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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber Threat Landscape for Distribution Systems

INL cyber analysts will present an overview of the current threat landscape for distribution systems. We will begin with examples of known attacks that have occurred recently to motivate the threat analysis and mitigation discussed in the remainder of the presentation. Examples may include the attacks affecting wind plants in Europe in Spring 2022, ransomware attacks on city utilities and commercial distribution systems, and advanced persistent threats (APTs) including the attacks on Ukrainian electric system in 2015 and 2016, as well as more recent evidence of other APT activity. We will present the end-to-end attack paths and discuss the various attacker skills, financing, motivations, and access that contributed to these attacks. In the second part of this presentation, we will discuss mitigating the cyber threats for distribution systems. We will discuss recent publicly disclosed vulnerabilities and explain their relevant context for distribution system security. Likely attacks to affect distribution systems, such as denial-of-service (DoS), ransomware, edge-device compromise, and advanced persistent threats (APTs) will be described. In addition to an overview of these kinds of attacks, we will provide examples of the various ways in which these attacks can start and what systems they can affect. Simple, cost-effective counter-measures to these attacks will be discussed and we will emphasize how these mitigations can reduce threats when properly applied and maintained.

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NASA NTRS2014

Analyzing Risks and Vulnerabilities of Various Computer Systems and Undergoing Exploitation using Embedded Devices

Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere has heightened from airports to communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APTs) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated, patched and secured state in a launch control system environment. Attacks on critical systems are becoming more and more relevant and frequent. Nation states are hacking into critical networks that might control electrical power grids or water dams as well as carrying out advanced persistent threat (APTs) attacks on government entities. NASA, as an organization, must protect its self from attacks from all different types of attackers with different motives. Although the International Space Station was created, there is still competition between the different space programs. With that in mind, NASA might get attacked and breached for various reasons such as espionage or sabotage. My project will provide a way for NASA to complete an in house penetration test which includes: asset discovery, vulnerability scans, exploit vulnerabilities and also provide forensic information to harden systems. Completing penetration testing is a part of the compliance requirements of the Federal Information Security Act (FISMA) and NASA NPR 2810.1 and related NASA Handbooks. This project is to demonstrate how in house penetration testing can be conducted that will satisfy all of the compliance requirements of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), as outlined in FISMA. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out the tasks stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, as well as policies and procedures.

Penetration Testing↗
NASA NTRS2015

Addressing Software Security

Historically security within organizations was thought of as an IT function (web sites/servers, email, workstation patching, etc.) Threat landscape has evolved (Script Kiddies, Hackers, Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), Nation States, etc.) Attack surface has expanded -Networks interconnected!! Some security posture factors Network Layer (Routers, Firewalls, etc.) Computer Network Defense (IPS/IDS, Sensors, Continuous Monitoring, etc.) Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Software Security (COTS, FOSS, Custom, etc.)

software↗
DOE OSTI2025

Evidence-based Graph Adversary Mapping (EGRAM) [Poster]

Cybersecurity companies such as CrowdStrike, Dragos, Microsoft and Unit 42 categorize Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) using their own naming schemes. As a result, these APTs are mapped to different malware sources and campaigns, all from differing sources, leading to inconsistent mapping. Inconsistent mapping causes confusion and adds further obscurity around these groups, making it difficult to track and mitigate APT cyberattacks. The Evidence-based Graph Adversary Mapping (EGRAM) tool remediates the mapping challenge by collecting, updating and converting adversary data and their sources into a valid, codified STIX v2.1 bundle which is then stored in a Neo4j graph database. It utilizes graph traversal methods and centrality analysis to generate actionable information as a Structured Threat Intelligence Graph (STIG), based on user queries. EGRAM exists as Python code and a Jupyter Notebook that acts as a searchable, evidence-based, source of intelligence for APT groups’ artifacts and cyber campaigns.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2019

A Context-Centered Research Approach to Phishing and Operational Technology in Industrial Control Systems

Advanced persistent threats (APT’s) that leverage phishing against operational technology (OT) are cyber-attacks that endanger critical infrastructure assets nationwide. Today phishing, a human focused exploit, constitutes 91% of successful attack vectors against Federal assets. This means Human Introduced Vulnerabilities (HICV’s) are the weakest cyber defense link. The success of these attacks also suggests HICV’s are not well understood nor mitigated. To characterize HICV’s and provide the necessary context in which they exist, this paper introduces a research approach derived from the mature science of Social Ecology. The desired end result of this research is an HICV focused risk assessment framework.

