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At least 19 records

Airplane crashes: engine troubles : a possible explanation

The aim was to bring attention to what might be the cause of some aircraft accidents for which there was no satisfactory explanation. The author notes that in testing aircraft accidents at the Bureau of Standards, it happened frequently that the engine performance became erratic when the temperature of the air entering the carburetor was between 0 C and 20 C. Investigation revealed the trouble to have been caused by the formation and collection of snow somewhere between the entrance to the carburetor and the manifold, probably at the throttle. Proof scarcely less convincing was obtained during engine tests. The results of such engine tests are described. Granting that the loss of power and the sudden increases in power were caused by the condensation of moisture from the air and the subsequent formation of snow, two solutions proved effective. The removal of the moisture or an increase in temperature cured the problem.

ENGINE TROUBLE↗

The problem of liquid fuels (for aircraft engines)

The crisis which troubles the world market for liquid fuel in general and for carburants in particular is doubtless one of the most serious ever experienced by modern industry. It is a national crisis of economic and political independence for countries like Italy and France. The solutions suggested for meeting the lack of liquid fuel may be summed up under two general headings: the economical use of the petroleum now available; creation of petroleum substitutes from natural sources within the country. The process of cracking is described at length.

FUELS↗

Solving A Corrosion Problem

The corrosion problem, it turned out, stemmed from the process called electrolysis. When two different metals are in contact, an electrical potential is set up between them; when the metals are surrounded by an electrolyte, or a conducting medium, the resulting reaction causes corrosion, often very rapid corrosion. In this case the different metals were the copper grounding system and the ferry's aluminum hull; the dockside salt water in which the hull was resting served as the electrolyte. After identifying the source of the trouble, the Ames engineer provided a solution: a new wire-and-rod grounding system made of aluminum like the ferry's hull so there would no longer be dissimilar metals in contact. Ames research on the matter disclosed that the problem was not unique to the Golden Gate ferries. It is being experienced by many pleasure boat operators who are probably as puzzled about it as was the Golden Gate Transit Authority.

Source record↗

Processes in construction of failure management expert systems from device design information

This paper analyzes the tasks and problem solving methods used by an engineer in constructing a failure management expert system from design information about the device to te diagnosed. An expert test engineer developed a trouble-shooting expert system based on device design information and experience with similar devices, rather than on specific expert knowledge gained from operating the device or troubleshooting its failures. The construction of the expert system was intensively observed and analyzed. This paper characterizes the knowledge, tasks, methods, and design decisions involved in constructing this type of expert system, and makes recommendations concerning tools for aiding and automating construction of such systems.

Malin, Jane T.↗

MOORE: A prototype expert system for diagnosing spacecraft problems

MOORE is a rule-based, prototype expert system that assists in diagnosing operational Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) problems. It is intended to assist spacecraft engineers at the TDRS ground terminal in trouble shooting problems that are not readily solved with routine procedures, and without expert counsel. An additional goal of the prototype system is to develop in-house expert system and knowledge engineering skills. The prototype system diagnoses antenna pointing and earth pointing problems that may occur within the TDRS Attitude Control System (ACS). Plans include expansion to fault isolation of problems in the most critical subsystems of the TDRS spacecraft. Long term benefits are anticipated with use of an expert system during future TDRS programs with increased mission support time, reduced problem solving time, and retained expert knowledge and experience. Phase 2 of the project is intended to provide NASA the necessary expertise and capability to define requirements, evaluate proposals, and monitor the development progress of a highly competent expert system for NASA's Tracking Data Relay Satellite. Phase 2 also envisions addressing two unexplored applications for expert systems, spacecraft integration and tests (I and T) and support to launch activities. The concept, goals, domain, tools, knowledge acquisition, developmental approach, and design of the expert system. It will explain how NASA obtained the knowledge and capability to develop the system in-house without assistance from outside consultants. Future plans will also be presented.

