Workshop on Biosecurity Curriculum Development in Yemen - Day 3: Implement and Evaluate for Biosecurity Curriculum: Action Plan.
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Sandia National Laboratories International Biological Threat Reduction Dept (SNL/IBTR) has an ongoing mission to enhance biosecurity assessment methodologies, tools, and guise. These will aid labs seeking to implement biosecurity as advocated in the recently released WHO's Biorisk Management: Lab Biosecurity Guidance. BioRAM 2.0 is the software tool developed initially using the SNL LDRD process and designed to complement the "Laboratory Biosecurity Risk Handbook" written by Ren Salerno and Jennifer Gaudioso defining biosecurity risk assessment methodologies.
Continually emerging biotechnologies and advancing techniques are increasing the world’s attention to the potential dual use of scientific research, and the possibility of significant risks to global health and security. It is imperative to establish a fundamental understanding in the life science community of the role scientists play in mitigating these risks and protecting national security. However, linking the life sciences and global security has not always been highly prioritized. Past surveys have shown a significant lack of biosecurity education and awareness in the life science community and has subsequently led to multiple plans, including policies, regulations, and awareness raising measures, to address this problem. Utilizing a review of the existing surveys and papers addressing the better integration of science and security, this paper proposes a way to create a true paradigm shift. By providing biosecurity education, as early as possible, to the next generation of scientists, it will be possible to change the way the life science community thinks about its active role in promoting and protecting security. Undergraduate life science course offerings at some of the top universities in the United States were surveyed. The results suggest there is a substantial void of biosecurity education offered to these young, future working scientists. It is vitally important that universities across the United States, and the rest of the world, develop programs and courses to fill this void, to build a foundational knowledge of biosecurity topics in undergraduate life scientists. This early education and awareness is essential to ensure the continued practice of responsible science that will help protect the global health security of the future.
We applied modeling and simulation to examine the real-world tradeoffs between developingcountry public-health improvement and the need to improve the identification, tracking, and security of agents with bio-weapons potential. Traditionally, the international community has applied facility-focused strategies for improving biosecurity and biosafety. This work examines how system-level assessments and improvements can foster biosecurity and biosafety. We modeled medical laboratory resources and capabilities to identify scenarios where biosurveillance goals are transparently aligned with public health needs, and resource are distributed in a way that maximizes their ability to serve patients while minimizing security a nd safety risks. Our modeling platform simulates key processes involved in healthcare system operation, such as sample collection, transport, and analysis at medical laboratories. The research reported here extends the prior art by provided two key compone nts for comparative performance assessment: a model of patient interaction dynamics, and the capability to perform uncertainty quantification. In addition, we have outlined a process for incorporating quantitative biosecurity and biosafety risk measures. Two test problems were used to exercise these research products examine (a) Systemic effects of technological innovation and (b) Right -sizing of laboratory networks.
Here, with recent outbreaks of MERS-Cov, Anthrax, Nipah, and Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, much emphasis has been placed on rapid identification of infectious agents globally. As a result, laboratories are building capacity, conducting more advanced and sophisticated research, increasing laboratory staff, and establishing collections of dangerous pathogens in an attempt to reduce the impact of infectious disease outbreaks and characterize disease causing agents. With this expansion, the global laboratory community has started to focus on laboratory biosafety and biosecurity to prevent the accidental and/or intent ional release o f these agents. Laboratory biosafety and biosecurity systems are used around the world to help mit igate the risks posed by dangerous pathogens in the laboratory. Veterinary laboratories carry unique responsibilities to workers and communities to safely and securely handle disease causing microorganisms. Many microorganisms studied in veterinary laboratories not only infect animals, but also have the potential to infect humans. This paper will discuss the fundamentals of laboratory biosafety and biosecurity.
