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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Progress on the MARVEL Cybersecurity by Design Model-Based Systems Engineering Project

Formal model-based systems engineering (MBSE) combines a model, systems thinking, and systems engineering to visually depict the boundaries, context, and behavior of interconnected systems, facilitating effective design, development, and utilization of engineered systems throughout the systems engineering lifecycle. Although nuclear reactor vendors employ these tools to integrate functionality, performance, and safety, they are not yet addressing digital risk concerns introduced by use of operational technology, such as digital instrumentation and control systems. To accomplish this objective, the Microreactor Applications Research Validation and EvaLuation (MARVEL) microreactor was used as an MBSE case study. This real-world application provides a first-of-a-kind opportunity to demonstrate the benefits of integrating digital risk and cybersecurity into the MBSE design process of a nuclear reactor. This paper provides an update of the ongoing MARVEL Cyber MBSE project as it specifically relates to the integration of digital risk management and cybersecurity by design.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Defensive Cybersecurity Architecture Design Using Force-on-Force Cyber-Physical Modeling

Currently, nuclear power plant physical security systems are highly dependent on air-gaps as a protective measure against cyber-threats. Cyber-physical threats become more likely as advanced cyber-threat capabilities to jump air-gaps transition into common use. Defending against the emerging threat of cyber-enabled physical intrusions is poorly understood. The consequence of these cyber-physical attacks has no quantitative analysis method to inform risk-informed, performance-based cybersecurity approaches. By modifying the physical security simulation tool Dante, cyber-physical threat consequence was able to be analyzed on a notional facility. The results of this analysis are used to design a Defensive Cybersecurity Architecture (DCSA) for the physical security system to produce example resilience measures for this notional facility. A DCSA defines security levels to provide a graded approach for defending plant functions, and security zones for trusted communication between systems. This approach can be applied to real world systems to produce physical protection systems and response measures that are resilient to cyber-physical threats.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Design of Defensive Cybersecurity Architectures for Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactors

This report presents the design of defensive cybersecurity architectures (DCSAs) for Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactors (SFRs). A DCSA is a cybersecurity design feature that places systems into security zones in a graded approach according to the importance of the functions performed by the systems. DCSA design efforts for advanced reactors may commence as early as the system-level design phase. This design approach is consistent with the draft regulatory guide for advanced reactor cybersecurity programs (DG-5075) and enables advanced reactor designers to consider the effects of security-by design (SeBD) features on their DCSAs. Integration of DCSA design and other cybersecurity activities with the traditional design process as part of a SeBD framework may enable advanced reactor designers to improve the security posture of their plants while reducing implementation and operating costs. This report provides a DCSA template for an exemplar SFR and how the template may be optimized for a given SFR design.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

ARCADE Analysis Methods & Validation Pathway

The Advanced Reactor Cyber Analysis and Development Environment (ARCADE) provides an automated analysis system which supports risk-informed performance based (RIPB) evaluations of nuclear control systems. Every possible cyber threat which could lead to consequence is identified by simulating the unsafe control action sequences which transform digital harm into physical harm. Eliminating the simulation of complex digital cyber attack chains cuts out unnecessary computational overhead and focuses directly on the physics of cyber-physical attacks. This focus enables designers to make informed decisions which can entirely eliminate categories of cyber threats against advanced reactors through the physical nature of the plant design. This narrowing of cyber threat against nuclear power plants through the physics of the system is intended to make any remaining threat management and cost efficient. This is the goal of the Tiered Cyber Analysis (TCA) outlined in NRC Draft Regulation Guide (RG) 5.96, which provides a RIPB cybersecurity approach for new reactors. ARCADE has been custom developed to meet the demands of the rigorous analysis required in Tier 1 of the TCA, which forms the foundation of the TCA process. Currently, ARCADE is still under development, but has made significant leaps in capability. A pilot analysis on the opensource Asherah simulator was performed which demonstrated key functionality goals. The next stage of ARCADE development involves improvements to the applications which support the analysis system, and enabling the analysis system to utilize the full suite of unsafe control action simulations. Since the analysis method’s core functions are complete, validation of the analysis method will be started concurrent to the next development stages. The automated analysis ARCADE will provide can radically change the cybersecurity design process for advanced reactors, reducing the cost of security implementation while enhancing cyber resilience. The pathway for ARCADE’s development to this goal has become much clearer. The majority of technical hurdles have been cleared, and the remaining development needs have been solidified. ARCADE is now capable of assisting the advanced reactor design process and directly support advanced reactor industry RIPB practices.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Internship Presentation: Integrating Safety and Cybersecurity: Security-by-Design with SOWT Analysis for Reactor Testing

