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At least 19 records

In-Field Alpha Spectrometry to Assess Uranium Enrichment In Uranium Hexafluoride

A new In-Field Alpha Spectrometry (IFAS) system is being developed to allow quick turnaround measurements of uranium enrichment in uranium hexafluoride samples. Samples are collected using specially-designed Single-Use Destructive Assay (SUDA) wafers which have an absorptive thin film of zeolite deposited onto a quartz substrate. The SUDA samples, along with a special holder, are designed to be attached directly to a sampling tap at a gas centrifuge enrichment plant or a uranium conversion facility, allowing gaseous UF6 to come into direct contact with the zeolite. The zeolite absorbs this material and converts it into stable, safe UO2F2 within a few minutes. Once the sample has been collected it is transferred to the IFAS system where a solid-state, silicon alpha spectrometer is used to quantitatively measure the alpha emissions from 234U, 235U, and 238U form the sample. The SUDA samples are designed so that thin-film spectra are produced, and the SUDA samples and IFAS system are designed so that a complete measurement, with a final 235U:Utotal determination of <±2%, can be made in less than eight hours. This short time frame will allow an inspector to get results on-site within one working shift.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

In-Field Alpha Spectrometry to Assess Uranium Enrichment In Uranium Hexafluoride

A new In-Field Alpha Spectrometry (IFAS) system is being developed to allow quick turnaround measurements of uranium enrichment in uranium hexafluoride (UF6) samples. Samples are collected using specially-designed Single-Use Destructive Assay (SUDA) wafers which have an absorptive film of zeolite deposited onto a quartz or metal substrate. The SUDA samples, along with a special holder, are designed to be attached directly to a sampling tap at a gas centrifuge enrichment plant or a uranium conversion facility, allowing gaseous UF6 to come into direct contact with the zeolite. The zeolite absorbs this material and converts it into stable, safe UO2F2 within a few minutes. Once the sample has been collected it is transferred to the IFAS system where a solid-state, silicon alpha spectrometer is used to quantitatively measure the alpha emissions from 234U, 235U, and 238U in the sample. The IFAS system is a small, light-weight device that can be quickly turned on and put into use. The SUDA samples and IFAS hardware are designed so that thin-film spectra are produced, allowing a complete measurement with a final 235U:Utotal determination having a precision <±2% to be made in less than eight hours. This short time frame will allow an inspector to get results on-site within one working shift; further innovations may reduce this to even shorter times.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

On the Origins and Significance of the Limit Demarcating Low-Enriched Uranium from Highly Enriched Uranium

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines uranium with a 235 U isotope concentration of 20 percent as the threshold between low-enriched uranium (LEU) and highly enriched uranium (HEU), and as a significant waypoint on the path towards weapon-grade uranium (typically above 90 percent 235 U enrich-ment). Furthermore, the distinction between LEU and HEU is widely used in shaping nonproliferation policy, and it has featured prominently in commentary over Iran’s nuclear program and the series of Nuclear Security Summits that since 2010 have sought to minimize civilian stockpiles and use of HEU. Yet the origin of this threshold is obscure, dating back 6 decades. Our research note traces the political origin and the technical basis for this limit.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Profile of World Uranium Enrichment Programs-2009

