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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Engineering in Cyber Resilience with Cyber-Informed Engineering

Engineers have super powers to provide cybersecurity resilience with deterministic engineering solutions and to protect systems from the most catastrophic consequences that a cyber saboteur could cause. Come to this session to learn how to use engineering risk management skills to harden your engineered systems from cyberattacks. Objective 1 Identify what system functions could be digitally induced to cause undesired high-impact consequences. Objective 2 Analyze how loss or instability of digital controls in a subsystem could lead to high-impact consequences. Objective 3 Analyze how loss or instability in the digital connectivity between systems could lead to high-impact consequences. Objective 4 Identify engineering controls which could build resilience by eliminating digital loss or instability pathways or reduce the impact of digital loss or instability. This presentation will introduce Cyber-Informed Engineering, described below, and walk participants through specific engineering use cases to show how engineers can consider the potential for cyber sabotage in their existing system designs and enact deterministic engineering-based controls which eliminate pathways for attack or mitigate specific consequences. A wide variety of application use cases will be considered so that audience members can align the material with familiar engineering applications. CIE is an engineering approach that integrates cyber resilience into the conception, design, build, and operation of any physical system that has digital connectivity, sensors, monitoring, or control. CIE offers the opportunity to use engineering to eliminate or mitigate avenues for cyber attack—starting from the earliest stage of design and continuing throughout the system’s lifecycle. Today, engineers and industrial control system (ICS) technicians build engineered systems with specific goals for safety, reliability, and functionality. While systems engineering includes considerable safety and failure mode analysis, cybersecurity risks are often not specifically addressed—particularly the risks of intentional cyber compromise, exploitation, and misuse. Cyber-Informed Engineering pairs well with traditional cyber defenses and offers an extra designed-in protection to eliminate the most catastrophic consequences which can be realized by an adversary should traditional cyber defenses fail.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

CYDRES: CYber Defense and REsilient System for securing grid-interactive efficient buildings

Smart buildings, especially Grid-interactive Efficient Buildings (GEBs), suffer from cyber-attacks and physical faults due to the integration of a large number of sensors and controls, connected devices, and associated communication networks. This study demonstrated a real-time advanced building resilient platform, called CYber Defense and REsilient System (CYDRES), which is deployable for existing and emerging Building Automation Systems (BASs). CYDRES aims to empower GEBs with cyber-attack-immune capabilities through multi-layer prevention and adaptation mechanisms to monitor, detect, and respond to cyber-attacks and physical operational faults. CYDRES is demonstrated through real-time experiments in a Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) testbed.

Building automation system, Cyber-attacks, Physica↗
DOE OSTI2023

Hybrid Cyber-attack Detection in Photovoltaic Farms

Here, to address the cyber-physical security in PV farms, a hybrid cyber-attack detection is proposed in this manuscript. To secure PV farms, the proposed method integrates model-based and data-driven methods by fusing the detection score at the device and system levels. First, a model-based cyber-attack detection method is developed for each PV inverter. A residual between the estimation of the Kalman filter and measurement is calculated. By leveraging the calculated residual from all inverters, a squared Mahalanobis distance is developed for device detection score generation. At the system level, a convolutional neural network (CNN) is proposed to detect cyber-attack using the waveform data at the point of common coupling (PCC) in PV farms. To improve the CNN detection accuracy, a set of well-designed features are extracted from the raw waveform data. Finally, a weighted detection score fusion method is proposed to combine device and system detection scores by using their complementary strength. The feasibility and robustness of the proposed method are validated by testing cases and a comparative experiment.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Small-Signal Angle Stability-Oriented False Data Injection Cyber-Attacks on Power Systems

The small-signal angle stability (SSAS) of a power system is determined by the property of operation points. The widely applied false data injection (FDI) cyber-attack, however, is able to stealthily mislead the optimal power flow (OPF) and thus compromise operation points, leading to damages to the SSAS margin. Here, to provide insights for cyber defenders, this paper proposes and investigates a stealthy SSAS-oriented FDI cyber-attack focusing on two attacking purposes, i.e., the SSAS margin and operation cost, with higher priority on the former one. First, this paper establishes a novel bi-level model with an implicit SSAS constraint based on a structure preserving model to compromise operation points. Then, for the SSAS interarea mode in a typical two-area system, this paper formulates closed-form expressions of how the SSAS margin and operation cost behave with respect to stealthy injections. By comparison, for the SSAS local mode in general power systems, this paper proposes a moving target cyber-attack-based hierarchical solution algorithm. Simulation results on a two-area system, a Kundur 11 bus system, and a modified IEEE 14 bus system demonstrate the significant damaging effects of the proposed SSAS-oriented FDI cyber-attack and the conflict between the two attacking purposes.

