Results for “DNA sequencing security”

DOE OSTI2026

Methods for safely sharing dual-use genetic data

Background: Some genetic data has dual-use potential. Sharing pathogen data has shown tremendous value. For example therapeutic development and lineage tracking during the COVID pandemic. This data sharing is complicated by the fact that these data have the potential to be used for harm. The genome sequence of a pathogen can be used to enable malicious genetic engineering approaches or to recreate the pathogen from synthetic DNA. Standard data security methods can be applied to genetic data, but when data is shared between institutions, ensuring appropriate security can be difficult. Sensitive data that is shared internationally among a wide array of institutions can be especially difficult to control. Methods for securely storing and sharing genetic data with potential for dual-use are needed to mitigate this potential harm.Results: Here we propose new methods that allow genetic data to be shared in a data format that prevents a nefarious actor from accessing sensitive aspects of the data. Our methods obfuscate raw sequence data by pooling reads from different samples. This approach can ensure that data is secure while stored and during electronic transfer. We demonstrate that by pooling raw sequence data from multiple samples of the same organism, the ability to fully reconstruct any individual sample is prevented. In the pooled data, most genomic information remains, but reads or mutations cannot be directly attributed to any individual sample. To further restrict access to information, regions of a genome can be removed from the reads.Conclusion: Our methods obscure genomic information within raw sequence reads. This method can allow genetic data to be stored and shared while preventing a nefarious actor from being able to perfectly reconstruct an organism. Broad-scale sequence information remains, while fine scale details about specific samples are difficult or impossible to reconstruct. Our software is available at https://github.com/Geneinfosec-Inc/ReadMixer.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

ISS External Microorganisms: A Payload to Close Planetary Protection Knowledge Gaps for Crewed Missions

Before NASA or COSPAR is able to set planetary protection requirements for crewed missions to locations like Mars there are a number of critical knowledge gaps that must be addressed (1). One of the most important knowledge gaps is an understanding of microbial leakage from crewed habitats and space suits. Current ECLSS (Environmental Control and Life Support System) and PLSS (Portable Life Support System) requirements do not include any provisions to control microbes that may escape along with vented or leaked gasses. The current generation of NASA space suits can leak at rates as high as 100 cm2 /min. during nominal operation (2). ISS (International Space Station) intentionally vents atmospheric gases like CO2 to maintain habitable conditions for the crew. Furthermore, every time an airlock is used for EVA (extravehicular activity)there is an accompanying release of internal atmosphere. Since it is not possible to sterilize a crewed mission, it is important that we understand what if any microbes are entrained in these vented and leaked products. It is also important to understand if these microbes can survive on exterior surfaces. Recent sampling of the Russian segments of ISS suggest that bacteria and fungi from inside ISS may be capable of surviving on external surfaces(3). NASA is developing an aseptic sampling tool for use during EVA and plans to collect samples from vents on ISS to build on these results. The results of this work will be used to develop planetary protection requirements for vented and leaked gasses from crewed volumes. NASA has developed and tested a tool kit for collecting microbiological samples during EVA(4). This tool kit contains eight commercially available, 23 mm. diameter, foam swabs that can be used to aseptically collect samples while at vacuum. The swabs are individually housed in aluminum canisters that are equipped with 0.2 μm Teflon filters. These filters allow the canisters to equilibrate to pressure changes while preventing microbiological contamination. The canisters will be cleaned and sterilized before flight. Results from ground-based testing indicate that this tool kit is capable of aseptically collecting microbes while at vacuum without becoming contaminated during pressure changes(5). Based on the results of this ground testing we have modified the tool kit to meet NASA safety requirements and improve the ergonomics. We added additional mounting points to the tool kit to give astronauts more options for securing it during use. We also changed the opening mechanism to improve the precision with which swabs can be extracted from the tool kit. We plan to use this kit on an upcoming EVA to collect samples from non-propulsive vents and areas near the U.S. airlock on ISS. These samples will be frozen at -80 ̊C and stored on station until they can be returned to Earth. We will analyze these returned samples using next generation DNA sequencing to determine the community composition and function of external ISS environments. The results of this study will close planetary protection knowledge gaps for crewed missions and will help NASA determine appropriate planetary protection requirements for life support systems. The tool kit will also be useful for collecting aseptic samples on upcoming crewed or robotic missions and could easily be modified to collect samples with organic contamination control requirements as well.

