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Cyber Deterrence and Stability

Throughout the 20th and early 21st centuries, deterrence and arms control have been cornerstones of strategic stability between the superpowers. However, the weaponization of the cyber realm by State actors and the multipolar nature of cyber conflict now undermines that stability. Strategic stability is the state in which nations believe that if they act aggressively to undermine U.S. national interests and the post-World War II liberal democratic order, the consequences will outweigh the benefits. The sense of lawlessness and lack of consequences in the cyber realm embolden States to be more aggressive in taking actions that undermine stability. Accordingly, this paper examines 1) the role of deterrence and arms control in securing cyber stability, and 2) the limitations and challenges associated with these traditional national security paradigms as applied to this emerging threat domain. This paper demonstrates that many 20th-century deterrence and arms control concepts are not particularly applicable in the cyber realm. However, they are not entirely irrelevant. The United States can distill lessons learned from this rich deterrence and arms control experience to develop and deploy a strategy to advance cyber stability.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Tools and Incentives for Implementing Codes of Ethics to Help Prevent the Reemergence of Chemical Weapons

Since the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the establishment of the Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in 1997, 96% of the world’s declared stockpile, comprising 72,305 metric tons of chemical warfare agents have been destroyed. Despite this notable progress, the convergence of chemistry and biology brings new challenges to preventing chemical weapons production, as the technical capability to manipulate the chemistry of microorganisms has diffused beyond the chemical industry and academic research communities. The development and voluntary adoption by chemical practitioners around the world of ethical codes or guidelines, such as The Hague Ethical Guidelines and the Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics (GCCE) , are important steps in strengthening international nonproliferation efforts through their potential to impact the intent of the individual by normalizing ethical behavior. However, the simple act of adopting a code does not guarantee ethical behavior. Care must be taken to ensure those adopting the code understand specifically the behavior being asked of them, and they must be given ample opportunities to practice exercising those behaviors in low-risk situations and encouragement to keep trying when they fail. Furthermore, in small-to-medium chemical companies, concerns that adopting such measures could negatively impact profit margins may dissuade some business owners from voluntarily adopting ethical codes, while a country’s decision makers may not prioritize establishment of new regulatory mechanisms that could address some of these concerns. In this paper, factors that may positively influence a chemical company’s decision to adopt ethical guidelines, such as integration of social sustainability elements into frameworks and approaches to maintain social legitimacy in the eyes of the broader community, are explored. Voluntary adoption of ethical codes gives teeth to arms control regimes. By encouraging chemical companies to become engaged in the community around them and providing easy-to-use tools like scenario-based E-learning to enable remote engagement and facilitate understanding of the principles undergirding the GCCE, they actively participate in making the world a better place and minimizing the potential for reemergence of chemical weapons.

Small Chemical Companies, Codes of Ethics, E-learn↗

Nomenclature, Chemical Abstracts Service Numbers, Isomer Enumeration, Ring Strain and Stereochemistry: What Does Any of This Have to do with an International Chemical Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Treaty?

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is an international disarmament and non-proliferation treaty that mandates a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. This treaty entered-into-force in 1997 and has a nearly universal membership of world states. The CWC provides definitions for what constitutes a chemical weapon and describes chemicals for which verification measures and regulatory oversight are required. These chemicals, which must be declared to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for verification purposes, appear in three Schedules within the CWC. The schedules list specific chemical substances and families of chemicals defined by molecular structure descriptions that allow a range of specified variable groups. The text of an international treaty provides a basis for laws and regulatory requirements at international and national levels that must be enacted to comply with treaty obligations. These laws and regulations must account for the “chemistry” that is described in the treaty text, which has been negotiated and agreed upon by world governments. In this paper, we look at some of the chemicals described within the CWC and discuss how atoms and molecules, nomenclature and Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) numbers, isomer enumeration, ring strain and stereochemistry influence the obligations of States to an international treaty. The material draws upon the authors’ experiences from an interactive “Science for Diplomats” initiative that has provided a forum for engaging with chemical disarmament decision makers to aid in their understanding of fundamental concepts in chemistry that have impact on treaty implementation. We hope this article will spark interest from chemistry students and educators in the provision of science advice for policymakers and provide policymakers with an appreciation of the complexity and importance of understanding the language of chemistry in support of a world free of chemical weapons.

