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DOE OSTI2018

Document Release of CSAM 99-140 to DNFSB for Review, October 17, 2018

The data sheet on HFE-7200 from 3M is included in attachment 2. Unfortunately, at this time, the Criticality Safety Group cannot allow the replacement of TCE by HFE-7200 for the reasons discussed below. The moderating and reflecting properties of HFE-7200 were compared to trichloroethylene (TCE) and water. The results of several calculations are presented in attachment 1 and indicate that water is a far superior moderator than either HFE-7200 or TCE, but HFE-7200 results in significantly higher reactivity than TCE. The criticality safety evaluation for machining (CSM1020) credited the usage of TCE and this material was included in the Monte Carlo calculations to determine the reactivity of the upset conditions. Unfortunately, since the results of these calculations are relatively high, it cannot be determined without significant re-evaluation whether the replacement of conservatisms were employed in CSM1020 to simplify the calculations, it is likely that a re-evaluation considering less conservative models would allow the approval of HFE-7200. The Criticality Safety Group will include HFE-7200 when the evaluation for machining is upgraded to higher mass limits (with shape control).

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

DOE OSTI2012

Ceramic HEPA Filter Program

Potential benefits of ceramic filters in nuclear facilities: (1) Short term benefit for DOE, NRC, and industry - (a) CalPoly HTTU provides unique testing capability to answer questions for DOE - High temperature testing of materials, components, filter, (b) Several DNFSB correspondences and presentations by DNFSB members have highlighted the need for HEPA filter R and D - DNFSB Recommendation 2009-2 highlighted a nuclear facility response to an evaluation basis earthquake followed by a fire (aka shake-n-bake) and CalPoly has capability for a shake-n-bake test; (2) Intermediate term benefit for DOE and industry - (a) Filtration for specialty applications, e.g., explosive applications at Nevada, (b) Spin-off technologies applicable to other commercial industries; and (3) Long term benefit for DOE, NRC, and industry - (a) Across industry, strong desire for better performance filter, (b) Engineering solution to safety problem will improve facility safety and decrease dependence on associated support systems, (c) Large potential life-cycle cost savings, and (d) Facilitates development and deployment of LLNL process innovations to allow continuous ventilation system operation during a fire.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2012

Recommended Tritium Oxide Deposition Velocity for Use in Savannah River Site Safety Analyses

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) has recently questioned the appropriate value for tritium deposition velocity used in the MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System Ver. 2 (Chanin and Young 1998) code when estimating bounding dose (95th percentile) for safety analysis (DNFSB 2011). The purpose of this paper is to provide appropriate, defensible values of the tritium deposition velocity for use in Savannah River Site (SRS) safety analyses. To accomplish this, consideration must be given to the re-emission of tritium after deposition. Approximately 85% of the surface area of the SRS is forested. The majority of the forests are pine plantations, 68%. The remaining forest area is 6% mixed pine and hardwood and 26% swamp hardwood. Most of the path from potential release points to the site boundary is through forested land. A search of published studies indicate daylight, tritiated water (HTO) vapor deposition velocities in forest vegetation can range from 0.07 to 2.8 cm/s. Analysis of the results of studies done on an SRS pine plantation and climatological data from the SRS meteorological network indicate that the average deposition velocity during daylight periods is around 0.42 cm/s. The minimum deposition velocity was determined to be about 0.1 cm/s, which is the recommended bounding value. Deposition velocity and residence time (half-life) of HTO in vegetation are related by the leaf area and leaf water volume in the forest. For the characteristics of the pine plantation at SRS the residence time corresponding to the average, daylight deposition velocity is 0.4 hours. The residence time corresponding to the night-time deposition velocity of 0.1 cm/s is around 2 hours. A simple dispersion model which accounts for deposition and re-emission of HTO vapor was used to evaluate the impact on exposure to the maximally exposed offsite individual (MOI) at the SRS boundary (Viner 2012). Under conditions that produce the bounding, 95 th percentile MOI exposure, i.e., low wind speed, weak turbulence, night, low deposition velocity, the effect of deposition and re-emission on MOI exposure was found to be very small. The exposure over the two hour period following arrival of the plume was found to be decreased by less than 0.05 %. Furthermore the sensitivity to deposition velocity was low. Increasing deposition velocity to 0.5 cm/s reduced exposure to 0.3 %. After a 24 hour period, an MOI would have been exposed to all of the released material. Based on the low sensitivity of MOI exposure to the value of deposition velocity when re-emission is considered, it is appropriately conservative to use a 0.0 cm/s effective deposition velocity for safety analysis in the MACCS2 code.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Evaluation of the Los Alamos Nuclear Material Packaging Risk Ranking Method

