A Framework to Demonstrate a DNP3 Interface with a CIM-Based Data Integration Platform
This poster was presented at the 2024 IEEE Power & Energy Society General Meeting, July 21-25, 2024, Seattle, Washington.
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This poster was presented at the 2024 IEEE Power & Energy Society General Meeting, July 21-25, 2024, Seattle, Washington.
The contemporary electrical grid is characterized by its complexity and abundance of data. A control-rich environment supported by information and communication technologies within an Advanced Distribution Management System (ADMS) presents a viable and cost-effective option for utility companies aiming to implement advanced real-time analytical schemes for monitoring and remotely controlling distribution feeders. Modular platform-based approaches to distribution operations require a structured framework for acquiring field device measurements, performing analytics, converting the setpoint to the correct protocol, and sending it on the appropriate communications network to the field devices. We present the development and deployment of an application service to integrate an open-source standardsbased platform with an ADMS test bed with field devices using the Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3) for data exchange. The step-by-step procedure for establishing the DNP3-Master service on an open-source distribution platform is outlined, comprehensively explaining the Master setup process. Moreover, sample use case results highlight the capabilities of the DNP3- Master service setup. Results demonstrate the scalability and configurability of the DNP3-Master service, making it adaptable for integration with other relevant applications, thus providing potential opportunities for real-world field trials and real-time assessments.
In this paper, we propose a Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) simulation testbed suitable for the implementation and testing of realistic cyberattacks on grid-tied smart inverter systems integrated with Distributed Energy Resources (DER) that use the Distributed Network Protocol-3 (DNP3) protocol for communications between grid components. Specifically, our testbed combines a Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) NovaCor device, outfitted with GNETx2 network interface cards, a gridtied DER topology implemented via the RTDS software package RSCAD, and a custom virtual network that emulates a man in the middle attacker. The Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacker captures DNP3 traffic and falsifies telemetry data in DNP3 packets to trigger unwarranted commands from a DNP3 controller that exploit smart inverter grid support functions. We choose DNP3 and implement grid support functions according to the IEEE Std. 1547-2018 mandated for the interconnection and interoperability of DER power systems with associated power components. Furthermore, we develop a protocol payload agnostic attack detection framework that leverages the round-trip time (RTT) anomalies between DNP3 requests and responses and can detect the presence of attacks without having to analyze the payload’s contents, while balancing trade-offs between false alarm counts, missed detections, and time to detection. To facilitate further research, we publicly release benign and attack network traffic exchanged between various sensors, controllers, and actuators in our grid-tied inverter testbed.
Grid integration of photovoltaic (PV) inverters has been increasing in the past decade. As a result of the uncertainties introduced with high penetrations of PV, better monitoring and control of the PV inverters becomes crucial for improving overall system stability. This paper focuses on the communications capability of the inverter controller and on enabling interoperability. Multiple standards are available to enable interoperability in PV inverters. In this paper, an interoperable controller, enabled by Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3) communications protocols, is developed for a grid-connected, three-phase PV inverter. The DNP3 server for the PV inverter is programmed on the real-time layer of the field-programmable gate array (FPGA)-based inverter controller. Set points for advanced inverter control functions, such as volt/VAr curves, ride-through curves, are sent from a DNP3 client, a simulated distribution management system application, to the PV inverter through DNP3. This communications capability of the inverter controller is validated using a controller-hardware-in-the-loop experimental setup. The code developed to achieve the interoperability is available in the public domain through open-source software licensing. This interoperability will enable smoother grid integration of smart PV inverters with advanced grid-support functions as well as allow better monitoring and control of PV inverters for grid stability.
The increasing deployment of distributed energy resources (DER) over the last decade is a great ally to combat climate change and strengthen the grid during increasingly common extreme weather events. However, DER systems, combined with the ongoing transition to a digital power grid, also pose substantial cybersecurity threats. One of the most common communication protocols used in DER integration is the Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3), which is known to have many security vulnerabilities. Thus, it is essential to investigate cyberattack behaviors and mitigation on power systems using DNP3. In this paper, we designed and implemented a cybersecurity testbed for a simulated photovoltaic (PV) maximum power point tracking (MPPT) charge controller. Our testbed uses an MPPT charge controller simulated on a Typhoon HIL602+ real-time simulator with a real DNP3 communication connection over TCP/IP, allowing for safe and efficient monitoring and manipulation of data traffic between the simulated hardware and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems.