Organic Chemistry, Alkanes/Cycloalkanes, Applicati↗

Preface: Chemical forensics

Introduction: This virtual special issue stems from 36 presentations given at the Fourth Chemical Forensics Symposium held 3 - 4 April 2017 as part of the 253rd American Chemical Society (ACS) National Meeting & Exposition in San Francisco, CA, USA. Since 2011, the ACS Division of Analytical Chemistry has hosted symposia that review developments and topics arising in chemical forensics. Chemical forensics is a developing scientific discipline that aims to attribute a chemical (or mixture) of interest to its source by the analysis of the chemical itself or associated material constituents to address investigative, legal or intelligence questions. “Source” refers to how, where and when a chemical was handled or produced. Given past and recent attacks with chemical warfare agents (CWAs) and other toxic chemicals there is a strong need for research and development in chemical forensics for the purpose of finding those responsible for chemical attacks. Hence, many of the papers in this issue deal with the source attribution of toxic chemicals that can be used as weapons. However, given the needs, principles and methods that are shared across different application areas of material provenance or authentication, papers that deal with the source attribution of other illicitly used chemicals and materials are included.

Chemical Forensic↗

Countering the future chemical weapons threat

After decades of difficult negotiations, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was adopted in 1993 and entered into force on 29 April 1997, banning the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons (CW). As the CWC celebrates the 25th anniversary of its entry into force, it can document considerable success, much of it attributed to the CWC implementing body—the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). However, facing a volatile international security environment and an everchanging chemical industry, the OPCW must transform to meet its mission and remain an exemplar for multilateralism. As the next CWC review conference approaches in 2023, a next-generation OPCW 2.0 can be effective and credible only if it reinforces international norms against CW, anticipates future challenges posed by advancements in science and technology (S&T), incorporates more qualitative elements into the verification and compliance system, and keeps pace with technological change.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Information Filters for Safeguards Applications: A Scoping Study

A core concern of the Department of Energy is protecting sensitive information in the face of verification agreements that may make use of increasingly sophisticated and intrusive sensors. The conflict between intrusiveness and information protection is evident in existing treaties, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Additional Protocol (AP), where Congress has seen a need to step in and enact implementing legislation to protect, for example, sensitive information such as certain unique chemical signatures, but in so doing has introduced complexities into U.S. treaty compliance policy. Information barriers or filters (IFs) – broadly defined as physical and/or encryption mechanisms that preclude acquisition of sensitive, quantitative information while allowing the acquisition of treaty-relevant qualitative information by an inspectorate – could play a useful role in avoiding this type of conflict. In order to stimulate new thinking on ways to meet existing and future safeguard challenges, this scoping study investigates how IFs – a technique borrowed from the realm of arms control verification - might contribute to international safeguards activities. Information filters (IFs) have long been recognized as an important tool for the protection of sensitive signals and other data in the verification of bilateral and multilateral arms control treaties. The implementation of NPT safeguards, while differing somewhat in context from arms control verification, involves similar sensitivity concerns. This report examines whether or not IFs can be useful in the world of international safeguards, and provides a survey of methods of barring or filtering information that could be applied. The study finds that while many safeguards activities involve non sensitive data, there are also a number of areas where IFs are already in use and others where IFs could make a useful contribution. Examples include verification of enrichment plants, complementary access inspections, and the Additional Protocol (AP) to Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Assessment of two benzylation strategies for the analysis of nerve-agent derived ethyl- and pinacolyl methyl phosphonic acids in sandy loam soil by GC–MS

Despite their prohibition by the Chemical Weapons Convention, nerve agents (NAs) remain in use against military and civilian targets. Due to their high reactivity, NAs readily degrade to phosphonic acids, making them important markers in the inspection of areas of presumed NA use. In this work, we assess the use of benzylation to modify ethyl- and pinacolyl methylphosphonic acids, degradation products of VX and Soman respectively, for their efficient detection in a soil matrix at ~10 and ~1 μg/g using GC–MS. The soil matrix, Sandy Loam (SL), was chosen for its ubiquitous nature, complex composition with silica particles embedded in clay, and low organic content. In this study, we demonstrate that benzylation via benzyl bromide yields a LOD = 25.6 ng/mL for benzylated-EMPA and LOD = 30.1 ng/mL for benzylated-PMPA. This is superior to the use of p-methoxybenzyl trichloroacetimidate in providing stable phosphonic acid ester derivatives for analysis. A base-modified procedure for p-methoxybenzylation was explored in this study yielding a LOD = 29.1 ng/mL for p-methoxybenzylated-EMPA and LOD = 39.8 ng/mL for p-methoxybenzylated-PMPA. Both benzylation pathways (benzyl bromide and p-methoxybenzyl trichloroacetimidate) can be used to yield phosphonic acid derivatives that provide further confirmation of these Soman and VX degradation products in soil samples in investigative scenarios. The work herein represents the first application of benzylation methods for the analysis of these NA markers in the acidic, silicon-based SL soil.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Method development for comprehensive extraction and analysis of marine toxins: Liquid-liquid extraction and tandem liquid chromatography separations coupled to electrospray tandem mass spectrometry