Repackaging nuclear material into robust containers to protect workers and the public has been ongoing at LANL and around the DOE complex for nearly two decades. The number of containers at LANL is around 5,000; limited resources for repackaging material has led to extended repackaging campaigns and the need to prioritize repackaging. Various methodologies have been used to prioritize the repackaging efforts and to demonstrate progress in risk reduction over time (e.g., Boerigter, 1997). The 2000-1 DNFSB recommendation recognized the limited DOE resources for repackaging, and acknowledged the need to “prioritize and schedule tasks to be undertaken with available funds according to consideration of risks.” Later, in DNFSB recommendation 2005-1, in addition to recommending that DOE develop a packaging standard, the Board recommended that “Characterization information should also be used to develop a surveillance program prioritized according to expected material and container risk (including, for example, material type, material form, and the age and type of container).” In response to requests and recommendations from the DOE and DNSFB to prioritize according to worker risk, a risk ranking method based on the potential consequence of dropping a container from 3 meters was developed in 2007 (Smith, 2007) and updated in 2014 (Hoffman, 2014). Various LANL implementation plans for repackaging were developed over the years using this methodology (Stone, 2014). Currently, this method is utilized in conjunction with an algorithm to mitigate programmatic risk to prioritize container repackaging and material processing (Prochnow, 2015). The purpose of this study is to document how the current risk ranking method works, how it is used and potential limitations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2019

An Overview of the United States Department of Energy's Nuclear Criticality Safety Program and Future Challenges

The United States (US) Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) was formally established in January 1998 as part of the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 97-2 implementation plan. The NCSP was initially focused on seven NCSP tasks: Critical Experiments, Benchmarking, Analytical Methods, Nuclear Data, Training and Qualification, Information Preservation and Dissemination, and Applicable Ranges of Bounding Curves and Data. The first NCSP 5-year plan was published in August 1999. Now, more than 20 years later, NCSP continues to serve the United States and the nuclear criticality safety (NCS) community around five technical program elements (TPEs): Analytical Methods, Information Preservation and Dissemination, Integral Experiments, Nuclear Data, and Training and Education. NCSP has three chartered support groups, the Criticality Safety Support Group, the Nuclear Data Advisory Group, and the DOE Criticality Safety Coordinating Team, all of which provide technical advisement to the NCS community, to DOE, and to the NCSP manager. NCSP has a comprehensive mission and vision document that provides technical and budget priorities for TPE attributes and goals to ensure that the needs of the NCS community and DOE NCS are prioritized appropriately to meet the goals defined by the 1998 DNFSB recommendation. Like any DOE/NNSA program, NCSP faces significant challenges in the future that involves program funding, rising nuclear facility costs, aging critical assembly infrastructure, knowledge retention, and other issues. This paper discusses NCSP and provides some insights into these and other challenges moving into the future.

Bowen, Douglas G.↗

DOE OSTI2015

The DOE Criticality safety support group - A retrospective perspective - 14580

The Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Criticality Safety Support Group (CSSG) came into being as a response to the DNFSB recommendation 1997-2 'Criticality Safety' which dealt with the continuation of criticality safety at defense nuclear facilities in the Department of Energy Enterprise. The DNFSB was concerned over the lack of capability management of practical experience pertinent to avoiding a criticality accident in non-reactor environments. One of the specific recommendations of 1997-2 was to 'Identify a core group of criticality experts experienced in the theoretical and experimental aspects of neutron chain reactions to advise on the above steps and assist in resolving future technical issues'. The CSSG, a group of 10 recognized experts in criticality safety, was chartered in late 1997 to address the recommendation. Members of the CSSG are drawn from DOE employees and contractor staff to provide advice and technical support to help meet the criticality safety needs of DOE missions, including stockpile stewardship, materials stabilization, transportation, storage, facilities life cycle (design through decommissioning), and waste disposal. The CSSG is an integral part of the DOE Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) developed to maintain and enhance the operational and technical criticality safety expertise and capability within the Department of Energy Enterprise. This paper outlines the history, purpose and continuing contribution of the CSSG as well as providing an understanding of the interfaces between the DOE CSSG, the DOE Criticality Safety Coordinating Team (CSCT), the ANS Nuclear Criticality Safety Division and the EFCOG Criticality Safety Subgroup. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Application of Holdup Measurement Results to Criticality Safety Evaluations [Slides]

