Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Cybersecurity Metrics”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records

Linking Threat Agents to Targeted Organizations: A Pipeline for Enhanced Cybersecurity Risk Metrics

In this study, we present a methodology leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) to transform Cybersecurity Threat Intelligence (CTI) narratives into actionable insights for individual organizations. Our approach automates the extraction of machine-readable adversary SKRAM (Skills, Knowledge, Resources, Authorities, and Motivation) attributes from open-source reports, extending LLM utility beyond typical interactions. This innovation enables precise, automated assessments of cybersecurity risks posed by various adversaries. Using a chain-of-thought and multi-shot prompting strategy, our methodology advances the automation of cybersecurity feature extraction for new machine-learning models that predict the risk of adversary targeting. This approach is refined using a substantial dataset of over 150 analyst-validated threat reports and synthetic organizational data from 900 companies. Here, by bootstrapping the training data with a rule-based heuristic over synthetic data, we have developed a high-accuracy machine-learning model that allows entities to dynamically prioritize threats and defensive actions.

Cyber Threat Intelligence↗

Assessing DER Network Cybersecurity Defences in a Power-Communication Co-Simulation Environment

Increasing penetrations of interoperable distributed energy resources (DER) in the electric power system are expanding the power system attack surface. Maloperation or malicious control of DER equipment can now cause substantial disturbances to grid operations. Fortunately, many options exist to defend and limit adversary impact on these newly-created DER communication networks, which typically traverse the public internet. However, implementing these security features will increase communication latency, thereby adversely impacting real-time DER grid support service effectiveness. In this work, a collection of software tools called SCEPTRE were used to create a co-simulation environment where SunSpec-compliant PV inverters were deployed as virtual machines and interconnected to simulated communication network equipment. Network segmentation, encryption, and moving target defence security features were deployed on the control network to evaluate their influence on cybersecurity metrics and power system performance. The results indicated that adding these security features did not impact DER-based grid control systems but improved the cybersecurity posture of the network when implemented appropriately.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Secure, Scalable Control and Communications for Distributed PV

An increasing number of jurisdictions are adopting Distributed Energy Resource (DER) interconnection standards which require photovoltaic (PV) inverters, energy storage systems, and other DER to include interoperable grid-support functionality. These functions provide grid operators the nobs to support local and bulk power system operations with DER equipment, but the associated grid operator-to-DER communications networks must be deployed with appropriate cybersecurity features. In some situations, additional security features may prevent control system scalability or increase communication latencies and dropouts. These unintentional consequences of the security features would therefore hinder the ability of the grid operator to implement specific control algorithms. This project evaluated the tradeoffs between power system performance and cybersecurity metrics for several grid services.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Secure Scalable Control and Communications for Distributed PV (Final Technical Report)

An increasing number of jurisdictions are adopting Distributed Energy Resource (DER) interconnection standards which require photovoltaic (PV) inverters, energy storage systems, and other DER to include interoperable grid-support functionality. These functions provide grid operators the nobs to support local and bulk power system operations with DER equipment, but the associated grid operator-to-DER communications networks must be deployed with appropriate cybersecurity features. In some situations, additional security features may prevent control system scalability or increase communication latencies and dropouts. These unintentional consequences of the security features would therefore hinder the ability of the grid operator to implement specific control algorithms. This project evaluated the tradeoffs between power system performance and cybersecurity metrics for several grid services. This was conducted in two parts.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Validating Cyber Security Requirements: A Case Study

Vulnerabilities in a system may have widely varying impacts on system security. In practice, security should not be defined as the absence of vulnerabilities. In practice, security should not be quantified by the number of vulnerabilities. Security should be managed by pursuing a policy that leads us first to the highest impact vulnerabilities. In light of these observations, we argue in favor of shifting our focus from vulnerability avoidance/removal to measurable security attributes. To this effect, we recommend a logic be used for system security, which captures/represents security properties in quantifiable, verifiable, measurable terms so that it is possible to reason about security in terms of its observable/perceptible effects rather than its hypothesized causes. This approach is orthogonal to existing techniques for vulnerability avoidance, removal, detection, and recovery, in the sense that it provides a means to assess, quantify, and combine these techniques.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