U.S. national security, prosperity, economy, and well-being require secure, flexible, and resilient Biopharmaceutical Manufacturing. The COVID-19 pandemic reaffirmed that the biomedical production value-chain is vulnerable to disruption and has been under attack from sophisticated nation-state adversaries. Current cyber defenses are inadequate, and the integrity of critical production systems and processes are inherently vulnerable to cyber-attacks, human error, and supply chain disruptions. The following chapter explores how a BioSecure Digital Twin will improve U.S. manufacturing resilience and preparedness to respond to these hazards by significantly improving monitoring, integrity, security, and agility of our manufacturing infrastructure and systems. The BioSecure Digital Twin combines a scalable manufacturing framework with a robust platform for monitoring and control to increase U.S. biopharma manufacturing resilience. Then, the chapter discusses some of the inherent vulnerabilities and challenges at the nexus of health and advanced manufacturing. Next, the chapter highlights that as the Pandemic evolves, we need agility and resilience to overcome significant obstacles. This section highlights an innovative application of Cyber Informed Engineering to developing and deploying a BioSecure Digital Twin to improve the resilience and security of the biopharma industrial supply chain and production processes. Finally, the chapter concludes with a process framework to complement the Digital Twin platform, called the Biopharma (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) OODA Loop Framework (BOLF), a four-step approach to decision-making outputs from the Digital Twin. The BOLF will help end users leverage twin technology by distilling the available information, focusing the data on context, and rapidly making the best decision while remaining cognizant of changes that can be made as more data becomes available.
Project Goals: The Integrative Modeling and Genome-scale Engineering for Biosystems Security (IMAGINE BioSecurity) SFA project seeks to establish an understanding of the behavior of engineered microbes in controlled versus environmental conditions to predictively devise new strategies for responding to biological escape. To this end, the IMAGINE Team has established a plant-soil mesocosm platform to track and quantify the fate of industrial microbes in environmental systems and assess the efficacy of biocontainment constraints upon genetically engineered microbe escape frequency and the impact of industrial microbes upon native ecological microbiomes. Abstract Text: Genetically modified industrial production microbes and their associated bioproducts have emerged as an integral component of a sustainable bioeconomy. However, the rapid development of these innovative technologies raises biosecurity concerns, namely, the risk of environmental escape. Thus, the realization of a bioeconomy hinges not only on the development and deployment of microbial production hosts, but also on the development of secure biosystems and biocontainment designs. Current laboratory-based biocontainment testing systems do not accurately reflect complexities found in natural environments, necessitating an environmentally relevant analysis pipeline that allows for the detection of rare escapees, the effect of associated bio-products, and the impact on native ecologies. To this end, we have developed an approach that utilizes soil mesocosms and integrated systems analyses to evaluate the efficacy of novel biocontainment strategies and to assess the impact of production systems upon terrestrial microbiome dynamics. We demonstrate the utility of this approach by modeling a contamination with industrial microbial chasses versus their biocontained counterparts. Here we demonstrate the broad utility of this system by highlighting findings from both strains of Saccharomyces cerevisiae that are contained with an inducible toxin anti-toxin system, and stains of Escherichia coli that are contained via genomic recoding. The resultant data demonstrate that this system has broad utility across diverse microbial chassis and biocontainment strategies, enables us to track the fate of our contaminating microbe with high sensitivity in the soil, as well as monitor broader impacts of the perturbation on the underlying soil system. The findings presented here support the use of this mesocosm-based approach to assess the environmental impact of industrial microbes and to validate biocontainment strategies.
Biosecurity literally means ‘safe life’ and encompasses all policies and measures taken to secure humans, animals and plants against biological threats regardless of whether they are naturally-occurring or man-made. This includes the prevention, detection and mitigation of damage by disease, pests and bioterrorism to economies, the environment (including water, agriculture, biodiversity) and human and animal health. Biosecurity cannot be defined singularly; rather it is the sum of government policies and programs; the role of institutions and individuals; the relationship of businesses and bio-responsibility, education and community engagement at the local, national and international levels.