Advanced Persistent Threats↗
DOE OSTI2020

A data analytical approach for assessing the efficacy of Operational Technology active defenses against insider threats

In recent years, the need for Operational Technology (OT) defenses has been recognized, serving as an additional line of defense when Information Technology (IT) defenses are bypassed. This is no longer considered an uncommon possibility when dealing with advanced persistent threat (APT) actors expected to be state-sponsored and receiving insider assistance. In these extreme adversarial situations, OT defenses aim to provide another layer of defense for the system, introduced directly at the physical process level, as described by the sensors data, the system model, and control actions. Just like IT defenses, two schools of thought, i.e., passive and active defenses, have emerged to address this challenge. In active defenses, representing the focus of this paper, known signatures, synthesized based on the system's unique characteristics, are inserted into the system. In contradistinction, passive methods rely solely on observing system behavior in search of patterns of normal behavior with deviations thereof representing abnormal behavior. In their most sophisticated implementations, both passive and active defenses rely on the use of data analytics to identify the patterns and synthesize the observed and/or inserted signatures. Past research has shown that passive defenses may be bypassed by APT actors relying on data analytics and their intimate knowledge of the system to evade detection by respecting the patterns identified by the defenders. Here this manuscript explores the use of active defenses under the assumption that the attacker has privileged access to the system, including access to the system's model and sensors data. Specifically, this manuscript assesses the ability of active defenses to remain invisible to the attackers, and discusses the associated challenges that must be addressed to ensure their resiliency against APT actors.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
NASA NTRS2013

IT Security Support for the Spaceport Command Control Systems Development Ground Support Development Operations

Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere was heightened from Airports to the communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APTs) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated and secured state in a launch control system environment. FISMA is a law that is mandated by the government to follow when government agencies secure networks and devices. My role on this project is to ensure network devices and systems are in compliance with NIST, as outlined in FISMA. I will achieve this by providing assistance with security plan documentation and collection, system hardware and software inventory, malicious code and malware scanning and configuration of network devices i.e. routers and IDSsIPSs. In addition I will be completing security assessments on software and hardware, vulnerability assessments and reporting, conducting patch management and risk assessments. A guideline that will help with compliance with NIST is the SANS Top 20 Critical Controls. SANS Top 20 Critical Controls as well as numerous security tools, security software and the conduction of research will be used to successfully complete the tasks given to me. This will ensure compliance with FISMA and NIST, secure systems and a secured network. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, policies and procedures.

computer information security↗
NASA NTRS2014

IT Security Support for the Spaceport Command Control Systems Development Ground Support Development Operations

Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere has heightened from airports to the communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APT's) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated and secured state in a launch control system environment. FISMA is a law that is mandated by the government to follow when government agencies secure networks and devices. My role on this project is to ensure network devices and systems are in compliance with NIST, as outlined in FISMA. I will achieve this by providing assistance with security plan documentation and collection, system hardware and software inventory, malicious code and malware scanning, and configuration of network devices i.e. routers and IDS's/IPS's. In addition, I will be completing security assessments on software and hardware, vulnerability assessments and reporting, and conducting patch management and risk assessments. A guideline that will help with compliance with NIST is the SANS Top 20 Critical Controls. SANS Top 20 Critical Controls as well as numerous security tools, security software and the conduction of research will be used to successfully complete the tasks given to me. This will ensure compliance with FISMA and NIST, secure systems and a secured network. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out the tasks stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, as well as policies and procedures.

