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DOE OSTI2023

Bounding Pressure and Flammability Evaluations for a Department of Energy Standard Canister Loaded with Aluminum-Clad Spent Fuel

This report presents bounding pressurization and flammability evaluations from the radiolytic gas generation expected during extended (>50 years) dry storage of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) elements in a sealed Department of Energy (DOE) Standard Canister. The primary questions involving extended ASNF dry storage center around the adequacy of dry storage conditioning processes (i.e., drying) and the behavior of residual hydrated aluminum oxides on the cladding—specifically, the radiolytic breakdown of chemically bound water in these corrosion products. The objectives of the presented work include providing a bounding assessment of the pressure with respect to the DOE Standard Canister’s structural integrity limits and identifying the potential for forming flammable or explosive gas mixtures (i.e., exceedance of the lower flammability limit of the molecular hydrogen [H2] and oxygen [O2] concentrations). The evaluation results confirm the findings of previous, more complex M&S work. That is, the structural integrity of the canister remains unchallenged by a wide margin. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the presented pressure calculations consider a full breakdown of the chemisorbed water, including a consequent release of all available H2. In reality, the breakdown of water in these systems will likely remain incomplete, due to competing chemical and radiolytic reactions, thereby attaining an equilibrium in the storage environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Oxygen Limit for Flammability of a Gas Mixture of Helium – Hydrogen – Oxygen in the U.S. Department of Energy Standard Canister

The radiolytic breakdown of residual free, physisorbed, and chemisorbed waters is anticipated in the sealed dry storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), releasing H 2 gas into the initial cover gas of helium. For aluminum-clad SNF (ASNF) in particular, the expected total hydrogen in the canister is enough to dominate the cover gas mixture if fully released, and based on experimental rates of H 2 generation, H 2 percentages exceeding the lower flammability limit appear likely. However, no evidence of radiolytic generation of O 2 has been observed to date, so the potential for flammability is averted due to the lack O 2 . Lack of oxygen has been credited for avoiding flammability in some existing storage and transportation approaches for SNF and other waste. This report reviews literature on flammability limits with a focus on the limiting oxygen concentration to provide technical underpinnings to refine a flammability criterion for gas mixtures of helium, hydrogen, and oxygen where the oxygen is expected to be the limiting species. While there is general consensus on H 2 flammability limits at standard temperature and pressure, the decay heat and gas generation within ASNF sealed dry storage canisters could push them to elevated temperatures and pressures, so the goal is to identify an oxygen threshold that will bound the behavior over the temperature and pressure range of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Standard Canister. The information reviewed in this document supports the criterion that the oxygen concentration in a He-H 2 -O 2 mixture should be less than 1.5% to avoid flammability at temperatures and pressures relevant to sealed dry storage of ASNF in the DOE Standard Canister, i.e., up to 343°C (650°F) and 500 psig, respectively. Note that while data covering the full range of temperature at atmospheric pressure and nearly the full range of pressure at room temperature were available, data for the combined effects was available only at moderate temperatures and pressures; the recommended 1.5% O 2 threshold is based on the breadth of available data reported here and apparent trends therein.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Drop Analysis of a Department of Energy Standard Canister Containing Fort Saint Vrain SNF– 24138

DOE manages over 300 types of SNF, many of which are located at the INL site. Managing this large variety of SNF for storage, transportation, and disposal poses a challenge to DOE. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the DOE SNF Road-Ready Demonstration (“Road-Ready Demonstration”), which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF for “road-ready dry storage.” Road-ready dry storage (RRDS) is an SNF management concept in which SNF is packaged into dry, sealed canisters that are then placed in on-site storage in anticipation of later transport and disposition. The forward-looking goal of the Road-Ready Demonstration is to establish the foundation for a large-scale RRDS program at the INL site. One critical aspect of RRDS is the ability to certify the DOE Standard Canister and its associated transportation package in accordance with 10 CFR 71 for offsite transportation. Depending on the SNF type and transportation strategy, DOE Standard Canisters may be required to maintain structural integrity under hypothetical accident scenarios (e.g., drop events). The DOE Standard Canisters have been tested and analyzed under various SNF loading configurations and accident drop events in support of the Idaho Spent Fuel Facility and other DOE programs; however, no analysis has yet been completed in support of the recently initiated Road-Ready Demonstration. This paper presents preliminary results from a finite element analysis of the Ø45.7 cm × 4.6 m (Ø18 in. × 15 ft) DOE Standard Canister under the 9 m drop at 80 degrees off-vertical drop scenario considered in previous INL tests and analyses. It considers the Fort St. Vrain spent nuclear fuel loading configuration proposed for the Road-Ready Demonstration, uses updated material properties, and applies the strain-based acceptance criteria established in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code’s Section III, Division 3 rules for storage and transportation spent nuclear fuel containments. This updated analysis is compared to previous DOE Standard Canister drop analyses. Preliminary results from the updated analysis show that certain regions of the containment exceed the allowable limits during the accidental drop event. However, these regions are limited to components performing a non-structural function. While further work on this analysis will be pursued, this analysis serves as the foundation for formal calculations used to support applicable certification efforts of the RRDS system at INL.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Drop Analysis of Department of Energy Standard Canister with Fort Saint Vrain SNF