It is generally agreed that the most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is acquiring fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Plutonium is produced in a nuclear reactor, whereas HEU is produced using a uranium enrichment process. Enrichment is also an important step in the civil nuclear fuel cycle, in producing low enriched uranium (LEU) for use as fuel for nuclear reactors to generate electricity. However, the same equipment used to produce LEU for nuclear reactor fuel can also be used to produce HEU for weapons. Safeguards at an enrichment plant are the array of assurances and verification techniques that ensure uranium is not diverted or enriched to HEU. There are several techniques for enriching uranium. The two most prevalent are gaseous diffusion, which uses older technology and requires a lot of energy, and gas centrifuge separation, which uses more advanced technology and is more energy efficient. Gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) provide about 40% of current world enrichment capacity but are being phased out as newer gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) are constructed. Estimates of current and future enrichment capacity are always approximate, due to the constant upgrades, expansions, and shutdowns occurring at enrichment plants, largely determined by economic interests. Currently, the world enrichment capacity is approximately 56 million kilogram separative work units (SWU) per year, with 22.5 million in gaseous diffusion and more than 33 million in gas centrifuge plants. Another 34 million SWU/year of capacity is under construction or planned for the near future, almost entirely using gas centrifuge separation. Other less-efficient techniques have also been used in the past, including electromagnetic and aerodynamic separations, but these are considered obsolete, at least from a commercial perspective. Laser isotope separation shows promise as a possible enrichment technique of the future but has yet to be demonstrated commercially. In the early 1980s, six countries developing gas centrifuge technology (United States, United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, and Australia) along with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Atomic Energy Community began developing effective safeguards techniques for GCEPs. This effort was known as the Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP). The HSP had the goal of maximizing safeguards effectiveness while minimizing the cost to the operator and inspectorate, and adopted several recommendations, such as the acceptance of limited-frequency unannounced access inspections in cascade halls, and the use of nondestructive assay measurements and tamper-indicating seals. While only the HSP participants initially committed to implementing all the measures of the approach, it has been used as a model for the safeguards applied to GCEPs in additional states. Uranium enrichment capacity has continued to expand on all fronts in the last few years. GCEP capacity is expanding in anticipation of the eventual shutdown of the less-efficient GDPs, the termination of the U.S.-Russia HEU blend-down program slated for 2013, and the possible resurgence of nuclear reactor construction as part of an expected 'Nuclear Renaissance'. Overall, a clear trend in the world profile of uranium enrichment plant operation is the continued movement towards multinational projects driven by commercial and economic interests. Along this vein, the safeguards community is continuing to develop new safeguards techniques and technologies that are not overly burdensome to enrichment plant operators while delivering more effective and efficient results. This report provides a snapshot overview of world enrichment capacity in 2009, including profiles of the uranium enrichment programs of individual states. It is a revision of a 2007 report on the same topic; significant changes in world enrichment programs between the previous and current reports are emphasized. It is based entirely on open-source information, which is dependent on published sources and may therefore not be completely accurate or reflect the most recent developments. Consequently, readers should not assume that information cited here has the endorsement of either ORNL or the U.S. Department of Energy. We are merely reporting what's been reported. In addition, this report briefly describes some of the safeguards techniques being used at various enrichment plants, including implementation of HSP recommendations.

Laughter, Mark D↗

International Atomic Energy Agency support of research reactor highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium fuel conversion projects

The IAEA has been involved for more than twenty years in supporting international nuclear non- proliferation efforts associated with reducing the amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in international commerce. IAEA projects and activities have directly supported the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) programme, as well as directly assisted efforts to convert research reactors from HEU to LEU fuel. HEU to LEU fuel conversion projects differ significantly depending on several factors including the design of the reactor and fuel, technical needs of the member state, local nuclear infrastructure, and available resources. To support such diverse endeavours, the IAEA tailors each project to address the relevant constraints. This paper presents the different approaches taken by the IAEA to address the diverse challenges involved in research reactor HEU to LEU fuel conversion projects. Examples of conversion related projects in different Member States are fully detailed. (author)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Profile of World Uranium Enrichment Programs - 2007

It is generally agreed that the most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is acquiring weapons grade fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Plutonium is produced in a nuclear reactor, while HEU is produced using a uranium enrichment process. Enrichment is also an important step in the civil nuclear fuel cycle, in producing low enriched uranium (LEU) for use in fuel for nuclear reactors. However, the same equipment used to produce LEU for nuclear fuel can also be used to produce HEU for weapons. Safeguards at an enrichment plant are the array of assurances and verification techniques that ensure uranium is only enriched to LEU, no undeclared LEU is produced, and no uranium is enriched to HEU or secretly diverted. There are several techniques for enriching uranium. The two most prevalent are gaseous diffusion, which uses older technology and requires a lot of energy, and gas centrifuge separation, which uses more advanced technology and is more energy efficient. Gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) provide about 40% of current world enrichment capacity, but are being phased out as newer gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) are constructed. Estimates of current and future enrichment capacity are always approximate, due to the constant upgrades, expansions, and shutdowns occurring at enrichment plants, largely determined by economic interests. Currently, the world enrichment capacity is approximately 53 million kg-separative work units (SWU) per year, with 22 million in gaseous diffusion and 31 million in gas centrifuge plants. Another 23 million SWU/year of capacity are under construction or planned for the near future, almost entirely using gas centrifuge separation. Other less-efficient techniques have also been used in the past, including electromagnetic and aerodynamic separations, but these are considered obsolete, at least from a commercial perspective. Laser isotope separation shows promise as a possible enrichment technique of the future, but has yet to be demonstrated commercially. In the early 1980s, six countries developing gas centrifuge technology (United States, United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, and Australia) along with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) began developing effective safeguards techniques for GCEPs. This effort was known as the Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP). The HSP had the goal of maximizing safeguards effectiveness while minimizing the cost to the operator and inspectorate, and adopted several recommendations, such as the acceptance of limited-frequency unannounced access (LFUA) inspections in cascade halls, and the use of nondestructive assay (NDA) measurements and tamper-indicating seals. While only the HSP participants initially committed to implementing all the measures of the approach, it has been used as a model for the safeguards applied to GCEPs in additional states. This report provides a snapshot overview of world enrichment capacity in 2007, including profiles of the uranium enrichment programs of individual states. It is based on open-source information, which is dependent on unclassified sources and may therefore not reflect the most recent developments. In addition, it briefly describes some of the safeguards techniques being used at various enrichment plants, including implementation of HSP recommendations.

