An editorial to the Special Issue on “Severe climate Risks”
The history of this Special Issue (https://www.sciencedirect.com/special-issue/10JD7LNJNQ0) indirectly dates back to the early 1990s, when the signature of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change kicked-off an international political process based on one overarching and foundational principle: to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” at the global level. More than three decades later, such a principle remains central, though complementary aims made their way through the climate negotiation process, such as the importance of ensuring equity and justice, to give just one example here. Scientific knowledge also considerably progressed and we know more about the range of risks that climate change imposes and will continue to impose to the biosphere and humankind, worldwide and at all territorial levels. It is also clear that societal responses to these risks —“climate adaptation” as we know it— are increasingly happening, but definitely not at the pace of climate risk trends (Berrang-Ford et al., 2021, Erisken et al., 2021, Olazabal and Ruiz De Gopegui, 2021, Magnan et al., 2023a, Reckien et al., 2023, UNEP, 2023). As a result, concerns have emerged over the recent years in both the scientific and policy arenas around the idea that societies may not be able to address all climate risks, and that limits to adaptation and induced residual risks need to be considered more seriously. Such concerns further highlight the continuing importance of the imperative to minimise dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, at any scale. But what does “dangerous interference” mean? How can we decide that we are entering the “dangerous” space, compared to a broader range of climate risks that would qualify as problematic but not necessarily “dangerous”? Who should make such a decision? Which conditions drive risk severity over time, including in the future? And what would be the environmental, economic, social and cultural implications of prioritising some climate risks over others? The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was a pioneer in addressing such questions through the development of the “Key Risks” framing that describes those climate risks having the potential to become dangerous or “severe” over the course of this century (Schellnhuber et al., 2006, Schneider et al., 2007, Oppenheimer et al., 2014, O’Neill et al., 2022). The Fifth and Sixth assessment cycles (AR5 and AR6) went a step further by identifying about 120 Key Risks across regions and sectors, and clustering them into 8 “Representative Key Risks” covering a range of geographical systems (low-lying coasts, and to terrestrial and ocean ecosystems), sectors (critical infrastructure, living standards, human health, food security, and water security) and human dimensions (peace and mobility) (Oppenheimer et al., 2014, O’Neill et al., 2022). This Special Issue was born of the efforts of a range of authors, during the development of the IPCC AR6 main Assessment Report between 2019 and 2022, to characterise Key Risks and Representative Key Risks, and advance knowledge on what shapes “severe climate risks” conceptually as well as in the real-world. The series of papers forming this Special Issue is not intended to cover the topic exhaustively, but rather to give readers an overview through the following narrative: defining “severe climate risks” is highly challenging (Magnan et al., 2023b), but knowledge is expanding on the driving climate hazards (Tebaldi et al., 2023) and their implications on geographical systems, sectors and human dimensions, using here food security (Mirzabaev et al., 2023), human mobility (Gilmore et al., 2024) and peace (Buhaug et al., 2023) as illustrative examples. The overall intention is to support especially decision-makers, whatever the scale or sector considered, in asking severity-driven questions to identify sector- and context-specific “priority” risks from climate change.