CyberMESA: Evaluation Procedures and Metrics for Charging Infrastructure Cybersecurity

A report detailing the cybersecurity evaluation and assessment procedures for EV charging infrastructure. This report is authored by three national lab contributors. INL, PNNL, NRL. The grid integration of Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure (EVCI) is a large and complex system of systems (SoS) made up of components from many manufacturers and integrated by various companies responsible for their operation and maintenance. This complexity makes it challenging to implement security standards like IEC 62443 across the entire infrastructure. This document aims to aid in the vulnerability assessments of individual devices, such as Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE), to support vendors in adopting and implementing security standards such as UL 2900, NIST SP 800-53 and Common Criteria (CC) (ISO/IEC 15408). This document serves as a guide to help evaluate the cybersecurity posture of EVCI assets. It aims to provide a consistent method for evaluating EVCI, enabling cybersecurity research teams to systematically test a wide range of electric vehicle (EV) assets. The target audiences include cybersecurity research teams, vendor development teams, automotive OEMs, and third-party evaluators.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Technical Guide for Implementing Cybersecurity Continuous Monitoring in the Nuclear Industry

A technical guide to assist the nuclear industry in implementing cybersecurity continuous monitoring program. The guide walks through the steps to develop a cybersecurity continuous monitoring program and provides details relative to the nuclear industry. It also includes a series of examples of optional metrics to be used, and technologies that can be useful when implementing a continuous monitoring program.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

CPES-QSM: A Quantitative Method Towards the Secure Operation of Cyber-Physical Energy Systems

Power systems are evolving into cyber-physical energy systems (CPES) mainly due to the integration of modern communication and Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices. CPES security evaluation is challenging since the physical and cyber layers are often not considered holistically. Existing literature focuses on only optimizing the operation of either the physical or cyber layer while ignoring the interactions between them. This paper proposes a metric, the Cyber-Physical Energy System Quantitative Security Metric (CPES-QSM), that quantifies the interaction between the cyber and physical layers across three domains: electrical, cyber-risk, and network topology. A method for incorporating the proposed cyber-metric into operational decisions is also proposed by formulating a cyber-constrained AC optimal power flow (C-ACOPF) that considers the status of all the CPES layers. The C-ACOPF considers the vulnerabilities of physical and cyber networks by incorporating factors such as voltage stability, contingencies, graph-theory, and IoT cyber risks, while using a multi-criteria decision-making technique. We note that simulation studies are conducted using standard IEEE test systems to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed metric and the C-ACOPF formulation.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Addressing the Need for Independence in the CSE Model

Abstract Information system security risk, defined as the product of the monetary losses associated with security incidents and the probability that they occur, is a suitable decision criterion when considering different information system architectures. Risk assessment is the widely accepted process used to understand, quantify, and document the effects of undesirable events on organizational objectives so that risk management, continuity of operations planning, and contingency planning can be performed. One technique, the Cyberspace Security Econometrics System (CSES), is a methodology for estimating security costs to stakeholders as a function of possible risk postures. In earlier works, we presented a computational infrastructure that allows an analyst to estimate the security of a system in terms of the loss that each stakeholder stands to sustain, as a result of security breakdowns. Additional work has applied CSES to specific business cases. The current state-of-the-art of CSES addresses independent events. In typical usage, analysts create matrices that capture their expert opinion, and then use those matrices to quantify costs to stakeholders. This expansion generalizes CSES to the common real-world case where events may be dependent.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Multi-Centrality Graph Spectral Decompositions and Their Application to Cyber Intrusion Detection

Many modern datasets can be represented as graphs and hence spectral decompositions such as graph principal component analysis (PCA) can be useful. Distinct from previous graph decomposition approaches based on subspace projection of a single topological feature, e.g., the centered graph adjacency matrix (graph Laplacian), we propose spectral decomposition approaches to graph PCA and graph dictionary learning that integrate multiple features, including graph walk statistics, centrality measures and graph distances to reference nodes. In this paper we propose a new PCA method for single graph analysis, called multi-centrality graph PCA (MC-GPCA), and a new dictionary learning method for ensembles of graphs, called multi-centrality graph dictionary learning (MC-GDL), both based on spectral decomposition of multi-centrality matrices. As an application to cyber intrusion detection, MC-GPCA can be an effective indicator of anomalous connectivity pattern and MC-GDL can provide discriminative basis for attack classification.

