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Towards Integrated Strategic Deterrence - 3rd Annual Cross-Domain Deterrence Seminar, 2016

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted the 3rd Annual Cross-Domain Deterrence (CDD) Seminar on November 15-17, 2016 in Livermore, CA. The seminar was sponsored by LLNL’s National Security Office (NSO) and Center for Global Security Research (CGSR). The primary purpose of the seminar was to utilize the crossdomain framework to work toward an approach for comprehensive and integrated strategic deterrence. The seminar focused on a tabletop exercise (TTX) to explore the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation in cyber space, outer space, and the nuclear domain. The TTX explored a scenario involving a NATO Article V defense of a Baltic ally. To help inform game “play,” the exercise was preceded by expert panel discussions about the CDD strategies of Russia and NATO. The exercise was followed by two panels on lessons learned and next steps, to help derive lessons from the TTX.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Ultrasonic Bat Deterrent Technology

The project objective was to advance the development and testing of a near commercial bat-deterrent system with a goal to increase the current GE deterrent system effectiveness to over 50% with broad species applicability. Additionally, the research supported by this program has provided insights into bat behavior and ultrasonic deterrent design that had not previously been explored. Prior research and development had demonstrated the effectiveness of a commercial-grade, air-powered, ultrasonic bat deterrent to be between 30-50% depending upon the species of bat. However, the previous research provided limited insight into the behavioral responses of bats in the presence of ultrasonic deterrent sound fields that could be utilized to improve effectiveness. A unique bat flight room was utilized to observe the behavioral characteristics of bats in the presence of ultrasonic sound fields. Behavioral testing in the bat flight facility demonstrated that ultrasonic sounds similar to those produced by the GE deterrent influenced the activities and behaviors, primarily those associated with foraging, of the species exposed. The study also indicated that continuous and pulsing ultrasonic signals had a similar effect on the bats, and confirmed that as ultrasonic sounds attenuate, their influence on the bats’ activities and behavior decreases. Ground testing at Wolf Ridge Wind, LLC and Shawnee National Forest assessed both continuous and pulsing deterrent signals emitted from the GE deterrent system and further enhanced the behavioral understanding of bats in the presence of the deterrent. With these data and observations, the existing 4-nozzle continuous, or steady, emission ultrasonic system was redesigned to a 6-nozzle system that could emit a pulsing signal covering a larger air space around a turbine. Twelve GE 1.6-100 turbines were outfitted with the deterrent system and a formal three-month field study was performed using daily carcass searches beneath the 12 turbines. Additionally, a unique 3D bat flight path visualization system was utilized to monitor for and identify any changes in bat activity caused by the operation of the deterrent system. Both the carcass search and flight path visualization data indicated that the pulsed deterrent system was effective, but not more effective, than the steady system tested in prior years. However, an unanticipated byproduct of the pulsing system was the emission of intermittent water vapor from the deterrent devices due to the air compression process that powered the devices. This water vapor may have altered the ultrasonic signal and obscured the results in an unknown way. While a qualitative analysis of the effect of the water vapor on the deterrent signal had indicated there was not dramatic change in the expected ultrasonic signal, it was not possible to conclusively determine if the pulse signal would have been more effective in the absence of the water vapor. A mid-season installation of a desiccant system was performed and the dataset divided into two groups to account for the change. Prior to the system change, the deterrent was not effective (-23%, P = 0.8617, α = 0.05) at reducing eastern red bat fatalities and effective (38%, P = 0.0169, α = 0.05) for the non-eastern red bat species, combined. After the installation of the desiccant system, the pulsed deterrent system showed similar results, although not statistically significant, with a point estimates of 23% (P = 0.2924, α = 0.05) observed for eastern red bats and 54% (P = 0.0926, α = 0.05) for the other combined bat species.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Evaluating the Effectiveness of an Ultrasonic Acoustic Deterrent in Reducing Bat Fatalities at Wind Energy Facilities