Laughter, Mark D↗

Assuaging Nuclear Energy Risks: The Angarsk International Uranium Enrichment Center

The recent nuclear renaissance has motivated many countries, especially developing nations, to plan and build nuclear power reactors. However, domestic low enriched uranium demands may trigger nations to construct indigenous enrichment facilities, which could be redirected to fabricate high enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. The potential advantages of establishing multinational uranium enrichment sites are numerous including increased low enrichment uranium access with decreased nuclear proliferation risks. While multinational nuclear initiatives have been discussed, Russia is the first nation to actualize this concept with their Angarsk International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC). This paper provides an overview of the historical and modern context of the multinational nuclear fuel cycle as well as the evolution of Russia's IUEC, which exemplifies how international fuel cycle cooperation is an alternative to domestic facilities.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Startup Test Plan and Predictions for Highly Enriched Uranium to Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Conversion at the University of Missouri Research Reactor

Nonpower reactors licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission require a startup test plan as part of any facility modification to verify operability prior to resumption of operations. In order to support conversion of the University of Missouri Research Reactor from the use of highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, a startup test plan has been devised to measure certain reactor physics parameters for the initial all-fresh LEU core licensing documentation that will be submitted. These parameters include the approach to critical, primary coolant void coefficient of reactivity, flux trap void coefficient of reactivity, determination of flux trap sample reactivity worth, radial and axial thermal neutron flux mapping, control blade worth calibration, primary and pool coolant temperature coefficient of reactivity, and flux mapping of experimental positions. Here, predictions for these parameters made using the Monte Carlo N-Particle Version 5 (MCNP5) radiation transport code are reported. These predictions will support the startup tests by providing a baseline set of expectations and additional insight into the performance of the LEU core.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

In-field alpha spectrometry system for uranium enrichment verification of uranium hexafluoride

A portable In-Field Alpha Spectrometry (IFAS) system was developed to support on-site uranium enrichment determination for samples taken at facilities working with gaseous UF 6 . It consists of a modified commercial alpha spectrometer, a vacuum pump, a laptop computer, and associated connectors and cables. The IFAS uses specially designed Single-Use Destructive Assay (SUDA) samplers to capture gaseous UF 6 and convert and store it as UO 2 F 2 in a thin-film zeolite. To examine the quantitative performance of the IFAS system a large number of replicate SUDA samples was acquired for natural uranium (NU, 0.72 wt%, 23 samples), low enriched uranium 1 (LEU1, 2.33 wt% 235 U, 10 samples), and low enriched uranium 2 (LEU2, 4.62 wt% 235 U, 10 samples). The standard deviation (SD) values for uranium enrichment determination with the IFAS for NU, LEU1, and LEU2, in 20-hour assays, were 0.037 wt% 235 U, 0.063 wt% 235 U, and 0.072 wt% 235 U, respectively. In addition, a separate analysis suggests that comparable SD values can be achieved in less time, approximately 8-10 hours. For context, these SD values are well below the International Atomic Energy Agency’s International Target Values for the determination of uranium enrichment in non-destructive assay measurements.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

A High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Transportation Concept

The uranium 235U enrichment commonly used in fuel production for U.S. light water nuclear reactors typically does not exceed 5 wt%. In contrast, many of the currently investigated advanced reactor concepts demand fuel with higher enrichments. This includes high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), characterized by a 235U enrichment of 5 to 20 wt%. The necessity of HALEU transportation in the fuel production cycle leads to new challenges caused by various technical and regulatory hurdles. Current U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission–approved transportation package designs for UF6 with enrichments above 5 wt% provide relatively small payloads [=116 kg (250 lb)]. Furthermore, in accordance with 10 CFR 71.55, package design activities for fissile material enriched above 5 wt% need to consider water infiltration in the containment as part of the criticality safety evaluations. This study presents a transportation package concept for HALEU advanced nuclear reactor fuel with a significantly higher payload of up to 376 kg (830 lb) of fissile material per package and up to 1881 kg (4149 lb) of HALEU per legal weight truck. The anticipated chemical form of the transported material is UO2 downblended from available highly enriched uranium. The concept utilizes a combination of existing transportation packaging, 18 inner canisters, and a novel basket design that includes a borated aluminum flux trap. Criticality and shielding evaluations; fundamental structural, confinement, and thermal assessments; and studies on package operations are presented. The results of this study build significant confidence in the technical feasibility of a high-capacity HALEU transportation package concept while demonstrating the concept’s potential to meet U.S. regulatory requirements.

