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14 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) Data Categorization Study: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Detection Device Data

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) seeks to address critical questions related to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) detection devices. This research aims to enhance the security and understanding of these devices by investigating various aspects of their identification, communication, and functionality. The primary focus is on network security, malware detection, device identification, and intelligence gathering. CBRN data can be categorized in various ways depending on the purpose of CBRN detection devices and the specific context of the applications for analysis. Criteria that can be used to assist in this effort include but are not limited to data type, data protocol, source/destination, application, time, security, and content. This study will inform additional paths for data classification, data profiling, data mapping, and data modeling. This will help the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) better understand their data and make informed decisions based on the insights gained from this study and their application. The CBRN Data Categorization study will include the identification of 5–10 different CBRN detection devices with unique characteristics for assessing and analyzing the data that is being produced by and transmitted from these devices.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Development of FRET clusters for CBRN Detection

Advanced sensor capabilities for the simultaneous on-site detection of specific chemical, biological, and radiological/nuclear (CBRN) threats is important to significantly limit the risk of exposure to personnel and allow the rapid collection of essential scientific data and critical evidence. Commercially available sensor capabilities are generally complex, and/or require highly specific and ultra-sensitive methods that are often power demanding or require offsite post-analysis for positive detection, leaving personnel vulnerable. The goal of this project is to develop a portable sensor capable of simultaneously detecting CBRN signatures using a multiplexed Förster Resonance Energy Transfer (FRET) based sensor. FRET sensors are tailorable, specific, and highly dependent on the donor-acceptor distance. In this project, nanoparticles were functionalized with aptamers that were designed for the detection of methylphosphonate, a sarin metabolite. FRET was measured between quantum dot donors and dye and metal nanoparticle acceptors using optical spectroscopy.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

CBRN Situational Awareness Tools for the Modern Age

CBRN Situational awareness (SA) should be a key operational requirement in the CNI area of discussion, not only for the “boots-on-the-ground” warfighter, but at a strategic level. For example, maneuver plans will need to be developed for contamination avoidance and battlefield survivability. Large datasets from instruments dispersed across the battlefield will thus need to be collected and processed into a holistic assessment of the radiological hazard. From there, hazard maps then must be distributed at the tactical level, all while continuing to effectively engage a peer adversary. This vision represents a network of sensors, software tools, data processing algorithms, communications suites, and common operational picture (COP) platforms working in concert to inform warfighters and command echelons alike of evolving nuclear and radiological hazards. This complex system-of-systems and the ultimate goal of effective engagement in a nuclear or radiological-hazard battlefield can be achieved through pursuit of improvement in collaborative SA tools.

Becker, Eric M.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Materials Data on CBrN by Materials Project

BrCN is Cyanogen Chloride structured and crystallizes in the orthorhombic Pmmn space group. The structure is zero-dimensional and consists of two cyanogen bromide molecules. C4+ is bonded in a linear geometry to one N3- and one Br1- atom. The C–N bond length is 1.17 Å. The C–Br bond length is 1.79 Å. N3- is bonded in a single-bond geometry to one C4+ atom. Br1- is bonded in a distorted single-bond geometry to one C4+ atom.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2024

FRET Based Biosensors for CBRN Threat Detection

Biosensors are devices used to detect the presence/concentration of a biological analyte. Biosensors consist of three parts: 1) a component that recognizes the analyte and produces a signal, 2) a signal transducer, and 3) a reader device. A multiplexed biosensor combines different biosensors for increased detection capabilities.

Demers, Steven M.↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Argonne SuperGel for CBRN Decontamination - 20160

The Argonne SuperGel was developed between 2003 and 2015 to fill a gap in our nation's capability to quickly decontaminate important structures following a radiological or nuclear release event. Specifically, the decontamination technology was developed to minimize damage to monuments, high valued structures, and critical infrastructure while reducing environmental and health impacts. An important criterion during its development, common reagents were employed that could be easily acquired in order to minimize the timeline for its deployment. Its current formulation uses off-the-shelf super-absorbing hydrogels common to the food and agricultural industry and common salts. Over the years, two formulations of the Argonne SuperGel have been developed to specifically target radioactive cesium contaminations and then, more generically, actinide and fission product contaminations. A biodegradable derivative of phosphoric acid is used in small amounts to promote the removal of insoluble actinide species. The original order of unit operations for the SuperGel technology was 1) applying the wash solution to promote mobility of the contaminants on the surface, 2) applying the hydrogel to absorb the wash solution and contaminants, and 3) removing the hydrogel for disposal. During the course of our studies, we tested a new formulation of the gel technology that eliminated the need for a separate step to apply the wash solution without a compromise in decontamination factors. Greater than 70% and >95% of Cs-137 were removed from concrete and tile coupons, respectively, after two decontaminations, with the best results using wash solutions of 1.0 M KCl and 1.0 M NH{sub 4}Cl formulations. We found no statistical difference between results at 30 deg. C and 40 deg. C or at 70% and 90% relative humidity. We tested the gel under strong UV irradiation to simulate extreme environments. While a tropical noontime UV flux did not adversely affect the gel system decontamination of Cs-137 from concrete or tile coupons, the noontime flux resulted in significant dehydration of the gel after two hours of constant exposure. The rehydration of the gel by the humid air (at 90% humidity and 40 deg. C) was slow and may not be sufficient to offset dehydration by the sun. Americium decontamination from concrete was 70% after optimizing the phosphoric acid derivative and carbonate salt concentration in the wash solution. Since its development, we have had the opportunity to test the SuperGel in the removal of legacy contaminations in hot cell facilities and former glovebox facilities at Argonne. This has provided a unique opportunity to evaluate the SuperGel on a range of contaminants outside the original specifications for its use. We will report on the origin of the gel formulation, some highlighted experimental data including independent testing by the US EPA which has never been reported, and its efficacy for removing legacy alpha contaminations and its potential use for removal of chemical and biological hazardous agents. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Zero Trust Strategies for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Detection Systems: D.1 Cyber Scenarios

