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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Evaluating cyber-risk in synchrophasor systems

Technology related to evaluating cyber-risk for synchrophasor systems is disclosed. In one example of the disclosed technology, a method includes generating an event tree model of a timing-attack on a synchrophasor system architecture. The event tree model can be based on locations and types of timing-attacks, an attack likelihood, vulnerabilities and detectability along a scenario path, and consequences of the timing-attack. A cyber-risk score of the synchrophasor system architecture can be determined using the event tree model. The synchrophasor system architecture can be adapted in response to the cyber-risk score.

Pal, Seemita↗
DOE OSTI2021

Survey of Cyber Risk Analysis Techniques for Use in the Nuclear Industry

Using traditional probabilistic risk analysis methods for severe accident safety risk management on non-digital systems, structures, and components at nuclear power plants is well-established. In contrast, cyber risk analysis of digital assets is still an immature field with unproven techniques due, in part, to the continuously changing threat environment and the challenge of digital assets failing in unexpected ways. As the nuclear fleet continues to adopt digital instrumentation and control systems, it is increasingly important to have effective and efficient cyber risk analysis techniques to support risk management decisions, such as risk elimination by system redesign or risk mitigation by implementation of prioritized security controls. To understand the state of the art in cyber risk analysis for future research, we surveyed 36 publications across ten application domains. We describe our survey methodology and rate each technique based upon scope, adoptability, and repeatability. In this work, we examine the unique constraints of the nuclear industry and outline the strengths and weaknesses of using the cyber risk analysis techniques in the industry, highlighting gaps with current techniques. We also discuss challenges and potential research directions for advancing the science for both existing and new advanced reactors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Sovereign Credit Rating Processes Adapted to Critical Infrastructure Cyber Risk Assessment

United States critical infrastructure entities are increasingly targeted by motivated and capable threat actors and must be prepared to assess and treat a diverse range of cyber risks. Consequently, this necessitates some form of analytical process to evaluate risks and inform cyber security investment decisions. A potential solution for structuring cyber risk evaluation exists within the field of sovereign credit ratings – where agencies employ mature approaches that integrate quantitative and qualitative data to produce a singular value of assessment. Adapting such approaches, we present a novel criterion and methodology for measuring and communicating the likelihood element of cyber risk. The methodology is composed of three sequential phases: a quantitative baseline organized by distinct capability frames, a bounded qualitative adjustment per frame, and a greater-bounded qualitative adjustment spanning the entire process. The process culminates in publication of a cyber capability rating that communicates a critical infrastructure entity’s ability and willingness to mitigate discontinuous function due to cyberattack.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2017

Consider the Consequences: A Powerful Approach for Reducing ICS Cyber Risk

Here, by identifying and analyzing threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts, asset owners can develop a risk profile for their industrial control systems (ICSs). This information is essential in developing, prioritizing, and implementing mitigations to reduce ICS cyber risk. To help bridge the gap between the cyber and physical domains, and gain a better understanding of cascading cyber/physical impacts, this paper will discuss the safety perspective of physical impacts, describe the ICS cyber kill chain model, explain the cyber/physical interface, review the “layers of protection analysis model” from a security perspective, discuss protection layers, and suggest a reference architecture for securing digital control devices.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber risk assessment and investment optimization using game theory and ML-based anomaly detection and mitigation for wide-area control in smart grids