cybersecurity↗

Deep Reinforcement Learning for Resilient Power and Energy Systems: Progress, Prospects, and Future Avenues

In recent years, deep reinforcement learning (DRL) has garnered substantial attention in the context of enhancing resilience in power and energy systems. Resilience, characterized by the ability to withstand, absorb, and quickly recover from natural disasters and human-induced disruptions, has become paramount in ensuring the stability and dependability of critical infrastructure. This comprehensive review delves into the latest advancements and applications of DRL in enhancing the resilience of power and energy systems, highlighting significant contributions and key insights. The exploration commences with a concise elucidation of the fundamental principles of DRL, highlighting the intricate interplay among reinforcement learning (RL), deep learning, and the emergence of DRL. Furthermore, it categorizes and describes various DRL algorithms, laying a robust foundation for comprehending the applicability of DRL. The linkage between DRL and power system resilience is forged through a systematic classification of DRL applications into five pivotal dimensions: dynamic response, recovery and restoration, energy management and control, communications and cybersecurity, and resilience planning and metrics development. This structured categorization facilitates a methodical exploration of how DRL methodologies can effectively tackle critical challenges within the domain of power and energy system resilience. The review meticulously examines the inherent challenges and limitations entailed in integrating DRL into power and energy system resilience, shedding light on practical challenges and potential pitfalls. Additionally, it offers insights into promising avenues for future research, with the aim of inspiring innovative solutions and further progress in this vital domain.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

California Energy Systems for the 21st Century (CES-21) Annual Report - 2018

The California Energy Systems for the 21st Century (CES-21) Program is a public-private collaborative research and development (R&D) program between the California Joint Utilities1 and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The purpose of this annual report is to provide the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC or Commission) with a summary of the 2018 progress of the CES-21 Program2. The CES-21 Program is designed to research solutions for the medium- and far-term challenges of a fastevolving energy marketplace. The program is comprised of two projects: Cybersecurity Project and Grid Integration - Flexibility Metrics Project. This report provides information on the operations of the CES-21 program, including projects funded, results of research, efforts made to involve third parties, and intellectual property that results from the research.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Cybersecurity Guide for Distributed Wind Presentation

This presentation communicates information about the MIRACL project Resilience Metrics report and Resilience Framework report. It was created for the 2021 MIRACL advisory board meeting. Distributed wind sits at the intersection of grid-connected, off-grid and behind-the-meter cyber-physical electrical energy systems. The unique physical properties and communications requirements for distributed wind systems mean that there are unique cybersecurity considerations, but there is little to no existing guidance on best practices for cybersecurity. This presentation is intended to be a starting point for distributed wind stakeholders including manufacturers, installers and integrators, and operators (facility, aggregator, or utility). A holistic threat perspective is used to describe the adversaries, threats, and potential impacts of cyberattacks, with special emphasis on what sets distributed wind systems apart from other distributed energy resources (DER). We present the recommendations for cybersecurity, both in terms of needs of the system and roles that specific stakeholders should fulfill. Distributed wind systems can come in a variety of architectures and applications, so there is no one-size-fits-all approach to cybersecurity. However, this document contains the relevant information for stakeholders to identify the cybersecurity needs of their system, refer to relevant standards, and apply best practices in a manner most consistent with their security and operational goals.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

ARCADES: analysis of risk from cyberattack against defensive strategies for the power grid

In this study, the authors introduce ARCADES (Analysis of Risk from Cyberattack against DEfensive Strategy), a technique to systematically explore the cybersecurity defence strategies based on contingency rankings in power systems. While cybersecurity defensive standards exist, these approaches are primarily based on expert opinions, rather than systematic studies of risk. ARCADES presents an approach to identify improved cybersecurity defensive strategies based on a graph‐based cyber‐physical security model that is evaluated by resistance‐distance metrics and then prioritised based on contingency analysis studies of the system. This study also proposed a technique that identifies the most critical cybersecurity mechanisms to protect the power grid. Planning and operation: those two applications for cybersecurity on power grid mainly explored in this study. For planning, a systematic method is developed to verify the effectiveness of security strategies and for operation, prioritised the security mechanism for auditing and monitoring purpose. As a case study, they analyse the IEEE‐14 bus, IEEE‐30 bus, and IEEE‐118 bus systems, observe the defensive strategies, and calculate substation criticality ranking by using the authors’ proposed method.