This study covers leveraging reactor testing facilities that are primarily designed with a focus on safety to enhance cybersecurity testing. By incorporating reactor security-by-design with reactor safety-by-design principles and adopting defense-in-depth strategies that emphasize both safety and security, the research evaluates applicable cyber tools, models, and solutions. This includes simulating specific cyber-attack scenarios using reactor simulators and performing SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis to improve the cybersecurity of reactor systems.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗
DOE OSTI2026

Cyote-attack Chain Estimator

Attack Chain Estimator (ACE) Application Overview The Attack Chain Estimator (ACE) Application is a sophisticated tool designed for the ingestion, classification, sequencing, and enrichment of cybersecurity threat reports. This application leverages advanced machine learning models and extensive historical data to provide comprehensive insights into cyber threats, specifically targeting Industrial Control Systems (ICS). Purpose The primary functions of the ACE Application include: Ingestion of Cybersecurity Threat Reporting: Capable of ingesting text-based threat reports in markdown or text file format. Supports ingestion of structured data from other sources in STIX/JSON format. Classification of Report’s Text-Based Events: Utilizes a DeBERTa classifier, specifically trained on cybersecurity data, to map the events to MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Tactics and Techniques. Classification is performed using multiple Jupyter notebooks and machine learning workflows hosted as FastAPI microservices: regex_data deberta_base_35_train_hft_classifier_mlflow.ipynb hft_regex_classifier_mlflow.ipynb param_train_hft_classifier_mlflow.ipynb regex_tactic_tech.ipynb Ordering of Tactics, Techniques, and Observable Events: Sequences the identified tactics, techniques, and events to form a coherent attack chain. Enrichment with Historical Attack Chain Details: Enhances the attack chain with details from historical attacks using a Markov model developed from CyOTE Precursor Analysis Report data. The Markov model is available as a FastAPI endpoint for seamless integration. Enrichment with Adversary Emulation Capabilities Data: Integrates adversary emulation capabilities data using MITRE Caldera for OT adversary abilities UUIDs. Export of Output Files: Provides options to export the enriched attack chain in JSON or CSV formats. Routing of Output to Other Applications: Facilitates routing of output to various platforms and applications, including: Threat Intelligence Platforms COREII Scout for Threat Intelligence Analysis COREII Modeling and Simulation for Adversary Emulation Technical Description The ACE Application is an advanced cybersecurity tool designed to provide detailed threat analysis and sequence generation. It is built on a robust architecture that integrates natural language processing, machine learning, and historical data modeling. Key Components: Data Ingestion Module: Handles the input of threat reports and data from various formats, ensuring flexibility in data sources. Classification Engine: Employs DeBERTa-based classifiers hosted as FastAPI microservices to analyze and classify threat report events in accordance with the MITRE ATT&CK framework for ICS. Sequence Generator: Orders the classified events into a logical attack chain, providing clear insight into the sequence of tactics and techniques used in the threat. Enrichment Engine: Integrates historical data and adversary emulation capabilities to enhance the attack chain with valuable context and additional details. The historical data enrichment is powered by a Markov model, which is available as a FastAPI endpoint. Export and Routing Module: Facilitates the export of the enriched attack chain in multiple formats and routes the output to designated applications for further analysis or emulation.

