Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Carlsbad Field Office”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records

Oxidizer Testing on Alternative Absorbents for Los Alamos National Laboratory - 18656

In the summer of 2016, during glovebox operations in TA-55, cheesecloth, a cellulosic material, was used to clean up a small spill of 9.8 molar nitric acid (oxidizer). Because cellulosic materials and oxidizers are incompatible, this prompted a chemical compatibility evaluation of the waste in TA-55 to determine if this waste was Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) ignitable waste (D001) or RCRA reactive waste (D003). After testing and consulting with the Carlsbad Field Office in Carlsbad (CBFO), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) NPI-7 decided to look for alternative absorbents to use in the gloveboxes that would not create an incompatibility issue with an oxidizer. While small spills are infrequent, they do happen and LANL wanted to be proactive and search for a material that would be compatible with an oxidizer. In December 2016, LANL NPI-7 requested LANL-Carlsbad's (LANL-CO) Difficult Waste Team to perform compatibility testing on potential alternative wipes for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The purpose for testing was to meet the Operational Experience Level 3 (OE-3) requirements that states 'any proposed use of organic absorbents or engineered absorbents in combination with potentially oxidizing TRU waste, wet or dry, should be evaluated and approved by the National TRU Program, Carlsbad Field Office' [1]. LANL NPI-7 requested LANL-CO to perform these tests because they were the group that performed all of the oxidizer testing for CBFO for the Basis of Knowledge (BoK) [2]. LANL NPI-7 chose nine fabrics and KMI Zeolite to be tested. The testing in Carlsbad took approximately 2 months to prepare the procedures, test plans and for the procurement of items. The burn rate testing was done in accordance with the requirements discussed in the BoK and approved by the LANL-CO Difficult Waste Team. Each absorbent was tested for 1) capacity limiting tests, 2) verifying the non-oxidizer threshold concentration of the oxidizer and 3) establishing the non-oxidizer concentration based on the experimental results. The effect of rinsing cheesecloth samples that have absorbed an oxidizer was also tested [3]. The burn rate testing provided three potential alternative absorbents (Spilfyter Hazmat Sorbent SM Pads Premium, Kimtech Pure W4 Wipers and Polybenzimidazole (PBI) Staple fiber) that produced a non-oxidizer result as defined by the BoK. Two wipes Spilfyter Hazmat Sorbent SM Pads Premium and Kimtech Pure W4 Wipers were able to absorb the highest concentration of potassium nitrite and still produce a non-oxidizer. TA-55 has used Spilfyter Hazmat Sorbent SM Pads Premium for a number of years in several of the processes and has ordered Kimtech Pure W4 Wipers for use in the facility. PBI fabric passed at 25 wt. % solution. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Environmental Programs at Los Alamos National Laboratory

Summary of this project is: (1) Teamwork, partnering to meet goals - (a) Building on cleanup successes, (b) Solving legacy waste problems, (c) Protecting the area's environment; (2) Strong performance over the past three years - (a) Credibility from four successful Recovery Act Projects, (b) Met all Consent Order milestones, (c) Successful ramp-up of TRU program; (3) Partnership between the National Nuclear Security Administration's Los Alamos Site Office, DOE Carlsbad Field Office, New Mexico Environment Department, and contractor staff enables unprecedented cleanup progress; (4) Continued focus on protecting water resources; and (5) All consent order commitments delivered on time or ahead of schedule.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Addressing the Highest Risk: Environmental Programs at Los Alamos National Laboratory

Report topics: Current status of cleanup; Shift in priorities to address highest risk; Removal of above-ground waste; and Continued focus on protecting water resources. Partnership between the National Nuclear Security Administration's Los Alamos Site Office, DOE Carlsbad Field Office, New Mexico Environment Department, and contractor staff has enabled unprecedented cleanup progress. Progress on TRU campaign is well ahead of plan. To date, have completed 130 shipments vs. 104 planned; shipped 483 cubic meters of above-ground waste (vs. 277 planned); and removed 11,249 PE Ci of material at risk (vs. 9,411 planned).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