security↗
DOE OSTI2020

SHARP-Net: Platform for Self-Healing and Attack Resilient PMU Networks

Synchrophasor technology plays a pivotal role in developing the next generation of wide-area monitoring, protection, and control in the smart grid environment. As technology and communications infrastructures evolve, however, so do the attack surfaces in the synchrophasor network that can be exploited by advanced persistent threat (APT) actors to affect power system stability and reliability. In this paper, we propose a novel platform for developing a self-healing and attack-resilient PMU network (SHARP-Net) by instituting a state-of-the-art intrusion detection system (IDS) with an intrusion mitigation system (IMS) and an alert management system (AMS). In particular, the proposed platform detects anomalies during cyberattacks on phasor data concentrators (PDCs) based on the rules defined in the IDS, then the generated alerts are published to the IMS through the AMS. The proposed IMS proceeds to take automated corrective responses to mitigate cyberattacks by reconfiguring the synchrophasor network to isolate the compromised PDCs, and it orchestrates new PDCs to prevent the future propagation of attacks. Further, the IMS restores the system's observability by reconnecting the new PDCs to make the grid attack-resilient. In this work, the SHARP-Net platform is developed by using Python-based libraries, minimega's software-defined network, and virtual machine orchestration. We implement and validate the proposed SHARP-Net architecture by testing a PMU network in the smart grid environment. SHARP-Net showed promising performance in detecting cyberattacks and mitigating them through the network reconfiguration.

computer architecture↗
DOE OSTI2019

A Multidimensional Holistic Framework for the Security of Distributed Energy and Control Systems

The digitization of smart grid distributed generation and industrial control systems has prompted utilities to deploy tools with ubiquitous communications that potentially widen the attack surface. The utilities still continue to rely on the traditional cybersecurity technologies, such as firewalls, anti-malware tools, and passwords that do not ensure security across all dimensions of the information assurance model required for a strong cybersecurity business process. This paper proposes a multidimensional holistic framework that addresses this gap through advanced technologies, intelligent algorithms, and continued assessments. To show proof, the layered defense model, a solution dimension of the framework, is integrated into the National Renewable Energy Laboratory's Security and Resilience Testbed to replicate a utility's enterprise and substation networks. The model is used to evaluate the security and resilience of microgrid control systems, and, based on the insights gathered, recommend best practices for utility cybersecurity analysts for a strong business process. Here, with this baseline, the paper conceptually introduces intelligence-driven solutions comprising contextual data analysis and machine learning to respond to advanced persistent threats sponsored by campaign efforts.

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DOE OSTI2025

Cybersecurity Challenges in Low-Inertia Power-Electronics-Dominated Grids

Here, the low inertia characteristics of the power electronics dominated grid (PEDG) introduces challenges while restoring voltage and frequency to their nominal values. These stability challenges create new cybersecurity vulnerabilities that are not thoroughly discussed in the literature. Cyber events such as false data injection (FDI), denial of service (DoS), man-in-the-middle attacks, stealthy attacks, and advanced persistent threats target PEDG to disrupt grid stability or gain financial benefits. The low inertia of PEDG (< 2s) compared to traditional grids (~10s) exacerbates these vulnerabilities. In response to stealthy attacks on state variables that supervisory layers cannot detect until significant harm occurs, the low inertia characteristics of PEDG offer substantial stealthy attack surfaces. To counteract such threats, PEDG must be equipped with ultra-fast real-time anomaly detection system and trajectory prediction mechanism to achieve effective cyberattack resiliency.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

CPS Testbed Architectures for WAMPAC using Industrial Substation and Control Center Platforms and Attack-Defense Evaluation

Advanced persistent threats and cyberattacks can impact wide-area monitoring, protection, and control (WAMPAC) system operation. Many cyber-physical system (CPS) testbeds have been developed for attack-defense experimentation and attack-resiliency tools evaluation for WAMPAC, but they are limited to a simulation-and-emulation based environment. This paper presents a quasi-realistic CPS attack-defense testbed-based framework for WAMPAC applications using the industrial substation and control center platforms such as eTerra integrated with the hardware-in-the-loop CPS smart grid testbed available at Iowa State University. The proposed framework includes various combinations of industry-grade substation and control center platforms, communication topologies, real-time digital simulators, and a novel cyber-physical distributed intrusion-and-anomaly detection system (D-IADS) for WAMPAC applications. The D-IADS includes a master at the control center and geographically distributed sensor devices at each substation. Each D-IADS sensor deployed at a substation or control center network monitors ingress and egress traffic, detect intrusions, and dispatch alerts to the D-IADS master. The D-IADS master centrally monitors and analyze the alerts and controls D-IADS sensors. We considered an EMP60 synthetic CPS grid as a case study to demonstrate the framework and proposed D-IADS for WAMPAC applications against cyberattack vectors such as Man-in-the-Middle DNP3 attack, denial-of-service, and data-integrity attacks.

