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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Intelligent Surrogate Model Development: Boosting Computational Efficiency for Autonomous Control of Advanced Reactors

Advanced reactors promise enhanced safety, greater efficiency, and waste reductions. To fully realize these benefits, it is crucial to address the need for autonomous or semi-autonomous control systems that require fewer operators. This research primarily supports the MARVEL autonomous control system, which requires real-time operation. However, the current RELAP5 reactor thermal hydraulic transient simulation is excessively time-consuming. Therefore, this study aims to leverage deep learning techniques to develop a surrogate model, providing a more efficient and accurate alternative for real-time performance. The model was trained using a combination of one-timestep prediction and scheduled sampling. It was then used for recursive prediction of the reactor state. This developed surrogate model significantly improves computational efficiency, achieving a 12 times acceleration.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗
DOE OSTI2026

Enabling In-Core Strain Measurement: Printed Sensors for Advanced Reactors

Advances in nuclear energy systems require an improved understanding of fuels, cladding, and structural materials; however, the extreme environmental conditions at irradiation test facilities often limit mechanical property evaluation to post-irradiation examination. In-situ monitoring techniques can accelerate materials qualification by providing direct insight into real-time material behavior during irradiation testing. Additively manufactured (AM) strain gauges offer a compact, material-compatible alternative to commercial sensors, particularly where space constraints, attachment limitations, or material compatibility requirements complicate conventional sensor use. This poster presents an overview of the development and testing of AM strain gauges in nuclear-relevant environments, demonstrating their potential to enhance structural health monitoring capabilities during irradiation experiments.

36 - MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2025

SAM Two-Phase Flow Model Development and Applications for Operational Transients in Advanced Reactors

As advanced nuclear technologies continue to develop, the need for the flexible operation and generation of these advanced reactors becomes necessary to maximize economic potential. As large-scale experiments are not always feasible, modeling and simulations of advanced reactors play a crucial role in design optimization and analysis. The SAM (System Analysis Module) code developed at Argonne National Laboratory is a state-of-the-art system-level thermal-hydraulic code aimed at simulating advanced reactor systems. Recent code developments have implemented two-phase flow modeling using the homogeneous equilibrium model, and a new steam generator component has been developed to utilize the two-phase flow implementation. In addition to verification tests, a load-following simulation was performed to model a realistic load-following transient in a proposed integrated system consisting of a conceptual advanced reactor known as the Advanced Burner Test Reactor (ABTR) and thermal energy storage (TES) tanks. The integrated system model uses two large TES tanks designed for sodium and a model helical coil steam generator to simulate the operational load-following transient. The flow rates of the feedwater and secondary loops are regulated to meet a prescribed steam generator load consistent with the electricity demand over a 24-h period. In conclusion, the results found the ABTR system was able to maintain stable reactor conditions and primary- and secondary-side characteristics over the course of the load-following transient.

Advanced Burner Test Reactor (ABTR)↗
DOE OSTI2025

Decay heat analysis for advanced reactor spent fuel transportation and storage applications

Accurate characterization of nuclide inventories and decay heat in spent nuclear fuel is critical for ensuring its safe handling, storage, transportation, and disposal. Although extensive research has been conducted on light-water reactor fuel, advanced reactors present unique challenges due to their diverse core configurations, fuel characteristics, neutron energy spectra, and burnup levels. Building upon previous efforts that developed representative reactor core models for various advanced reactor types and fuels, this study evaluates reactor-specific decay heat characteristics. The results highlight significant variations across advanced reactor types as well as across reactor designs within the same reactor type, and they provide comparison to typical commercial light-water reactor fuel. For example, thermal-spectrum reactor fuels were observed to have an approximately 100-fold decrease in decay heat over the first decade of cooling, whereas the reduction was 10-fold for fast-spectrum reactor fuels. Mass-specific decay heat at discharge can differ by three orders of magnitude among the fast and thermal reactor systems considered. Overall, for the analyzed advanced reactor fuel, fewer than 17 nuclides account for over 99% of total decay heat at 0.5 years, and that number drops to fewer than 7 nuclides at 100 years of cooling. By quantifying reactor-specific decay heat trends and nuclide contributions, this work provides a technical basis to support the development of spent fuel management strategies for advanced reactor fuels as well as safety evaluations for storage, transportation, and long-term waste disposal.