RH Packaging Program Guidance (Rev. 3.1)

The purpose of this program guidance document is to provide the technical requirements for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of the Remote-Handled Transuranic (RH-TRU) 72-B Waste Shipping Package (also known as the "RH-TRU 72-B") and directly related components. This document complies with the requirements as specified in the RH-TRU 72-B Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificate of Compliance (C of C) 9212. If there is a conflict between this document and the SARP and/or C of C, the C of C shall govern. The C of C states, "each package must be prepared for shipment and operated in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 7.0, Operating Procedures, of the application." It further states: "…each package must be tested and maintained in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 8.0, Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program of the Application." Chapter 9.0 of the SARP tasks the Department of Energy Carlsbad Field Office or the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Management and Operating (M&O) Contractor with assuring the packaging is used in accordance with the requirements of the C of C. Because the packaging is NRC approved, users need to be familiar with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) §71.8, "Deliberate Misconduct." Any time a user suspects or has indications that the conditions of approval in the C of C were not met, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) shall be notified immediately. The CBFO will evaluate the issue and notify the NRC if required. In accordance with 10 CFR Part 71, "Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material," certificate holders, packaging users, and contractors or subcontractors who use, design, fabricate, test, maintain, or modify the packaging shall post copies of (1) 10 CFR Part 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliances," regulations, (2) Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and (3) NRC Form 3, Notice to Employees. These documents must be posted in a conspicuous location where the activities subject to these regulations are conducted. This document details the instructions to be followed to operate, maintain, and test the RH-TRU 72-B packaging. This Program Guidance standardizes instructions for all users. Users shall follow these instructions or equivalent approved instructions. Following these instructions assures that operations meet the requirements of the SARP.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

De-Inventory Plan for Transuranic Waste Stored at Area G

This report describes the strategy and detailed work plan developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to disposition transuranic (TRU) waste stored at its Area G radioactive waste storage site. The focus at this time is on disposition of 3,706 m 3 of TRU waste stored above grade by June 30, 2014, which is one of the commitments within the Framework Agreement: Realignment of Environmental Priorities between the Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the State of New Mexico Environment Department (NMED), Reference 1. A detailed project management schedule has been developed to manage this work and better ensure that all required activities are aligned and integrated. The schedule was developed in conjunction with personnel from the NNSA Los Alamos Site Office (LASO), the DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO), the Central Characterization Project (CCP), and Los Alamos National Security, LLC (LANS). A detailed project management schedule for the remainder of the above grade inventory and the below grade inventory will be developed and incorporated into the De-Inventory Plan by December 31, 2012. This schedule will also include all newly-generated TRU waste received at Area G in FYs 2012 and 2013, which must be removed by no later than December 31, 2014, under the Framework Agreement. The TRU waste stored above grade at Area G is considered to be one of the highest nuclear safety risks at LANL, and the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board has expressed concern for the radioactive material at risk (MAR) contained within the above grade TRU waste inventory and has formally requested that DOE reduce the MAR. A large wildfire called the Las Conchas Fire burned extensive areas west of LANL in late June and July 2011. Although there was minimal to no impact by the fire to LANL, the fire heightened public concern and news media attention on TRU waste storage at Area G. After the fire, New Mexico Governor Susana Martinez also requested that LANL accelerate disposition of TRU waste stored above grade at Area G. The 3,706 m 3 volume of TRU waste stored above grade consists of 4,495 containers that include all above grade non-cemented waste as well as above grade cemented waste that was ready for characterization on October 1, 2011. This volume includes all newly-generated TRU waste currently stored at Area G as of October 1, 2011. This volume does not include the Bolas Grandes spheres, mixed low level waste (MLLW) containers, empty containers, cemented waste that requires remediation, projected newly generated TRU waste from FY 2012 and later, or TRU waste stored below grade. The 3,706 m 3 volume represents about 86 per cent of the total volume of TRU waste stored above grade on October 1, 2011. The De-Inventory Plan supports the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) goal to disposition 90% of the Legacy TRU waste within the DOE complex by the end of 2015 as stated in its Roadmap for EM’s Journey to Excellence (Reference 2). The plan also addresses precursor actions for disposition of TRU waste that are necessary for compliance with the Compliance Order on Consent issued by the NMED in 2005 (Reference 3).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Annual Site Environmental Report for 2009