Toxins from biological sources are recognized as potential chemical weapon threats, with saxitoxin and ricin listed by the chemical weapons convention (CWC) as schedule one agents (CWC reference). These two toxins represent a metabolite (saxitoxin) and protein (ricin) from algal and plant sources, respectively. An array of toxins have been listed as "select agents" by the Health and Human Services (HHS) select agent program, including ricin, abrin, saxitoxin, tetrodotoxin, specific paralytic alpha conotoxin peptides, T-2 toxin, diacetoxyscirpenols, botulinum toxins, and staphylococcal enterotoxins [1]. The quantities of these toxins dictate whether they are considered select agents with federal oversight of their storage and use. While this list captures some of the naturally occurring toxins that may pose a threat to the public, there are a number of other naturally occurring toxins that may also be a concern.

biodetection↗

Carbamoylation as an Effective Tool in the Analysis of the Soman Nerve Agent Marker Pinacolyl Alcohol in Soil Matrices by EI-GC-MS and LC-HRMS

Pinacolyl alcohol (PA) is a Schedule 2 chemical commonly featured in most proficiency tests (PTs) administered by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) due to its direct as well as forensic link to the nerve agent Soman. Therefore, its detection by Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) inspection teams during on-site investigations is a strong indicator of the past or latent presence of Soman in the environment. Its small molecular weight (102), early elution time, and poor ionization profile make PA a challenging analyte to detect particularly at low concentrations (∼1–10 μg/g). In this work, 1,1′-carbonyldimidazole (CDI) has been used to effectively modify PA for the first time in two different soil matrices (Virginia type A soil and silt sediment) at two separate concentrations (1 and 10 μg/g) for its subsequent detection by EI-GC-MS and LC-HRMS methods. For the EI-GC-MS analysis, the PA carbamate derivative (PIC) exhibits improved chromatography relative to PA such as improved peak shape, increased molecular weight (196 for PIC and 102 for PA) and increased retention time (16.9 min for PIC and ∼4.1 min for PA). In addition, the derivatization also improves the detection of PA by LC-HRMS as the PIC product possesses protonation sites (i.e., imidazole ring) relative to none exhibited by PA. More importantly, the carbamoylation proceeds under mild conditions (55 °C, no base) and rapidly (3 h), characteristics that make it an appealing protocol for the analysis of PA during OPCW PTs or real case scenarios particularly in instances where it is present at low concentrations. It is anticipated that the protocol can be applied to the forensic analysis of this important Soman marker in various environmental matrices.

Chemistry↗

Chemical and Biological Contract Manufacturing Services: Potential Proliferation Concerns and Impacts on Strategic Trade Controls

The use of contract manufacturing services in the chemical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnology industries has grown significantly in recent years, but the potential for such service providers to be exploited for chemical or biological weapons proliferation has garnered relatively little attention, despite the role of contract manufacturers in the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network. Here, we examine the dual-use potential and global spread of chemical and biological contract manufacturing and their ramifications for related strategic trade controls (STCs). Hundreds of providers of dual-use contract services were found worldwide, but they were primarily located in jurisdictions with comprehensive STC regulations. This then provides some degree of protection against their misuse. However, the results outlined below also suggest that chemical and biological contract manufacturers are a critical community to target for STC outreach activities and efforts to increase industry compliance. Targeted outreach would help prevent contract manufacturing service providers from unwittingly contributing to the production and proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Reply to “Comment on ‘Nomenclature, Chemical Abstracts Service numbers, isomer enumeration, ring strain, and stereochemistry: What does any of this have to do with an international chemical disarmament and nonproliferation treaty?’”

A letter to the Journal of Chemical Education provided comments and accurate enumerations of isomers for sets of organic compounds discussed in the paper “Nomenclature, Chemical Abstracts Service numbers, isomer enumeration, ring strain, and stereochemistry: What does any of this have to do with an international chemical disarmament and nonproliferation treaty?”. This is a reply to that letter to address the comments and propose updates to the original paper in order to incorporate the accurate enumeration values.