With the increasing penetration of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) at the grid-edge, power systems include more energy storage, remote switches, relays, voltage regulators, and other intelligent electronic devices (IED). Effective control of these grid-edge devices by using Advanced Distribution Management Systems (ADMS) can yield substantial improvements to the resiliency and power quality of distribution systems. In this paper, improvements to the resiliency of a distribution system are demonstrated using a multi-site evaluation environment consisting of a real-time Hardware-in-Loop (HIL) setup in which DERs and other IEDs are modeled; and an ADMS which monitors and is able to control the distribution system assets. The HIL model and the ADMS are located 2400 km away, with communication between the sites enabled by a data manager using Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3), demonstrating the system's capabilities even over long distances. After a simulated transmission system failure in the HIL demonstration setup, DERs and other devices are operated to restore critical loads and node voltage profile (to within the 'nominal +/-5%' band) in the distribution system.
Cyber-physical system (CPS) security for the smart grid enables secure communication for the SCADA and wide-area measurement system data. Power utilities world-wide use various SCADA protocols, namely DNP3, Modbus, and IEC 61850, for the data exchanges across substation field devices, remote terminal units (RTUs), and control center applications. Adversaries may exploit compromised SCADA protocols for the reconnaissance, data exfiltration, vulnerability assessment, and injection of stealthy cyberattacks to affect power system operation. In this paper, we propose an efficient algorithm to generate robust rule sets. We integrate the rule sets into an intrusion detection system (IDS), which continuously monitors the DNP3 data traffic at a substation network and detects intrusions and anomalies in real-time. To enable CPS-aware wide-area situational awareness, we integrated the methodology into an open-source distributed-IDS (D-IDS) framework. The D-IDS facilitates central monitoring of the detected anomalies from the geographically distributed substations and to the control center. The proposed algorithm provides an optimal solution to detect network intrusions and abnormal behavior. Different types of IDS rules based on packet payload, packet flow, and time threshold are generated. Further, IDS testing and evaluation is performed with a set of rules in different sequences. The detection time is measured for different IDS rules, and the results are plotted. All the experiments are conducted at Power Cyber Lab, Iowa State University, for multiple power grid models. After successful testing and evaluation, knowledge and implementation are transferred to field deployment.
Fifth-generation networks promise wide availability of wireless communication with inherent security features. The 5G standards also outline access for different applications requiring low latency, machine-to-machine communication, or mobile broadband. These networks can be advantageous to numerous applications that require widespread and diverse communications. One such application is found in smart grids. Smart grid networks, and Operational Technology (OT) networks in general, utilize a variety of communication protocols for low-latency control, data monitoring, and reporting at every level. Transitioning these network communications from wired Wide Area Networks (WANs) to wireless communication through 5G can provide additional benefits to their security and network configurability. However, introducing these wireless capabilities may also result in a degradation of network latency. In this paper, we propose utilizing 5G for smart grid communications, and we evaluate the latency impacts of encapsulating GOOSE, Modbus, and DNP3 for transmission over a 5G network. The OpenAirInterface open-source library is utilized to deploy an in-lab 5G Core Network and gNB for testing with off-the-shelf User Equipment (UE). This creates an effective 5G test platform for experimenting with different OT protocols such as GOOSE. The results are validated by measuring two different Intelligent Electronic Devices’ contact closure times for each network configuration. These tests are also conducted for varying packet sizes in order to isolate different sources of network latency. Our study outlines the latency impact of communication over 5G for time-critical and non-critical applications regarding their transition toward private 5G-based OT network implementations. The conducted experiments illustrate that in the case of GOOSE packets, simple encapsulation may exceed the protocol’s time-critical nature, and, therefore, additional measures must be taken to ensure a viable transition of GOOSE to 5G services. However, non-critical applications are shown to be viable for migration to 5G.
The convergence of Operational Technology (OT) and Information Technology (IT) networks has become increasingly prevalent with the growth of Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) applications. This shift, while enabling enhanced automation, remote monitoring, and data sharing, also introduces new challenges related to communication latency and cybersecurity. Oftentimes, legacy OT protocols were adapted to the TCP/IP stack without an extensive review of the ramifications to their robustness, performance, or safety objectives. To further accommodate the IT/OT convergence, protocol gateways were introduced to facilitate the migration from serial protocols to TCP/IP protocol stacks within modern IT/OT infrastructure. However, they often introduce additional vulnerabilities by exposing traditionally isolated protocols to external threats. This study investigates the security and reliability implications of migrating serial protocols to TCP/IP stacks and the impact of protocol gateways, utilizing two widely used OT protocols: Modbus TCP and DNP3. Our protocol analysis finds a significant safety-critical vulnerability resulting from this migration, and our subsequent tests clearly demonstrate its presence and impact. A multi-tiered testbed, consisting of both physical and emulated components, is used to evaluate protocol performance and the effects of device-specific implementation flaws. Through this analysis of specifications and behaviors during communication interruptions, we identify critical differences in fault handling and the impact on time-sensitive data delivery. The findings highlight how reliance on lower-level IT protocols can undermine OT system resilience, and they inform the development of mitigation strategies to enhance the robustness of industrial communication networks.