This presentation includes an overview of the program and Background of the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) recommendation 2007-1. Additionally, discussed is the Fissile Material Holdup and Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2012

SRNL Phase 1 Assessment of the WTP Waste Qualification Program

The Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Project is currently transitioning its emphasis from an engineering design and construction phase toward facility completion, start-up and commissioning. With this transition, the WTP Project has initiated more detailed assessments of the requirements that must be met during the actual processing of the Hanford Site tank waste. One particular area of interest is the waste qualification program. In general, the waste qualification program involves testing and analysis to demonstrate compliance with waste acceptance criteria, determine waste processability, and demonstrate laboratory-scale unit operations to support WTP operations. The testing and analysis are driven by data quality objectives (DQO) requirements necessary for meeting waste acceptance criteria for transfer of high-level wastes from the tank farms to the WTP, and for ensuring waste processability including proper glass formulations during processing within the WTP complex. Given the successful implementation of similar waste qualification efforts at the Savannah River Site (SRS) which were based on critical technical support and guidance from the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), WTP requested subject matter experts (SMEs) from SRNL to support a technology exchange with respect to waste qualification programs in which a critical review of the WTP program could be initiated and lessons learned could be shared. The technology exchange was held on July 18-20, 2011 in Richland, Washington, and was the initial step in a multi-phased approach to support development and implementation of a successful waste qualification program at the WTP. The 3-day workshop was hosted by WTP with representatives from the Tank Operations Contractor (TOC) and SRNL in attendance as well as representatives from the US DOE Office of River Protection (ORP) and the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) Site Representative office. The purpose of the workshop was to share lessons learned and provide a technology exchange to support development of a technically defensible waste qualification program. The objective of this report is to provide a review, from SRNL's perspective, of the WTP waste qualification program as presented during the workshop. In addition to SRNL's perspective on the general approach to the waste qualification program, more detailed insight into the specific unit operations presented by WTP during the workshop is provided. This report also provides a general overview of the SRS qualification program which serves as a basis for a comparison between the two programs. Recommendations regarding specific steps are made based on the review and SRNL's lessons learned from qualification of SRS low-activity waste (LAW) and high-level waste (HLW) to support maturation of the waste qualification program leading to WTP implementation.

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DOE OSTI2014

LANL Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) Self-Assessment

On December 21, 2012 Secretary of Energy Chu transmitted to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) revised commitments on the implementation plan for Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant. Action 2-5 was revised to require contractors and federal organizations to complete Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) selfassessments and provide reports to the appropriate U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) - Headquarters Program Office by September 2013. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) planned and conducted a Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) Self-Assessment over the time period July through August, 2013 in accordance with the SCWE Self-Assessment Guidance provided by DOE. Significant field work was conducted over the 2-week period August 5-16, 2013. The purpose of the self-assessment was to evaluate whether programs and processes associated with a SCWE are in place and whether they are effective in supporting and promoting a SCWE.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2022

Lab and federal board: Pursuing a common objective for enhanced worker safety

On July 12-14, Thomas Summers, the vice chair of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, visited the Laboratory alongside a small team of other DNFSB employees, including the two resident inspectors assigned full time at Los Alamos. The visit allowed him to tour the nuclear facilities around the Lab where he learned about the important work conducted by the myriad of employees who work within these facilities. As part of his visit, Summers and his team also observed the July 13 full-scale emergency exercise that was centered at TA-55.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

DOE OSTI2022

Operational and Mission Highlights (A Monthly Summary of Top Achievements, November 2022)

On November 16, Los Alamos National Laboratory Director Thom Mason answered questions from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) at a public hearing in Santa Fe about the safety of operations at the Laboratory’s plutonium facility and the pit production mission. Mason participated on a panel along with National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Administrator Jill Hruby, Deputy NNSA Administrator James McConnell, and NNSA Los Alamos Field Office Manager Ted Wyka.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2013