DOE manages over 300 types of SNF, most of which are located at the INL site. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the Road-Ready Capability Demonstration Project, which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF at the INL site for ?road-ready dry storage?. ?Road-ready dry storage? is a SNF management concept where SNF is packaged into dry and sealed canisters, which are then placed in on-site storage in anticipation of later transportation. The forward-looking goal of the Demonstration is establishing the foundation for a large-scale road-ready dry storage program at the INL site. The Demonstration will first package Fort Saint Vrain SNF currently stored at INL into several DOE Standard Canisters. These Standard Canisters will then be loaded into another commercial transportation or storage containment system (e.g., storage cask or transportation package). The Standard Canister is a class of standardized canisters designed for containing the large variety of DOE-managed SNF during interim storage, transportation and/or disposal at a geological repository. One critical aspect of road-ready dry storage is the ability to license the DOE Standard Canisters and its associated transportation package to 10 CFR 71. Depending on the SNF and transportation strategy, the Standard Canisters may have to maintain structural integrity under normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accident scenarios (i.e., drop events). The Standard Canisters have been tested and analyzed under various SNF loading configurations and accident drop events in support of the Idaho Spent Fuel Facility and other DOE programs. However, no analysis has been completed to support the recent Demonstration. This analysis will consider the Ø0.5 m × 5.1 m Standard Canister under drop scenario(s) considered in previous INL tests and analyses, including the 9 m drop at 80 degree off vertical. However, this analysis will consider the more recent Fort Saint Vrain loading configurations proposed for the Demonstration. This analysis will performed using strain-based acceptance criteria established by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 3. It will be compared to previous analyses and form the foundation of further formal calculations that will be used to support licensing efforts of the road-ready dry storage system at INL.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Drop Analysis of a Department of Energy Standard Canister Containing Fort Saint Vrain SNF

DOE manages over 300 types of SNF, many of which are located at the INL site. Managing this large variety of SNF for storage, transportation, and disposal poses a challenge to DOE. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the DOE SNF Road-Ready Demonstration (“Road-Ready Demonstration”), which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF for “road-ready dry storage.” Road-ready dry storage (RRDS) is an SNF management concept in which SNF is packaged into dry, sealed canisters that are then placed in on-site storage in anticipation of later transport and disposition. The forward-looking goal of the Road-Ready Demonstration is to establish the foundation for a large-scale RRDS program at the INL site. One critical aspect of RRDS is the ability to certify the DOE Standard Canister and its associated transportation package in accordance with 10 CFR 71 for offsite transportation. Depending on the SNF type and transportation strategy, DOE Standard Canisters may be required to maintain structural integrity under hypothetical accident scenarios (e.g., drop events). The DOE Standard Canisters have been tested and analyzed under various SNF loading configurations and accident drop events in support of the Idaho Spent Fuel Facility and other DOE programs; however, no analysis has yet been completed in support of the recently initiated Road-Ready Demonstration. This paper presents preliminary results from a finite element analysis of the Ø45.7 cm × 4.6 m (Ø18 in. × 15 ft) DOE Standard Canister under the 9 m drop at 80 degrees off-vertical drop scenario considered in previous INL tests and analyses. It considers the Fort St. Vrain spent nuclear fuel loading configuration proposed for the Road-Ready Demonstration, uses updated material properties, and applies the strain-based acceptance criteria established in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code’s Section III, Division 3 rules for storage and transportation spent nuclear fuel containments. This updated analysis is compared to previous DOE Standard Canister drop analyses. Preliminary results from the updated analysis show that certain regions of the containment exceed the allowable limits during the accidental drop event. However, these regions are limited to components performing a non-structural function. While further work on this analysis will be pursued, this analysis serves as the foundation for formal calculations used to support applicable certification efforts of the RRDS system at INL.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Bounding Pressure and Flammability Evaluations of Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel Department of Energy Standard Canisters