The purpose of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Annual Site Environmental Report for 2009 (ASER) is to provide information required by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting. Specifically, the ASER presents summary environmental data to: (1) characterize site environmental management performance; (2) summarize environmental occurrences and responses reported during the calendar year; (3) Confirm compliance with environmental standards and requirements; and (4) highlight the WIPP Environmental Management System (EMS) and significant environmental programs and accomplishments, including progress toward the DOE Environmental Sustainability Goals. The DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) and the management and operating contractor (MOC), Washington TRU Solutions LLC (WTS), maintain and preserve the environmental resources at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). DOE Order 231.1A; DOE Order 450.1A, Environmental Protection Program; and DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, require that the affected environment at and near DOE facilities be monitored to ensure the safety and health of the public and workers, and preservation of the environment. This report was prepared in accordance with DOE Order 231.1A, which requires that DOE facilities submit an ASER to the DOE Headquarters Chief Health, Safety, and Security Officer. The WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (HWFP) Number NM4890139088-TSDF (treatment, storage, and disposal facility) further requires that the ASER be provided to the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Future Transition of WIPP from EM to Another DOE Office - 19256

The U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) has a primary mission to assist federal government entities disposition transuranic (TRU) radioactive waste. The main resource for disposition is the deep geologic repository known as the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Other resources include a complete transportation system and a program that assists in the certification and shipment of TRU waste to WIPP known as the National TRU Program (NTP). All of these resources are managed by CBFO, which currently is part of the DOE Environmental Management (EM) program. EM's primary mission for DOE is to clean up the legacy remaining from many years of nuclear weapons research and production. But, CBFO estimates the need for WIPP and NTP will continue beyond the mission of EM and will assist other entities such as the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Office of Science (OS) and the Navy. As the inventory of legacy TRU waste is reduced, the inventory of new TRU waste will continue from ongoing missions. So, over the life span of WIPP the primary customers of CBFO will shift from legacy EM sites to newly-generated TRU waste sites. And, somewhere along the way CBFO estimates that it will transition, primarily from an EM support (legacy waste) entity to a primarily a NNSA support (newly-generated waste) entity to facilitate ongoing DOE missions. This paper will address the need for that change at a programmatic level and will include some ideas for conceptual planning for such a transition. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

RH Packaging Operations Manual (Rev. 6)

This procedure provides operating instructions for the remote-handled transuranic (RH-TRU) 72-B Waste Shipping Package (hereinafter referred to as "RH-TRU 72-B"). In this document, "Packaging" refers to the assembly of components necessary to ensure compliance with the packaging requirements (not loaded with a payload). "Package" refers to a Type B packaging that, with its radioactive contents, is designed to retain the integrity of its containment and shielding when subject to the normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accident test conditions set forth in 10 CFR Part 71. Before RH-TRU 72-B loading operations begin, loading procedures and revisions must be sent to the DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) at site.documents@wipp.ws for approval. Loading of the RH-TRU 72-B can be done one of two ways: on the cask trailer in the vertical position or by removing the cask from the trailer and loading it in an area designated for remote-handling. Two types of trailers were specially designed to transport the RH-TRU 72-B: a spread-axle trailer requiring a crane to rotate the cask and a cask uprighting trailer designed with built-in hydraulics to rotate the RH-TRU 72-B into the vertical position while on the trailer. The hydraulic power unit is a separate piece of equipment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

RH Packaging Program Guidance (Rev. 3)