The electric power grid is increasingly becoming susceptible to cyber attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in the smart grid control, information, and physical layers. Successful cyber attacks can have catastrophic impacts on the social and economic well-being of any nation all over the globe. It has, thus, become imperative to secure the smart grid against such adversarial actions to ensure stable, secure, and reliable operation of the grid. The existing research and industry practices prove to be inadequate in terms of providing pragmatic and effective defense methodologies and measures for long-term cybersecurity planning and real-time cybersecurity for grid operation. For example, existing works lack models that incorporate uncertain behavior of cyber-attackers and pragmatic defense measures for cyber risk assessment and cybersecurity investment optimization which often provide unreliable and strictly qualitative solutions to these problems. At the same time, with the growing number of cyber incidents in the grid, there still exists a need to develop attack-resilient algorithms for wide-area monitoring, protection, and control (WAMPAC) applications like the wide-area voltage control systems (WAVCS) for Flexible AC Transmissions Systems (FACTS) that lack in scalable and feasible solutions from the cybersecurity perspective. This dissertation proposes novel models and methodologies for: (1) Cybersecurity planning, and (2) Cybersecurity for system operation. The cybersecurity planning is achieved through cyber risk assessment and cybersecurity resource investment optimization for long-term cybersecurity of the grid using game theory and attack-defense trees. Cybersecurity for system operation consists of development of cyber anomaly detection and mitigation algorithms for flexible AC transmission system (FACTS) controller-based wide-area voltage control systems (WAVCS) using machine learning (ML), and software defined networking-based moving target defense network routing for achieving real-time cyber-physical security for grid operations. This is followed by hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) implementation and evaluation of these attack prevention, detection, and mitigation algorithms and methodologies showcasing their feasibility in a close to real-world environment. For cybersecurity planning, a novel approach involving a combination of game theory and attack defense trees (ADT) for optimal cybersecurity resource allocation in the smart grid is proposed. This methodology involves modeling of the cyber-physical smart grid substations as ADTs, defining attacker costs, defense costs, and attack probabilities for attack access points. Using game theoretical formulation, optimal defense strategies for the defender of the system to invest cybersecurity resources in the grid are obtained. Additionally, a game-theoretic framework is developed for quantitative cyber-physical risk assessment of the grid under a dynamically changing cyber threat space and uncertain behavior of cyber attackers which is further used to optimize investments in the smart grid's cybersecurity resources. The attacker, defender, and the smart grid system are modeled while incorporating attacker-stochasticity and federal guidelines for smart grid cybersecurity. This allows quantification of threat, vulnerabilities, and attack impact of the grid for quantitative risk assessment. The defender's budget to invest in the security resources in the grid is optimized based on the strategies leading to minimum system risk. The evaluation of the proposed solutions highlight the feasibility for practical implementation of these methodologies and algorithms in the smart grid, while taking the federal requirements and guidelines for smart grid security into consideration. For achieving cybersecurity for system operation, attack prevention, detection, and mitigation algorithms and methodologies are developed specifically for FACTS-based WAVCS. Anomaly detection and mitigation in the WAVCS are achieved using algorithms based on machine learning which involves offline training and testing of ML models with CPS datasets incorporating physics-based features that allow accurate distinction between system faults and cyber attacks. For attack prevention, a methodology based on software defined network (SDN)-based moving target defense (MTD) network routing is proposed that enables prevention of Denial of Service (DoS) type attacks on the smart grid communication system. Subsequently, these methodologies and algorithms are implemented and evaluated on an HIL testbed that allows for real-time attack prevention, detection, and mitigation of emulated cyber attacks on the WAVCS in a close to real-world environment. The results show highly accurate and efficient performance of the implemented algorithms and methodologies with the smart grid system operating within the NERC's system operation limits even in the presence of DoS and data integrity cyber attacks. This work opens up future research opportunities in other directions such as (1) Expanding cybersecurity planning methodologies to real-time cyber contingency analysis with different game formulations; and (2) Applying the cybersecurity for system operation algorithms to broader categories of wide-area control applications.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cyber Risk Considerations for Nuclear Digital I&C Systems

Many engineers and scientists researching modeling and analysis methods for nuclear energy advancement are focused on proof-of-concept and early-stage development for new reactor designs. Since instrumentation and control (I&C) systems are traditionally developed later in the systems engineering lifecycle, researchers may be unfamiliar with modern digital technology used in these I&C systems. It is even more likely that they are unfamiliar with the cyber risks associated with them. This paper provides a brief overview of nuclear digital I&C systems before examining the importance of cyber risk management at nuclear reactors and the benefits of including Cyber-Informed Engineering throughout the systems engineering lifecycle. The primary goal is for engineers and scientists to develop a mindset that incorporates cybersecurity as another discipline alongside safety when designing and developing new technologies, regardless of technology readiness level.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

The Open Science Cyber Risk Profile: The Rosetta Stone for Open Science and Cybersecurity

The Open Science Cyber Risk Profile (OSCRP) working group has created a document that motivates scientists by demonstrating how improving their security posture reduces the risks to their science. This effort aims to both bridge the communication gap between scientists and IT security professionals and allows for the effective management of risks to open science caused by IT security threats.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Overview and Recommendations for Cyber Risk Assessment in Nuclear Power Plants

Digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems are being deployed in nuclear power plants (NPPs) for both existing and advanced reactor designs. As I&C systems become more digitized to allow features like near autonomous control and remote operation, they introduce greater cyber risk to NPPs. Cyberattacks targeting industrial control systems (ICSs) are growing in both qualities and capabilities, which indicates that cybersecurity needs to be an integral part of risk assessment in the industry. Although there are some risk assessment methods in traditional information technology (IT) cybersecurity, the differences between IT and ICS cybersecurity make it infeasible to apply these risk assessment methods directly to ICSs. Some research has focused on risk assessment methods for ICSs, but few studies focus on applications to NPPs. Ideal risk frameworks for the nuclear industry are dynamic and account for system dependencies; this survey review focuses on such risk assessment methods both in and outside the nuclear field. In this article, the major challenges in cybersecurity risk assessment research are pointed out, and further research suggestions and considerations for cyber risk assessment in I&C systems are identified.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2018