This project was designed to use thermal video cameras and fatality monitoring to evaluate the effectiveness of an ultrasonic acoustic deterrent (UAD) on bat activity and mortality, respectively. Our goals were to redesign the UAD device and installation infrastructure, determine the placement on wind turbines to optimize safety, compatibility and functionality, and to compare the mortality among the following conditions: Control (deterrents off and turbines feathered up to the manufacturer’s cut-in speed of 3.5 m/s), Deterrent (deterrents on and turbines feathered up to the manufacturer’s cut-in speed of 3.5 m/s), Curtailment (deterrents off and turbines feathered up to 5/ m/s), and combination (deterrents on and turbines feathered up to 5 m/s). The project was divided into a Feasibility Study and Comparative Study. The objectives for the Feasibility Study were to develop an installation strategy, redesign a previous iteration of a UAD to improve performance and weatherization, and test the effectiveness of the deterrents on bat activity. The Feasibility Study was intended to work out potential issues using a relatively small number of devices prior to manufacturing and installing numerous devices for a larger-scale comparative study. The division of the project into these separate studies was based on previous experience and the challenges of assessing the capabilities of an untested UAD. During the initial development and manufacturing of the UAD, NRG Systems decided to use a piezoelectric transducer rather than an electrostatic transducer, which was used by a previous device (i.e. Deaton UAD). NRG Systems conducted lab testing (i.e., IP67 or Ingress Protection) to ensure no water or dust ingress. In addition, shock/drop trials and variations in temperature exposure were conducted as part of the reliability testing. NRG Systems also developed a communications system to allow for continuous performance monitoring of the UADs. For the Feasibility Study, we installed 6 UADs on each of 2 Gamesa G90 2-MW wind turbines (Turbine 14 and 8) at the South Chestnut Wind Energy Facility, Pennsylvania and monitored activity under control and treatment (i.e. Deterrent) conditions using thermal video monitoring. There are two major sources of variation in bat activity (beyond the anticipated treatment effect): 1) environment around the turbines might inherently favor more activity at one than the other; 2) weather conditions on any given night or within season difference (e.g., migration later during the study period) might favor more activity on some nights than on other nights. Because we could only monitor two turbines on any night, we sought to control the potential influences of these two sources by alternating the turbine on which deterrents were activated each night. If there were no loss of data due to technical failures, this design would result in an equal number of deterrent and control nights at each turbine through the monitoring period, balancing the effects of both sources of variation. We compared the time bats spent and the number of events that occurred in overlapping cameras FOV as an indicator of risk, since 80% of the overlapping FOV of the cameras was in the RSA. Equipment failures, majority due to lightning, resulted in only 17 nights with useable data, with unbalanced treatment assignment within turbines and uneven distribution of treatment assignment throughout the observational period. This resulted in a confounding of treatment assignment and seasonal change. Deterrent treatment was measured at Turbine 14 on only 2 of the first 8 usable nights (spanning the period from 8/18-9/17), whereas 6 times on Turbine 8. From 9/18-927, deterrent was on at Turbine 14 on 6 of the remaining 10 nights, and 4 on Turbine 8. We recorded a total of 1,057 bats and observed a reduction in number of events and duration of events at the UAD-activated turbine when it was Turbine 14. When Turbine 8 had the UAD activated, we observed no difference in number or duration of events. Variation between turbines is not unusual and can cause issues when study designs have no true replication, i.e., multiple turbines per treatment. Within-turbine differences suggested a trend for reduced activity when UADs were activated, particularly for Turbine 14. These results may be caused by the overall higher bat activity at Turbine 8 and confounding of treatment assignment and seasonal trends. We mapped 58 bat events in 3-dimensional space (3D), 30 and 28 events during control and treatment conditions, respectively. We observed bats crossing the rotor plane under both control and treatment conditions and observed a total of 40 confirmed or near-collisions (i.e., target close to blade but no visual confirmation of a strike) out of a total of 1,491 medium and high confidence bat observations (880 control, 611 at treatment). Twice as many collisions/possible collisions were observed during control conditions. Given the challenges with the equipment and potential confounding of the data (i.e., different activity levels at the two wind turbines), we were unable to determine whether this initial turbine placement and orientation was optimal. Given no new information on how best to install the devices, we elected to use the same placement and orientation for the comparative study. For the Comparative Study, the objectives