Benders decomposition↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cyber-Enabled Sabotage, Critical Function Assurance, and Cyber-Informed Engineering

Cyber-enabled Sabotage, Critical Function Assurance, and Cyber-Informed Engineering: This discussion will introduce the idea of cyber-enabled sabotage, and the role engineering plays in the cyber defense of critical functions with a focus on electric power systems. It will outline how and why engineering practice must be used to apply cybersecurity principles to establish safe and reliable operations even in the face of determined and skilled adversaries, and give an overview of INL’s Consequence-Driven Cyber-Informed Engineering methodology to apply these principles. There will be an opportunity for audience questions and answers at the end of the session.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Using Cyber-Informed Engineering for Cyber Defense Workbook

This workbook was prepared for a detailed workshop in Cyber-Informed Engineering. It is designed to provide an audience of electrical cooperative engineering staff with an opportunity to practice leveraging the principles of Cyber-Informed Engineering for a hypothetical system upgrade. This workbook contains material describing the fictional project, information about Cyber-Informed Engineering, hands-on exercises, and a copy of the slides presented during the workshop. It can stand alone as a CIE resource.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2026

SDN-Based Smart Cyber Switching (SCS) for Cyber Restoration of a Digital Substation

In recent years, critical infrastructure and power grids have increasingly been targets of cyber-attacks, causing widespread and extended blackouts. Digital substations are particularly vulnerable to such cyber incursions, jeopardizing grid stability. This paper addresses these risks by proposing a cybersecurity framework that leverages software-defined networking (SDN) to bolster the resilience of substations based on the IEC- 61850 standard. The research introduces a strategy involving smart cyber switching (SCS) for mitigation and concurrent intelligent electronic device (CIED) for restoration, ensuring ongoing operational integrity and cybersecurity within a substation. The SCS framework improves the physical network’s behavior (i.e., leveraging commercial SDN capabilities) by incorporating an adaptive port controller (APC) module for dynamic port management and an intrusion detection system (IDS) to detect and counteract malicious IEC-61850-based sampled value (SV) and generic object-oriented system event (GOOSE) messages within the substation’s communication network. The framework’s effectiveness is validated through comprehensive simulations and a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed, demonstrating its ability to sustain substation operations during cyber-attacks and significantly improve the overall resilience of the power grid.

Liu, Chen-Ching (ORCID:0000000289417958)↗
DOE OSTI2023

Electrical Fault Detection, Power Quality, Distributed Energy Resource Use Cases, and Cyber Event Applications with the Cyber Grid Guard System Using Distributed Ledger Technology

Electrical utilities continue to deploy more intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) inside and outside electrical substation and are associated with distributed energy resources (DERs). The integrity and confidentiality of data from IEDs is crucial, and distributed ledger technology (DLT) could improve the resilience of microgrids by helping to make these data more secure. The most popular applications using blockchain technology for electrical utilities is in the field is based on energy trading. However, the dynamism of the penetration of customer owned DERs and the deployment of sensors with IEDs have led to the identification of new applications using DLT that are focused on other areas, such as monitoring, operation and management of the grid and its assets. In addition, the majority of studies on electrical grid applications with blockchain were validated with software simulations. Although general monitoring of power systems for using DLT could be evaluated in operational electric grids, other DLT research applications such as defense against cyber-attacks and/or electrical fault detection are not likely to be performed in a real infrastructure because of possible risks to the network/equipment security. This report summarizes the application of power system applications using distributed ledger technology (DLT), providing a secure DLT framework for collecting data from IEDs like power meters and protective relays inside and outside of an electrical substation and/or between two different electrical utilities. In this study, the use case scenarios were created and assessed for different power system application by using DLT. The electrical fault detection for faulted phases (1), power quality monitoring of phase voltage magnitudes, frequency levels and load power factor (2), DERs use case monitoring (3), and cyber-event applications (4) were performed in a test bed with a Cyber-Grid Guard (CGG) system using DLT. It had a real-time simulator with power meters and protective relays in-the-loop. The first section of this report presents a literature review of power system applications using blockchain at research level. The second section shows the theory and equations used on this report. The third section shows the description of the test bed, equipment, architecture, and electrical grid diagrams. The fourth section shows the experimental models and use case scenarios that were performed for the electrical fault detection, power quality, DERs use case, and cyber event applications with the CGG system using DLT. The fifth section shows the results collected from the tests based on comparing the time stamped events of the analog signals from the IEDs, DLT computer and real time simulator. The sixth section performed the discussion of the results for the use case scenarios. Finally, section seven presents the conclusions for this report were presented.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS1983