Advanced reactors↗
DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Reactor Designs Security Analysis, Risk, and Recommendations: Risks, Consequences, and Possible by-Design Mitigation Approaches Associated with Select Advanced Reactors

Next-generation advanced reactors (ARs) incorporate enhanced safety systems, have smaller source terms, and feature compact modular designs, which should lessen their collective risk profiles. However, to fully evaluate risk, security needs to be a part of the equation. Without taking security into consideration, safety systems and components in the new ARs may be vulnerable to sabotage. These base attributes, coupled with enhanced security features specific to AR design through sound engineering and security-by-design (SeBD), should provide developers and operators with lower inherent security risk profiles. Building security early into the AR design may remove or passively secure potential critical targets from an adversary’s reach , thereby increasing overall safety and security. An integrated approach and diverse design team that includes engineering, operations, and security experts are fundamental to building security into the design without sacrificing fundamental operational efficiencies and principles. The objective of this project was to evaluate the security and safety interfaces for five classes of reactors, identify potential security vulnerabilities of structures, systems, and components (SSC), and underscore the need to consider security alongside safety in the design o f these concepts. The five reactor classes evaluated in this project and presented in this report are molten-salt reactors (MSR), high temperature gas reactors (HTGR), sodium-fast reactors (SFR), advanced light-water reactors (ALWR), and microreactors. These designs were selected because they reflect the concepts that are closest to market deployment and have received significant resource investments from the public and private sector. This project assesses the inherent security risks posed by common classes of ARs, provides a methodology and framework to assess security along with safety, and offers an analysis of potential mitigation strategies that could be incorporated. For each AR technology, the SSCs that relate to radionuclide source safety functions are discussed to understand the SSC contribution to safety and relative importance in the protective strategy for the design. The assumptions that went into evaluating each reactor concept originated from generic publicly available nonproprietary information and should not directly be used to qualify an absolute risk profile nor to rank specific AR designs. Instead, the purpose of the analysis is to understand and compare the generic inherent security risks of different AR technologies.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
DOE OSTI2024

Identify and Assess Technical Challenges in Safeguards Measurements of Spent Advanced Reactor Fuels

Advanced reactor (AR) designs use various nuclear fuel types that can be significantly different than conventional light-water reactor (LWR) fuels, including differences in sizes, compositions, and chemical forms (e.g., oxide, carbide, metal). Nearly all the proposed AR fuels use high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), which will have higher enrichments (5–20 wt% 235 U) than LWR fuels (currently limited to <5 wt% 235 U). In advance of the wide use of these new fuel types around the world, international safeguards organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA]) are working with some of the AR vendors to formulate safeguards approaches for these AR fuel cycles. As part of the overall safeguards approach, it is important to identify the potential technical challenges in performing safeguards verification measurements of these AR fuels (both fresh and spent fuels) in advance of the widespread adoption of these new fuel types, because new safeguards technologies can take several years to develop, test, and approve for use. This report documents work performed in fiscal year 2024 based on modeling and simulation to assess the performance of the existing safeguards measurement technologies for irradiated or spent AR fuel elements or items. This work is a continuation of the work performed in fiscal year 2023 that focused on fresh AR fuels. Spent AR fuels have a distinct difference from their LWR counterparts: unlike the spent LWR fuels typically stored in a water-filled pool, some spent AR fuels—such as tristructural-isotropic (TRISO)-based fuels—will most likely be stored in air-filled hot cells. Because most safeguards measurements on spent fuel performed to date have been conducted under water, the air-filled hot cell environment could present unique challenges to safeguards measurements. Fork detector (FDET) and Cerenkov viewing device (CVD) systems have been the two primary instruments used by the IAEA for several decades to measure spent LWR fuel assemblies stored in pools for safeguards verification purposes. Because the lower refractive index of air causes Cerenkov light to be of lower intensity in air than in water, existing CVDs are likely unable to perform safeguards verification measurements for spent fuel stored in an air-filled hot cell, as is the case for the TRISO-based spent fuel elements (e.g., pebbles, graphite fuel blocks). Unlike FDET measurements, CVD measurements do not require fuel be moved, so they are a simpler and faster to take than FDET measurements. The inability to perform CVD measurements on the TRISO-based AR fuel types presents a major technical challenge in the effort to use existing technology to perform safeguards measurements on spent AR fuels. This study was mainly conducted through the modeling and simulation of an FDET or an FDET-like system on five spent AR fuel types, including one metallic fuel type and four TRISO-based fuel types in both pebble and graphite block forms in their respective storage configurations and environments. Because the various AR fuel types have significantly different dimensions, FDET systems must be adapted to accommodate them. Partial defect tests were also simulated in this study to assess the FDET’s ability to detect potential fuel diversions. The FDET measures the fuel’s total passive neutron and gamma emissions. The simulated FDET results from spent AR fuel items are compared against results from a typical spent pressurized water reactor (PWR) assembly. High-purity germanium (HPGe) gamma detector measurements were also simulated for the spent AR fuel types and the PWR assembly because the signature photopeaks have been used in LWR safeguards verifications, although HPGe is usually not used to detect diversions because of the fuel’s self-attenuation effects on those photopeaks. The results indicate that these detectors have significant challenges in performing safeguards measurements of the spent AR fuel items, including incompatibilities between AR fuel items and existing FDETs, lower neutron count rates, lower sensitivities to fuel diversions in certain AR fuel items, and significantly higher interference from a neighboring fuel item when the measurement is performed in air. These results suggest that an alternative technology or significant and timely technology development is needed to perform adequate safeguards measurements of some of these AR fuel items.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Development of Predictive Models for Advanced Reactor Autonomous Control