were to investigate the relative mortality rates among 4 treatments. We searched the area within 90 m of each turbine daily to recover the highest number of fresh fatalities possible. We were unable to detect a clear reduction in mortality from deterrents alone for any individual species. Surprisingly, mortality rate of the eastern red bat (Lasiurus borealis) was estimated to be 1.3–4.2 times as much when turbines were operating normally and UADs were on than when UADs were off. Reduction in mortality of all bat species combined due to curtailment of turbines was estimated to be between 0%–38%. This effect was nullified when, in addition to curtailment, UADs were on, with 95% confidence interval ranging from a 45% reduction to a 36% increase in mortality. This was likely due to the large proportion of eastern red bats in the total carcass population. Mortality of all low-frequency echolocating bats combined (i.e. hoary bat [L. cinereus], big brown bat [Eptesicus fuscus], silver-haired bat [Lasionycteris noctivagans]) relative to control was lower when curtailed (95% CI: 0%–74%), but the addition of UADs had no detectable effect (95%CI: 13%–79%). The combined treatment reduced mortality in silver-haired bats relative to control by 11%–99%, compared to curtailment (81% reduction–67% increase) or deterrent (82% reduction–67% increase) alone. Because silver-haired bats comprised a large proportion of low-frequency calling bats found during this study, a similar effect was seen for that group. The higher mortality observed for eastern red bats at UAD compared to control could have been caused by several factors, such as the effective range of the UAD, particularly at higher frequencies, behavior, positioning of the devices on the nacelle, or a combination of these. We used 3D thermal videography to compare control and UAD bat behavior from two turbines using a total of 203 3D bat-tracks across 34 nights. We recorded a similar number of bat-tracks between treatment groups, with 51% and 49% for control and UAD, respectively. Due to potential differences in bat behavior around spinning vs stationary turbine blades, we examined UAD effectiveness separately for non-operating turbines (feathered below cut-in speed of 3.5 m/s) and operating (normal operation above wind speed of 3.5 m/s). We found a higher proportion of bat-tracks at operating turbines (82%) compared to non-operating turbines (18%), although this does not account for overall time turbines were operating versus not. At non-operating turbines the UAD appears to be effective at reducing the amount of time, flight length, and number of passes through the rotor plane, compared to control. In addition, we found bats approached turbines similarly between control and treatment turbines, with 61% of control and 63% of UAD bat-tracks originating leeward of the hub. In contrast, at operating turbines, we saw little change in bat behavior in response to UADs. For example, we found an increase in the average duration of bat-tracks between non-operating and operating turbines for UAD but at control turbines we found average duration decreased once turbines became operational. Both control and UAD had a high proportion of bat-tracks that crossed the rotor plane (i.e., collision risk) originate from the windward side when turbines were operational 65% to 92%, respectively. Given that the UAD devices closest to the blades were orientated parallel to the blades, its possible bats were not exposed to the signal until they were close to the turbine blades, as suggested by the slightly higher mean duration within 5 meters of the blades for UAD turbines. Future research should consider concentrating UAD intensity on the areas of risk (i.e. blades) with enough buffer to allow bats to react to the sound before entering the rotor-swept area (RSA). In addition, investigating the potential of installing UAD units windward of the turbine blades (e.g. a hub-mounted UAD), particularly since even under control conditions, a relatively high proportion (65%) of crosses through the blade plane originated windward. 3D thermal videography provided valuable information on future testing strategies (e.g. device placement, UAD orientation) to improve UAD effectiveness when bats are at risk (i.e., operating wind turbines). Across the entire project we experienced issues with the operation and communication with the UADs. Most of the issues occurred during the Feasibility Study and were resolved prior to the Comparability Study. Additional challenges surfaced during the Comparability Study but were remedied immediately and are thought to have little impact on the results. We had logistical constraints at the project that limited our ability use traditional methods in our camera calibration. Several calibrations showed inaccurate scales, which may have been related to inadequate spatial coverage of “points” in the camera calibration volume. Because we were using actual video recordings of bats at a wind turbine, the behavior of bats could have concentrated “points” in specific areas of the turbine (i.e. leeward of nacelle), and limited “points” in other areas, resulting in camera calibration issues. We have plans to address these inconsistencies and improving the software and related methodologies by early 2020.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