Use of CYBER 203 and CYBER 205 computers for three-dimensional transonic flow calculations

Experiences are discussed for modifying two three-dimensional transonic flow computer programs (FLO 22 and FLO 27) for use on the CDC CYBER 203 computer system. Both programs were originally written for use on serial machines. Several methods were attempted to optimize the execution of the two programs on the vector machine: leaving the program in a scalar form (i.e., serial computation) with compiler software used to optimize and vectorize the program, vectorizing parts of the existing algorithm in the program, and incorporating a vectorizable algorithm (ZEBRA I or ZEBRA II) in the program. Comparison runs of the programs were made on CDC CYBER 175. CYBER 203, and two pipe CDC CYBER 205 computer systems.

Melson, N. D.↗
DOE OSTI2023

Design methodologies and engineering applications for ecosystem biomimicry: an interdisciplinary review spanning cyber, physical, and cyber-physical systems

Abstract Ecosystem biomimicry is a promising pathway for sustainable development. However, while typical form- and process-level biomimicry is prevalent, system-level ecosystem biomimicry remains a nascent practice in numerous engineering fields. This critical review takes an interdisciplinary approach to synthesize trends across case studies, evaluate design methodologies, and identify future opportunities when applying ecosystem biomimicry to engineering practices, including cyber systems (CS), physical systems (PS), and cyber-physical systems (CPS). After systematically sourcing publications from major databases, the papers were first analyzed at a meta level for their bibliographic context and for statistical correlations among categorical variables. Then, we investigated deeper into the engineering applications and design methodologies. Results indicate that CPS most frequently mimic organisms and ecosystems, while CS and PS frequently mimic populations-communities and molecules-tissues-organ systems, respectively (statistically highly significant). An indirect approach is most often used for mimicry at organizational levels from populations to ecosystems, while a direct approach frequently suits levels from molecules to organisms (highly significant). Dominant themes across engineering applications include symbiotic organism search algorithms for CS and ecological network analysis for CPS, while PS are highly diverse. For design methodologies, this work summarizes and details ten well-documented biomimetic process models among literature, which addresses an outdated concern for a lack of systematic methods for ecosystem biomimicry. In addition to the Biomimetics Standard ISO 18458, these methods include the Natural Step and Techno-Ecological Synergy framework, among others. Further, the analyses revealed future opportunities from less utilized design methods (e.g. interdisciplinary teams tackling indirect, ecosystem-level projects) to well-established engineering concepts ready for technological advancement (e.g. implementing membrane computing for physical applications). For future studies, this review provides a comprehensive reference for ecosystem biomimetic design practices and application opportunities across multiple engineering domains.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS2015

Analyzing Cyber Security Threats on Cyber-Physical Systems Using Model-Based Systems Engineering

The spectre of cyber attacks on aerospace systems can no longer be ignored given that many of the components and vulnerabilities that have been successfully exploited by the adversary on other infrastructures are the same as those deployed and used within the aerospace environment. An important consideration with respect to the mission/safety critical infrastructure supporting space operations is that an appropriate defensive response to an attack invariably involves the need for high precision and accuracy, because an incorrect response can trigger unacceptable losses involving lives and/or significant financial damage. A highly precise defensive response, considering the typical complexity of aerospace environments, requires a detailed and well-founded understanding of the underlying system where the goal of the defensive response is to preserve critical mission objectives in the presence of adversarial activity. In this paper, a structured approach for modeling aerospace systems is described. The approach includes physical elements, network topology, software applications, system functions, and usage scenarios. We leverage Model-Based Systems Engineering methodology by utilizing the Object Management Group's Systems Modeling Language to represent the system being analyzed and also utilize model transformations to change relevant aspects of the model into specialized analyses. A novel visualization approach is utilized to visualize the entire model as a three-dimensional graph, allowing easier interaction with subject matter experts. The model provides a unifying structure for analyzing the impact of a particular attack or a particular type of attack. Two different example analysis types are demonstrated in this paper: a graph-based propagation analysis based on edge labels, and a graph-based propagation analysis based on node labels.