This paper presents bounding pressure and flammability evaluations for DOE Standard Canister loaded with DOE-managed aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF). The objective of these evaluations is to gain confidence in the safety and feasibility of possible loading configurations for extended (>50 years) periods of dry storage, with particular focus on the dry storage canister pressures and potential for formation of a flammable atmosphere. The primary concern about the extended dry storage of ASNF is radiolytic gas generation. The aluminum cladding of these materials tends to corrode, and these corrosion products—typically aluminum oxides, such as boehmite, bayerite, or gibbsite—could carry water. This makes ASNF dry storage canisters difficult to dry. The gamma radiation field in dry storage environments could cause a radiolytic breakdown of residual water, forming chemical species such as molecular hydrogen (H2). The release of these species could increase the canister pressure and lead to the generation of a flammable canister atmosphere. The bounding evaluations presented within this study surmise conservative, but credible, conditions and processes. This includes the assumption of a full breakdown of a large quantity of free, physisorbed, and chemisorbed water (bound in a trihydrate, i.e., Al2O3 • 3H2O, layer). The considered dry storage configurations include a ~3 m (10 ft) long, ~46 cm (18 in) diameter (10 x 18) DOE Standard Canister loaded with 32 Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) ASNF elements, and a ~3 m (10 ft) long, ~61 cm (24 in) (10 x 24) diameter DOE Standard Canister loaded with 40 ATR ASNF elements. While the results of this study indicate the possibility of atmospheric hydrogen concentrations above the lower flammability limit, insufficient concentrations of oxygen will prevent the formation of flammable atmospheres. The maximum credible pressures remain well within the structural limits of the DOE Standard Canister.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2025

An approach for spent nuclear fuel containment integrity verification using gas tagging

Verification of containment integrity is required for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) managed by the commercial nuclear industry and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), especially after extended storage. Certain SNF storage systems, such as the DOE road-ready dry storage system, hold several packaged containments within a welded over-canister. These packaged containments are called Department of Energy Standard Canisters (DOESCs). DOESC leakage identification is challenging because their containment boundary cannot be accessed for testing and their contents (i.e., SNF and fill gas) are often similar. There are concerns that this could result in costly characterization and repackaging operations of DOE road-ready dry storage systems if compromised DOESCs are suspected. Here, to address these concerns, this paper presents an approach for applying a gas tagging process using xenon to uniquely identify compromised inaccessible containments following extended storage. The containments considered for this application are seven DOESCs, each packaged within a single over-canister. Two different SNF loading configurations from the Advanced Test Reactor and Fort Saint Vrain nuclear power plant are considered. These configurations are used to represent research reactor aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) and TRi-structural ISOtropic (TRISO) SNF types. Results for this application show that for ASNF and TRISO type fuels for which the selected fuels are representative, the volume of taggant required at loading is determined primarily by the lower detection limit and leak rate of taggant from a compromised DOESC, rather than the amount of fission-generated xenon in the loaded fuel. While the application presented is suited for larger leaks, smaller leaks could be detected by modifying certain design parameters. This gas tagging approach can also be applied to other DOE containments and advanced reactor SNF storage systems.

07 - ISOTOPES AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Milestone 1.2.16. Reconciling the Impacts of Thermal Pretreatment on Radiation-Induced H2 Generation from Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel Surrogate Materials

To support the technical basis for the extended dry storage of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF), thermal pretreatment procedures to minimize the radiation-induced generation of molecular hydrogen (H2) have been investigated. The aim of thermal pretreatment is to eliminate the residual adsorbed water content on the ASNF’s corrosion layers, precursors for H2 generation. To date, irradiation studies in this area have found conflicting results for the effectiveness of thermal pretreatment procedures. The aim of this study was to reconcile those differences. However, the presented results, which utilized a modified in situ thermal pretreatment procedure, afforded H2 yield data that further indicates that thermal pretreatment does not significantly reduce the radiation-induced yield of H2 from gamma irradiated ASNF surrogate materials. Assessment of the differences between thermal pretreatment studies suggests that stainless-steel—present in the irradiation setup of studies that demonstrated a reduction in the yield of H2 with thermal pretreatment—may afford not only unanticipated interfacial chemistry, but also the formation and radiolytic contribution of iron oxides to the chemistry underpinning the formation of H2 in these systems. Given the Department of Energy Standard Canister—proposed for the extended dry storage of ASNF—is predominantly composed of stainless-steel, the potential contribution of stainless-steel and its corrosion layers to radiolytic H2 production should be further investigated. This research was funded by the U.S. Department of Environmental Management, Office of Technology Development, under contract DE-AC07-05ID14517.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2021