Advanced reactor designs including microreactors and small modular reactors will contribute to the clean production of cheap energy, and autonomous control for advanced reactors is an appealing option for reducing cost. However, there is a lack of industry experience applying autonomous control for advanced nuclear reactors. To accelerate the development and industry acceptance of autonomous control software for nuclear reactors, we aim to demonstrate autonomous control of the Purdue University research reactor (PUR-1) using INL-developed model predictive control (MPC) methods. To prepare for this demonstration, data-driven predictive models based on process data collected from PUR-1 have been developed and integrated with MPC and used to control a physics-based model of PUR-1. A data-driven dynamics model and a gated recurrent unit (GRU) network were both trained on process data from PUR-1. The dynamics model was shown to effectively control the reactor model with MPC when provided reactivity as a control variable but failed to control the model through the control rod positions. The GRU network produced more accurate predictions than the dynamics model when evaluated on operational data, and future work will include the evaluation of the GRU network in the controller.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Insights from Surrogate Industries on Remote Operations for Advanced Reactors

With development of advanced reactors, understanding the human factors considerations related to remote operations remains an important topic. This work presents insights captured from reviewing relevant surrogate industries with remote operations, as they may apply to advanced reactor development. This work provides insights into important human factors considerations for remote operations to ensure safe and reliable adoption of these prospective reactor technologies.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Reactor System Safety: A case for New and Advanced Reactors

This presentation covers a generic overview of reactor system safety testing, analysis, and related research and development (R&D) focusing on new and advanced reactor systems. This presentation is prepared for graduate-level student seminar talks. No specific reactor design information is provided. Only publicly available information and related published articles and book contents are utilized.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗
DOE OSTI2025

Human Factors Considerations for Anticipated Uses of Autonomy in Advanced Reactor Technologies

The objective of this report is examine anticipated advanced reactor designs that incorporate high levels of autonomy in operation of advanced reactor systems or facilities, and to begin identifying the human factors engineering (HFE) considerations relevant to those designs. The insights gained will help identify areas where U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) may need to develop or update review guidance to adequately address HFE considerations essential for safe operation. The adequacy of existing guidance, along with recommendations for updates or new guidance, may be addressed in future reports. We use the term “landscape analysis” to describe the review, analysis, and characterization of publicly available information on the anticipated future state of the industry regarding particular technologies or operational concepts. This landscape analysis considers the potential range of advanced reactor automation concepts that may be used for monitoring and controlling nuclear systems and facilities, including the potential for highly automated, near autonomous, or fully autonomous operation of advanced nuclear reactors.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Modeling and Simulation Supporting Material Control and Accounting for Advanced Reactors: Task 2: Safeguards Modeling and Simulation Assessment