Paul, Tony [Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Idaho↗
DOE OSTI2026

Cybersecurity Risk Profiles for Distributed Energy Resource Management Systems

Managing the digitalization of increasingly diversity energy resources is a complex challenge for energy systems planners and managers. As the penetration of solar photovoltaics (PV) and other distributed renewable energy resources (DERs) expands, distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS) will play an increasingly important role in managing, monitoring, and controlling DERs as electric systems before more distributed, interconnected, and networked. However, the cybersecurity implications of DERMS deployments are not well understood today. A lack of understanding around the cybersecurity implications of DERMS deployments and variability in the security posture of DERMS vendors, owners, and operators could introduce new security risks to evolving electric power systems. This paper describes cybersecurity attack scenarios on DERMS, identifies related cybersecurity standards and guidelines, reviews the security features of state-of-the-art DERMS solutions, and offers cybersecurity guidance for DERMS vendors, owners, and operators to protect DERMS' unique capabilities. Standardizing cybersecurity requirements for DERMS could help improve the security of DERMS integrations and improve innovations that are more secure by design. The cybersecurity guidance found in this paper is intended to offer a unified approach and lay the foundation for future standardization of DERMS cybersecurity to reduce risk to the solar industry and other renewable energy stakeholders when integrating these technologies with electric power systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Grid Communications: Cybersecurity and Supply Chain Challenges and Emerging Regulation Session Three

The TADA Grid Communications Workshops are designed to strengthen cybersecurity and digital assurance across the energy sector by focusing on secure deployment and management of grid communications technologies. These workshops bring together state energy offices, utilities, and technology suppliers to explore the intersection of communications infrastructure, supply chain risks, and emerging regulatory requirements. Participants will apply Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to reduce risks in communications systems, engage with INL’s procurement guidance, and explore future tools. Through scenario-based exercises and peer exchange, attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their grid communications projects. The workshops also help participants navigate evolving regulatory frameworks such as FEOC rules in the OBBB, NERC CIP-013, and NDAA 2024, while identifying compliance gaps in mixed-technology environments. A key outcome is the formation of a practitioner network with ongoing access to INL expertise and resources, fostering long-term resilience in the digital energy ecosystem. This is Session 3 of 3 (Full Version).

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2026

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Power Generation Guide [Slides]

This guide offers suggestions for applying CIE principles to technologies used to generate electric power. It addresses issues of design, implementation, and maintenance, preemptively addressing cybersecurity threats to electric generation. The intended audience for this guide includes practitioners across the energy and cybersecurity sectors, such as energy industry professionals (e.g., engineers, system designers, operators, and researchers) and cybersecurity experts (e.g., communication system designers, information technology/operational technology [IT/OT] administrators, and penetration testers).

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Grid Communications: Digital Assurance and Supply Chain Challenges and Emerging Regulation Session Two

The TADA Grid Communications Workshops are designed to strengthen cybersecurity and digital assurance across the energy sector by focusing on secure deployment and management of grid communications technologies. These workshops bring together state energy offices, utilities, and technology suppliers to explore the intersection of communications infrastructure, supply chain risks, and emerging regulatory requirements. Participants will apply Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to reduce risks in communications systems, engage with INL’s procurement guidance, and explore future tools. Through scenario-based exercises and peer exchange, attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their grid communications projects. The workshops also help participants navigate evolving regulatory frameworks such as FEOC rules in the OBBB, NERC CIP-013, and NDAA 2024, while identifying compliance gaps in mixed-technology environments. A key outcome is the formation of a practitioner network with ongoing access to INL expertise and resources, fostering long-term resilience in the digital energy ecosystem. This is Session 2 of 3 (Full Version).