A One System Integrated Approach to Simulant Selection for Hanford High Level Waste Mixing and Sampling Tests

The Hanford Tank Operations Contractor (TOC) and the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) contractor are both engaged in demonstrating mixing, sampling, and transfer system capabilities using simulated Hanford High-Level Waste (HLW) formulations. This represents one of the largest remaining technical issues with the high-level waste treatment mission at Hanford. Previous testing has focused on very specific TOC or WTP test objectives and consequently the simulants were narrowly focused on those test needs. A key attribute in the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 2010-2 is to ensure testing is performed with a simulant that represents the broad spectrum of Hanford waste. The One System Integrated Project Team is a new joint TOC and WTP organization intended to ensure technical integration of specific TOC and WTP systems and testing. A new approach to simulant definition has been mutually developed that will meet both TOC and WTP test objectives for the delivery and receipt of HLW. The process used to identify critical simulant characteristics, incorporate lessons learned from previous testing, and identify specific simulant targets that ensure TOC and WTP testing addresses the broad spectrum of Hanford waste characteristics that are important to mixing, sampling, and transfer performance are described.

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DOE OSTI2013

A One System Integrated Approach to Simulant Selection for Hanford High Level Waste Mixing and Sampling Tests - 13342

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DOE OSTI2013

Improved Management of the Technical Interfaces Between the Hanford Tank Farm Operator and the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant - 13383

The Department of Energy (DOE) is constructing the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) at the Hanford site in Washington to treat and immobilize approximately 114 million gallons of high level radioactive waste (after all retrievals are accomplished). In order for the WTP to be designed and operated successfully, close coordination between the WTP engineering, procurement, and construction contractor, Bechtel National, Inc. and the tank farms operating contractor (TOC), Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, is necessary. To develop optimal solutions for DOE and for the treatment of the waste, it is important to deal with the fact that two different prime contractors, with somewhat differing contracts, are tasked with retrieving and delivering the waste and for treating and immobilizing that waste. The WTP and the TOC have over the years cooperated to manage the technical interface. To manage what is becoming a much more complicated interface as the WTP design progresses and new technical issues have been identified, an organizational change was made by WTP and TOC in November of 2011. This organizational change created a co-located integrated project team (IPT) to deal with mutual and interface issues. The Technical Organization within the One System IPT includes employees from both TOC and WTP. This team has worked on a variety of technical issues of mutual interest and concern. Technical issues currently being addressed include: - The waste acceptance criteria; - Waste feed delivery and the associated data quality objectives (DQO); - Evaluation of the effects of performing a riser cut on a single shell tank on WTP operations; - The disposition of secondary waste from both TOC and WTP; - The close coordination of the TOC double shell tank mixing and sampling program and the Large Scale Integrated Test (LSIT) program for pulse jet mixers at WTP along with the associated responses to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 2010-2; - Development of a set of alternatives to the current baseline that involve aspects of direct feed, feed conditioning, and design changes. The One System Technical Organization has served WTP, TOC, and DOE well in managing and resolving issues at the interface. This paper describes the organizational structure used to improve the interface and several examples of technical interface issues that have been successfully addressed by the new organization. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2013

Recent Improvements in Interface Management for Hanford's Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant - 13263

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of River Protection (ORP) is responsible for management and completion of the River Protection Project (RPP) mission, which includes the Hanford Site tank farms operations and the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). The RPP mission is to store, retrieve and treat Hanford's tank waste; store and dispose of treated wastes; and close the tank farm waste management areas and treatment facilities by 2047. The WTP is currently being designed and constructed by Bechtel National Inc. (BNI) for DOE-ORP. BNI relies on a number of technical services from other Hanford contractors for WTP's construction and commissioning. These same services will be required of the future WTP operations contractor. Partly in response to a DNFSB recommendation, the WTP interface management process managing these technical services has recently been improved through changes in organization and issue management. The changes are documented in an Interface Management Plan. The organizational improvement is embodied in the One System Integrated Project Team that was formed by integrating WTP and tank farms staff representing interfacing functional areas into a single organization. A number of improvements were made to the issue management process but most notable was the formal appointment of technical, regulatory and safety subject matter experts to ensure accurate identification of issues and open items. Ten of the thirteen active WTP Interface Control Documents have been revised in 2012 using the improved process with the remaining three in progress. The value of the process improvements is reflected by the ability to issue these documents on schedule and accurately identify technical, regulatory and safety issues and open items. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2019