Commercial interest in advanced reactors for power production in the United States is increasing. A variety of advanced reactor designs are being developed, and many of them use non-traditional fuel forms. Therefore, the material control and accounting (MC&A) methods that will be required for these advanced reactor systems also need to be developed to ensure that the necessary safeguards are implemented. To provide information that can be leveraged to explore different MC&A approaches, three representative advanced reactor types were evaluated from a technical safeguards perspective. These reactor designs were selected to encompass common materials and configurations that could affect safeguards considerations. The three designs evaluated were a molten salt reactor (MSR), a gas-cooled reactor (GCR), and a heat pipe-cooled microreactor.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Radiological Releases from Novel Fuel Forms in Advanced Reactors During Severe Accidents for Consequence Analyses

Various advanced reactor developers are exploring the potential for reductions in the size of physical security forces and emergency planning zones. These reductions are based on robust fuel forms and inherently safe reactor designs. However, such reductions in physical protection measures could increase the risk of sabotage. To assess the possibility of reducing these measures, sabotage-induced radiological consequence analyses were carried out. These analyses considered accident scenarios that were beyond design basis accidents and overly conservative (Shah, 2025a; Shah, 2025b; Shah and Hartanto, 2026), yielding very large release fractions. These fractions, which can be used to evaluate physical protection and emergency planning requirements, have been crudely determined and applied as demonstrations for a sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) (Shah and Hartanto, 2025a), a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) (Shah and Hartanto, 2025b), a heat pipe–cooled reactor (HPR) (Shah and Hartanto, 2025c), and a molten salt–cooled reactor (MSR) (Shah et al., 2026). A Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) team used MELCOR—a fully integrated severe accident analysis code—to demonstrate the code’s capability to analyze advanced (i.e., not light water–cooled) reactors (including a fluoride salt–cooled high-temperature reactor [FHR]) and calculate radiological releases to the environment during severe accidents (Wagner et al., 2022a, 2022b, 2022c, 2023a, and 2023b). Although the analyses were carried out to demonstrate MELCOR’s growing capability, the release source terms were estimated for advanced reactors, providing valuable insights into the accident progression and radiological releases. These findings from prior SNL studies, including estimated source terms and related sensitivity studies, were leveraged to derive source terms for postulated sabotage-induced accidents. Insights from these sensitivity studies informed the scaling of SNL’s estimated source terms for the defined accident scenarios. The derived release fractions for the severe accident scenarios for the respective reactor designs can be used to perform more nuanced dose consequence analyses to evaluate the reactors’ physical protection and emergency planning zone requirements. These analyses are in accordance with the risk-informed, performance-based approach proposed under 10 CFR Part 53. This study builds on the prior source term analyses and associated sensitivity studies by SNL to derive time-dependent and design-informed release fractions. Section 2 describes the diverse advanced reactor designs analyzed by the SNL team. Section 3 discusses the severe accident analyses, the release fractions calculated, and the limitations and assumptions of the demonstration project. Section 4 presents the release percentages derived for the hypothetical sabotage-induced severe accidents at the advanced reactors. Section 5 summarizes the study’s findings and conclusions.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Worst Case Sabotage Consequence Modeling for Advanced Reactors

Under proposed rulemaking by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, advanced reactor licensees may qualify for a reduction in onsite responders if the consequences from a sabotage attack do not exceed 25 rem at the reactor site boundary 2 hours after a release occurs. This work presents a preliminary assessment of the feasibility of meeting the 25 rem at the site boundary criteria. Using advanced reactor radionuclide inventories radiological release estimates created by collaborators at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the MACCS consequence analysis code was used to investigate the distance at the dose from hypothetical sabotage events reaches 25 rem for different advanced reactor technologies. It was found that the distance to 25 rem depended heavily on sampled weather conditions and sabotage release fractions, and further refinement of release fractions and MACCS modeling parameters is recommended.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Survey of emerging nuclear data needs for nonproliferation applications with advanced reactors

