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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): CIL issues resolution report, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. This report contains IOA assessment worksheets showing resolution of outstanding IOA CIL issues that were summarized in the IOA FMEA/CIL Assessment Interim Report, dated 9 March 1988. Each assessment worksheet has been updated with CIL issue resolution and rationale. The NASA and Prime Contractor post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation assessed is believed to be technically accurate and complete. No assessment issues remain that has safety implications. Volume 1 contain worksheets for the following sybsystems: Landing and Deceleration Subsystem; Purge, Vent and Drain Subsystem; Active Thermal Control and Life Support Systems; Crew Equipment Subsystem; Instrumentation Subsystem; Data Processing Subsystem; Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control Subsystem; Hydraulics and Water Spray Boiler Subsystem; and Mechanical Actuation Subsystem.

Urbanowicz, Kenneth J.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): CIL issues resolution report, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes And Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. This report contains IOA assessment worksheets showing resolution of outstanding IOA CIL issues that were summarized in the IOA FMEA/CIL Assessment Interim Report, dated 9 March 1988. Each assessment worksheet has been updated with CIL issue resolution and rationale. Volume 2 contains the worksheets for the following subsystems: Nose Wheel Steering Subsystem; Remote Manipulator Subsystem; Atmospheric Revitalization Subsystem; Extravehicular Mobility Unit Subsystem; Power Reactant Supply and Distribution Subsystem; Main Propulsion Subsystem; and Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) CIL issues resolution report, volume 3

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. This report contains IOA assessment workshets showing resolution of outstanding IOA CIL issues that were summarized in the IOA FMEA/CIL Assessment Interim Report, dated 9 March 1988. Each assessment worksheet has been updated with CIL issue rsolution and rationale. Volume 3 contains the worksheets for the Reaction Control Subsystem and the Communications and Tracking Subsystem.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2005

External Tank CIL Closed Loop Verification System

Lockheed Martin was requested to develop a closed loop CIL system following the Challenger accident. The system that was developed has proven to be very robust with minimal problems since implementation, having zero escapes in the last 7 years (27 External Tanks). We are currently investigating expansion of the CIL Closed Loop system to include "MI" CILs.

Hartley, Eugene A., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS1996

Meteorological Satellites (METSAT) and Earth Observing System (EOS) Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit-A (AMSU-A) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL)

This Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is for the Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit-A (AMSU-A) instruments that are being designed and manufactured for the Meteorological Satellites Project (METSAT) and the Earth Observing System (EOS) integrated programs. The FMEA analyzes the design of the METSAT and EOS instruments as they currently exist. This FMEA is intended to identify METSAT and EOS failure modes and their effect on spacecraft-instrument and instrument-component interfaces. The prime objective of this FMEA is to identify potential catastrophic and critical failures so that susceptibility to the failures and their effects can be eliminated from the METSAT/EOS instruments.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the rudder/speed brake subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Rudder/Speed Brake (RSB) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline along with the proposed Post 51-L CIL updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RSB hardware. The IOA product for the RSB analysis consisted of 38 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 27 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 34 FMEAs and 18 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all CIL items. Based on the Pre 51-L baseline, all non-CIL FMEAs were also in agreement.

Wilson, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the ascent thrust vector control actuator subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Ascent Thrust Vector Control Actuator (ATVD) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter ATVC hardware. The IOA product for the ATVC actuator analysis consisted of 25 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 16 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 21 FMEAs and 13 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all CIL items. Based on the Pre 51-L baseline, all non-CIL FMEAs were also in agreement.

Wilson, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the body flap subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Body Flap (BF) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter BF hardware. The IOA product for the BF analysis consisted of 43 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 19 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 34 FMEAs and 15 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all CIL items. Based on the Pre 51-L baseline, all non-CIL FMEAs were also in agreement.

Wilson, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the elevon actuator subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Elevon Subsystem hardware, generating draft failure modes, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Elevon hardware. The IOA product for the Elevon analysis consisted of 25 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 17 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA FMEA/CIL, which consisted of 23 FMEAs and 13 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all CIL items. Based on the Pre 51-L baseline, all non-CIL FMEAs were also in agreement.