Performance Evaluation of AG-1 FC Filters Under Upset Conditions and the Effects of Aging on Filters - 19501

High efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters are routinely used in nearly every operating Department of Energy (DOE) and National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) nuclear facility. These nuclear grade HEPA filters installed in DOE and NNSA confinement ventilation systems are credited as the final barrier to protect the environment, the public, and the worker from accidental release of virtually all airborne radioactive materials, and must meet the American Society of Mechanical Engineers' (ASME) Code on Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment (CONAGT) AG-1 standard. This testing activity evaluates ASME AG-1 Section FC axial flow HEPA filters, both separator and separator-less, under upset conditions. Additionally, testing efforts have analyzed the effects of filter degradation due to aging. In 1997, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) raised concerns of the potential vulnerability of HEPA filters in vital safety systems, both from a design stand point and the potential for degradation of HEPA filter performance over time. The DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) has a Cooperative Agreement with Mississippi State University (MSU) Institute for Clean Energy Technology (ICET) to conduct testing of HEPA filters. DOE-EM has established a Technical Working Group (TWG) of over thirty subject matter experts from the nuclear industry to provide input and oversight of ICET projects and activities. This has included establishment/approval of testing parameters for evaluating these filters under ASME NQA-1 compliant Test Plans. The current scope of work involves evaluation of the performance envelope for new and aged separator and separator-less designs of AG-1 Section FC axial flow HEPA filters. A range of elevated test conditions (T and RH) are used to determine the operating envelope within which DOE nuclear safety experts can credit installed HEPA filter performance, thereby establishing a risk-informed DOE service life. This paper will present preliminary test results of new and aged axial flow filters tested at ICET. Results in this paper include data collected from new separator and separator-less type FC HEPA filters and equivalent test data for a limited group of aged separator and separator-less type FC HEPA filters. Testing for both scopes of work evaluate initial filter performance under ambient conditions of temperature (60 deg. F - 80 deg. F (∼16 - ∼27 deg. C)) and relative humidity (40-60%), loading of each filter with Aluminum Trihydroxide, Al(OH)3, to a specified differential pressure, and then exposing the filter to specified elevated temperature and relative humidity conditions. In addition to the upset conditions of elevated temperature and relative humidity, the performance of HEPA filters under fire scenarios is not well characterized. ICET is currently designing a burn box and testing apparatus to study the effects of fire from burning liquids and a wide range of blends of combustible solids. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2016