The evolving landscape of cybersecurity necessitates a paradigm shift to a Zero Trust (ZT) model, which assumes breaches and continuously verifies trust. This approach reshapes how trust boundaries are established, focusing on identities, devices, networks, applications, and data, rather than solely relying on perimeter defenses such as firewalls. Central to this transformation is the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) Special Publication 800-207, outlining the Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA), along with Executive Order 14028, which mandates federal agencies to adopt ZT principles. Complementary to these efforts, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) developed the Zero Trust Maturity Model (ZTMM), providing a framework with five pillars and three cross-cutting capabilities to guide agencies toward enhanced cybersecurity maturity. In support of these initiatives, the DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) is applying ZT principles to secure Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) detection systems. Recognizing the diverse deployment models and network connectivity of these systems—from stationary, non-networked units to mobile, cloud-connected devices—the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing cybersecurity scenarios specifically for CBRN environments. These scenarios examine various configurations and technological capabilities, offering insights into the application of ZTMM pillars in enhancing the security postures of CBRN devices. The cybersecurity scenarios presented by PNNL are hypothetical, crafted to explore theoretical situations and stimulate discussion on the potential use or compromise of CBRN detection systems in varied contexts. These narratives are illustrative and do not reference any real events or actual networks. Instead, they employ generalized reference models to highlight concepts and potential issues within CBRN security, focusing on how Zero Trust strategies can be adapted to address these challenges effectively.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack. The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.” As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state,1 and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack.2 The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.”3 As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Consequence Management Cobalt Magnet 2022 Laboratory Analysis: After Action Report

On May 16-20, 2022, federal mission partners (e.g., DOE Consequence Management, CDC, FDA, FBI, DHS) as well as integrated state, local, tribal, and territorial governments took part in Cobalt Magnet 22 (CM22), a large-scale, week-long radiological incident exercise in Austin, Texas, that linked several important national assets (National Search Program, Radiological Assistance Program, and Consequence Management [CM] personnel) into a single response effort. The exercise had nine (9) overarching Objectives and an additional 162 associated Critical Tasks for all the participating organizations. In total, 13 National Core Capabilities spanning 5 Mission Areas were represented in the final exercise. This exercise enabled a full range of capabilities to be fielded together and examine the operational connection between major assets, discover any resource shortages associated with conducting multiple mission areas simultaneously or in close succession, and identify any challenges related to leadership. This report summarizes nearly 100 successes and observations provided from players and controllers supporting the LA Division, Fly Away Laboratory (FAL) and Gamma Spectroscopist operations. The observations were categorized to align with the FRMAC programmatic functional areas to consider for future improvements: Logistics, CBRN Responder, Laboratory Analysis, Sampling and Monitoring, Health and Safety, Gamma Spectroscopist Operations, Fly Away Laboratory, and the FRMAC Interdivision Interoperability Group (FIIG).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Zero Trust Framework: CWMD Zero Trust Principles Model

The research focuses on the critical need for enhanced cybersecurity within the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office, specifically targeting Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear devices. Traditional perimeter-based security models are insufficient against modern cyber threats, prompting a shift toward Zero Trust principles (ZTP) that emphasize continuous verification and stringent security for all devices. Federal directives mandate the adoption of Zero Trust (ZT) across agencies, supported by guidelines from National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and National Security Agency (NSA). The research involved mapping ZT guidance from these agencies to develop tailored CWMD ZTP. The study identified gaps and areas for improvement, including clear transitional guidance from traditional to ZT architectures and the focus on explicit cross cutting capabilities. Design improvements are recommended to ensure increased comprehensive protection and resilience against sophisticated cyber threats for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) devices. Collaborative efforts among federal agencies are essential for the successful deployment of an optimized ZT guidance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