A Method for Assessing Effectiveness and Technical Capabilities Required for Integrated Deterrence (NSLP-Final Report-Draft2022)

The United States faces an ever-increasingly multi-polar security environment dominated by great power competition with China and a lingering Russian threat as well as from would-be regional hegemons led by ambitions from Iran and North Korea. Our adversaries are pursuing and expanding the strategic means by-which they have an asymmetric offset (e.g., cyber, space, and other modes below the level of armed conflict). To combat and deter against the widening range of hostile actions, the U.S. must have additional capabilities with-which to deter. All of which drives us towards a more thoughtful integrated approach to deterrence, attempting to best align deterrent tools with the adversary actions in order to maximize the credibility of our deterrent. Such an approach complicates our deterrence strategy and demands a methodology to assess whether the U.S. has the deterrent tools necessary to deter the adversarial actions most costly to the U.S. To address this complexity, we create a framework to comprehensively and systematically assess our deterrent tools as qualitatively measured against the adversarial actions we wish to deter. Deterrence is ultimately an operation in the cognitive domain and at the heart of the framework presented here is the fundamental deterrence calculus which we use as the defining measure of whether a tool will credibly deter a given action. We describe the eight levers of the deterrence calculus and distill these levers to four products that are used to qualitatively assess the overall effectiveness of deterrence tools against adversarial actions. Credibility is determined by two principal variables: the technical credibility of the deterrent tool, and the principle of proportionality. Technical credibility of realized deterrence products is assessed through development of key mission requirements and hardware (e.g., components) that will impose costs, deny benefits, or encourage restraint. The principle of proportionality qualitatively asserts that for a deterrent tool to be cognitively credible, the costs imposed against, or benefits denied by, an action are commensurate to the magnitude of costs received from the adversarial action. By basing this framework on these two fundamentals, it is possible to compare deterrent tools in a systematic approach across the broad spectrum of hostile actions.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Ultrasonic deterrents provide no additional benefit over curtailment in reducing bat fatalities at an Ohio wind energy facility

Wind energy is important for achieving net-zero greenhouse gas emissions but also contributes to global bat mortality. Current strategies to minimize bat mortality due to collision with wind-turbine blades fall broadly into two categories: curtailment (limiting turbine operation during high-risk periods) and deterrence (discouraging bat activity near turbines). Recently, there has been interest in combining these strategies to achieve greater reductions in bat fatalities than either strategy might achieve in isolation. To investigate the effectiveness of combining curtailment with ultrasonic deterrent minimization strategies, we deployed six ultrasonic deterrents at nacelle height on 16 experimental turbines at Avangrid Renewables’ Blue Creek Wind Energy Facility. We rotated between four conditions (normal operations, curtailment only, deterrent only, curtailment and deterrent) randomly assigned to four wind turbines each night between 15 June and 3 October 2017. We found that bat mortality at wind turbines was independent of wind speed. The effectiveness of ultrasonic acoustic deterrents varied between high-frequency-calling species (eastern red bats) and low-frequency-calling species (hoary bats, silver-haired bats, and big brown bats). When deterrents were active, mortality was twice as high for eastern red bats compared to the control. Conversely, deterrents had a weak dampening effect on bat mortality for low-frequency species. We found no additive effects on mortality reduction for turbines operating both curtailment and deterrents compared to either approach in isolation. Our findings suggest that ultrasonic acoustic deterrents may not be effective for both high and low frequency echolocating bats. The increase in fatalities of eastern red bats is alarming and underscores the importance of considering site- and species-specific effects of minimization solutions.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Analytic framework for the United States cyber deterrence strategy. Final draft, 2nd submission (20 May 2015]

If the United States (U.S.) government allows cyberattacks to continue on their current trajectory of increased frequency and effect, the bonds holding our society together will be jeopardized, potentially impacting the survival of our society as we know it. Actions must be taken not only to defend against, but also to deter future cyberattacks. To achieve a credible and actionable U.S. Cyber Deterrence Strategy, the following three lines of effort are recommended for implementation by the White House: 1. Add a sixth priority to the Obama Administration's current cyberspace priorities to state: "Advance our cyber response policies and capabilities to further protect the country's national interests by deterring attacks within cyberspace." 2. Adopt the proposed Cyber Deterrence Analytic Framework as a guide for policy makers to use when determining the appropriate response to a cyberattack. 3. Implement the proposed Presidential Policy Directive outlining the United States' deterrence policy for cyber. These recommendations for establishing a U.S. Cyber Deterrence Strategy address the following key findings: As the U.S. private sector owns and operates over 90% of all of the networks and infrastructure of cyberspace, an effective policy must be communicated clearly across the government, business enterprise, and most importantly, to the people; More so than any time in our nation's history, individuals, companies, and organizations depend on cyberspace for uses ranging from social interactions to sustaining democracy; Threats existing within the cyber domain have grown both in attack vector complexity and societal impact; and, The current Presidential Executive Orders and Policy Directives related to cyber deterrence do not include a strategy for deterring attacks. The concepts presented in this paper were derived from interviews with experts in subjects ranging from deterrence philosophy, nuclear weapons implementation, U.S. cyber operations, and U.S. cyber policy. In addition, theories on deterrence strategies are explored, ranging from the 1960s to present to develop a deterrence strategy unique to cyber. Lastly, recent examples of cyberattacks are examined to provide evidence for the need to establish consequences for those individuals or countries that continue to behave nefariously within cyberspace. To form a strong foundation for a U.S. Cyber Deterrence Strategy, the U.S. must establish and clearly articulate the consequences for nations or individuals if they choose to initiate a cyberattack on the U.S. or its national interests.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Ultrasonic Jet Bat Deterrent System Advancement