Engineering Scale Drying of Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel: Experiment Report

Engineering-scale tests were performed to evaluate the relative effectiveness of forced gas and vacuum-drying processes on aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) in preparation for extended dry storage. Drying models were developed to improve confidence in the likely range of conditions at the start of dry storage and to understand the factors most significant to each process. Testing was performed at the Holtec International Forced Helium Dehydration training facility in Camden, New Jersey, by students from the University of South Carolina in collaboration with Idaho National Laboratory. A full-size Type 1a basket, with a full-diameter vessel configuration (based on the Department of Energy standardized canister design), was used in combination with a 10 assembly surrogate ASNF arrangement to provide a proxy for geometry. A resistance heater incorporated in one assembly simulated the influence of 100 W decay heat. This instrumented chamber allowed testing of the removal of bulk water, physisorbed water, and chemisorbed water over a range of operating parameters with either drying process. Thick oxide films were grown on aluminum test plates to mimic the ASNF surface chemistry. These one-use test plates were housed within select assemblies during drying. Post-test analysis of these plates gave a measure of the moisture removed during each test, which was compared to a control. Instrumentation provided detailed thermal, humidity, and gas or pressure data relevant to each test. Model simulations generally compared favorably to instrument data for the tests. While both processes were able to remove bulk water, removal of chemisorbed water was shown to depend heavily on local temperature. To the disadvantage of vacuum drying, operations approaching or exceeding 220°C achieved consistently more dehydroxylation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Thermal Modelling of Advanced Test Reactor Fuel in a Generalized Dry Storage System

Star-CCM+, a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) software was used to conduct modeling and simulation of the thermal performance of a dry storage configuration consisting of Department of Energy Standardized Canisters (DOESCs) loaded with aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF.) The configuration includes nine DOESCs loaded with Advanced Test Reactor ASNF contained within a stainless steel overcanister centered in a ventilated, concrete overpack. The simulations were used to estimate the maximum temperatures reached by backfill gases inside the overcanister and DOESCs.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2025

The Empty DOESC Handling Tool Verification and Redesign

The handling tool for the Department of Energy Standard Canister (DOESC) is made of six simultaneously movable jaws to apply pressure to the inside surface of the DOESC to allow for their transport when empty (Figure 1). The verification of the handling tool requires analyzing the point of contact of the tool and the canister to see how the roundness effects the handling tool.

12 - MGMT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTE↗
DOE OSTI2023

Thermal Modeling of Advanced Test Reactor Fuel in a Generalized Dry Storage System Under Hypothetical Accident Conditions

Work was performed to investigate the thermal behavior of a sealed aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) dry storage configuration under hypothetical accident conditions during long-term storage. The considered system consists of a concrete dry storage overpack; a welded over canister, backfilled with argon; and nine Department of Energy (DOE) standardized canisters (DOESCs) loaded with ASNF, backfilled with helium gas. One technical concern associated with the long-term storage of ASNF includes radiolytic hydrogen generation. The yield of large quantities of hydrogen could lead to DOESC over pressurization or a flammable internal atmosphere. While flammability concerns can be resolved by preventing the ingress of oxygen, the canister pressure is partially controlled by the atmosphere temperature. This memorandum summarizes the results of modeling and simulation (M&S) work completed with Star CCM+ (a computational fluid dynamics [CFD] software) considering the thermal effects of a fully engulfing flame and another scenario with the vent ports of the concrete dry storage overpack completely blocked. The goal was to determine the bounding maximum temperature of the DOESC internal atmosphere to evaluate a worst-case pressure scenario, as well as the critical vent port blockage durations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

A Review of Remote Welding and Nondestructive Examination Technologies for the DOE Standard Canister