Howlin, Katherine↗

Safe Handling Practices

In 1977 Compugraphic Corporation was experiencing an unacceptable failure rate on microelectronic chips. Company engineers suspected that static electricity was causing the trouble because some electronic components are highly susceptible to damage by electrostatic charge. From a NASA Tech Brief, they learned that Rockwell International had prepared a report on safe handling practices for electronic components. NASA provided a Technical Support Package detailing 50 safe handling procedures affecting workers, work areas, equipment and packaging materials. Where poor practices were discovered, re-education of employees and other corrective measures were undertaken.

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STS-114: Discovery Post MMT Press Conference

Bruce Buckingham of NASA Public Affairs hosted this press conference. Wayne Hill, Space Shuttle Deputy Program Manager; John Muratore, Shuttle Systems and Integration Manager; Mike Wetmore, Director for Shuttle Processing were present. Wayne started with a video from Shuttle Logistics Depot showing details of a point sensor box commonly named the black box. Work with the trouble shooting continues on a day to day basis, no definite launching date is set. John reports that they are in a mission support mode all over the country until the sensor problem is solved. Mike reports his team will complete scrub and securing tasks through the next day, restore the facility to its normal mode, and will start to a four day process of getting back to launch once trouble shooting is completed. Tanking test, thermal environment, problem identification, engine cut-off sensor problems, sensors, risk, design reviews, test and analysis, correlation of the problem with Columbia, are some of the topics covered with the News media.

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Content and Representation of Information Needed to Support Time-Constrained Problem Solving

NASA’s current mission-operations paradigm originated with Project Mercury and endured with minimum evolution through the Apollo Program, Space Shuttle Program, and ISS missions. At its foundation is a near-complete real-time dependence on a ground team to manage the combined state of the mission, vehicle, and crew. Utilizing many engineers and operators with broad and deep expertise; large, distributed datasets including extensive telemetry; and expansive analytical and computing power, this ground team has served as the safety net for crewed spaceflight missions over the past 60 years. This approach must change to address challenges associated with missions beyond low Earth orbit (BLEO), including infrequent resupply, reduced ability to evacuate, and delayed communications that prohibit real-time operational support. We anticipate that a necessary part of this change will be increased independence for the crew, as roles and responsibilities traditionally performed by ground teams move on board the vehicle. While many risks are associated with Earth-independent operations, one particular concern is ensuring that the crew will have adequate onboard support to perform urgent problem solving when communication with the ground is delayed or intermittent. A key resource that enables the ground team to respond to anomalies quickly and effectively is the extraordinary expertise and experience it possesses. It is comprised of 80+ experts on at any given time, with a combined 600+ years of system-specific experience across 22 unique console disciplines. A small crew will face the unprecedented challenge of independently responding to anomalies that have historically been handled by a team 20 times their size. Another important resource upon which the ground heavily relies to support procedure execution and anomaly response is data. The amount of telemetry data that each flight controller monitors is extensive. In addition, as the ground team works to further assess impacts, trouble shoot, identify workarounds, and oversee procedure execution, it accesses and synthesizes engineering and procedure information, as well as system build, test, and configuration documentation. It is not feasible nor useful to put all these data onboard as crews become more Earth independent. Each member of a small Mars mission small crew will have multiple roles beyond monitoring telemetry and data gathering, and multiple roles within anomaly resolution processes, thereby limiting their capacity for copious amounts of information. Moreover, while access is necessary, it alone is insufficient. Information will need to be compiled, refined, and represented appropriately to support the crew’s reduced attention and expertise. This work seeks to understand the content and representation of information needed to support time-constrained problem solving and decision making by the crew without real-time ground support. To build this understanding, we first surveyed the literature, focusing on how expert problem solvers construct and manipulate their mental models. Next, we interviewed expert problem solvers in spaceflight and analogous domains and surveyed industry solutions for data presentation. Finally, we analyzed current spaceflight operations by investigating flight controller anomaly resolution processes during ISS training simulations and real operational events. These methods led to creating a problem-solving framework that details common themes and features of attending to, assessing, analyzing, and acting on problems in complex, time-constrained domains. Using this framework and the results of our analysis, we identified conceptual data representations needed for crew-led problem-solving. Preliminary onboard user interface concepts to meet identified needs will be presented.