General Electric Renewable Energy (GE) and the Department of Energy (DOE) worked to develop a project with an objective to increase confidence in acoustic ultrasonic bat deterrent technologies in wind turbines, by mitigating stakeholder investment risks that currently hinder the adoption of deterrent technologies. Many wind turbine sites utilize a bat conservation plan that curtail wind turbines and stop energy production. Curtailment is a known bat impact mitigation solution that has an history of environmental regulatory acceptance. To help support a solution that allows for simultaneous bat conservation and energy production with regulatory acceptance of acoustic bat deterrents, GE proposed a study to compare four treatments: control (no curtailment or deterrent), deterrent only, deterrent plus curtailment, and curtailment only. The concept was to provide a direct comparison of bat deterrent and curtailment effectiveness within the same wind farm and bat migration season. This comparison was intended to advocate for the adoption of bat deterrents with a large-scale field study by addressing customer concerns on regulatory acceptance of deterrents. The study was to be hosted at a forested habitat site during a bat migration season, by Stony Creek Energy, LLC (SCE), the owner of the Orangeville Wind Farm (OWF) in the state of New York. Included was a behavioral study plan with two turbines to monitor bat flight paths with thermal imaging cameras.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Aerodynamic-whistles-based ultrasonic tone generators for bat deterrence

Novel ultrasonic bat deterrents based on aerodynamic whistles are proposed and investigated experimentally and numerically for their ability to generate ultrasound. The baseline deterrent, a single-whistle design inspired by Beeken [“Fluid ultrasonic generator,” U.S. patent 3,432,804 (1969)], is examined first. It consists of two resonating cavities/chambers. The whistle is “powered” by a regulated high-pressure air supply, and the performance of the whistle is examined for a range of supply pressures. Far-field acoustic measurements in the 20 Hz–50 kHz frequency range are made in an anechoic chamber. The noise measurements are supplemented with two- and three-dimensional unsteady Reynolds-averaged Navier–Stokes (uRANS) simulations to investigate the mechanisms of ultrasound generation. The Ffowcs Williams–Hawkings acoustic analogy is used with the three-dimensional uRANS results to predict the far-field radiation. The far-field acoustic predictions are in good agreement with the measurements in the anechoic chamber. The peak frequency (fundamental) of the radiated ultrasound of the baseline deterrent is approximately 23 kHz. Harmonics and a sub-harmonic of the fundamental tone are also observed. The numerical simulations show that the two resonating chambers of the baseline deterrent operate out-of-phase and Helmholtz resonance determines the whistling frequency over the range of supply air pressure considered. A six-whistle deterrent targeting a broad spectral coverage in the 20–50 kHz frequency range is designed, fabricated, and tested in the anechoic chamber. Each whistle in the deterrent is obtained by geometrically scaling the baseline whistle. Measurements show that the six-whistle ultrasound deterrent generates ultrasound with six dominant peaks in the designed frequency range when the supply air pressure exceeds 5 psig. The proposed ultrasound devices can be used for a variety of purposes including bat deterrence at wind turbines.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Why does cyber deterrence fail and when might it succeed? A framework for cyber scenario analysis