The purpose of this program guidance document is to provide the technical requirements for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of the Remote Handled-Transuranic (RH-TRU) 72-B Waste Shipping Package (also known as the "RH-TRU 72-B") and directly related components. This document complies with the requirements as specified in the RH-TRU 72-B Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificate of Compliance (C of C) 9212. If there is a conflict between this document and the SARP and/or C of C, the C of C shall govern. The C of C states: "...each package must be prepared for shipment and operated in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 7.0, Operating Procedures, of the application." It further states: "...each package must be tested and maintained in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 8.0, Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program of the Application." Chapter 9.0 of the SARP tasks the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Management and Operating (M&O) Contractor with assuring the packaging is used in accordance with the requirements of the C of C. Because the packaging is NRC-approved, users need to be familiar with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) §71.8, "Deliberate Misconduct." Any time a user suspects or has indications that the conditions of approval in the C of C were not met, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) shall be notified immediately. The CBFO will evaluate the issue and notify the NRC if required. In accordance with 10 CFR Part 71, "Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material," certificate holders, packaging users, and contractors or subcontractors who use, design, fabricate, test, maintain, or modify the packaging shall post copies of (1) 10 CFR Part 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance," regulations, (2) Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and (3) NRC Form 3, Notice to Employees. These documents must be posted in a conspicuous location where the activities subject to these regulations are conducted. This document details the instructions to be followed to operate, maintain, and test the RH-TRU 72-B packaging. This Program Guidance standardizes instructions for all users. Users shall follow these instructions or equivalent approved instructions. Following these instructions assures that operations meet the requirements of the SARP.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Brine Availability Test in Salt (BATS) (FY25 Final Closeout)

This fiscal year 2025 (FY25) closeout report summarizes the final experiments conducted and data collected in phase 2 of the Brine Availability Test in Salt (BATS 2). The design and interpretation of the test was previously funded by the US Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition Program, under the Disposal Research and Development (R&D) program of the Office of Spent Fuel & Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) but they are not funding it anymore (since May 2025). The experiment was located underground at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), southeastern New Mexico, which is a DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) site managed by the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO). DOE-EM funds the WIPP Test Coordination Office (TCO), which provided critical implementation support for the continued execution of BATS. A high-level summary of processes expected in a salt repository are given in Kuhlman & Mills (2025).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Journey From Sandia To Los Alamos - 12465

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) relies on laboratory experiments and computer-based models to verify the reliability of the nation's nuclear stockpile. Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) tests various materials in extreme environments designed to mimic those of nuclear explosions using the Z machine. The Z machine is a key tool in the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) stockpile stewardship mission and is used to study the dynamic properties of nuclear weapon materials. In 2006, SNL/NM and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) defining experiments to be conducted in the Z machine involving plutonium (Pu) provided by LANL. Five Pu experiments have been completed with as many as 20 more planned through 2016. The experimental containment vessel used for the experiment and containing the Pu residues, becomes transuranic (TRU) waste after the experiment and termination of safeguards and is considered a LANL waste stream. Each containment vessel is placed in a 55-gallon Type A drum or standard waste box (SWB) for shipment back to LANL for final certification and eventual disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The experimental containment vessels are greater than 99% metallic materials (ferrous and non-ferrous metals). In addition to the Pu targets, detonators with high explosives (HE) are used in the experiments to isolate the containment vessel from the Z machine as energy is delivered to the Pu samples. The characterization requirements, transportation issues, required documentation, and the approvals needed before shipments were challenging and required close coordination between SNL/NM, Sandia Site Office, LANL, Los Alamos Site Office, Washington TRU Solutions, Inc., the Central Characterization Project, and the Carlsbad Field Office. Between 2006 and 2010, representatives from SNL/NM and LANL worked to develop an approved path forward to meet the requirements of all stakeholders. This project clearly demonstrates successful cooperation between LANL and SNL/NM, and support from the LASO, SSO, CBFO, WTS, and CCP. Key elements were communication and documented plans with responsible parties and due dates. Now that the first successful shipment has been accomplished, it is believed that future shipments will become a more routine activity. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Plutonium Oxidation State Distribution in the Presence of WIPP-Relevant Organics and Iron Corrosion Products