With increasing penetration levels of distributed energy resources (DERs) on the distribution grid, as well as new technological advancements in the cyber space, new cyberattack vectors are being introduced, and the available attack surface is constantly increasing. Despite this increasing risk, the standard IEEE 1547-2018 does not yet recommend cybersecurity measures for DERs. To address this and to better protect data on the distribution grid - from the standpoints information security as well as operational security - ModuleOT has been developed. The module aims to significantly reduce cyberattack vectors by improving data privacy for user applications. This is accomplished by performing the core functions of encryption, authentication, authorization, certificate management, and user access control. The module integrates a custom security application with hardware cryptographic acceleration. The application secures all communications using Transmission Control Protocol over Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). These include the three most commonly used communications protocols for power systems information exchange: Modbus, Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3), and Smart Energy Profile 2.0 (SEP2.0). These three protocols are also supported by IEEE 1547-2018 for all DER devices. This paper tests the data encryption/decryption feature on a physical networking test bed with emulated Modbus devices reporting grid data and presents the results.
Abstract A power system is a complex cyber‐physical system whose security is critical to its function. A major challenge is to model, analyse and visualise the communication backbone of the power systems concerning cyber threats. To achieve this, the design and evaluation of a cyber‐physical power system (CPPS) testbed called Resilient Energy Systems Lab (RESLab) are presented to capture realistic cyber, physical, and protection system features. RESLab is architected to be a fundamental platform for studying and improving the resilience of complex CPPS to cyber threats. The cyber network is emulated using Common Open Research Emulator (CORE), which acts as a gateway for the physical and protection devices to communicate. The physical grid is simulated in the dynamic time frame using Power World Dynamic Studio (PWDS). The protection components are modelled with both PWDS and physical devices including the SEL Real‐Time Automation Controller (RTAC). Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3) is used to monitor and control the grid. Then, the design is exemplified and the tools are validated. This work presents four case studies on cyberattack and defence using RESLab, where we demonstrate false data and command injection using Man‐in‐the‐Middle and Denial of Service attacks and validate them on a large‐scale synthetic electric grid.
This study presents an ensemble learning approach for fault classification and location identification in a smart distribution network containing photovoltaics (PV)-based microgrid. Lack of available data points and the unbalanced nature of the distribution system make fault handling a challenging task for utilities. The proposed method uses event-driven voltage data from smart meters to classify and locate faults. The ensemble voting classifier is composed of three base learners; random forest, k-nearest neighbours, and artificial neural network. The fault location (FL) task has been formulated as a classification problem where the fault type is classified in the first step and based on the fault type, the faulty bus is identified. The method is tested on IEEE-123 bus system modified with added PV-based microgrid along with dynamic loading conditions and varying fault resistances from 0 to 20 Ω for both unbalanced and balanced fault types. A further sensitivity analysis has been done to test the robustness of the proposed method under various noise levels and data loss errors in the smart meter measurements. The ensemble method shows improved performance and robustness compared to some previously proposed FL methods. Finally, the proposed method has been experimentally validated on a real-time simulation-based testbed using a state-of-the-art digital real-time simulator, industry standard DNP3 communication protocol and a cpu-based control centre running the FL algorithm.
This paper presents the laboratory evaluation of a commercial Microgrid Management System (MGMS) implemented in the real-world Bronzeville Microgrid which features a futuristic scenario with high renewable energy integration and the use of multiple Grid-Forming (GFM) inverters. The primary objective of the performance evaluation for the MGMS is to assess the MGMS's capability to dispatch GFM units, including a GFM PV unit and two GFM battery units, to maintain the system stability and ensure economic operation, thus guaranteeing the microgrid's resilience during prolonged outages and dynamic events. The laboratory controller hardware-in-the-loop provides realistic testing environment through detailed electromagnetic transient modeling of the microgrid system, hardware MGMS, and standard communication protocols (DNP3). The CHIL evaluation shows how the MGMS effectively manages the GFM inverters, highlighting its performance in maintaining stability, reliability, and survivability in a microgrid environment with a high penetration of renewable energy sources.