Through cyberattacks on information technology and digital communications systems, antagonists have increasingly been able to alter the strategic balance in their favor without provoking serious consequences. Conflict within and through the cyber domain is inherently different from conflict in other domains that house our critical systems. These differences result in new challenges for defending and creating resilient systems, and for deterring those who would wish to disrupt or destroy them. The purpose of this paper is to further examine the question of whether or not deterrence can be an effective strategy in cyber conflict, given our broad and varied interests in cyberspace. We define deterrence broadly as the creation of conditions that dissuade antagonists from taking unwanted actions because they believe that they will incur unacceptably high costs and/or receive insufficient benefits from taking that action. Deterrence may or may not be the most credible or effective strategy for achieving our desired end states in cybersecurity. Regardless of the answer here, however, it is important to consider why deterrence strategies might succeed under certain conditions, and to understand why deterrence is not effective within the myriad contexts that it appears fail. Deterrence remains a key component of U.S. cyber strategy, but there is little detail on how to operationalize or implement this policy, how to bring a whole-of-government and whole-of- private-sector approach to cyber deterrence, which types of antagonists can or should be deterred, and in which contexts. Moreover, discussion about how nations can and should respond to significant cyber incidents largely centers around whether or not the incident constitutes a "use of force," which would justify certain types of responses according to international law. However, we believe the "use of force" threshold is inadequate to describe the myriad interests and objectives of actors in cyberspace, both attackers and defenders. In this paper, we propose an approach to further examine if deterrence is an effective strategy and under which conditions. Our approach includes systematic analysis of cyber incident scenarios using a framework to evaluate the effectiveness of various activities in influencing antagonist behavior. While we only examine a single scenario for this paper, we propose that additional work is needed to more fully understand how various alternative thresholds constrain or unleash options for actors to influence one another's behavior in the cyber domain.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Nuclear Weapon Deterrence Principles

Presentation Overview: Nuclear Weapon Deterrence Principles; Deterrence Basics; Key Elements of Nuclear Deterrence; Nuclear Deterrence Theories; Nuclear Deterrence Cold War; Nuclear Deterrence Today; New Deterrence Challenges

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A Heterogeneous System for Eagle Detection, Deterrent, and Wildlife Collision Detection for Wind Turbines (Final Technical Report)

This report summarizes the design, implementation, and test of an integrated system for automated detection and deterrence of eagles, with included wind turbine blade strike detection and imaging functionality. A machine learning approach was used in conjunction with a 360° camera system for automated detection and classification of golden eagles. This was developed using footage obtained from trained golden eagles and other raptors, in collaboration with wildlife biologists and professional bird handlers. Oregon State University developed a visual deterrent system, which uses inflatable anthropomorphic sculptures with random, kinetic motion to deter eagles, and conducted limited field testing on live eagles; the deterrent can be triggered by the visual detection of eagles using the vision system. Finally, a multi-sensor module was developed that is mounted at the turbine blade root. This module measures vibration and other motions to detect blade strikes, and an integrated on-blade camera captures an image of any impacting objects. Long-term, this blade strike detection system is intended to support an automatic monitoring and certification system for the eagle detection and deterent system. Independent field testing of each system component is described. Testing of the integrated system on an operational wind turbine was conducted across three separate field tests. This includes multi-day fields tests on a General Electric 1.5MW wind turbine at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) National Wind Technology Center (NWTC) in Boulder, CO in October 2018 and July 2019; installation procedures, test procedures, and a summary of collected data are presented. A third multi-day on-turbine field test is also presented, which was performed using a General Electric 1.5MW wind turbine at the North American Wind Research and Training Center (NAWRTC) at Mesalands Community College, Tucumcari, NM in April 2019. Across these field tests, the vision system was demonstrated using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and the eagle classification algorithm was not tested; the visual deterrent system was demonstrated, including automatic, remote deployment following surrogate visual detections; and, multi-sensor on-blade data was recorded across multiple wind turbine operational conditions and through more than 100 surrogate blade strikes using soft projectiles, including the successful demonstration of automatic image capture of striking objects. This data set was also used for offline development and validation of enhanced collision detection algorithms. As summarized in this report, the development and field validation of an integrated detection, deterrent, and blade collision detection system represents a critical proof of concept for future technology development of related detection and deterrent technologies, where both deterrent as well as collision detection recording devices are needed for future siting, monitoring, and operation of wind turbine installations, both onshore and offshore.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Passive Ultrasonic Deterrents to Reduce Bat Mortality in Wind Farms (Final Report)

