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Class B Materials Code Case to include: FY25 - High temperature design methodology, overview of ASME Section III (Division 5), Design for elevated temperature service, Goal to address current gaps, evaluation of proposed rules, allowable stress development, Class A materials (existing ASME approach), variable confidence index, data extrapolation, bounding value for SEE, and next steps.
This report summarizes updates on the ongoing development of the new American Society of Mechanical Engineers Section III, Division 5, Class B rules to address the potential failure modes of Class B components. An initial design-by-analysis approach and supporting design rules are presented. The elastic-perfectly plastic (EPP) analysis approach has been adopted for primary stress limit and ratcheting check to prevent the component failure against the structural failure mode against primary load and strain accumulation due to cyclic loads. The creep-fatigue damage assessment uses explicitly defined elastic follow-up calculated from the stress concentration region of given component. Damage fraction calculation uses a novel coupled approach to capture the influence of the elastic follow-up and provide adequate conservatism for Class B components. The proposed Class B rules does not use the stress classification approach and uses the combined loads to assess component.
This report provides the time-dependent allowable stress calculation strategy leveraging the limited creep rupture tests data generated to support the allowable stress for 100,000 hours in American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC), Section II, Part D. A variable confidence index procedure to extrapolate material properties to support 500,000 hours design life is discussed. Time-dependent allowable stresses for Class B component design and analysis are presented for Grade 1 and Grade 2 of Alloy 625. The presented data extrapolation and allowable stress calculation method will support new material addition using limited creep rupture data in the new ASME Boiler and BPVC, Section III, Division 5, Class B rules.
Overview of high temperature metals, including component construction rules for advanced reactor designs, assessment of filler metal for Alloy 800H weldments, high-temperature crack growth rate testing, work packages and contributors for FY24, creep-fatigue damage summation evaluation, GCR metal needs, and high temperature metals from other programs.
CFRP composites have not been used for nuclear safety-related applications until recently. In 2019, the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Committee approved a new Code Case N-871 for internal repairs of Class 2 and 3 safety-related piping using CFRP for Service Levels A, B, C, and D for a service life of 50 years. The NRC did not review N-871 for inclusion in the Code Case Regulatory Guides. This project focuses on evaluating the capabilities and limitations of Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) methods for examining the Carbon Fiber Reinforced Polymer (CFRP) repairs in commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs). This Report summarizes the work done on this project until the end of FY24.
This paper reports on progress towards developing a spatial stability code for compressible shear flows with two inhomogeneous directions, such as crossflow dominated swept-wing boundary layers and attachment line flows. Certain unique aspects of formulating a spatial, two-dimensional eigenvalue problem for the secondary instability of finite amplitude crossflow vortices are discussed. A primary test case used for parameter study corresponds to the low-speed, NLF-0415(b) airfoil configuration as tested in the ASU Unsteady Wind Tunnel, wherein a spanwise periodic array of roughness elements was placed near the leading edge in order to excite stationary crossflow modes with a specified fundamental wavelength. The two classes of flow conditions selected for this analysis include those for which the roughness array spacing corresponds to either the naturally dominant crossflow wavelength, or a subcritical wavelength that serves to reduce the growth of the naturally excited dominant crossflow modes. Numerical predictions are compared with the measured database, both as indirect validation for the spatial instability analysis and to provide a basis for comparison with a higher Reynolds number, supersonic swept-wing configuration. Application of the eigenvalue analysis to the supersonic configuration reveals that a broad spectrum of stationary crossflow modes can sustain sufficiently strong secondary instabilities as to potentially cause transition over this configuration. Implications of this finding for transition control in swept wing boundary layers are examined. Finally, extension of the spatial stability analysis to supersonic attachment line flows is also considered.
An overview of the NASA Glenn Low-Pressure Turbine (LPT) Flow Physics Program will be presented. The flow in the LPT is unique for the gas turbine. It is characterized by low Reynolds number and high freestream turbulence intensity and is dominated by interplay of three basic mechanisms: transition, separation and wake interaction. The flow of most interest is on the suction surface, where large losses are generated due to separation. The LPT is a large, multistage, heavy, jet engine component that suffers efficiency degradation between takeoff and cruise conditions due to decrease in Reynolds number with altitude. The performance penalty is around 2 points for large commercial bypass engines and as much as 7 points for small, high cruise altitude, military engines. The gas-turbine industry is very interested in improving the performance of the LPT and in reducing its weight, part count and cost. Many improvements can be accomplished by improved airfoil design, mainly by increasing the airfoil loading that can yield reduction of airfoils and improved performance. In addition, there is a strong interest in reducing the design cycle time and cost. Key enablers of the needed improvements are computational tools that can accurately predict LPT flows. Current CFD tools in use cannot yet satisfactorily predict the unsteady, transitional and separated flow in the LPT. The main reasons are inadequate transition & turbulence models and incomplete understanding of the LPT flow physics. NASA Glenn has established its LPT program to answer these needs. The main goal of the program is to develop and assess models for unsteady CFD of LPT flows. An approach that consists of complementing and augmenting experimental and computational work elements has been adopted. The work is performed in-house and by several academic institutions, in cooperation and interaction with industry. The program was reviewed at the Minnowbrook II meeting in 1997. This review will summarize the progress that was made since and will introduce newly started projects. The LPT program is focused on three areas: acquisition of experimental and numerical databases and on modeling and computation. Priority was initially given to experiments. There are three classes of experiments: simulated LPT passages, linear cascade, both with and without wakes, and low-speed rotating rig. They are being conducted as follows: At NASA GRC on a flat surface with blade pressure distribution, at the US Naval Academy on a curved surface. The addition of wakes is studied at the University of Minnesota in a curved passage with a retractable wake generator, and at Texas A&M University in a linear cascade with continuously running wake generator. The pressure distribution of the Pratt & Whitney blade 'Pak B' is used in all these experiments. Experiments have been performed also in the GEAE Low-Speed Rotating Turbine (LSRT) rig with GE-designed airfoils. Work on numerically generated database is in progress at the University of Kentucky, using the DNS/LES code LESTool developed there. Turbulence/transition model assessment and development is performed also at the University of Kentucky, where a new intermittency transport model was developed and many experimental test cases have been numerically computed. Assessments of models using simulations of multistage LPT experiments were performed at Virginia Commonwealth University using the Corsair code. Work on suction surface separation delay, using passive and active flow-control, has also been initiated. Following the overview, Principal Investigators attending the workshop will present in detail several of the projects supported by NASA.