MBSE↗
DOE OSTI2024

Talk Title: AI & Cybersecurity in ASEAN's Digital Future Venue: CyberForum: ASEAN Cyber Resilience Conference Hosted by: Indonesia Cyber Security Forum (ICSF) in coordination with US State Department's mission to ASEAN in Indonesia

The talk covers: * Quick orientation around AI * Quick review of relevant domains of Cybersecurity * The promise of AI in cybersecurity – applications * Discussion of the state of technology today, referencing Gartner Hype Cycle diagram * The peril of AI for cybersecurity – threats and risks * A roadmap for where to go from here, emphasizing a trained workforce, referencing published (ISC)^2 survey results

Benz, Zachary O.↗
DOE OSTI2024

An Old Guys Perspective of Cyber - Journey Through INL Cyber Research

An overview of the history of cybersecurity at INL and how it has evolved with today's Critical Infrastructure, including the advancement of Electric Vehicles (EVs) and the EV charging infrastructure. Recent and future research efforts are included to demonstrate the current state of the art and where this technology might progress. With maybe a little Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt (FUD) mixed in...

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS2016

Cyber-Threat Assessment for the Air Traffic Management System: A Network Controls Approach

Air transportation networks are being disrupted with increasing frequency by failures in their cyber- (computing, communication, control) systems. Whether these cyber- failures arise due to deliberate attacks or incidental errors, they can have far-reaching impact on the performance of the air traffic control and management systems. For instance, a computer failure in the Washington DC Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZDC) on August 15, 2015, caused nearly complete closure of the Centers airspace for several hours. This closure had a propagative impact across the United States National Airspace System, causing changed congestion patterns and requiring placement of a suite of traffic management initiatives to address the capacity reduction and congestion. A snapshot of traffic on that day clearly shows the closure of the ZDC airspace and the resulting congestion at its boundary, which required augmented traffic management at multiple locations. Cyber- events also have important ramifications for private stakeholders, particularly the airlines. During the last few months, computer-system issues have caused several airlines fleets to be grounded for significant periods of time: these include United Airlines (twice), LOT Polish Airlines, and American Airlines. Delays and regional stoppages due to cyber- events are even more common, and may have myriad causes (e.g., failure of the Department of Homeland Security systems needed for security check of passengers, see [3]). The growing frequency of cyber- disruptions in the air transportation system reflects a much broader trend in the modern society: cyber- failures and threats are becoming increasingly pervasive, varied, and impactful. In consequence, an intense effort is underway to develop secure and resilient cyber- systems that can protect against, detect, and remove threats, see e.g. and its many citations. The outcomes of this wide effort on cyber- security are applicable to the air transportation infrastructure, and indeed security solutions are being implemented in the current system. While these security solutions are important, they only provide a piecemeal solution. Particular computers or communication channels are protected from particular attacks, without a holistic view of the air transportation infrastructure. On the other hand, the above-listed incidents highlight that a holistic approach is needed, for several reasons. First, the air transportation infrastructure is a large scale cyber-physical system with multiple stakeholders and diverse legacy assets. It is impractical to protect every cyber- asset from known and unknown disruptions, and instead a strategic view of security is needed. Second, disruptions to the cyber- system can incur complex propagative impacts across the air transportation network, including its physical and human assets. Also, these implications of cyber- events are exacerbated or modulated by other disruptions and operational specifics, e.g. severe weather, operator fatigue or error, etc. These characteristics motivate a holistic and strategic perspective on protecting the air transportation infrastructure from cyber- events. The analysis of cyber- threats to the air traffic system is also inextricably tied to the integration of new autonomy into the airspace. The replacement of human operators with cyber functions leaves the network open to new cyber threats, which must be modeled and managed. Paradoxically, the mitigation of cyber events in the airspace will also likely require additional autonomy, given the fast time scale and myriad pathways of cyber-attacks which must be managed. The assessment of new vulnerabilities upon integration of new autonomy is also a key motivation for a holistic perspective on cyber threats.

Complex Networks↗