Touhiduzzaman, Md↗

Performance Assessments of Demand Flexibility from Grid-Interactive Efficient Buildings: Issues and Considerations

This SEE Action Network report explains basic concepts and fundamental considerations for assessing the actual demand flexibility performance of buildings participating in demand flexibility programs and responding to time-varying retail rates. Demand flexibility is the capability of distributed energy resources (DERs) to adjust a building’s load profile across different timescales. Assessments determine the timing, location, quantity, and quality of grid services provided. The results can be used for financial settlements and to improve performance of demand flexibility, support its consideration in resource potential studies and electricity system planning, and contribute to cost-effectiveness evaluations. While practitioners and regulators regularly find opportunities to improve performance assessments of demand-related services, to a large degree current best practices are sufficient for basic service offerings as demand flexibility is implemented today. However, advances in assessment practices will be required in a future with grid-interactive efficient buildings (GEBs) that provide continuous demand flexibility by integrating multiple DERs and flexibility modes (load shed, load shift, modulate, and generate). Example practices include using new baseline constructs—including whether baselines are even required for certain building flexibility modes or configurations, deploying more advanced metering and analytics, further developing cybersecurity standards, improving communication standards for increased interoperability, and establishing performance metrics and assessment procedures for load modulation as it is more fully defined and implemented. This report provides information on prioritizing and designing performance assessment elements for demand flexibility programs and time-varying retail rates, assessment protocols, and research and development needs. Additional research sponsored by DOE’s Building Technologies Office offers more detailed technical information on assessing performance of demand flexibility, including definition of performance metrics.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Towards a New Supply Chain Cybersecurity Risk Analysis Technique

Supply chain cyber-attacks, such as the SolarWinds Orion attack, are occurring with greater frequency. These attacks compromise a digital device before it is sent to customers, bypassing traditional security controls to remain persistent and undetected in operational environments. While supply chain attacks are prevalent, methods for analyzing the risk of these attacks are currently unavailable. This paper proposes new supply chain cyber-attack difficulty and risk metrics to evaluate the relative risk of an attack throughout the supply chain lifecycle. Difficulty metrics for each stakeholder in a digital device’s supply chain (e.g., hardware manufacturing, firmware development, software development, storage, and distribution entities) are calculated using scores from cybersecurity maturity questionnaires in a Bayesian Network leaky Noisy-MAX model. These difficulty metrics are then used to calculate an overall supply chain cyber-attack risk. Vulnerability and recoverability metrics are also proposed to evaluate the relative stakeholder influence in the attack risk. These proposed relative risk metrics enable continuous supply chain monitoring, provide decision-makers with information necessary for improved supplier selection, and help drive improvements in the cybersecurity posture of the stakeholders in their supply chain.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Cybersecurity Methods for Grid-Connected Power Electronics

The present work shows a secure-by-design process, defense-in-depth method, and security techniques for a secure distributed energy resource. The distributed energy resource is a cybersecure, solar inverter and battery energy storage system prototype, collectively called the Cybersecure Power Router. Consideration is given to the use of the Smart Green Power Node for a foundation of the present work. Metrics for controller security are investigated to evaluate firmware security techniques. The prototype's ability to mitigate, respond to, and recover from firmware integrity degradation is examined. The prototype shows many working security techniques within the context of a grid-connected, distributed energy resource. Further work is expected in the Cybersecure Power Router project. Consideration is also provided for the migration of the present research and the Smart Green Power Node to realize a pre-production prototype.

Moquin, Stephen Joe↗