The oxidation state and solubility of plutonium (Pu) in high ionic strength synthetic WIPP (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant) brines as a function of pC H+ in the presence and absence of WIPP-relevant organic ligands (EDTA [Ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid], oxalate, citrate, acetate) and iron corrosion products (magnetite and metallic iron) at 𝑇 = 23 ± 2 ∘C was thoroughly studied by long-term batch solubility experiments (between approximately 800-1,100 days) from an undersaturation approach. The oxidation state of Pu in the WIPP environment has been a topic of interest since the initial Compliance Certification Application (CCA). This study aims to investigate the solubility of Pu under the expected WIPP conditions and to determine the oxidation state of the solid phase that will control the solubility. One of the most important results of this study is that the Pu oxidation state was analyzed both from the surface area of the corrosion products and in the precipitated solid. The analysis of the Pu oxidation state on the surface of the iron mineral from the ongoing undersaturated experiments is more relevant to the performance assessment of nuclear waste disposal than short term batch (plutonium-iron phase) experiments. The X-ray Absorption Near-Edge Spectroscopy (XANES) analysis showed that Pu oxidation state is different on the metal surface and in the precipitated solid. Pu(III) is the dominant oxidation state in the metallic iron (Fe 0 ) system in the presence and absence of organics. Pu(IV) is the dominant oxidation state in the magnetite system in the presence and absence of organics. Also, organics stabilize Pu(IV) in the magnetite system. Analysis of Pu in the precipitated solid by Extended X-ray Absorption Fine Structure (EXAFS) analysis showed that Pu formed an inner-sphere complex with iron with minor amounts of PuO 2 present. X-ray diffraction (XRD) results indicate that metallic iron and magnetite did not oxidize in three years in the alkaline and high ionic strength system. Under these conditions (8 < pC H+ < 10 at T = (22 ± 2) °C under nitrogen atmosphere, the solubility of Pu changes by up to three orders of magnitude (10 -5 and 10 -8 M). The spread in solubility is highest at pC H+ = 9. Pu(III) and Pu(IV) showed different solubility behavior in the synthetic WIPP brine. A summary of the data collected in this report will be submitted to Sandia National Laboratories as part of a parameter update report which will outline the changes to the OXSTAT parameter for the 2026 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2026). The experiments performed were done according to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) approved Test Plan entitled “Effects of Radiolysis, Organic Complexation, and Redox Conditions on the Speciation and Oxidation State Distribution of Pu(III/IV)” (LCO-ACP-25). All data reported were obtained under the Los Alamos National Laboratory-Carlsbad Office (LANL-CO) Quality Assurance Program, which is compliant with the DOE Carlsbad Field Office, Quality Assurance Program Document (CBFO/QAPD).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Communicating with future generations - Major obstacles to overcome - 15009

The Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) is responsible for managing activities related to the disposal of transuranic (TRU) and TRU-mixed waste in the geologic repository at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), 2150 feet (655 meters) below the land surface, at the WIPP, near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations Part 191.14(c) [1] and Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations Part 194.43 [2] require a Passive Institutional Controls program be developed for the WIPP. The primary purpose of the Passive Institutional Controls program is to indicate the location of the repository and the risk it presents to an intruder, thus reducing the likelihood of inadvertent human intrusion into the repository. A plan was put into place during the 1990's with records management and storage, awareness triggers, permanent marker design concepts, including languages, graphics and engineered drawings, plus testing schedules for materials and structures. This work included the thoughts of expert panels and individuals. The plan held up under peer review and met the regulatory requirements. But will it really work? Will future generations a thousand years, two thousand years, or seven thousand years from now really be able to decipher and understand the message? This is the challenge international constructors, operators, and regulators of repositories for the disposal of any hazardous materials must face. It is important to explore the history of language, both written words and graphics; and what we can learn from the past to assist us in communicating with the future. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

There is Nothing Here for You: Passive Institutional Controls and Preemptive Resource Exploitation - 16197

The Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) is required by Title 40 CFR Part 191.14(c) and Title 40 CFR Part 194.43 to develop a Passive Institutional Controls (PICs) program to prevent the likelihood for future human intrusion into the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The purpose of this paper is to explore how the exploitation of resources under nuclear waste repositories as a part of PICs could reduce the risk of future human intrusion. The WIPP, located in the northern Permian Basin near Carlsbad, New Mexico, is a geologic repository for the permanent isolation of defense-related transuranic waste. In 1995, a series of geophysical surveys by the New Mexico Bureau of Mines and Mineral Resources estimated the total hydrocarbon reserves underneath the WIPP, which included a 16-section area plus a one mile buffer. Since that time the Delaware Basin well database has been maintained to closely monitor hydrocarbon extraction activities. The database was used in compiling relevant oil and gas extraction data retrieved from The New Mexico Oil Conservation Division. The volume of hydrocarbons extracted from 1995 to the present suggests that if current extraction growth trends continue (as historic market and production data indicate they will), all known crude oil reserves under the WIPP, obtainable through current extraction technology, will be depleted within approximately 10 years, i.e., by 2026. This is well before the anticipated WIPP closure and start of the Active Institutional Controls (AICs) program called for in 40 CFR Part 194.41(b). In addition, gas resources, although more difficult to forecast, are not expected to last beyond 2137. Title 40 CFR 194.33 states, 'Inadvertent and intermittent intrusion by drilling for resources... is the most severe human intrusion scenario'. This human intrusion scenario is the feature, event, and process (FEP) that performance assessment (PA) has identified as having the most significant impact on radionuclide releases during the 10,000 year regulatory period for the WIPP. Title 40 CFR 194.43 requires a PICs program which contains '... [records] in the international archives that would likely be consulted by individuals in search of unexploited resources'. Due to political, social, and economic motivators for resource exploration and exploitation, the potential future absence of hydrocarbon resources under the WIPP is important in deterring possible human intrusion. To minimize the risk of future human intrusion, it may be necessary to consider actively removing as many of the exploitable hydrocarbon resources under and around a nuclear waste repository as is practicable before the end of the period of AICs (i.e., 100 years after closure of the repository). Additionally, communicating the absence of hydrocarbon resources under a nuclear repository should take a prominent role in any PICs program. Due to its high-cost nature, exploratory drilling of any kind currently involves cost/benefit analysis. If in the future the economic realities of resource exploration remain similar to today, and future oil companies know the resources for a particular area have already been heavily exploited, hypothetically, they would become less motivated to drill in that area. They would instead opt to explore an area with better prospects. It is important then that the remaining hydrocarbon reserves be clearly stated and prominently displayed. In essence we should communicate the message, loud and clear, 'There is nothing here for you'. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Investigation and Recovery Following the Drum Event at INL's ARP-V Facility - 19517

Contractors working under the Department of Energy's (DoE's) Idaho Field Office have been exhuming and processing buried legacy waste from early weapons development and productions operations since 1984. Since operations began, nearly 400,000 drums have passed through this process. On April 11, 2018, repackaged drums were staged in an airlock (radiological buffer area) awaiting transfer to another facility for characterization. Late in the evening after operations had ended, four of the drums over pressurized causing an energetic displacement of their lids. A significant fraction of drum contents was ejected and dispersed throughout the airlock. The event activated the fire detection system in the facility initiating an emergency response from the site fire department, radiological protection, and operations. Initial intervention by fire department personnel was unsuccessful at quenching the reaction, so the responders egressed to a safe distance and monitored the situation. After determining the event had terminated and it was safe to enter, the facility was assessed revealing significant contamination in the airlock from the ejected waste. The area surrounding the facility was surveyed and it was determined that no contamination was released outside the facility. The Fluor Idaho, LLC (Fluor Idaho) Program Manager commissioned an investigation and recovery effort, which focused on three aspects: (1) technical investigation, (2) event and causal analysis, and (3) facility recovery. A team of highly qualified individuals from around the DOE Complex was assembled to support the technical investigation. The team included representatives from several Fluor Idaho, Fluor Corporate, Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (INL), LANL, SRNL, South West Research Institute, DOE Carlsbad Field Office, and Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board, and DOE-Headquarters. This team addressed the reaction mechanism of the event by guiding the sampling activities and coordinating analysis and testing by the analytical laboratories. Independent and experienced investigators were brought in to conduct a rigorous event and cause analysis. The Causal Analysis Team pursued direct, root, and contributing causes. Interviews were conducted, and documents were reviewed to develop an event and causal analysis. The Accelerated Retrieval Project V Operations team mobilized to decontaminate and recover the facility. Significant progress has been made in this effort, area and airborne contamination levels have been significantly reduced allowing limited activities to resume. In addition, this group supported sample collection efforts as directed by the Technical Investigation Team. This paper reviews key findings and milestones from the technical investigation, the event and causal analysis, and facility recovery operations. From these elements of the investigation, lessons learned are identified that would benefit other organizations involved with legacy waste management and disposition. Waste management is common to all sites in the DOE Complex and the events and recovery efforts described in this paper may provide beneficial insights to these operations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Disposition of transuranic residues from plutonium isentropic compression experiment (Pu-ice) conducted at Z machine