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DOE OSTI2023

Sensor and Actuator Attacks on Hierarchical Control Systems with Domain-Aware Operator Theory

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) provide opportunities for cyber attacks to have physical impacts. Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are a subclass of cyber threats that act stealthily to avoid detection and enable long-term attacks. Here, we build on our past work in APT modelling to combine deception-based sensor bias attacks and direct actuator manipulations in attacks against a hierarchical control system. That past work used the Koopman operator to develop a data-driven, domain-aware, optimization-based attacker model. Using an expansion of this model, we compute several different attacks, including multiple simultaneous attacks, against a high-fidelity commercial building emulator and compare the impacts of those attacks to each other. One next step of interest is to construct a defender system, built on the same modelling approach, designed to detect and mitigate such attacks.

koopman operator, Cyber-Physical Security, machine↗
DOE OSTI2020

HIDES: Hybrid Intrusion Detector for Energy Systems

The establishment of a resilient electric grid accompanied by a secure communications network is an ongoing battle as advanced persistent threats continue to exploit existing vulnerabilities in legacy supervisory control and data acquisition system (SCADA) infrastructure. Traditional intrusion detection systems (IDSs) lack consistent performance because of the continuously evolving attack surface of SCADA systems. These shortcomings can be overcome by integrating logical system behavior, protocol-specific knowledge, and data-based learning to develop a comprehensive IDS solution. In this paper, we present a Hybrid Intrusion Detector for Energy Systems by integrating a network-based IDS, state-of-the-art machine learning-based IDS, and model-based IDS to detect unknown and stealthy cyberattacks targeting the SCADA networks. The proposed IDS uses synchrophasor measurements and cyber logs to learn patterns of different scenarios based on spatiotemporal behaviors of power systems. As a proof of concept, we implement and validate the proposed IDS by leveraging resources available at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory's Energy Systems Integration Facility test bed. Experimental results show promising performance in detecting cyberattacks while providing realtime visualization of power system measurements and cyber logs.

machine-learning intrusion detection system↗
DOE OSTI2021

Metagames and Hypergames for Deception-Robust Control

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) consist of computing and communication devices integrated with physical components such as sensors and actuators. Increasing connectivity to the Internet for remote monitoring and control has made CPSs more vulnerable to deliberate attacks, which are distinctly different from random perturbations in the system. This provides a way for purely cyber attacks to have physical consequences. Stuxnet is a prominent example of such an attack, one in which the malware acted over an extended period of time while deliberately remaining undetected. Such attacks can be described as Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) -- long-term, stealthy attacks. Here, we extend our previous work on hypergames to develop defender strategies that are robust to deception and do not rely on attack detection. We prove that the defender can bound the attacker payoff with these strategies even when the attacker can choose between different attack modes, and we numerically demonstrate our approach on a realistic building control system. Finally, we discuss next steps in extending this approach towards an operational capability.

hypergames, cyber-physical systems, robust control↗
DOE OSTI2020

Multiple social platforms reveal actionable signals for software vulnerability awareness: A study of GitHub, Twitter and Reddit