A B Regberg↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

ISS External Microorganisms: A Payload to Close Planetary Protection Knowledge Gaps for Crewed Missions

Before NASA or COSPAR is able to set planetary protection requirements for crewed missions to locations like Mars there are a number of critical knowledge gaps that must be addressed (1). One of the most important knowledge gaps is an understanding of microbial leakage from crewed habitats and space suits. Current ECLSS (Environmental Control and Life Support System) and PLSS (Portable Life Support System) requirements do not include any provisions to control microbes that may escape along with vented or leaked gasses. The current generation of NASA space suits can leak at rates as high as 100 cm2 /min. during nominal operation (2). ISS (International Space Station) intentionally vents atmospheric gases like CO2 to maintain habitable conditions for the crew. Furthermore, every time an airlock is used for EVA (extravehicular activity)there is an accompanying release of internal atmosphere. Since it is not possible to sterilize a crewed mission, it is important that we understand what if any microbes are entrained in these vented and leaked products. It is also important to understand if these microbes can survive on exterior surfaces. Recent sampling of the Russian segments of ISS suggest that bacteria and fungi from inside ISS may be capable of surviving on external surfaces(3). NASA is developing an aseptic sampling tool for use during EVA and plans to collect samples from vents on ISS to build on these results. The results of this work will be used to develop planetary protection requirements for vented and leaked gasses from crewed volumes. NASA has developed and tested a tool kit for collecting microbiological samples during EVA(4). This tool kit contains eight commercially available, 23 mm. diameter, foam swabs that can be used to aseptically collect samples while at vacuum. The swabs are individually housed in aluminum canisters that are equipped with 0.2 μm Teflon filters. These filters allow the canisters to equilibrate to pressure changes while preventing microbiological contamination. The canisters will be cleaned and sterilized before flight. Results from ground-based testing indicate that this tool kit is capable of aseptically collecting microbes while at vacuum without becoming contaminated during pressure changes(5). Based on the results of this ground testing we have modified the tool kit to meet NASA safety requirements and improve the ergonomics. We added additional mounting points to the tool kit to give astronauts more options for securing it during use. We also changed the opening mechanism to improve the precision with which swabs can be extracted from the tool kit. We plan to use this kit on an upcoming EVA to collect samples from non-propulsive vents and areas near the U.S. airlock on ISS. These samples will be frozen at -80 ̊C and stored on station until they can be returned to Earth. We will analyze these returned samples using next generation DNA sequencing to determine the community composition and function of external ISS environments. The results of this study will close planetary protection knowledge gaps for crewed missions and will help NASA determine appropriate planetary protection requirements for life support systems. The tool kit will also be useful for collecting aseptic samples on upcoming crewed or robotic missions and could easily be modified to collect samples with organic contamination control requirements as well.

A B Regberg↗

DOE OSTI2025

Integrase-on-Demand

SAND2025-07449O Integrase-on-Demand is a software tool that allows users to identify regions in genomic sequences where genetic material can be integrated with high probability. It uses a database of integrases and their DNA attachment sites to search against any genomic sequence, producing a list of open sites, the integrase sequence, and the source of the genomic island. The program requires MASH software to be available on the system. It consists of a main script and a precomputed input file, with a taxonomy mode that searches closely related genomes and a search mode that looks for identical attachment site matches in the integrase/attachment input file. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Williams, Kelly [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-CA), Li↗

DOE OSTI2025

Secure biosystems design in Saccharomyces cerevisiae establishes effective biocontainment strategies and mechanisms of escape

The widespread application of recombinant DNA and synthetic biology approaches for microbial metabolic engineering pursuits has motivated the development of biocontainment strategies, targeting safe and secure deployment of genetically modified microorganisms (GMMs). However, the design rules and mechanistic drivers governing biocontainment efficacy, as well as impacts of biocontainment upon microbial fitness, remain to be comprehensively evaluated, hindering predictive design and application of these strategies. We have developed a platform for high-resolution analysis of a transactivated kill switch in laboratory and industrial strains of Saccharomyces cerevisiae to assess modes of biocontainment escape and establish design rules for development of kill switch systems in diverse microbes. A camphor-regulated, RelE toxin system was systematically deployed to assess the impacts of differential kill switch copy number and ploidy in laboratory vs industrial strains. CRISPR-mediated integration of the biocontainment system at various loci revealed rapid escape events driven, in part, by mutations to both the Cam-transactivator (cam-TA) and RelE toxin. Genetic engineering enabled recapitulation of escape phenotypes, confirming mechanisms of escape and establishing structure-function relationships in the cam-TA system. Interestingly, genomic resequencing of escape mutants also revealed a series of off-target mutations, implicating additional modes of kill switch escape. Multi-copy integration of the kill switch system mitigated these effects by orders of magnitude, without compromising the biosynthetic capacity of the microbes, but proved insufficient to establish sustained biocontainment. The resultant data define a series of key design rules for next-generation biocontainment strategies and add to a growing foundational knowledge base targeting establishment of secure biosystems designs.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