Nuclear science plays a key role in non-proliferation activities supporting advanced reactor technologies. Nuclear data underpin predictions and interpretations of nuclear material behavior and signatures in reactor fuel production, use, transport, and storage. Advanced reactors provide new challenges compared to the current fleet of thermal fission reactors. This report consolidates reported nuclear data needs from representative workshops, conferences, and publications, identifying six themes for recommended future investments supporting non-proliferation and safeguards applications. While also identified as data needs, major fission product evaluations and (α,n) reactions were omitted as there are ongoing activities producing new data under NA22/Objective O. Each theme is summarized below with example data and association with the nonproliferation mission for advanced fuels and reactors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Summary Report Of The FY25 Reactor Physics Verification And Validation Exercises In The Advanced Reactor Technologies - Gas-cooled Reactor Program

Valdiation and verification of numerical tools is critical for ensuring reasonable predictions for design scoping, licensing, and safety analsyis. In this report, two reactor physics verification and validation exercises are presented. The first of these exercises focuses on burnup analysis with data from the Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) program. Simulations are performed with Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) and are compared with the experimental measurements for the AGR 1 and 2 experiments that utilize both UCO and UO2 fuel. The second exercises utilizes data from the HTR-Proteus experiments to perform reactor physics validation. Specifications of the experimental facility are provdied, along with a demonstration of initial modeling efforts in Serpent for one of the determistic packing experiments. Both cases are part of the Generation-IV international forum (GIF) Very High-Temperature Reactor (VHTR) Computational Methods, Validation, and Benchmarking (CMVB) program, an international collaborative organization dedicated to the verification and validation of High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (HTGR) analysis. Participation in the CMVB allows the US Department of Energy (DOE) to leverage these existing validation activities to provide extra value through benchmarking activities with other CMVB members.

and Benchmarking (CMVB) program↗
DOE OSTI2025

Important Human Actions for Advanced Reactors: Implications for Human Factors

As advanced reactor platforms continue to develop and gain traction in the energy sector there is a need for risk-informed, scalable regulations that match that progress. This is a core component of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s proposed Part 53 Rule Making; the Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy (ADVANCE) Act; and other efforts that seek to update nuclear power regulations. This paper covers one key aspect of that regulatory evolution: Important Human Actions (IHA). In this paper, we discuss how the understanding and definitions of IHAs have changed and what that means for human factors engagement through the process of developing these technologies. Instead of a narrow focus on control actions that led to an increase in core damage risk, the new focus is on IHAs is “wherever they occur.” What this means is that having a highly automated or passive safety system does not eliminate IHAs. Rather, it shifts the focus point to all the actions that enable these systems. Everything from maintenance, to design, to training can be considered an IHA and that dramatically shifts the efforts and level of engagement necessary for human factors to enable these technologies. We discuss the notions of risk-informed human factors that underpin these efforts, give several examples, and briefly describe the risk assessment methodologies that will be needed. In the past, IHAs were identified and then became a focus point of human factors engineering (HFE) activities to ensure a robust evaluation of the task was completed. The future is less clear. HFE for nuclear energy will need to evolve and become more integrated in technology development than ever before.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Rancor Integrated Procedure System (RIPS): A Computer-Based Procedure Platform for Advanced Reactor Research

The Rancor Microworld Simulator is a simplified, pressurized water, small modular reactor simulator that includes a multi-unit plant model server, an advanced digital human-machine control interface, and the Rancor Integrated Procedure System (RIPS). Rancor provides a research and development tool that can be used for collecting operator performance data and for prototyping concepts of operations (ConOps) for advanced reactor development. RIPS is meant as a research tool and includes many unique features: (1) RIPS has a robust procedure authoring system. (2) RIPS has the capability to run any of the three IEEE-Std-1786 computer-based procedure types. (3) RIPS can be configured to take on the look and feel of different vendors’ computer-based procedure systems for the purpose of developing and evaluating different ConOps for plant upgrades or new builds. (4) RIPS includes the capability for logging operator procedure use, including integrating procedure logs with Rancor simulator logs, thereby allowing automated data collection of operator scenario runs. (5) RIPS integrates with the Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER), a dynamic human reliability analysis environment that creates a digital human twin or virtual operator to mimic reactor operator performance. (6) RIPS includes support for automation of plant monitoring and control functions. While RIPS is explicitly built into Rancor, it may also be used with full-scope training simulators. This functionality allows RIPS to be used for existing plants and advanced reactors under development.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