Software vulnerabilities are flaws in computer systems that leave users open to attack. In many cases, these vulnerabilities go unnoticed and remain unresolved in codebases. Thus, awareness of software vulnerabilities among the public is crucial to ensure effective cybersecurity practices, the development of high quality software, and ultimately national security. This awareness can be better understood by studying the spread and evolution of software vulnerability discussions in online communities. This work is the first to evaluate and contrast how discussions about software vulnerabilities spread on three social platforms -- Twitter, GitHub, and Reddit. To lay the groundwork, we showcase a novel fundamental framework for measuring information spread that identifies the spread mechanisms and observables across platforms, the units of information, and the groups of measurements that can be applied to focus on a specific phenomena e.g., information cascades. We then analyze and contrast social network topologies for three example social networks and measure the scale and speed of the spread of discussion of specific vulnerabilities to understand how far and how widely they spread, how many users participate in discussions, and the duration of their spread. To demonstrate the awareness of more impactful software vulnerabilities, a subset of our analysis focuses on vulnerabilities targeted during recent major cyber attacks as well as vulnerabilities exploited by advanced persistent threat groups. We discover that usually, vulnerability discussions start on GitHub, before occurring on Twitter and Reddit. While studying how some user-level and content-level characteristics influence vulnerability spread, we observe that Twitter discussions started by users predicted to be humans have larger size, breadth, depth, adoption rate, lifetime, and structural virality compared to those started by users predicted to be bots. On Reddit, we contrast the differences in thread structure that originate from posts with positive, negative and neutral polarity. We find that posts that are positive have larger, deeper and wider discussions compared to negative and neutral posts. We anticipate the results of our analysis to not only increase the understanding of software vulnerability awareness but also inform models for simulating information spread across multiple social environments online.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Center of Excellence for Operational Technology

The Center of Excellence for Operational Technology Traditional Presentation Abstract 2025 National Laboratories Information Technology Summit | Denver, CO Traditional Presentation Session Managing cybersecurity risk in Operational Technology (OT) presents a significant challenge across the Department, and critically, at many of the national laboratories. This includes IT-OT convergence, aging OT systems, cost of updating OT systems, and increased Advanced Persistent Threat efforts against OT including the 16 critical infrastructure sectors as listed in Presidential Policy Directive 21. DoE’s Office of Science and NNSA’s Office of the Chief Information Officer are taking the lead in addressing this challenge to include critical systems, by establishing the Center of Excellence (CoE) for Operational Technology. Championed by NNSA Deputy Chief Information Officer Steven McAndrews and the Office of Science Chief Information Officer Shila Cooch, the CoE for OT was chartered in February 2025 to address the challenges of OT cybersecurity and compliance. The CoE for OT will create partnerships and leverage expertise from across the NNSA National Security Enterprise and DOE Labs, Plants and Sites. The CoE will also collaborate with colleagues in other government agencies, industry partners and academia. The CoE for OT discussion at the National Laboratories Information Technology Summit ’25 will include the genesis of the CoE, stated goals, organizational structure, and the effort to attract OT subject matter experts to join the CoE effort to share knowledge and expertise. The discussion will include opportunities to get involved and contribute to this important effort. This session will be led by CoE for OT Co-Chairs Matt Kwiatkowski, Fermi National Laboratory Chief Information Security Officer, and Steven Weldon, Savannah River National Laboratory Cyber Program Director at the Georgia Cyber Center. The session will be of particular interest to CIOs, CTOs, CISOs, as well as IT and OT practitioners.

Kwiatkowski, Matt [Fermilab]↗
DOE OSTI2023

Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator Cohort 1: Authentication and Authorization

In the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy, the Biden-Harris Administration defines the need for a "defensible, resilient digital ecosystem where it is costlier to attack systems than defend them." The strategy cites the Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator (CECA) as an exemplary effort to bolster the security and resilience of clean energy generation. These efforts help "secure the clean energy grid of the future and [generate] security best practices that extend to other critical infrastructure sectors" and promise broad and far-reaching impacts to bridge the capabilities of private industry and the needs of energy production. Cohort 1 of CECA launched in the fall of 2022 with a focus on solutions that provide strong authentication and authorization for industrial control systems to mitigate attacks on the energy grid. Authentication and authorization verify that the identity (authentication) and permissions (authorization) of a user or device are aligned with their assigned roles. Weaknesses in either can have serious repercussions. To assess the strength of Cohort 1's solutions, CECA devised threat scenarios grounded in historical precedents: the CECA team reviewed exploits from real-world case studies of state-sponsored actors to match the assessment's attack paths and targets. Cohort 1 results provided the energy industry, product vendors, and related agencies valuable insights into the efficacy and applicability of solutions in common system configurations under realistic threat scenarios. The results of the assessment highlight points for interrogation and improvement in subsequent technology iterations. CECA's evaluations are part of an ongoing conversation and collaboration to bolster U.S. cyber resilience against adversaries today and in the future.

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