anomaly response↗

A second generation expert system for checking and diagnosing AXAF's electric power system

AXAF - Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Facility - is a third NASA's great space observatory. Each of these observatories is intended to cover different parts of the electromagnetic spectrum (x-ray for AXAF) and to provide high resolution images of celestial sources in our universe. While the spacecraft is in orbit, the electric power system (EPS) performance is monitored via sensors measuring voltages, currents, pressures, and temperatures. The sensor data are sent from the spacecraft to the ground station as telemetry and analyzed on arrival. Monitoring, diagnosis and maintenance of such EPS is an arduous task which requires expertise and constant attention of the ground personnel. To help the ground crew in this task, much of it should be automated and delegated to expert systems, which draw engineer's attention to possible malfunctions and allows him to review the telemetry to determine the source of the trouble, diagnose the suspected fault and to propose a corrective action. Those systems are built on assumptions such as: (1) domain knowledge is available and can be represented as a set of rules; (2) domain knowledge is circumscribed, static, and monotonic; and (3) expert decision making can be emulated by a logical inference mechanism.

Bykat, Alex↗

Stirling Engine Dynamic System Modeling

The Thermo-Mechanical systems branch at the Glenn Research Center focuses a large amount time on Stirling engines. These engines will be used on missions where solar power is inefficient, especially in deep space. I work with Tim Regan and Ed Lewandowski who are currently developing and validating a mathematical model for the Stirling engines. This model incorporates all aspects of the system including, mechanical, electrical and thermodynamic components. Modeling is done through Simplorer, a program capable of running simulations of the model. Once created and then proven to be accurate, a model is used for developing new ideas for engine design. My largest specific project involves varying key parameters in the model and quantifying the results. This can all be done relatively trouble-free with the help of Simplorer. Once the model is complete, Simplorer will do all the necessary calculations. The more complicated part of this project is determining which parameters to vary. Finding key parameters depends on the potential for a value to be independently altered in the design. For example, a change in one dimension may lead to a proportional change to the rest of the model, and no real progress is made. Also, the ability for a changed value to have a substantial impact on the outputs of the system is important. Results will be condensed into graphs and tables with the purpose of better communication and understanding of the data. With the changing of these parameters, a more optimal design can be created without having to purchase or build any models. Also, hours and hours of results can be simulated in minutes. In the long run, using mathematical models can save time and money. Along with this project, I have many other smaller assignments throughout the summer. My main goal is to assist in the processes of model development, validation and testing.

Nakis, Christopher G.↗

A New Spin

The trouble was that the shuttle was still under development when that schedule was set. As time went on, the Shuttle had problems with its high pressure turbines, thermal protection tiles, engines, and more. The early launch dates had to be scrapped. NASA Headquarters told us, "We re going to delay your launch two years to allow more time for the Shuttle development to take place. You can slow your development accordingly." Right off the bat, we looked into the celestial mechanics and how they would affect us. The difficulty in launching a spacecraft to Jupiter changes on a year-to- year basis, in a cyclical pattern that repeats about every ten or twelve years. In order to achieve the velocity needed to get from low earth orbit to Jupiter, an upper stage is required in the Shuttle. For the 1982 launch the upper stage was adequate, but it could not provide the velocity we would need in 1984. This meant we would have to separate the Galileo probe from the Galileo orbiter before launch and put each of them on separate Shuttles with separate upper stages. When we told the folks at Headquarters this, they told us, "Okay we'll give you two Shuttle launches."