Rinderpest is a virus that can affect cattle and other even toes ungulates; evidence of outbreaks from over 10,000 years ago highlights the potential impact of this virus. During the 18th century, Rinderpest caused huge losses in cattle throughout Europe. Starting in the mid 1900’s vaccination efforts seemed feasible and work was initiated to vaccinate large populations of cattle. Walter Plowright received numerous awards for updating the Rinderpest vaccine which many believed would be the key to eradication. Vaccination of the disease lead to a massive drop in outbreaks and the last confirmed case of Rinderpest in Asia was in 2000 and in Africa in 2001.1 At this point, Rinderpest has been declared eradicated from nature. However, stocks of the virus are still in many laboratories.2 Rinderpest was investigated as a biological weapon agent during the Second World War. However, following WWII, rinderpest was not considered a high risk as a biological weapon as there was no direct military advantage. Now, with the concern of the use of biological agents as weapons in acts of terrorism, concern regarding rinderpest has resurfaced. Since the eradication of this virus, cattle populations are highly susceptibility to the virus and the economic impacts would be significant. This paper will discuss the specific nature of the terrorism risks associated with rinderpest; and based upon those risks provide recommendations regarding biosecurity management. The biosecurity management measures will be defined in a manner to align with the CWA 15793: the laboratory biorisk management document.
Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) was awarded a pilot project in FY22 under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science Biopreparedness Research Virtual Environment (BRaVE) initiative, to define research priorities, needs, and requirements for a national virtual center devoted to the biosecurity of bioenergy crops. The mission of the proposed center, referred to as the National Virtual Biosecurity for Bioenergy Crop Center (NVBBCC), would be to provide the scientific basis and tools to detect, characterize, model, and mitigate biothreats to bioenergy crops. This function will be essential to ensure the projected increased US reliance over the next few decades on key plant-based energy products, such as biojet fuel. The NVBBCC is envisioned as a distributed, virtual center with multiple national laboratories at its core to maximize the use of existing unique facilities and expertise across the DOE complex. A major goal of the pilot project was to develop a roadmap for establishing NVBBCC through a series of meetings to gather community input. A total of about 150 individuals, drawn from DOE laboratories, the USDA, academia, NIH, DHS and the private sector participated in six planning meetings held in FY23. Four of the meetings were focused on specific research topics (disease detection, dispersion and disease propagation, biomolecular characterization of plant-pathogen interaction, and mitigation strategies). These four meetings were followed by a meeting that focused on computational needs to support collaborative, data-intensive research within a distributed center as well as workforce development. A final meeting focused on establishing and maintaining preparedness within NVBBCC to respond to an emerging disease within bioenergy crops and how it would collaborate and coordinate with USDA and DHS.
FY24 Progress Report for the National Virtual Biosecurity for Bioenergy Crops Center (NVBBCC).
The presentation focuses on ways to use genomics to solve national bioenergy and biosecurity challenges.
The Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted a workshop titled, “Rethinking U.S. Biosecurity Strategy for the Decade Ahead” on October 27-29, 2020. The workshop included participants from the policy, military, and technical communities in the United States as well as from U.S. allies. The workshop, convened virtually due to the ongoing global COVID-19 pandemic, was a close collaboration between CGSR and the Physical Life Sciences (PLS) Directorate at LLNL. While the scope of conference extended beyond current circumstances to include precedents and predictions for both public health and bioweapons, contemporary events weighed heavily on the discussion participants.
Security models for the bioeconomy have largely been developed on risk profiles borrowed from the financial industry and, in some cases, industrial control systems. The bioeconomy, however, has unique characteristics that require domain-specific knowledge of the risks to environmental, health and economic impact from directly targeted attacks. Key questions need to be assessed and answered for any facility engaged in bioproduction. These include: how much technical information must the attacker possess in order to target a specific process or facility? Which processes cause the largest economic impact if disrupted? Can an attacker lead companies down the wrong path of research, leading to irrecoverable losses of time, resources and capital? Can attackers disrupt venture capital strategies and affect financial returns? What are the resources required to attack key workflows, and subsequently what is the cost of defense? What strategies are effective against such attackers, and what are their cost? Can government provide an active role in assurance of material, process and results for critical bioeconomic infrastructure?