Alkanes/Cycloalkanes, Chemical Weapons Convention ↗

Computational modeling of drug-resistant bacteria. Final report

Initial proposal summary: The evolution of antibiotic-resistant mutants among bacteria (superbugs) is a persistent and growing threat to public health. In many ways, we are engaged in a war with these microorganisms, where the corresponding arms race involves chemical weapons and biological targets. Just as advances in microelectronics, imaging technology and feature recognition software have turned conventional munitions into smart bombs, the long-term objectives of this proposal are to develop highly effective antibiotics using next-generation biomolecular modeling capabilities in tandem with novel subatomic feature detection software. Using model compounds and targets, our design methodology will be validated with correspondingly ultra-high resolution structure-determination methods at premier DOE facilities (single-crystal X-ray diffraction at Argonne National Laboratory, and neutron diffraction at Oak Ridge National Laboratory). The objectives and accomplishments are summarized.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Contentious narratives and disinformation about nuclear weapons in strategic deterrence and competition: A SOCOM perspective. Part of Section: United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in Emerging Strategic & Geopolitical Challenges: Operational Implications for US Combatant Commands

Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine demonstrates the challenge for strategic deterrence and competition of countering contentious narratives and disinformation about weapons of mass destruction (WMD) during conventional regional wars against a nucleararmed adversary. Moscow uses both tailored, contentious narratives and targeted disinformation about WMD in Ukraine to influence and disrupt local and global perceptions in support of its deterrence and competition objectives vis-à-vis the United States and NATO. Since December 2021, Moscow has made a focal point of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons in its efforts to establish a permissive environment for its military buildup on the border with Ukraine and then its military intervention. These information tactics also demonstrate an opportunity for US Special Operations Forces (SOF). They are a case study for considering how SOF can contribute to strategic deterrence and competition objectives, specifically countering adversary gray-zone information efforts to alter regional security orders.1 Such a role is in line with the 2022 Special Operations Forces Vision and Strategy, which provides a framework for the evolution of SOF into “a force capable of creating strategic, asymmetric advantages for the nation as a key contributor of integrated deterrence” (United States Special Operations Command, 2022). This paper briefly examines this strategic challenge and SOF opportunity, focusing narrowly on the distinction between contentious narratives and disinformation about nuclear weapons and the role of SOF in countering these gray-zone information tactics. The nuclear dimension of Moscow’s contentious narratives and disinformation in the “special military operation” is of particular interest because it demonstrates the distinction between strategic efforts to influence and disrupt local and global perceptions in Moscow’s favor. This distinction between influence and disruption is less clear with Russia’s contentious narratives and disinformation about chemical and biological weapons in Ukraine, as disinformation about these two types of WMD appears to overwhelm contentious narratives. We believe this distinction is useful for policymakers and warfighters responsible for countering gray-zone information tactics because it provides a framework for crafting tailored responses to contentious narratives and disinformation about nuclear weapons and other WMD. The chapter concludes with a discussion of efforts that could be undertaken by SOF in cooperation with other relevant stakeholders to address this aspect of adversary gray-zone information tactics.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Report of a Workshop on Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC November 30, 2017

At a time which some view as the end of the post-Cold War era, geopolitics is increasingly fluid, complex and dangerous, including Russian and Chinese modernization of their nuclear and conventional forces nuclear and their increasingly aggressive foreign policies; North Korean nuclear and missile tests and provocations; Iran’s missile tests, regional ambitions and support for terrorism; Syria’s civil war and use of chemical weapons; and the growing global threat of Islamic terrorism. In this new security environment, potential adversaries are emboldened. Allies are reacting to more concrete and tangible threats. They are demanding greater assurances and, in some cases, questioning the credibility of the guarantees we offer and debating the pursuit of nuclear arms in ways we have not seen since the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was created.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Limiting factors for carbon based chemical double layer capacitors

The Chemical Double Layer (CDL) capacitor improves energy storage density dramatically when compared with conventional electrolytic capacitors. When compared to batteries, the CDL Capacitor is much less energy dense; however, the power density is orders of magnitude better. As a result, CDL-battery combinations present an interesting pulse power system with many potential applications. Due to the nature of the CDL it is inherently a low voltage device. The applications of the CDL can be tailored to auxiliary energy and burst mode storages which require fast charge/discharge cycles. Typical of the applications envisioned are power system backup, directed energy weapons concepts, electric automobiles, and electric actuators. In this paper, we will discuss some of the general characteristics of carbon-based CDL technology describing the structure, performance parameters, and methods of construction. Further, analytical and experimental results which define the state of the art are presented and described in terms of impact on applications.