Casani, John↗

SOFIA Program SE and I Lessons Learned

Once a "Troubled Project" threatened with cancellation, the Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA) Program has overcome many difficult challenges and recently achieved its first light images. To achieve success, SOFIA had to overcome significant deficiencies in fundamental Systems Engineering identified during a major Program restructuring. This presentation will summarize the lessons learn in Systems Engineering on the SOFIA Program. After the Program was reformulated, an initial assessment of Systems Engineering established the scope of the problem and helped to set a list of priorities that needed to be work. A revised Systems Engineering Management Plan (SEMP) was written to address the new Program structure and requirements established in the approved NPR7123.1A. An important result of the "Technical Planning" effort was the decision by the Program and Technical Leadership team to re-phasing the lifecycle into increments. The reformed SOFIA Program Office had to quickly develop and establish several new System Engineering core processes including; Requirements Management, Risk Management, Configuration Management and Data Management. Implementing these processes had to consider the physical and cultural diversity of the SOFIA Program team which includes two Projects spanning two NASA Centers, a major German partnership, and sub-contractors located across the United States and Europe. The SOFIA Program experience represents a creative approach to doing "System Engineering in the middle" while a Program is well established. Many challenges were identified and overcome. The SOFIA example demonstrates it is never too late to benefit from fixing deficiencies in the System Engineering processes.

Ray, Ronald J.↗

Making aerospace technology work for the automotive industry, introduction

NASA derived technology already in use in the automotive industry include: (1) developments in electronics design, computer systems, and quality control methods for line testing of cars and trucks; (2) a combustion analysis computer program for automotive engine research and development; (3) an infrared scanner and television display for analyzing tire design and performance, and for studying the effects of heat on the service life of V-belts, shock mounts, brakes, and rubber bearings; (4) exhaust gas analyzers for trouble shooting and emissions certification; (5) a device for reducing noise from trucks; and (6) a low cost test vehicle for measuring highway skid resistance. Services offered by NASA to facilitate access to its technology are described.

Olson, W. T.↗

Acoustical Detection Of Leakage In A Combustor

Abnormal combustion excites characteristic standing wave. Acoustical leak-detection system gives early warning of failure, enabling operating personnel to stop combustion process and repair spray bar before leak grows large enough to cause damage. Applicable to engines, gas turbines, furnaces, and other machines in which acoustic emissions at known frequencies signify onset of damage. Bearings in rotating machines monitored for emergence of characteristic frequencies shown in previous tests associated with incipient failure. Also possible to monitor for signs of trouble at multiple frequencies by feeding output of transducer simultaneously to multiple band-pass filters and associated circuitry, including separate trigger circuit set to appropriate level for each frequency.

Puster, Richard L.↗

Reducing the cognitive workload: Trouble managing power systems

The complexity of space-based systems makes monitoring them and diagnosing their faults taxing for human beings. Mission control operators are well-trained experts but they can not afford to have their attention diverted by extraneous information. During normal operating conditions monitoring the status of the components of a complex system alone is a big task. When a problem arises, immediate attention and quick resolution is mandatory. To aid humans in these endeavors we have developed an automated advisory system. Our advisory expert system, Trouble, incorporates the knowledge of the power system designers for Space Station Freedom. Trouble is designed to be a ground-based advisor for the mission controllers in the Control Center Complex at Johnson Space Center (JSC). It has been developed at NASA Lewis Research Center (LeRC) and tested in conjunction with prototype flight hardware contained in the Power Management and Distribution testbed and the Engineering Support Center, ESC, at LeRC. Our work will culminate with the adoption of these techniques by the mission controllers at JSC. This paper elucidates how we have captured power system failure knowledge, how we have built and tested our expert system, and what we believe are its potential uses.