Wilson, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the life support and airlock support systems, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Life Support and Airlock Support Systems (LSS and ALSS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. The discrepancies were flagged for potential future resolution. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter LSS and ALSS hardware. The IOA product for the LSS and ALSS analysis consisted of 511 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 140 potential critical items. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 456 FMEAs and 101 CIL items. The IOA analysis identified 39 failure modes, 6 of which were classified as CIL items, for components not covered by the NASA FMEAs. It was recommended that these failure modes be added to the NASA FMEA baseline. The overall assessment produced agreement on all but 301 FMEAs which caused differences in 111 CIL items.

Arbet, J. D.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware, and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. The IOA product for the RCS analysis consisted of 208 hardware and 2064 EPD and C failure mode worksheets that resulted in 141 hardware and 449 EPD and C potential critical items (PCIs) being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. After comparison and discussions with the NASA subsystem manager, 96 hardware issues, 83 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, and 280 EPD and C issues, 158 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, and 280 EPD and C issues, 158 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, remain unresolved. Volume 1 contains the subsystem description, assessment results, and some of the IOA worksheets.

Prust, Chet D.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) for the Space Shuttle solid rocket motor

The recertification of the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) and Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) has included an extensive rewriting of the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). The evolution of the groundrules and methodology used in the analysis is discussed and compared to standard FMEA techniques. Especially highlighted are aspects of the FMEA/CIL which are unique to the analysis of an SRM. The criticality category definitions are presented and the rationale for assigning criticality is presented. The various data required by the CIL and contribution of this data to the retention rationale is also presented. As an example, the FMEA and CIL for the SRM nozzle assembly is discussed in detail. This highlights some of the difficulties associated with the analysis of a system with the unique mission requirements of the Space Shuttle.

Russell, D. L.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the remote manipulator system FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Remote Manipulator System (RMS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were than compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison for the Orbiter RMS hardware are documented. The IOA product for the RMS analysis consisted of 604 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 458 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 45 FMEAs and 321 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all but 154 FMEAs which caused differences in 137 CIL items.

Tangorra, F.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the landing/deceleration (LDG/DEC) subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Landing/Deceleration (LDG/DEC) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter LDG/DEC hardware. The IOA product for the LDG/DEC analysis consisted of 259 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 124 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 267 FMEA's and 120 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all but 75 FMEA's which caused differences in 51 CIL items.

Odonnell, R. A.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of instrumental subsystem FMEA/CIL

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Instrumentation hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison for the Orbiter Instrumentation hardware are documented. The IOA product for Instrumentation analysis consisted of 107 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 22 critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the Pre 51-L NASA baseline with 14 Post 51-L FMEAs added, which consists of 96 FMEAs and 18 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all but 25 FMEAs which caused differences in 5 CIL items.

Gardner, J. R.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the backup flight system FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Backup Flight System (BFS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and Potential Critical Items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter BFS hardware. The IOA product for the BFS analysis consisted of 29 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 21 Potential Critical Items (PCI) being identified. This product was originally compared with the proposed NASA BFS baseline and subsequently compared with the applicable Data Processing System (DPS), Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), and Displays and Controls NASA CIL items. The comparisons determined if there were any results which had been found by the IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. The original assessment determined there were numerous failure modes and potential critical items in the IOA analysis that were not contained in the NASA BFS baseline. Conversely, the NASA baseline contained three FMEAs (IMU, ADTA, and Air Data Probe) for CIL items that were not identified in the IOA product.

Prust, E. E.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the manned maneuvering unit

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contain within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Martin Marietta FMEA/CIL Post 51-L updates. A discussion of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. These discrepancies were flagged as issues, and recommendations were made based on the FMEA data available at the time. The results of this comparison for the Orbiter MMU hardware are documented. The IOA product for the MMU analysis consisted of 204 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 95 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 179 FMEAs and 110 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all 121 FMEAs which caused differences in 92 CIL items.

Huynh, M.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the guidance, navigation, and control subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Guidance, Navigation, and Control System (GNC) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison for the Orbiter GNC hardware is documented. The IOA product for the GNC analysis consisted of 141 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 24 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 148 FMEAs and 36 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all but 56 FMEAs which caused differences in zero CIL items.

Trahan, W. H.↗