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At least 19 records

Braxton Marlatt Intern Poster

The Internet of Things (IoT) encompasses a vast network of interconnected devices embedded with software, sensors, and network connectivity, enabling data collection and exchange. While IoT technology revolutionizes various industries, it also introduces significant security challenges. This research focuses on enhancing IoT security through the implementation of Zero Trust Architecture concepts, specifically targeting the Network and Device pillars of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s Zero Trust Maturity Model. By generating Codified Attack Surfaces (CAS) using custom Structured Threat Information eXpression bundles, this project aims to provide enhanced visibility into network communications, detect vulnerabilities in device firmware, and improve the overall security posture for IoT devices and networks. The methodology involves defining custom STIX schema and objects, collecting data from intra-IoT traffic, external network traffic, and firmware analysis, and automating the conversion and correlation of this data into STIX bundles. The automated generation of attack surfaces offers comprehensive insights into activity, vulnerabilities, and anomalies within an IoT environment, enabling proactive threat identification and mitigation.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Challenges in Firmware Re-Hosting, Emulation, and Analysis

System emulation and firmware re-hosting have become popular techniques to answer various security and performance related questions, such as determining whether a firmware contain security vulnerabilities or meet timing requirements when run on a specific hardware platform. While this motivation for emulation and binary analysis has previously been explored and reported, starting to either work or research in the field is difficult. To this end, we provide a comprehensive guide for the practitioner or system emulation researcher. Here, we layout common challenges faced during firmware re-hosting, explaining successive steps and surveying common tools used to overcome these challenges. We provide classification techniques on five different axes, including emulator methods, system type, fidelity, emulator purpose, and control. These classifications and comparison criteria enable the practitioner to determine the appropriate tool for emulation. We use our classifications to categorize popular works in the field and present 28 common challenges faced when creating, emulating, and analyzing a system from obtaining firmwares to post emulation analysis.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Evaluating Methods of Software Bill of Materials Generation to Enhance Nuclear Power Plant Cybersecurity

Instrumentation and control (I&C) systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs) are potential targets of cyberattacks and can prove deleterious for the safety of the NPPs. A Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) provides a detailed list of the various components and their dependencies in software, which helps in vulnerability and risk assessment for cyber hygiene and situational awareness. For an NPP, the process of generating an accurate SBOM report can be complex due to the legacy systems and firmware binaries involved. While most current SBOM tools are focused more on modern internet technology software, this research provides insights and guidelines for an NPP to generate an accurate and efficient SBOM. Here, the paper proposes a new methodology to help NPPs categorize software and use appropriate tools to generate SBOMs for their digital I&C systems.

SBOM↗

INL CyberStrike

Explore the source record for details and available documents.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Forensic Analysis of SOHO Router Binaries

Small Office/Home Office (SOHO) routers are used by millions of consumers across the United States, and are commensurately vulnerable. Forensic analysis of SOHO router firmware helps to understand and mitigate those vulnerabilities. This poster focused particularly on analysis of BusyBox executables, a software suite that provides several Unix utilities in a single file. Three main tools were used to analyze the binaries. BinWalk was used to extract the files, but also to build entropy graphs, extract Linux kernel images, and identify CPU architectures; WiiBin processed the binaries to find endianness, architecture, the percent compressed/encrypted, and compiler data; and @DisCo, a machine learning tool used to determine function similarity in disassembled binaries, analyzed similarities and determined versions of extracted BusyBox files from each router. These tools found that venders from all five routers utilized the same version of the BusyBox software across different firmware updates, demonstrating the importance of constant firmware scrutiny to protect against security vulnerabilities.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Second Generation Readout For Large Format Photon Counting Microwave Kinetic Inductance Detectors

We present the development of a second generation digital readout system for photon counting microwave kinetic inductance detector (MKID) arrays operating in the optical and near-infrared wavelength bands. Our system retains much of the core signal processing architecture from the first generation system but with a significantly higher bandwidth, enabling the readout of kilopixel MKID arrays. Each set of readout boards is capable of reading out 1024 MKID pixels multiplexed over 2 GHz of bandwidth; two such units can be placed in parallel to read out a full 2048 pixel microwave feedline over a 4 GHz–8 GHz band. As in the first generation readout, our system is capable of identifying, analyzing, and recording photon detection events in real time with a time resolution of order a few microseconds. Here, we describe the hardware and firmware, and present an analysis of the noise properties of the system. We also present a novel algorithm for efficiently suppressing IQ mixer sidebands to below −30 dBc.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

