countermeasure of the severe accident occurred in Japan, i.e. 'Mid-and-long-Term Road map towards the Decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Units 1-4'. According to the road map, nuclear power reactor vendors and research institutes in Japan have started the national project to carry out the decommissioning activity. International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID) is the association for technical development for Fukushima site decommissioning. Under this umbrella, nuclear power reactor vendors in Japan, i.e. Toshiba, Hitachi and Mitsubishi, and Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) have carried out the technical development required for the criticality safety control of the Fukushima fuel debris. Furthermore, JAEA has a plan to use the criticality assembly STACY for obtaining the neutronics characteristics of the fuel debris by modifying STACY from the solution system to heterogeneous system. This program is conducted by entrustment of Nuclear Regulation Authority of Japan, independently from IRID framework. It is expected that it will reach first criticality in FY2018. Researchers in universities in Japan also have own research program to control reactivity of fuel debris. This presentation will summarize the on-going research programs in Japan for the criticality safety control in order to remove and store the fuel debris from Fukushima site. (author)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

A Frozen Soil Barrier to Control Groundwater Inflow into Damaged Reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station - 16613

Reactor buildings and support facilities at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (F1 Site) were damaged by a March 2011 tsunami. In response, the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) is implementing a number of countermeasures to limit the releases and impacts of contaminated water to the surrounding environment. The diverse countermeasures work together in an integrated manner to provide different types, and several levels, of environmental protection. In general, the strategy represents an example of a 'defense in depth' concept that is used for nuclear facilities around the world. One of the key countermeasures is a frozen soil barrier encircling the damaged reactor facilities. The frozen barrier is intended to limit the flow of water into the area, reduce the amount of water entering damaged reactors, and reduce the resulting volume of contaminated water that requires treatment and storage. The frozen soil barrier was designed and installed by a team from TEPCO and Kajima Corporation. A group of scientists and engineers from US Department of Energy National Laboratories provided independent evaluation of the frozen barrier design and operational plans along with technical recommendations to the TEPCO team. The frozen soil barrier design extends to about 30 m depth; the bottom of the barrier is in a low permeability interval, and the total barrier length around the reactors is just over 1.5 km. The barrier required 1927 total boreholes: 1568 for freeze pipes plus 359 for temperature monitoring arrays. Drilling of all of the boreholes was completed November 9, 2015. Construction of the refrigeration plant is complete and all of the above ground piping/manifolds are in the final stages of construction. The DOE laboratory independent assessment of the frozen soil barrier concluded that the technical characteristics of a frozen barrier are relatively well suited to Fukushima-specific hydrogeologic conditions and the need for reducing the inflow of water into damaged reactors at the F1 Site. The scale of the Fukushima barrier is bounded by industry experience and the equipment and infrastructure proposed for the ground freezing is well understood. The on-site pilot test at Fukushima indicated predictable ground freezing and supported the full scale design parameters. These factors increase the confidence in the frozen soil barrier project underway at Fukushima. TEPCO is currently working with the Japanese Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA), providing operational plans/strategies for the frozen soil barrier and modeling results of the projected performance. Full scale frozen soil barrier operations are to begin after authorization from NRA. (authors)

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Multi-Phased, Post-Accident Support of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant - 12246