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Grid Communications Supply Chain & Emerging Regulation Challenges Session 1

The TADA Grid Communications Workshops are designed to strengthen cybersecurity and digital assurance across the energy sector by focusing on secure deployment and management of grid communications technologies. These workshops bring together state energy offices, utilities, and technology suppliers to explore the intersection of communications infrastructure, supply chain risks, and emerging regulatory requirements. Participants will apply Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to reduce risks in communications systems, engage with INL’s procurement guidance, and explore future tools. Through scenario-based exercises and peer exchange, attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their grid communications projects. The workshops also help participants navigate evolving regulatory frameworks such as FEOC rules in the OBBB, NERC CIP-013, and NDAA 2024, while identifying compliance gaps in mixed-technology environments. A key outcome is the formation of a practitioner network with ongoing access to INL expertise and resources, fostering long-term resilience in the digital energy ecosystem.

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗
NASA NTRS2018

Application Software Cybersecurity Scanning

Scanning software applications for cybersecurity vulnerabilities is a crucial step is assessing the overall health of the application, but how can this kind of scan be performed to give development teams the information they need to make informed design decisions? Two pilot cybersecurity scans were conducted in an attempt to answer this question. A scanning team composed of various subject matter experts was established and worked closely with the development team to perform these scans and capture metrics throughout the process. These interactions and metrics indicate that these scans can be performed in an unobtrusive way and still provide valuable information to development teams regarding the health of their application. This work is not definitive in nature but serves as a foundation for future work.

Barner, Lyle↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Integration into Model- Based Systems Engineering (MBSE)

Engineering design in the field of industrial engineering, such as designing automated factories or warehouses, is critical for the effective operation of facilities. Any design flaws introduced early can result in significant capital expenses to correct. However, early-stage engineering design is inherently complex. The systems are not yet built, requiring designers to integrate various aspects, including digital engineering and cybersecurity, to support virtual representations throughout the design process. In this study, we propose an approach to integrate Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into model-based systems engineering (MBSE). This approach facilitates the development of a digital thread for engineering systems, ensuring secure digital artifacts in the design of industrial engineering systems.

42 - ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

GridSTIX

SF-25-112 Grid-STIX is a comprehensive extension of the STIX (Structured Threat Information Expression) 2.1 ontology specifically designed for electrical grid cybersecurity applications. This ontology provides a standardized, machine-readable framework for modeling grid assets, operational technology devices, threats, vulnerabilities, supply chain risks, and security relationships in electrical power systems. ## Key Features - **Comprehensive Grid Coverage**: Physical assets, OT devices, grid components, sensors, and energy storage systems - **Zero Trust Architecture**: Policy decision points, enforcement points, trust brokers, and continuous monitoring - **AMI Infrastructure**: Advanced metering networks, head-end systems, mesh gateways, and MDM systems - **Advanced Security Modeling**: Attack patterns, vulnerabilities, mitigations, and supply chain risks - **Critical Grid Relationships**: Power flow, protection, control, and synchronization relationships - **Supply Chain Security**: Supplier modeling, country of origin tracking, and risk assessment - **Protocol Support**: DNP3, Modbus, IEC 61850, IEC 60870-5-104, OPC-UA, and IEEE standards - **Python Code Generation**: Automated STIX-compliant Python class generation from ontologies - **Interactive Visualization**: Enhanced HTML network graphs with grid-specific categorization - **STIX 2.1 Compliance**: Full compatibility with STIX threat intelligence ecosystem

Blakely, Benjamin [Argonne National Laboratory (AN↗
DOE OSTI2026

Cyber Halo Innovation Research Program (CHIRP) Handbook: CHIRP Program Document 2026

The Cyber Halo Innovation Research Program (CHIRP) handbook outlines a comprehensive framework designed to advance space cybersecurity education, workforce development, recruitment efforts for United States Space Force (USSF) Space Systems Command (SSC) and the Department of the Airforce, and foster students’ professional growth. It provides an overview of CHIRP's objectives and strategic focus, establishing the foundation for participant engagement through a network of collaborations with academic institutions, contracted industry partners, training and certification organizations, federal agencies, and community organizations. It states a clear participation strategy for SSC and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) for program execution and successful support for student transition to a career in space cybersecurity.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