Evaluating Age Effects on HEPA Filter Performance

Nuclear grade high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters are routinely employed as the final control element in confinement ventilation systems. The traditional HEPA filter utilizes a pleated filter medium of fibrous glass that has been produced in a manner analogous to manufacturing paper. These filters are the physically weakest element in a containment ventilation system. Containment ventilation systems are designed to condition the air-stream (temperature, relative humidity, moisture, particle size distribution of aerosols, and aerosol concentration) to levels/conditions that fibrous glass HEPA filters can handle. Approximately 6000 nuclear grade HEPA filters are purchased each year for use in the DOE/NNSA complex. Additional filters are purchased for use in commercial nuclear power generation and ventilation systems of other nuclear applications. These filters are designed and tested in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) AG-1 Code Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment. This code establishes design requirements and qualification procedures. Qualification testing of axial flow filters is described in paragraphs 5000 and following of AG-1. The series of qualification tests are intended to describe the operating envelope of HEPA filters and verify the reliability of a filter design. AG-1 qualification also confirms the pedigree of components used in manufacture for that filter design. The collective set of qualification tests establishes the assumed operating envelope for AG-1 filters. The effects of age on HEPA filter performance have been a concern for at least two decades. A combination of physical evaluation of aged filter media and a review of filter failure records resulted in Appendix C of the Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook (NACH), Determination of HEPA Filter Life. This states that HEPA filters are not to be used beyond 10 years from the date of manufacture. Additionally, filters put into service in locations where they may become wet are to be taken out of service five years from date of manufacture. Filters that have become wet are to be taken out of service immediately. Finally, it should also be pointed out that filters held in Level B storage are subject to the same 10-year service life. Very limited bench-scale testing in the 1990's raised concern that aging HEPA filters do not have the strength to withstand an accident scenario. In May of 1999, the DNFSB released a Technical Report 23 entitled HEPA Filters Used in the Department of Energy's Hazardous Facilities. This report expressed concerns for the potential vulnerability of HEPA filters in vital safety systems. Concerns and uncertainty associated with degradation of HEPA filter performance over time led the DOE sites to limit HEPA filter service life to 10 years from the date of manufacture or five years in cases where filters may become wet. Establishment of a conservative service life needs to be based on data from a structured series of tests comparing the performance envelope of new and aged full-scale filters. A service life that is insufficiently conservative endangers workers and the public. One that is excessively conservative costs can cause hundreds of otherwise unnecessary filter changes. This increases exposure of employees, disrupts facility operations, and increase disposal costs by millions of dollars annually. Conclusive data are needed to resolve uncertainty associated with the damaging effects of aging on durability of HEPA filters. Therefore, this study needs to provide a sufficient body of evidence to allow DOE and site professionals to make prudent decisions. An updated version of ASME AG-1 Section FC included a non-mandatory appendix that would include the DOE guidance for service life of HEPA filters. Balloting of this revision generated significant resistance to inclusion of any kind of service life language citing the lack of supporting experimental data. Efforts to resolve negative votes failed and resistance to acceptance of the language increased. The result has been to not include service language in Section FC and requests to remove it from sections that already include such language. The recent activity of the ASME AG-1 Committee on Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment effectively de-emphasizes following DoE's service life guidelines. The DOE Office of Nuclear Safety under its NSR and D program provided the Mississippi State University Institute for Clean Energy Technology (ICET) finding to initiate a study to determine the effects of aging on AG-1 axial flow filters just prior to actions taken within the AG-1 committee regarding service life. The NSR and D funding facilitated timely development of a national technical working group comprised of members from the regulatory community, DOE complex, and commercial power to resolve uncertainty associated with effects of aging. The Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) has been funding the ICET to evaluate the performance envelope for AG-1 HEPA filters. ICET is one of DOE-EM's qualified suppliers. Synergy has been achieved by associating the NSR and D aged filter activities to testing activities evaluating the performance envelopes of separator and separator-less AG-1 HEPA filters funded by DOE-EM. The DOE-EM funded activities establish baseline data for the aged filter study and future EM funding will provide long term support for testing additional aged filters. EM funding of new filters includes analytical evaluation of media tensile strength by thermal analysis to establish baseline values and determine mass loss of moisture resistance and acrylic binders due to use. All of these values can be used for comparison of test results for aged filters. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

DOE OSTI2012

Test Plan - Solids Accumulation Scouting Studies

This plan documents the highlights of the Solids Accumulations Scouting Studies test; a project, from Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), that began on February 1, 2012. During the last 12 weeks considerable progress has been made to design and plan methods that will be used to estimate the concentration and distribution of heavy fissile solids in accumulated solids in the Hanford double-shell tank (DST) 241-AW-105 (AW-105), which is the primary goal of this task. This DST will be one of the several waste feed delivery staging tanks designated to feed the Pretreatment Facility (PTF) of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). Note that over the length of the waste feed delivery mission AW-105 is currently identified as having the most fill empty cycles of any DST feed tanks, which is the reason for modeling this particular tank. At SRNL an existing test facility, the Mixing Demonstration Tank, which will be modified for the present work, will use stainless steel particles in a simulant that represents Hanford waste to perform mock staging tanks transfers that will allow solids to accumulate in the tank heel. The concentration and location of the mock fissile particles will be measured in these scoping studies to produce information that will be used to better plan larger scaled tests. Included in these studies is a secondary goal of developing measurement methods to accomplish the primary goal. These methods will be evaluated for use in the larger scale experiments. Included in this plan are the several pretest activities that will validate the measurement techniques that are currently in various phases of construction. Aspects of each technique, e.g., particle separations, volume determinations, topographical mapping, and core sampling, have been tested in bench-top trials, as discussed herein, but the actual equipment to be employed during the full test will need evaluation after fabrication and integration into the test facility.

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