Rose, M. Frank↗

Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) Development Risk Communication

There are clear advantages of development of a Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) for a crewed mission to Mars. NTR for in-space propulsion enables more ambitious space missions by providing high thrust at high specific impulse (approximately 900 sec) that is 2 times the best theoretical performance possible for chemical rockets. Missions can be optimized for maximum payload capability to take more payload with reduced total mass to orbit; saving cost on reduction of the number of launch vehicles needed. Or missions can be optimized to minimize trip time significantly to reduce the deep space radiation exposure to the crew. NTR propulsion technology is a game changer for space exploration. However, "NUCLEAR" is a word that is feared and vilified by some groups and the hostility towards development of any nuclear systems can meet great opposition by the public as well as from national leaders and people in authority. Communication of nuclear safety will be critical to the success of the development of the NTR. Why is there a fear of nuclear? A bomb that can level a city is a scary weapon. The first and only times the Nuclear Bomb was used in a war was on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War 2. The "Little Boy" atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 and the "Fat Man" on Nagasaki 3 days later on August 9th. Within the first 4 months of bombings, 90- 166 thousand people died in Hiroshima and 60-80 thousand died in Nagasaki. It is important to note for comparison that over 500 thousand people died and 5 million made homeless due to strategic bombing (approximately 150 thousand tons) of Japanese cities and war assets with conventional non-nuclear weapons between 1942- 1945. A major bombing campaign of "firebombing" of Tokyo called "Operation Meetinghouse" on March 9 and 10 consisting of 334 B-29's dropped approximately1,700 tons of bombs around 16 square mile area and over 100 thousand people have been estimated to have died. The declaration of death is very clear for conventional weapons and then the declaration of death due to radiation becomes vague and unclear. This may have been due to people mis-understanding the dangers and effects of radiation when assessing the damage and harm to people initially, but it is also become insidious when expressing opposition to nuclear energy. A nuclear radiation accident can be scary due to the power involved and the fear of radiation release. The International Atomic Energy Agency defines a nuclear and radiation accident a "an event that has led to significant consequences to people, the environment or the facility." There have been 3 commercial nuclear reactor accidents (Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Fukushima) that stand out to the public and much of the information about the result and impact to workers, environment, and public can be misleading. Often information is presented without clear correlation with radiation and other pertinent information is left out presenting a very scary situation to affect the emotions of the reader. A very boring but "critically acclaimed" movie was made in 1979 called "The China Syndrome" starring Jane Fonda and Jack Lemmon. The film was released on March 16, 1979, 12 days before the 3-Mile Island nuclear accident in Pennsylvania. The basis from the movie was from a few nuclear plant incidents and in particular, the Brown's Ferry Alabama Power Plant fire. In one scene from the movie, a physicist Dr. Elliott Lowell played by Donald Hotton states that a China Syndrome event would make "an area the size of Pennsylvania" permanently uninhabitable. Real serious nuclear incidents like Chernobyl and Fukushima are often sited to make people fear the consequences of using nuclear power. However, the consequences are at best poorly communicated and at worst fictitiously inflated to instigate social unrest against nuclear power. There is an article being circulated on Facebook with a title "28 Signs that the (US) West Coast is being absolutely fried with nuclear radiation from Fukushima" which focus on mis-information and fear mongering. Nuclear power and NTR are powerful resources that can open many doors for future prosperity and capability. With great power comes great responsibility. Radiation and its effects need to be better understood, quantified, and communicated. A human mission to mars has its own risks of deep space radiation and is considered a considerable risk at 400 milli-Sieverts per year in deep space and 245 milli-Sieverts per year on the surface of Mars as measured by the Mars Curiosity mission. Although these quantities of ionizing radiation are within the astronaut career limit, it exceeds the yearly average amounts of ionizing radiation. Astronaut crews have experienced these levels of radiation before, but for durations shorter than a year, and a mission to Mars could possibly be 3 years in length. There is also evidence that people can comfortably handle higher levels of ionizing radiation where the radiation occurs naturally like Ramsar, Iran when people can experience 270 milli-Sieverts per year. A risk posture that the development, test, and flight of an NTR will meet opposition from groups who oppose nuclear energy must be likely and the impact can be sever to the effort. Active risk mitigation must be taken for an NTR full-scale development project. The NTR design must take into account safety for transport and off nominal conditions. Nuclear fuel element must consider containment of fission products and Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) that may meet less opposition should be considered for safety and security reasons. Even though testing was conducted on Rover/NERVA safely and successfully in the 60's with exhaust sent heavenward in to open air, modern testing of NTR must consider full containment and no release of ionizing radiation to the public and must meet the current requirement of no more than 0.1 milli-Sieverts per year to the public. 0.1 milli-Sieverts is equivalent to eating one banana or a 20 hour plane flight. Good communication with the public and regulatory agencies will be essential to show that all effort is applied toward protection to the public and astronauts. The inspiring endeavor to put humans on Mars to study the planet, search for life, and learn more about this Solar System will be full of risks but it will be worth it. NTR will be worth the development effort if it allows humans to explore our Solar System.