Manner, David B.↗

Reducing the cognitive workload - Trouble managing power systems

The complexity of space-based systems makes monitoring them and diagnosing their faults taxing for human beings. When a problem arises, immediate attention and quick resolution is mandatory. To aid humans in these endeavors we have developed an automated advisory system. Our advisory expert system, Trouble, incorporates the knowledge of the power system designers for Space Station Freedom. Trouble is designed to be a ground-based advisor for the mission controllers in the Control Center Complex at Johnson Space Center (JSC). It has been developed at NASA Lewis Research Center (LeRC) and tested in conjunction with prototype flight hardware contained in the Power Management and Distribution testbed and the Engineering Support Center, ESC, at LeRC. Our work will culminate with the adoption of these techniques by the mission controllers at JSC. This paper elucidates how we have captured power system failure knowledge, how we have built and tested our expert system, and what we believe its potential uses are.

Manner, David B.↗

Collaboration: It Is Much More Than the Technology

A joint study conducted with the University of Central Florida and the National Aeronautics and Space Agency's (NASA) Kennedy Space Center (KSC) resulted in a new approach to the collaboration issues that had troubled the Agency. We believe in teams. We believe in the concept of collaboration. We never doubted Douglas Engelbart's thesis-- "Our very survival depends on our ability to work together, more effectively, to get collectively smarter. Computers -- when used properly -- can help us do that". It was not lack of trying. Predictably, NASA engineers had worked as if better and better technology would resolve the matter. It had not. The study itself provided an insight, an "aha! moment that pointed us toward the problems of collaboration we had to solve. People quickly saw that we had to remove barriers and make it easier to share data, coordinate efficiently, work together to add value and create corporate memory. This paper describes what happened.

Elfrey, Priscilla↗

Analysis of Droplet Size during the Ice Accumulation Phase Of Flight Testing

There are numerous hazards associated with air travel. One of the most serious dangers to the pilot and passengers safety is the result of flying into conditions which are conducive to the formation of ice on the surface of an aircraft. Being a pilot myself I am very aware of the dangers that Icing can pose and the effects it can have on an airplane. A couple of the missions of the Icing branch is to make flying safer with more research to increase our knowledge of how ice effects the aerodynamics of an airfoil, and to increase are knowledge of the weather for better forecasting. The Icing Branch uses three different tools to determine the aerodynamic affects that icing has on a wing. The Icing research tunnel is an efficient way to test various airfoils in a controlled setting. To make sure the data received from the wind tunnel is accurate the Icing branch conducts real flight tests with the DHC-6 Twin Otter. This makes sure that the methods used in the wind tunnel accurately model what happens on the actual aircraft. These two tools are also compared to the LEWICE code which is a program that models the ice shape that would be formed on an airfoil in the particular weather conditions that are input by the user. One benefit of LEWICE is that it is a lot cheaper to run than the wind tunnel or flight tests which make it a nice tool for engineers designing aircraft that don t have the money to spend on icing research. Using all three of these tools is a way to cross check the data received from one and check it against the other two. industries, but it is also looked at by weather analysts who are trying to improve forecasting methods. The best way to avoid the troubles of icing encounters is to not go into it in the first place. By looking over the flight data the analyst can determine which conditions will most likely lead to an icing encounter and then this information will aid forecasters when briefing the pilots on the weather conditions. am looking at the weather data from certain flights and analyzing the type of precipitation that the plane is flying through. During flight tests there is a probe on the bottom of the aircraft that gathers information on the size and shape of the particles that it is flying through. The data can then be viewed on a computer. After grouping the weather into certain groups we can then pick certain groups which we think should be analyzed farther. The goal is to remove all the ice particles because they do not contribute to the icing on an aircraft. We use a 2D analyzer which measures the droplet size and categorizes the drops into bins of certain sizes. We can then look at what the characteristics of the weather that we were flying through such as the temperature and dew point and compare this with the size of the drops that the 2D analyzer measured. We can then look at what type and shape of ice that formed on the wing during this time period. Having this data will help us to reproduce these conditions using LEWICE and the wind tunnel. Having consistency among the tests will make things more accurate. With respect to weather forecasting we will be able to learn which conditions can lead to icing. Better accuracy in weather reporting will lead to fewer run-ins with icing which will also lead to fewer accidents.

Miller, Eric James↗