The modern electrical grid is a complex and a data rich system, requiring several sub-systems to provide the capability and support needed to perform functions such as distributed energy resource management, outage management, and fault location and isolation, to name a few. There is a need to develop software solutions and platforms that provide an integrated infrastructure to allow interoperability between these subsystems, while leveraging the abundant data available from today’s grid. In this paper, we present the development and deployment of an application service to integrate GridAPPS-D which is an open source, standards-based software platform with SurvalentONE, a commonly used DNP3 based ADMS platform that allows operation, monitoring, analysis, restoration, and optimization of network operations. We present details of the integration architecture, including its implementation, and provide results from functional testing of the architecture on a 13 bus IEEE system. The results validate that the integration is successful and is able to provide a two-way exchange of communication and translation between different communication protocols.
To better secure critical infrastructure, especially power systems, this paper introduces a virtual SCADA automation controller. The automation controller is a gateway into a power subsystem, making it a valuable target for cyber-attacks that could cut it off from the control center and cause a loss of view and control. To prevent this, the Virtual Automation Controller (VAC) is a backup device that mirrors the capabilities of the physical controller. It can communicate via Modbus and DNP3 and is containerized so it can be deployed on a variety of platforms. Furthermore, it utilizes software-defined networking to quickly disconnect a failed automation controller and preserve its state for forensics. The VAC gives system operators time to replace the failed controller and prevents dangerous and costly damage to power systems. The VAC is compared against the SEL 3505-3 RTAC and shown to have the necessary features to act as a failover controller.
The fast-paced growth in digitization of smart grid components enhances system observability and remote-control capabilities through efficient communication. However, enhanced connectivity results in heightened system vulnerability towards cybersecurity risks in the cyber-physical power system. Coordinated cyber-attacks (CCA), when undetected, lead to system-wide impact in terms of large disturbances or widespread outages. Detecting CCA in the cyber layer is critical to thwart cyber-attacks in real-time before the attack impacts the physical system. The challenge of locating CCA stems from the complex grid dynamics, making it difficult to distinguish between normal operational variations and cyber-attack impact. CCA often employs multiple attack vectors targeting geographically distributed components, further complicating CCA identification. Existing research in intrusion detection is primarily focused on the transmission network and limited to detecting individual attacks. In this paper, a novel proactive DCA strategy is proposed for early detection of CCA by establishing correlations among distinct attack events through model-based reinforcement learning that utilizes abductive reasoning to conclude the attacker goal. The solution includes understanding the system model, learning the system dynamics, and correlating individual cyber-attacks to extract the attacker’s objective. The developed learning algorithm identifies the most probable attack path to reach the attacker’s objective by predicting the next attack steps. A DNP3-based cyber-physical co-simulation testbed is developed to test the proposed algorithm using the IEEE 13-node test feeder.
Advanced persistent threats and cyberattacks can impact wide-area monitoring, protection, and control (WAMPAC) system operation. Many cyber-physical system (CPS) testbeds have been developed for attack-defense experimentation and attack-resiliency tools evaluation for WAMPAC, but they are limited to a simulation-and-emulation based environment. This paper presents a quasi-realistic CPS attack-defense testbed-based framework for WAMPAC applications using the industrial substation and control center platforms such as eTerra integrated with the hardware-in-the-loop CPS smart grid testbed available at Iowa State University. The proposed framework includes various combinations of industry-grade substation and control center platforms, communication topologies, real-time digital simulators, and a novel cyber-physical distributed intrusion-and-anomaly detection system (D-IADS) for WAMPAC applications. The D-IADS includes a master at the control center and geographically distributed sensor devices at each substation. Each D-IADS sensor deployed at a substation or control center network monitors ingress and egress traffic, detect intrusions, and dispatch alerts to the D-IADS master. The D-IADS master centrally monitors and analyze the alerts and controls D-IADS sensors. We considered an EMP60 synthetic CPS grid as a case study to demonstrate the framework and proposed D-IADS for WAMPAC applications against cyberattack vectors such as Man-in-the-Middle DNP3 attack, denial-of-service, and data-integrity attacks.
Operational complexity is ever-increasing for electric utilities that face challenges including integration of DERs, customer expectation of energy choices, the proliferation of non-utility-owned resources, new business models with energy service providers, and new technology with IT/OT convergence. To maintain and improve the quality of operations, planning, and decision-making in general, utilities need to manage and navigate the complexity. Managing complexity requires a modular, scalable, and flexible solution. Connecting large amounts of DERs and introducing new services requires increased grid control and evolving applications. In this paper, we show an approach utilizing model-based standardized interfaces that simplifies integration and deployment of new algorithms and smart field devices for interoperability across legacy or new systems. A modular design is presented for a reference implementation of widely used DNP3 and IEEE 2030.5 interfaces within an open-source, standards-based data integration platform for integration of smart field devices with independently developed, best-of-breed applications.