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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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3 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Identifying human failure events (HFEs) for external hazard probabilistic risk assessment

In recent years, several advancements in nuclear power plant (NPP) probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) have been driven by increased understanding of external hazards, plant response, and uncertainties. However, major sources of uncertainty associated with external hazard PRA remain. One important source is how risk-significant human actions that are carried out to enable plant response and recovery from natural hazards cause the close coupling of physical impacts on plants and overall plant risk during these hazard events. This makes human reliability and human-plant interactions important elements to consider in resolving PRA gaps in external hazards. One of the challenges in considering human response in external hazard probabilistic risk assessment (XHPRA) is that most existing human reliability analysis (HRA) models were not developed for assessing actions outside the control room (termed ex-control room actions) and hazard response. To support this new scope, HRA models will need to be developed or modified to support identification of human activities, causal factors, and uncertainties inherent in external hazard response, thereby providing insights regarding event timing and physical event conditions as they relate to human performance. In this study, there are two main objectives: (1) evaluate the applicability of an existing cognitive-based HRA method, Phoenix, to ex-control room actions, and (2) identify sources of uncertainty to be characterized or reduced in order to make this method suitable for XHPRA. The first step of such work is performed by assessing the suitability of existing HRA methods to support identifying human failure events (HFEs) for human response to flooding hazards. These HFEs are human actions or inactions that are involved in human responses to flooding hazards and could contribute to the loss of a critical function for the plant in the scenario being examined. Here, in this work, decomposition analyses using the cognitive-based Phoenix HRA model are used to identify HFEs. The Phoenix method was found to be suitable for analyzing ex-control room actions as well as identifying specific HFEs and underlying crew failure modes (CFMs). However, the method's suitability for use in ex-control room actions would benefit from expanding the available CFMs to accommodate a larger variety of physical and communication tasks.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

NASA’s first ground-based Galactic Cosmic Ray Simulator: Enabling a new era in space radiobiology research

With exciting new NASA plans for a sustainable return to the moon, astronauts will once again leave Earth’s protective magnetosphere only to endure higher levels of radiation from galactic cosmic radiation (GCR) and the possibility of a large solar particle event (SPE). Gateway, lunar landers, and surface habitats will be designed to protect crew against SPEs with vehicle optimization, storm shelter concepts, and/or active dosimetry; however, the ever penetrating GCR will continue to pose the most significant health risks especially as lunar missions increase in duration and as NASA sets its aspirations on Mars. The primary risks of concern include carcinogenesis, central nervous system (CNS) effects resulting in potential in-mission cognitive or behavioral impairment and/or late neurological disorders, degenerative tissue effects including circulatory and heart disease, as well as potential immune system decrements impacting multiple aspects of crew health. Characterization and mitigation of these risks requires a significant reduction in the large biological uncertainties of chronic (low-dose rate) heavy-ion exposures and the validation of countermeasures in a relevant space environment. Historically, most research on understanding space radiation-induced health risks has been performed using acute exposures of monoenergetic single-ion beams. However, the space radiation environment consists of a wide variety of ion species over a broad energy range. Using the fast beam switching and controls systems technology recently developed at the NASA Space Radiation Laboratory (NSRL) at Brookhaven National Laboratory, a new era in radiobiological research is possible. NASA has developed the “GCR Simulator” to generate a spectrum of ion beams that approximates the primary and secondary GCR field experienced at human organ locations within a deep-space vehicle. The majority of the dose is delivered from protons (approximately 65%–75%) and helium ions (approximately 10%–20%) with heavier ions (Z ≥ 3) contributing the remainder. The GCR simulator exposes state-of-the art cellular and animal model systems to 33 sequential beams including 4 proton energies plus degrader, 4 helium energies plus degrader, and the 5 heavy ions of C, O, Si, Ti, and Fe. A polyethylene degrader system is used with the 100 MeV/n H and He beams to provide a nearly continuous distribution of low-energy particles. A 500 mGy exposure, delivering doses from each of the 33 beams, requires approximately 75 minutes. To more closely simulate the low-dose rates found in space, sequential field exposures can be divided into daily fractions over 2 to 6 weeks, with individual beam fractions as low as 0.1 to 0.2 mGy. In the large beam configuration (60 × 60 cm 2 ), 54 special housing cages can accommodate 2 to 3 mice each for an approximately 75 min duration or 15 individually housed rats. On June 15, 2018, the NSRL made a significant achievement by completing the first operational run using the new GCR simulator. This paper discusses NASA’s innovative technology solution for a ground-based GCR simulator at the NSRL to accelerate our understanding and mitigation of health risks faced by astronauts. Ultimately, the GCR simulator will require validation across multiple radiogenic risks, endpoints, doses, and dose rates.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