In 1992, the U.S. Congress passed legislation to discontinue above- and below-ground testing of nuclear weapons. Because of this, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) must rely on laboratory experiments and computer-based calculations to verify the reliability of the nation's nuclear stockpile. The Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) Z machine was developed by the DOE to support its science-based approach to stockpile stewardship. SNL/NM researchers also use the Z machine to test radiation effects on various materials in experiments designed to mimic nuclear explosions. Numerous components, parts, and materials have been tested. These experiments use a variety of radionuclides; however, plutonium (Pu) isotopes with greater than ninety-eight percent enrichment are the primary radionuclides used in the experiments designed for stockpile stewardship. In May 2006, SNL/NM received authority that the Z Machine Isentropic Compression Experiments could commence. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) provided the plutonium targets and loaded the target assemblies, which were fabricated by SNL/NM. LANL shipped the loaded assemblies to SNL/NM for Z machine experiments. Three experiments were conducted from May through July 2006. The residues from each experiment, which weighed up to 913 pounds, were metallic and packaged into a respective 55-gallon drum each. Based on a memorandum of understanding between the two laboratories, LANL provides the plutonium samples and the respective radio-isotopic information. SNL/NM conducts the experiments and provides temporary storage for the drums until shipment to LANL for final waste certification for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southeastern New Mexico. This paper presents a comprehensive approach for documenting generator knowledge for characterization of waste in cooperation with scientists at the two laboratories and addresses a variety of topics such as material control and accountability, safeguards of material, termination of safeguards for eventual shipment from SNL/NM to LANL, associated approvals from DOE-Carlsbad Field Office, which governs WIPP and various notifications. It portrays a comprehensive approach needed for successful completion of a complex project between two national laboratories.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Annual Site Environmental Report for 2010

The purpose of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Annual Site Environmental Report for 2010 (ASER) is to provide information required by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting. Specifically, the ASER presents summary environmental data to: (1) Characterize site environmental management performance. (2) Summarize environmental occurrences and responses reported during the calendar year. (3) Confirm compliance with environmental standards and requirements. (4) Highlight significant environmental accomplishments, including progress toward the DOE Environmental Sustainability Goals made through implementation of the WIPP Environmental Management System (EMS). The DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) and the management and operating contractor (MOC), Washington TRU Solutions LLC (WTS), maintain and preserve the environmental resources at the WIPP. DOE Order 231.1A; DOE Order 450.1A, Environmental Protection Program; and DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, require that the affected environment at and near DOE facilities be monitored to ensure the safety and health of the public and workers, and preservation of the environment. This report was prepared in accordance with DOE Order 231.1A, which requires that DOE facilities submit an ASER to the DOE Headquarters Chief Health, Safety, and Security Officer. The WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit Number NM4890139088-TSDF (Permit) further requires that the ASER be provided to the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