Literature Review on Modeling Cyber Networks and Evaluating Cyber Risks

The National Infrastructure Simulations and Analysis Center (NISAC) conducted a literature review on modeling cyber networks and evaluating cyber risks. The literature review explores where modeling is used in the cyber regime and ways that consequence and risk are evaluated. The relevant literature clusters in three different spaces: network security, cyber-physical, and mission assurance. In all approaches, some form of modeling is utilized at varying levels of detail, while the ability to understand consequence varies, as do interpretations of risk. This document summarizes the different literature viewpoints and explores their applicability to securing enterprise networks.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Adapting Traditional Hazards Analysis Methods to Address Cyber Risks

Traditional hazards analysis (HA) methods, originally developed to address physical and operational risks, often fall short when it comes to identifying and mitigating cyber threats. These cyber threats pose unique and evolving risks to critical infrastructure and industrial control systems (ICS). This report explores the integration of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into existing HA methods to enhance their ability to address cyber-induced risks. CIE provides organizations with a practical, cost-effective approach to closing the gap between traditional HA methods and the need for cyber risk mitigation. By leveraging existing safety processes and controls, CIE allows users to examine and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities without overhauling existing HA methods. This report identifies areas where HA and CIE naturally align and where their approaches diverge. It emphasizes how CIE principles can be used to adapt HA methods, broadening their scope to include cyber risks and enabling the mitigation of cyber- induced impacts alongside traditional hazards and failure scenarios. This report examines how CIE can be applied across various HA methods—such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA). It provides strategies for integrating CIE to strengthen the identification, assessment, and mitigation of cyber-induced risks. The findings offer a structured entry point for organizations to embed CIE concepts into hazards and safety analyses, as well as broader engineering processes, ultimately supporting the design and operation of a more resilient infrastructure.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Adapting Traditional Hazards Analysis Methods to Address Cyber Risks

Traditional hazards analysis (HA) methods, originally developed to address physical and operational risks, often fall short when it comes to identifying and mitigating cyber threats. These cyber threats pose unique and evolving risks to critical infrastructure and industrial control systems (ICS). This report explores the integration of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into existing HA methods to enhance their ability to address cyber-induced risks. CIE provides organizations with a practical, cost-effective approach to closing the gap between traditional HA methods and the need for cyber risk mitigation. By leveraging existing safety processes and controls, CIE allows users to examine and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities without overhauling existing HA methods. This report identifies areas where HA and CIE naturally align and where their approaches diverge. It emphasizes how CIE principles can be used to adapt HA methods, broadening their scope to include cyber risks and enabling the mitigation of cyber- induced impacts alongside traditional hazards and failure scenarios. This report examines how CIE can be applied across various HA methods—such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA). It provides strategies for integrating CIE to strengthen the identification, assessment, and mitigation of cyber-induced risks. The findings offer a structured entry point for organizations to embed CIE concepts into hazards and safety analyses, as well as broader engineering processes, ultimately supporting the design and operation of a more resilient infrastructure.

42 - ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Large-Scale Hydrogen Storage Cyber Risk Assessment

Hydrogen storage systems may become more widely deployed throughout the country, and so it is possible that individual and interconnected systems will be exposed to cyber-attacks. These events can cause physical and financial harm to employees, people in the vicinity of the facility, and the company that owns the facility. The two main ways bad actors may access information or control from a hydrogen storage facility are through information technology and operations technology devices, the former of which refers to data and information from networked devices and the latter of which refers to onsite controls for the physical system. Both types of entryways into the system should be considered when companies conduct cyber risk assessments and when regulators develop or revise relevant codes and standards. This report analyzes cybersecurity risks associated with a generic hydrogen storage system by outlining the system's purpose and the importance of its cybersecurity. The hydrogen storage system architecture and communication protocols are provided to understand potential cyber vulnerabilities. Later, an event tree analysis is performed on hydrogen operation to identify system weaknesses by outlining potential attack scenarios. This report also identifies critical cyber assets related to different hydrogen operations followed by an examination of potential threats, and the impact of cyber assets on those operational assets.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2024

Large-Scale Hydrogen Storage Cyber Risk Assessment

Hydrogen storage systems are becoming more widely deployed throughout the country, and as their presence continues to grow, it is possible that individual and interconnected systems will be exposed to cyber-attacks. These events can cause physical and financial harm to employees, people in the vicinity, and to the company that owns the facility. The two main mechanisms malicious actors may access information or control from a hydrogen storage facility are through information technology and operations technology devices, the former of which refers to data and information from networked devices and the latter of which refers to onsite controls for the physical system. Both types of entryways into the system should be considered when facility managers conduct cyber risk assessments and when regulators develop or revise relevant codes and standards. This report analyzes cybersecurity risks applicable to a wide variety of hydrogen storage systems by outlining the system's purpose and the importance of its cybersecurity. The hydrogen storage system architecture and communication protocols are provided to understand potential cyber vulnerabilities. Later, an event tree analysis is performed on hydrogen operation to identify system weaknesses by outlining potential attack scenarios. This report also identifies critical cyber assets related to different hydrogen operations followed by an examination of potential threats, and the impact of cyber assets on those operational assets.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2017