The isolation and characterization of a multigene family of the first class of dirigent proteins (namely that mainly involved in 8-8' coupling leading to (+)-pinoresinol in this case) is reported, this comprising of nine western red cedar (Thuja plicata) DIRIGENT genes (DIR1-9) of 72-99.5% identity to each other. Their corresponding cDNA clones had coding regions for 180-183 amino acids with each having a predicted molecular mass of ca. 20 kDa including the signal peptide. Real time-PCR established that the DIRIGENT isovariants were differentially expressed during growth and development of T. plicata (P < 0.05). The phylogenetic relationships and the rates and patterns of nucleotide substitution suggest that the DIRIGENT gene may have evolved via paralogous expansion at an early stage of vascular plant diversification. Thereafter, western red cedar paralogues have maintained an high homogeneity presumably via a concerted evolutionary mode. This, in turn, is assumed to be the driving force for the differential formation of 8-8'-linked pinoresinol derived (poly)lignans in the needles, stems, bark and branches, as well as for massive accumulation of 8-8'-linked plicatic acid-derived (poly)lignans in heartwood.
Implemented security protocols are basically pieces of software which are used to (a) authenticate the other communication partners, (b) establish a secure communication channel between them (using insecure communication media), and (c) transfer data between the communication partners in such a way that these data only available to the desired receiver, but not to anyone else. Such an implementation usually consists of the following components: the protocol-engine, which controls in which sequence the messages of the protocol are sent over the network, and which controls the assembly/disassembly and processing (e.g., decryption) of the data. the cryptographic routines to actually encrypt or decrypt the data (using given keys), and t,he interface to the operating system and to the application. For a correct working of such a security protocol, all of these components must work flawlessly. Many formal-methods based techniques for the analysis of a security protocols have been developed. They range from using specific logics (e.g.: BAN-logic [4], or higher order logics [12] to model checking [2] approaches. In each approach, the analysis tries to prove that no (or at least not a modeled intruder) can get access to secret data. Otherwise, a scenario illustrating the &tack may be produced. Despite the seeming simplicity of security protocols ("only" a few messages are sent between the protocol partners in order to ensure a secure communication), many flaws have been detected. Unfortunately, even a perfect protocol engine does not guarantee flawless working of a security protocol, as incidents show. Many break-ins and security vulnerabilities are caused by exploiting errors in the implementation of the protocol engine or the underlying operating system. Attacks using buffer-overflows are a very common class of such attacks. Errors in the implementation of exception or error handling can open up additional vulnerabilities. For example, on a website with a log-in screen: multiple tries with invalid passwords caused the expected error message (too many retries). but let the user nevertheless pass. Finally, security can be compromised by silly implementation bugs or design decisions. In a commercial VPN software, all calls to the encryption routines were incidentally replaced by stubs, probably during factory testing. The product worked nicely. and the error (an open VPN) would have gone undetected, if a team member had not inspected the low-level traffic out of curiosity. Also, the use secret proprietary encryption routines can backfire, because such algorithms often exhibit weaknesses which can be exploited easily (see e.g., DVD encoding). Summarizing, there is large number of possibilities to make errors which can compromise the security of a protocol. In today s world with short time-to-market and the use of security protocols in open and hostile networks for safety-critical applications (e.g., power or air-traffic control), such slips could lead to catastrophic situations. Thus, formal methods and automatic reasoning techniques should not be used just for the formal proof of absence of an attack, but they ought to be used to provide an end-to-end tool-supported framework for security software. With such an approach all required artifacts (code, documentation, test cases) , formal analyses, and reliable certification will be generated automatically, given a single, high level specification. By a combination of program synthesis, formal protocol analysis, certification; and proof-carrying code, this goal is within practical reach, since all the important technologies for such an approach actually exist and only need to be assembled in the right way.