Kim, Tony↗

Nuclear Thermal Propulsion Development Risks

There are clear advantages of development of a Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP) for a crewed mission to Mars. NTP for in-space propulsion enables more ambitious space missions by providing high thrust at high specific impulse ((is) approximately 900 sec) that is 2 times the best theoretical performance possible for chemical rockets. Missions can be optimized for maximum payload capability to take more payload with reduced total mass to orbit; saving cost on reduction of the number of launch vehicles needed. Or missions can be optimized to minimize trip time significantly to reduce the deep space radiation exposure to the crew. NTR propulsion technology is a game changer for space exploration to Mars and beyond. However, 'NUCLEAR' is a word that is feared and vilified by some groups and the hostility towards development of any nuclear systems can meet great opposition by the public as well as from national leaders and people in authority. The public often associates the 'nuclear' word with weapons of mass destruction. The development NTP is at risk due to unwarranted public fears and clear honest communication of nuclear safety will be critical to the success of the development of the NTP technology. Reducing cost to NTP development is critical to its acceptance and funding. In the past, highly inflated cost estimates of a full-scale development nuclear engine due to Category I nuclear security requirements and costly regulatory requirements have put the NTP technology as a low priority. Innovative approaches utilizing low enriched uranium (LEU). Even though NTP can be a small source of radiation to the crew, NTP can facilitate significant reduction of crew exposure to solar and cosmic radiation by reducing trip times by 3-4 months. Current Human Mars Mission (HMM) trajectories with conventional propulsion systems and fuel-efficient transfer orbits exceed astronaut radiation exposure limits. Utilizing extra propellant from one additional SLS launch and available energy in the NTP fuel, HMM radiation exposure can be reduced significantly.

Kim, Tony↗

Detonation Waves in High Explosives

A material at high temperature can react or decompose. For an energetic material, the reaction is exothermic and releases chemical energy that would further increase the temperature. Under some circumstances, when a reaction is triggered, such a reaction can propagate and the material rapidly releases a large amount of energy giving rise to an explosion. Examples of such materials are aerosols, suspensions of solid particles or liquid droplets in a gas; such as coal dust, grain dust and fuel-air explosions. Frequently, explosions are due to accidents. A spectacularly destructive example is the recent explosion of a large quantity of ammonium nitrate (thousands of tons) in Beirut, Lebanon (August 2020); see for example Beirut explosion. Ammonium nitrate is used as a fertilizer. It and the aerosols are not considered to be explosives due to the limited conditions for which an explosion can occur. An aerosol gets the oxidizer from the surrounding air. Burning requires diffusion of the oxidizer to the particle surface where the reaction occurs. A large density of small particles is required for a fast enough reaction to support an explosion. In contrast, an explosive is an energetic material with both fuel and oxidizer mixed on a molecular scale (either premixed gases or within molecules of a solid). This allows fast enough reactions over a wide range of conditions to support a self-propagating reactive wave known as a detonation wave. A detonation wave can be controlled and an explosive used for useful purposes such as in mining, construction, demolition, explosive welding, argon flash lamp, pulsed power using a magnetic flux generator [see also Goforth et al., 2015], jet cutter with shaped charge, explosive art, and generating conditions to study the response of materials at high strain rates and high pressures [see for example, Marsh, 1980]. Explosives are also used in conventional munitions and nuclear weapons. The focus of this book is on the theory and phenomenology of solid high explosives (HEs); in particular, plastic-bonded explosives (PBXs). Some aspects of detonation wave theory are needed to interpret explosive data. Hence, the theory is presented before the detonation wave phenomenology. A familiarity with fluid flow, specifically the notion of shock waves and the shock loci are assumed. In the remainder of this chapter we give a brief overview on the basic properties of detonation waves and PBXs.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