In the wake of the March 11 earthquake and tsunami and the subsequent flooding of several of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi reactors, Japan and the Japanese utility TEPCO faced a crisis situation with incredible challenges: substantial amounts of radioactive mixed seawater and freshwater accumulated in the basements of four reactor and other buildings on the site. This water held varying levels of contamination due to the fact that it had been in contact with damaged fuel elements in the cores and with other contaminated components. The overall water inventory was estimated at around 110,000 tons of water with contamination levels up to the order of 1 Ci/l. Time was of the essence to avoid overflow of this accumulated water into the ocean. AREVA proposed, designed and implemented a water treatment solution using a proven chemical coprecipitation process with ppFeNi reagent, which is currently in use for effluent treatment on several nuclear sites including AREVA sites. In addition to the extremely short schedule the other challenge was to adapt the chemical treatment process to the expected composition of the Fukushima water and, in particular, to evaluate the impact of salinity on process performance. It was also necessary to define operating conditions for the VEOLIA equipment that had been selected for implementation of the process in the future facility. The operation phase began on June 17, and by the end of July more than 30,000 tons of highly radioactive saltwater had been decontaminated - the Decontamination Factor (DF) for Cesium was ∼10{sup 4}. It allowed recycling the contaminated water to cool the reactors while protecting workers and the environment. This paper focuses on the Actiflo{sup TM}-Rad water treatment unit project that was part of the TEPCO general water treatment scheme. It presents a detailed look at the principles of the Actiflo{sup TM}-Rad, related on-the-fly R and D, an explanation of system implementation challenges, and a brief summary of operation results to date. AREVA's response to the Fukushima Dai-Ichi crisis was multi-phased: emergency aid and relief supply was sent within days after the accident; AREVA-Veolia engineering teams designed and implemented a water treatment solution in record time, only 3 months; and AREVA continues to support TEPCO and propose solutions for waste management, soil remediation and decontamination of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi site. Despite the huge challenges, the Actiflo{sup TM}-Rad project has been a success: the water treatment unit started on time and performed as expected. The performance is the result of many key elements: AREVA expertise in radioactive effluents decontamination, Veolia know-how in water treatment equipments in crisis environment, and of course AREVA and Veolia teams' creativity. The project success is also due to AREVA and Veolia teams' reactivity and high level of commitment with engineering teams working 24/7 in Japan, France and Germany. AREVA and Veolia deep knowledge of the Japanese industry ensured that the multi-cultural exchanges were not an issue. Finally the excellent overall project management and execution by TEPCO and other Japanese stakeholders was very efficient. The emergency water treatment was a key step of the roadmap towards restoration from the accident at Fukushima Dai-Ichi that TEPCO designed and keeps executing with success. (authors)

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Estimate of the Potential Amount of Low-Level Waste from the Fukushima Prefecture - 12370

The amount of waste generated by the cleanup of the Fukushima Prefecture (Fukushima-ken) following the releases from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident (March 2011) is dependent on many factors, including: - Contamination amounts; - Cleanup levels determined for the radioisotopes contaminating the area; - Future land use expectations and human exposure scenarios; - Groundwater contamination considerations; - Costs and availability of storage areas, and eventually disposal areas for the waste; and - Decontamination and volume reduction techniques and technologies used. For the purposes of estimating these waste volumes, Fukushima-ken is segregated into zones of similar contamination level and expected future use. Techniques for selecting the appropriate cleanup methods for each area are shown in a decision tree format. This approach is broadly applied to the 20 km evacuation zone and the total amounts and types of waste are estimated; waste resulting from cleanup efforts outside of the evacuation zone is not considered. Some of the limits of future use and potential zones where residents must be excluded within the prefecture are also described. The size and design of the proposed intermediate storage facility is also discussed and the current situation, cleanup, waste handling, and waste storage issues in Japan are described. The method for estimating waste amounts outlined above illustrates the large amount of waste that could potentially be generated by remediation of the 20 km evacuation zone (619 km{sup 2} total) if the currently proposed cleanup goals are uniformly applied. The Japanese environment ministry estimated in early October that the 1 mSv/year exposure goal would make the government responsible for decontaminating about 8,000 km{sup 2} within Fukushima-ken and roughly 4,900 km{sup 2} in areas outside the prefecture. The described waste volume estimation method also does not give any consideration to areas with localized hot spots. Land use and area dose rate estimates for the 20 km evacuation zone indicate there are large areas where doses to the public can be mitigated through methods other than removal and disposal of soil and other wastes. Several additional options for waste reduction can also be considered, including: - Recycling/reusing or disposing of as municipal waste material that can be unconditionally cleared; - Establishing additional precautionary (e.g., liners) and monitoring requirements for municipal landfills to dispose of some conditionally-cleared material; and - Using slightly-contaminated material in construction of reclamations, banks and roads. Waste estimates for cleanup will continue to evolve as decontamination plans are drafted and finalized. (authors)

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