SCA Tools - SCRM Value Add or Lossy Noise Machines

Software supply chain risk management (SCRM) depends upon accurate information regarding the software components that comprise any given software system. The collection of components included in a software package can be organized within a software bill of materials, or SBOM. SBOMs are ideally generated when the software components are put together, such as at compile time, but for many reasons that has not and is not always possible. For example, legacy or proprietary software packages often do not have SBOMs available to downstream consumers of that software. It’s not just end users that are affected, manufacturers themselves also must deal with this problem. To answer these questions, the market has seen the rise of several commercial software composition analysis (SCA) tools. These tools aim to peer into completed software systems, automatically identifying hidden software dependencies and looking up known vulnerabilities associated with those dependencies to enable end-users to enhance their cyber supply chain risk management processes. These tools are potentially a huge boon to end users of legacy and proprietary software – and a potential bane, depending on how accurate they are. This research asks that question – how accurate are currently available binary SCA tools – and provides answers to several other questions: What does it mean to be “accurate”? What limitations do the tools have in identifying common edge cases that take place in modern software development? Can they help you avoid a devastating supply chain attack, or is it all just noise? After researching SCA tools on the market, we identified three vendors that fit our use case and would provide analysis on compiled binaries. Using these tools, we submitted firmware for critical infrastructure devices for analysis and SBOM generation. The SBOM outputs were then cross referenced with SBOMs generated through manual analysis for comparison. In addition to the firmware samples, we also submitted edge case samples based off a popular open-source library that were specifically crafted to evaluate each tools’ ability to accurately identify components. These samples were customized to be consistent with modifications we have seen in modern software development as well as a couple that are representative of supply chain attacks.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Automated Vulnerability Detection (AVUD) for Compiled Smart Grid Software

This project developed and implemented a system for conducting cybersecurity vulnerability detection of smart grid components and systems by performing static analysis of compiled software (“firmware”). The resulting system for automated vulnerability detection (AVUD) was implemented as part of Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s existing test bed for smart meters, the Sustainable Campus Initiative. The work consisted of two phases: the first phase implemented the necessary software and computational models to perform the analysis, and the second phase demonstrated the system on example firmware in partnership with smart meter manufacturer Sensus USA, Inc. The resulting system won an R&D 100 award and has been successfully commercialized, winning a National Laboratory Consortium Commercialization Award.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Firmware Tampering Detection in Heavy-Duty Vehicles through J1939 CAN Analysis

Modern heavy-duty vehicles rely on complex networks of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that communicate using the J1939 protocol. While this system makes it easier to update and configure vehicle components, it also opens the door to serious cybersecurity risks if not properly secured. This work investigates the potential for firmware tampering through the J1939 communication protocol, which enables ECU configuration and reprogramming over the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. By monitoring CAN traffic during legitimate maintenance operations and reverse-engineering OEM diagnostic software, we identified common and proprietary J1939 message identifiers, authentication patterns, and vulnerabilities within Unified Diagnostic Services (UDS). These findings demonstrate that inadequate authentication mechanisms can allow malicious actors to alter ECU firmware or disable safety functions, posing severe operational and safety risks. Our analysis contributes to the development of vehicle intrusion detection systems capable of recognizing abnormal reprogramming activity and future firmware fingerprinting methods to verify software integrity across ECUs. This work highlights the importance of standardizing secure firmware authentication across manufacturers to strengthen cyber resilience in heavy-duty vehicle systems.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Automated Vulnerability Detection for Compiled Smart Grid Software

While testing performed with proper experimental controls can provide scientifically quantifiable evidence that software does not contain unintentional vulnerabilities (bugs), it is insufficient to show that intentional vulnerabilities exist, and impractical to certify devices for the expected long lifetimes of use. For both of these needs, rigorous analysis of the software itself is essential. Automated software behavior computation applies rigorous static software analysis methods based on function extraction (FX) to compiled software to detect vulnerabilities, intentional or unintentional, and to verify critical functionality. This analysis is based on the compiled firmware, takes into account machine precision, and does not rely on heuristics or approximations early in the analysis.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Architecture and Implementation of OpenPET Firmware and Embedded Software