Risk informed cyber security for nuclear power plants - 342

Nuclear power plants are increasingly adding digital components for plant operation, safety, and security. These digital components fill a gap with legacy equipment where replacement components no longer exist. They also benefit operation of the plant by increasing efficiency in power generation, monitoring of equipment and plant parameters, as well as aiding operator control. However, the addition of digital components and systems also adds cyber risks with previously unanalyzed failure modes and attack vectors are introduced with these new systems. These risks are difficult to identify, analyze, and mitigate due to the increasingly complex nature of the digital components and the integration of these components with additional plant processes and communication networks. The research presented in this paper develops a new method that addresses the cyber risk to inform appropriate levels of protection. EPRI and Sandia are working under a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement to develop an effective method of evaluating the cyber risk in production nuclear power facilities. The Cyber Hazards Analysis Risk Methodology (CHARM) focuses on ensuring adequate controls are in place for appropriate cyber protection of the plant from radiological release or generation risk. Existing plant hazards analyses (e.g., PRA, FTA) do not account for software deficiencies or adversarial intent. This method leverages existing plant analyses and MIT's Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) to create cyber informed fault trees. These new fault trees will provide the basis for comprehensive cyber risk analysis and help ensure potential gaps in cyber security controls are identified and corrected. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Engineering Out Industry 4.0 Cyber Risk

The increasing complexity and business requirements of operational technology (OT) devices is beginning to break the normal segmentation between information technology (IT) and OT networks. The introduction of industry 4.0 devices such as industrial internet of things (IIoT) and other intelligent industrial devices (IID), virtualized OT systems, OT cloud integration, and artificial intelligence (AI)-driven industrial control systems (ICS) has challenged traditional IT/OT cybersecurity strategies. Industry 4.0 devices are analyzed through the lens of well-regarded models such as the PERA model and confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) security objectives, showing the division between what is needed and traditional cybersecurity countermeasures. In this paper, the practice of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) is proposed to bridge the gap between IT/OT security, enhance the practice of cybersecurity in this modern age, and reduce the impacts of consequential events in OT.

42 - ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Connecting the Dots: An Assessment of Cyber-risks in Networked Building and Municipal Infrastructure Systems

The buildings and city streets we walk down are changing. Driven by various data-driven use cases, there is increased interest in networking and integrating lighting and other building systems (e.g., heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC), security, scheduling) that were previously not internet-facing, and equipping them with sensors that collect information about their environment and the people that inhabit it. These data-enabled systems can potentially deliver improved occupant and resident experiences and help meet the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) national energy and carbon reduction goals. Deploying connected devices new to being networked, however, is not without its challenges. This paper explores tools available to system designers and integrators that facilitate a cybersecurity landscape assessment – or more specifically the identification of threats, vulnerabilities, and adversarial behaviors that could be used against these networked systems. These assessments can help stakeholders shift security prioritization proactively toward the beginning of the development process.

cyber-risk assesment, adversarial behavior, MITRE ↗
NASA NTRS2017

Managing Cyber Risk: from the Ground to the Air and Beyond Out There

Experts from the aerospace sector with the focus of presenting current state-of-the-art in aviation cyber security and discussing major challenges, requirements, and developments. A variety of topics will be addressed by the panel, including: Aviation cyber security regulations, standards, and best practices Aviation information sharing and analysis challenges Aircraft systems and avionics cyber security challenges Airline and airport stakeholder cyber perspectives CNSATM cyber security challenges UAS cyber security and privacy requirements Military aviation cyber security issues in the NAS

Davis, Jerry L.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Engineering Out Industry 4.0 Cyber Risk Presentation for EnCyCriS

The increasing complexity and business requirements of operational technology (OT) devices is beginning to break the normal segmentation between information technology (IT) and OT networks. The introduction of industry 4.0 devices such as industrial internet of things (IIoT) and other intelligent industrial devices (IID), virtualized OT systems, OT cloud integration, and artificial intelligence (AI)-driven industrial control systems (ICS) has challenged traditional IT/OT cybersecurity strategies. Industry 4.0 devices are analyzed through the lens of well-regarded models such as the PERA model and confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) security objectives, showing the division between what is needed and traditional cybersecurity countermeasures. In this paper, the practice of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) is proposed to bridge the gap between IT/OT security, enhance the practice of cybersecurity in this modern age, and reduce the impacts of consequential events in OT.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