Eidelpes, Elmar↗

Californium-252 production at the High Flux Isotope Reactor - II: Comparison between the highly enriched uranium and a proposed low-enriched uranium core

This is the second paper on a 252 Cf production study performed in support of efforts to convert the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The first paper primarily focuses on validating computational tools and nuclear data. This companion paper evaluates another critical aspect: the 252 Cf production capability with a proposed LEU core. HFIR must maintain its world-class performance and missions following conversion and because 252 Cf is a vital, multipurpose neutron-emitting radioisotope, the ability to efficiently produce 252 Cf must be preserved. In this study, the HFIRCON transport and depletion tool, several nuclear data libraries, and Campaign 78 data were used to compute 252 Cf production, sensitivity, and safety metrics. Further, results indicate the 252 Cf production and production rates are slightly higher with a 95MW th LEU core compared with those obtained with the 85MW th HEU core. Additionally, the target peak fission rate densities, discharge cumulative fission densities, and heat deposition rates with the LEU core are within a few percent of those calculated with the HEU core. The findings suggest HFIR’s 252 Cf production capability can be effectively maintained with an LEU core without adversely affecting the safety metrics.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Evaluation of a uranium zirconium hydride fuel rod option for conversion of the MIT research reactor (MITR) from highly-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium

The conversion of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR) from the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel-plate assemblies to low-enriched uranium (LEU) by replacing the HEU fuel plates with specially designed General Atomics (GA) uranium zirconium hydride (UZrH) LEU fuel rods is evaluated in this paper. The margin to critical heat flux (CHF) in the core, which is cooled by light water at low pressure, is evaluated analytically for steady-state operation. A form of the Groeneveld CHF lookup table method is used and described in detail. A CHF ratio of 1.41 was found in the present analysis at 10 MW with engineering hot channel factors included. Therefore, the nominal reactor core power, and neutron flux performance, would need to be reduced by at least 25% in order to meet the regulatory requirement of a minimum CHF ratio of 2.0.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Optimization of In-Field Alpha Spectrometry for Uranium Enrichment Determination in Uranium Hexafluoride

In response to needs identified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) research is underway to develop In-Field Alpha Spectrometry (IFAS) as a method to allow IAEA safeguards inspectors to collect samples of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) at processing facilities to assess and verify uranium enrichment. For sample collection, the IFAS method uses Single-Use Destructive Assay (SUDA) samplers, which contain thin zeolite coatings that trap UF6 gas and convert it to the safer, more stable form uranyl fluoride (UO2F2). For alpha spectrometry, the IFAS instrument employs a large area silicon semiconductor transducer to detect and record alpha particle energy-deposition events. Over the past year optimization work has significantly increased the diameter of useful SUDA samples (from 12.7 mm to 48 mm), improved the manufacturability and reproducibility of SUDA samples, increased the area of the IFAS alpha spectrometer sensor from 1.2 cm to 3.1 cm, and improved source positioning within the IFAS. This paper will report on this optimization work, its impacts on IFAS performance, and future plans for IFAS miniaturization, improvements, and testing.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

Optimization Of In-field Alpha Spectrometry For Uranium Enrichment Determination In Uranium Hexafluoride

In response to needs identified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) research is underway to develop In-Field Alpha Spectrometry (IFAS) as a method to allow IAEA safeguards inspectors to collect samples of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) at processing facilities to assess and verify uranium enrichment. For sample collection, the IFAS method uses Single-Use Destructive Assay (SUDA) samplers, which contain thin zeolite coatings that trap UF6 gas and convert it to the safer, more stable form uranyl fluoride (as a dihydrate, UO2F2&middot;2H2O). For alpha spectrometry, the IFAS instrument employs a large area silicon semiconductor transducer to detect and record alpha particle energy-deposition events. Over the past year optimization work has significantly increased the diameter of useful SUDA samples (from 12.7 mm to 48 mm), improved the manufacturability and reproducibility of SUDA samples, increased the area of the IFAS alpha spectrometer sensor from 1.2 cm to 3.1 cm, and improved source positioning within the IFAS. This paper will report on this optimization work, its impacts on IFAS performance, and future plans for IFAS miniaturization, improvements, and testing.

Chichester, David↗

Emulating Variable Uranium Enrichments With Radiation Signature Training Devices (RSTD)

Radiological signature training devices (RSTDs) are sealed sources (or assemblies of sources) that emulate the radiation signature of larger masses of special nuclear material for passive detection while maintaining a minimal logistical footprint in security, radiological safety, criticality safety, and transportation requirements. Previous work focused on emulation of large quantities of highly enriched uranium for search and field identification with radioisotope identification detectors and mobile systems. New work has expanded into investigating use of the RSTDs with laboratory safeguards tools, such as MGAU and FRAM, and emulating uranium spectra of multiple enrichments over more energy regions (particularly the x-ray region).

Blessinger, Christopher S.↗