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) manages a wide variety of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that poses a unique management challenge. To help address this challenge, the DOE Standard Canister (DOESC), designed to remain sealed during handling, storage, transportation, and disposal, was conceptualized as a standardized containment vessel to accommodate DOE-managed SNF. Since 1999, several welding and examination processes have been independently developed for the DOESC’s closure welds. However, neither the DOESC nor these processes have been realized in an operational capacity. This review paper seeks to present and compare previously developed DOESC closure weld, nondestructive examination, and repair processes and technologies. Specific processes developed for the Idaho Spent Fuel Facility, in preparation for the Yucca Mountain geological repository, and the recent Road-Ready Demonstration Project are discussed. Further, specific focus is given to how different operating constraints and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC) have driven certain welding and nondestructive examination requirements. Historical DOESC welding and examination strategies are assessed against current regulatory and BPVC requirements. The comparison of welding processes, technologies, and DOESC designs presented in this review paper will inform further construction efforts for other commercial and DOE-managed SNF containments, including the DOESC.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Criticality Analysis of FSV Spent Nuclear Fuel in the DOE Standard Canister

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing over 300 types of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). To manage this large variety of fuel types, DOE plans to employ standardized canisters for the transportation, long-term storage, and eventual disposal of SNF. Idaho National Laboratory is currently supporting DOE’s SNF Packaging Demonstration Project, in which Fort Saint Vrain (FSV) fuel assemblies will be loaded into a DOE Standard Canister. This paper presents criticality calculations demonstrating that all four or five FSV fuel assemblies loaded into the DOE Standard Canister will remain subcritical in any expected normal or credible abnormal conditions. Previous criticality analyses were performed for one FSV fuel assembly and 12 Peach Bottom Core 2 fuel elements loaded into a DOE Standard Canister. This paper covers the criticality analysis performed for loading both four and five FSV fuel assemblies into a DOE Standard Canister. Various intact and degraded mode configurations were modeled in conducting the criticality calculations. This analysis encompassed three different configurations: (1) a single DOE Standard Canister loaded into a concrete storage overpack, (2) seven DOE Standard Canisters loaded into a concrete storage overpack, and (3) nine DOE Standard Canisters loaded into a concrete storage overpack. The overpack dimensions were varied for each of the three configurations, and transport, storage, and disposal scenarios were analyzed for each configuration. For transport scenarios, a pair of degradation cases was analyzed. In the first case, the fuel compacts became degraded and were removed from the fuel block, then deposited at the bottom of a horizontally placed canister, thereby simulating a drop event. The canister was considered to remain intact. In the second case, the spacing between horizontally placed canisters in a nine-canister overpack was reduced such that the canisters were piled on top of each other, simulating a drop event. For this case, no degradation of the canister internals or fuel was considered. For storage scenarios, the water moderator location in the system was varied to enable identification of the most reactive configurations. Dry and wet conditions were analyzed for the fuel materials, canister, and overpack. For disposal scenarios, two degradation cases were analyzed. In the first, the stainless-steel internals of the canister degraded to either hematite or goethite under both dry and wet conditions. In the second case, degraded FSV fuel formed a uranium-water slurry that filled the coolant/void holes. None of the cases presented exceeded the application specific upper subcritical limit.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Modeling of ATR Fuel in DOE Standard Canisters with Helium Backfill

One pathway for road-ready and final disposition packaging configurations for the aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ANSF) fuel is storage within helium backfilled sealed Department of Energy (DOE) standard canisters. The typical packaging configuration for the 15-foot DOE standard canisters places 10 advance test reactor (ATR) elements a basket, and three baskets are loaded within each DOE canister. During in-reactor operations and cooling pond storage conditions, oxyhydroxide layers form on the surface of the aluminum clad fuel. These layers produce hydrogen gas over time due to the fuel’s radiation field. As part of the packing procedure, the ATR fuel should be dried to remove any residual physio-/chemi- sorbed water bound to the surface. A 50-year CFD model of the DOE canister packaged with fuel was developed to provide a temperature profile for coupled chemical modeling of the conditions within the canister. The results of this modeling include results at fully saturated and fully dried fuel cladding conditions. In the associated experimental work, radiolysis experiments tests were completed in a helium environment, and G-values for the radiolytic production of hydrogen from the oxyhydroxide layers were provided. That reaction was coupled with the thermal profiles and gas-phase reactions to develop a 50-year model of the conditions within a sealed DOE canister with ATR fuel. For a nominal scenario of stored ATR fuel, after 50 years the model results give a 1.36 atm total pressure, 7% mole percent hydrogen, for the upper decay heat, 1.51 atm total pressure, 16% mole percent hydrogen, and for upper decay heat with undried fuel 2.6 atm total pressure, 15% mole percent hydrogen. No case modeled yields significant oxygen, and for the lower decay heat case that is modeled, hydrogen concentrations are under the 4% flammability limit after 50 years of storage. The modeled pressures for all cases modeled are below the pressure limit for the DOE standard sealed canister.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Code of Record: DOE Standard Canister (DOESC)