The overall objective of this project was to develop active and passive ultrasonic deterrent concepts to mitigate bat mortality at wind turbines. The research was supported by the US Department of Energy under the contract DE-EE0008731. Novel ultrasonic bat deterrents are investigated in this study. The deterrents are based on the idea of aerodynamic whistles wherein flow-acoustic resonance is used to produce high-amplitude tonal sound at desired ultrasonic frequencies. The deterrents can be grouped into active and passive. The active deterrents/whistles are driven by pressurized air supplied by an external source (e.g., an air compressor). The passive deterrents/whistles are designed to be mounted on wind turbine blades and are “powered” by the energy in the air moving past the rotor blades. Multiple active and passive deterrent ideas are proposed and investigated numerically and experimentally. The computational analysis involves solving the compressible unsteady Reynolds-averaged Navier-Stokes (URANS) equations and coupling the near-field aerodynamic solution with an integral method based on the Ffowcs Williams-Hawkings acoustic analogy to predict ultrasound in the farfield. Experiments are performed in the anechoic chamber at ISU (for the active whistles) and in the Stability wind tunnel at Virginia Tech (for the passive whistles).

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Evaluation of an acoustic deterrent to reduce bat mortalities at an Illinois wind farm

ABSTRACT From 2014 to 2016, GE Renewable Energy and California Ridge Wind Energy tested an ultrasonic bat deterrent system during the autumn bat migration period at an operating wind farm in Illinois, USA. The deterrent system consisted of air‐jet ultrasonic emitters mounted on nacelles and towers in a different configuration each year. Each year we conducted a randomized block experiment to determine whether the acoustic deterrent reduced bat mortalities at the wind farm. Effectiveness was based on estimates of bat mortalities during 3‐day trials. The operation of the acoustic deterrent resulted in significant overall bat fatality reductions of 29.2% ( = 7.5%) and 32.5% ( = 6.8%) in 2014 and 2015, respectively. All‐bat fatality rates were not reduced in 2016; however, annual all‐bat effectiveness estimates were influenced by species composition. We analyzed deterrent effectiveness for eastern red ( Lasiurus borealis ), hoary ( Lasiurus cinereus ), and silver‐haired ( Lasionycteris noctivagans ) bats, the 3 species most commonly found during the carcass searches. Hoary bats were consistently deterred each year, but annual deterrent effectiveness varied for eastern red and silver‐haired bats. © 2019 The Authors. Wildlife Society Bulletin published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of The Wildlife Society.

Romano, W. Brad↗

Evaluating the Effectiveness of a Detection and Deterrent System in Reducing Golden Eagle Fatalities at Operational Wind Facilities

The Renewable Energy Wildlife Institute (REWI) was appointed as the prime awardee of DOE award number DE-EE0007883 to lead a team of scientists, wind developers, and technology manufacturers toward the overarching goal of evaluating the effectiveness of the current DTBird system in minimizing the risk of golden eagles (Aquila chrysaetos) and other large soaring raptors from approaching the rotor-swept zone (RSZ) of operating wind turbines. As part of this goal, the team set out to 1) quantify the expected reduction in collision risk for golden eagles from operation of the detection and deterrence modules in a manner that supports the approach used by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) to assess and credit facility operators for their efforts to minimize predicted collision fatalities and 2) provide information to help improve the technology to maximize its effectiveness. DTBird is an automated detection and audio deterrent system created by the Spanish company Liquen, designed to discourage birds from entering the RSZ of spinning wind turbines. The system uses cameras to automatically detect airborne targets of interest, records each such event in an online database, and triggers a warning signal (loud sound) if the tracked object has moved close to the turbine. If the object moves even closer to the RSZ, a more aggressive dissuasion signal is broadcast. To meet our objectives, the team conducted a two-year experiment at the Goodnoe Hills wind facility in Washington state, in which 14 turbines were outfitted with DTBird units. Daily, each DTBird-equipped turbine was randomly assigned to a control or treatment group. Treatment turbines operated with DTBird running as intended—broadcasting warning or deterrent signals when DTBird detected a target within range. On control turbines, no sound signals were broadcast if a moving target triggered the DTBird system. The team also flew unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) designed to coarsely mimic the general size, weight, and coloration of golden eagles in programmed flight transects across DTBird detection ranges to quantify DTBird’s ability to detect intended targets and to evaluate factors that influence the probability of detection and DTBird’s response distances. Additionally, the team evaluated the behavioral responses of in situ eagles exposed to spinning turbines alone (visual and sound influences) versus spinning turbines plus broadcasted DTBird audio deterrents, to estimate the effectiveness of deterrence by the DTBird system. The data and results from these investigations were combined with those from a pilot study conducted at the Manzana Wind Power Project in California to better evaluate DTBird’s effectiveness across different landscapes.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Thinking Globally about U.S. Extended Deterrence