OpenPET is an open source, modular, extendible, and high-performance platform suitable for multi-channel data acquisition and analysis. Due to the versatility of the hardware, firmware, and software architectures, the platform is capable of interfacing with a wide variety of detector modules not only in medical imaging but also in homeland security applications. Analog signals from radiation detectors share similar characteristics-a pulse whose area is proportional to the deposited energy and whose leading edge is used to extract a timing signal. As a result, a generic design method of the platform is adopted for the hardware, firmware, and software architectures and implementations. The analog front-end is hosted on a module called a Detector Board, where each board can filter, combine, timestamp, and process multiple channels independently. The processed data is formatted and sent through a backplane bus to a module called Support Board, where 1 Support Board can host up to eight Detector Board modules. The data in the Support Board, coming from 8 Detector Board modules, can be aggregated or correlated (if needed) depending on the algorithm implemented or runtime mode selected. It is then sent out to a computer workstation for further processing. The number of channels (detector modules), to be processed, mandates the overall OpenPET System Configuration, which is designed to handle up to 1,024 channels using 16-channel Detector Boards in the Standard System Configuration and 16,384 channels using 32-channel Detector Boards in the Large System Configuration.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Open Source Software Prevalence Ingest Tool

The OSSP Ingest Tool accepts user-input organizational information, ingests IT/OT asset lists in Excel format, and ingests the associated CycloneDX SBOM's. It then performs analytics demonstrating the ability to answer the follow research questions: o RQ1. Ability to identify all OSS services running on, and all OSS components present within, an OT device o RQ1a: Ability to differentiate multiple versions of the same OSS component within each OT device. o RQ1b: Ability to differentiate running from not-running OSS components. o RQ1c: Ability to differentiate based on the originator of the component, because a supplier may have modified it after retrieval from the upstream software source. o RQ2. Ability to correlate the identity of a single OSS component across multiple OT devices, mitigating common name variations such as differences in capitalization, '-' vs '_', and so on. o RQ3. Ability to perform subset analysis of OSS components across multiple OT devices o RQ3a: Ability to perform subset analysis across OSS libraries, generating density & distribution graphs to identify commonly-used libraries and outliers. o RQ3b: Ability to perform subset analysis of a single OSS library, generating density & distribution by CI sector, by device type, by device make/model, and/or by firmware version. o RQ3c: Ability to perform subset analysis by grouping OSS libraries according to programming language, then overlay with RQ4b. o RQ3d: Ability to perform subset analysis by OSS upstream source, providing insight into degree of modifications performed by suppliers. o RQ4. Ability to identify dependencies (transitive and direct) of each differentiated OSS library within each OT device, and enable RQ1,2,3 iteratively for dependencies. o RQ1. Ability to identify all OSS services running on, and all OSS components present within, an OT device o RQ1a: Ability to differentiate multiple versions of the same OSS component within each OT device. o RQ1b: Ability Page

Kapadia, Shayna [Lawrence Livermore National Labor↗

FY25 Mid-Year Report: FNCL Enhancements Implementation

During the first half of FY25 the FNCL team has made consistent progress toward the completion of our project goals. The FNCL prototype panel design has been successfully applied to a fully instrumented 3-panel system which is actively under construction. The FNCL Demonstrator System contains solid scintillators instrumented with SiPMs, which operate on an updated CAEN digitizer, requires no high-voltage, and has a smaller overall footprint. The onboard software will include the LLNL-developed GMM-PSD signal processing. Later this year the system will be experimentally tested alongside the baseline FNCL instrument at LLNLs ISSA facility. In addition to a full systems test, the performance of a DD generator for active interrogation measurements compared to the standard AmLi source will be established for both systems. The data collected at the ISSA facility will be used to experimentally validate the FNCL-Fast Isotopic Fuel Assay’s (FIFA) capability to measure U-235 loading and to predict gadolinium poison content with passive interrogation. The FNCL-FIFA modal was benchmarked with simulation-based data and a user-friendly GUI was added earlier this year. Three separate codes have been submitted to the LLNL ESW system for review prior to their transfers. These include the Predictive Modeling Response toolkit, GMM-PSD firmware beta version, and the FNCL-FIFA analysis package with GUI and user documentation.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

WeaselBoard :

Critical infrastructures, such as electrical power plants and oil refineries, rely on programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to control essential processes. State of the art security cannot detect attacks on PLCs at the hardware or firmware level. This renders critical infrastructure control systems vulnerable to costly and dangerous attacks. WeaselBoard is a PLC backplane analysis system that connects directly to the PLC backplane to capture backplane communications between modules. WeaselBoard forwards inter-module traffic to an external analysis system that detects changes to process control settings, sensor values, module configuration information, firmware updates, and process control program (logic) updates. WeaselBoard provides zero-day exploit detection for PLCs by detecting changes in the PLC and the process. This approach to PLC monitoring is protected under U.S. Patent Application 13/947,887.

Mulder, John C.↗