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Packaging Demonstration seeks to develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE SNF for road-ready dry storage (RRDS); and establish the processes that will be used in a future production facility. The Packaging Demonstration will utilize the DOE Standard Canister (DOESC) for packaging select DOE-managed SNF types for interim storage, transportation and disposal as part of RRDS. Placing DOE-managed SNF into RRDS is part of the strategic framework for SNF on the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) site. To comply with DOE, INL and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements, this Code of Record establishes the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC), Section III, Division 3 as the Code that will govern DOESC and internal support structure constructioni, with certain clarifications. This Code of Record establishes a rationale for proceeding without construction certification of the DOESC (i.e., “N-stamping) and the extent to which a Registered Professional Engineer is required for the DOE Spent Fuel Packaging Demonstration. Given the (i) standard industry practice to pursue independent licensure of commercial storage casks and transportation packages by the NRC in lieu of ASME certification and (ii) guidance provided by 10 CFR 830, DOESC construction activities need not be certified (i.e., “stamped”) to the ASME BPVC. However, additional quality assurance requirements will apply as outlined in this Code of Record.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Estimation of General Area Dose Rates During Closure Weld Operations on the DOE Standard Canister Pacific Basin Nuclear Conference 2024

The Department of Energy (DOE) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Road Ready Demonstration Project is an effort to package DOE-managed SNF for road-ready dry storage. A key operation in this demonstration is performing the closure weld on the DOE Standard Canister after it has been loaded with the SNF. Planning the closure weld operations is ongoing and must consider what parts of the operations (if any) can be done manually and what parts must be done remotely. A key parameter to inform the evolving planning of these operations is the dose rate in the vicinity of the canister and the dose hazard posed to the closure weld operators and collocated workers. This study developed a Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) model of the closure weld operation, which was used to estimate general area dose rates as well as dose rates to the welding location, weld operators, and collocated workers. These estimates provide some insight into the potential radiation exposure hazard for workers during the operations and are a factor to be considered in the ongoing development of designs, technology, processes, and administrative controls for packaging DOE-managed SNF for road-ready dry storage.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Considerations for Managing DOE Standard Canisters within an Over-canister as Part of an Integrated Waste Management System

To better enable informed decision making regarding the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, the Integrated Waste Management Program within the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) has been sponsoring the research into a comprehensive integrated waste management system (IWMS) that considers all major back-end aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., transportation, storage, and disposal). An important aspect of the IWMS is DOE-managed SNF. DOE and its predecessor agencies have generated, transported, received, stored, and reprocessed SNF at DOE facilities nationwide, and DOE is responsible for managing the SNF currently in its possession. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types that employ various cladding materials, fuel materials, and enrichments. To enable interim, road-ready dry storage (RRDS) of the wide variety of SNF types found in the DOE inventory, a standardized canister system (i.e., the DOE Standard Canister) was proposed. This robust, welded canister system is designed to confine radionuclides, prevent criticality by precluding content moderation, and satisfy other requirements as part of a larger storage, transportation, and disposal system. While SNF has yet to be loaded into a DOE Standard Canister, DOE Standard Canister designs were included in past storage facility and disposal facility design licensing endeavors. In a renewed effort to evaluate packaging SNF at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in a RRDS configuration, researchers are planning the RRDS Packaging Demonstration. This demonstration is supplemented by analytical structural, criticality, and material compatibility evaluations that support management of SNF in DOE Standard Canisters, taking advantage of past analysis work to the extent possible. One of the largest differences between the current Packaging Demonstration and past analytical evaluations is the inclusion of an over-canister containing multiple DOE Standard Canisters. For the Packaging Demonstration, DOE Standard Canisters loaded with SNF are planned to be placed in a larger diameter over-canister. The sealed over-canister could then be placed in a storage overpack for onsite storage, or in a transportation overpack for shipment to an offsite storage location or disposal site once one becomes available. This paper examines the relevant considerations and provides a preliminary evaluation of integrating the over-canister configuration into the storage, transportation, and disposal processes of the overall waste management system. For storage and transportation, the over-canister can be considered analogous to a multi-purpose canister (MPC) for commercial SNF. For disposal, the DOE Standard Canisters could be removed from the over-canister and placed in a co-disposal waste package with canisters containing vitrified HLW similar to configurations examined previously, or the sealed over-canisters might be capable of direct disposal in a waste package.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