In contrast to the Cold War bilateral global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, the modern nuclear age features a more complex, multiplayer arena on the regional scale. With the exception of the U.S. and Russia, most major powers retain relatively small nuclear arsenals or technical hedge capabilities. The U.S., with strong interests and security partnerships in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East, must navigate through long-standing rivalries and active conflicts while attempting to divine the intentions of less experienced nuclear decision makers in charge of weak domestic institutions. As a result, analysts and policymakers must think globally about U.S. extended deterrence. How have the requirements of extended deterrence and assurance changed? Are there important threads that connect each region? What should the U.S. do differently? To explore these questions, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s Center for Global Security Research, in partnership with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Pacific Forum CSIS, held a workshop on “Thinking Globally about U.S. Extended Deterrence” in Washington, DC on November 2, 2015. The workshop brought together approximately 40 U.S. and foreign deterrence specialists and government officials, all attending in their private capacities. The participants joined a day of not-for-attribution discussions on the changing deterrence and assurance requirements, the threads that connect the regions, and U.S. strategy to deal with emerging challenges. The following is a summary of key takeaways.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Remixing the ‘Appropriate Mix’: Reassessing NATO’s Deterrence and Defense Posture in the Face of New Threats

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the countries of Europe face a renewed challenge from the east vis-à-vis the Putin regime in Moscow. In the face of these new challenges, NATO must reconsider its deterrence and defense posture in order to deter conflict in Europe. Unfortunately, Russian attempts to rewrite the rules of the post-Cold War international order by force have been coupled with nuclear saber rattling and overt nuclear threats. Russia’s nuclear threats, in addition to provocative changes to Russia’s nuclear posture in its Military Doctrine, are methods to make up for Russia’s conventional military inferiority relative to NATO and the United States. Some have described Moscow’s actions as laying the groundwork for a nuclear coercion strategy. While the decrease in the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States has reduced the likelihood of nuclear annihilation to an all-time low since the height of the Cold War, Russia’s nuclear coercion strategy is increasing the probability of nuclear employment in Europe. The probability of nuclear use is compounded by Russia’s tremendous local military advantage around its periphery in spite of U.S. global military primacy. This military advantage increases the incentive to use military force if Russian decision-makers conclude that a quick military victory is possible, or if Russian leaders miscalculate based on an incorrect assessment of military force balance or resolve of their adversary. The integration of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (referred to as the Baltics in this paper) into the NATO alliance in 2004 makes Russia’s military advantage in its periphery increasingly relevant. Each NATO state is required to assist any NATO state that comes under attack per Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Baltic states’ proximity to Russia, their weak indigenous militaries, their former status as Soviet Republics, large population of ethnic Russians, and Russian President Vladimir V. Putin’s claim that he will protect Russians wherever they are makes the Baltics the most likely flashpoint for conflict between NATO and Russia. This analysis will tackle the problem of reshaping NATO’s deterrence and defense posture in light of the new Russian threat and its obligation to defend its most vulnerable members. Specifically, it will assess the suitability of NATO’s “appropriate mix” of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities to deterring conventional conflict with Russia and, if conventional deterrence fails, preventing Russian nuclear escalation. It will use a scenario-based approach informed by a deterrence model to explore how changes to NATO’s posture and policy could impact the deterrence of Russian aggression.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Cyber Deterrence and Stability

Throughout the 20th and early 21st centuries, deterrence and arms control have been cornerstones of strategic stability between the superpowers. However, the weaponization of the cyber realm by State actors and the multipolar nature of cyber conflict now undermines that stability. Strategic stability is the state in which nations believe that if they act aggressively to undermine U.S. national interests and the post-World War II liberal democratic order, the consequences will outweigh the benefits. The sense of lawlessness and lack of consequences in the cyber realm embolden States to be more aggressive in taking actions that undermine stability. Accordingly, this paper examines 1) the role of deterrence and arms control in securing cyber stability, and 2) the limitations and challenges associated with these traditional national security paradigms as applied to this emerging threat domain. This paper demonstrates that many 20th-century deterrence and arms control concepts are not particularly applicable in the cyber realm. However, they are not entirely irrelevant. The United States can distill lessons learned from this rich deterrence and arms control experience to develop and deploy a strategy to advance cyber stability.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