Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “ALPHA-BEARING WASTES”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2019

Characterization Techniques for TRU Waste from the Analytical Laboratory Hot Cells at Idaho National Laboratory - 19610

Since the first reactor went hot in 1942, there has been a never ending desire to improve the nuclear reactor and the fuel that it burns. The Idaho National Laboratory has been a key player in reactor and fuel development. As more research projects begin, the spectrum of waste parameters grows. Over the years, the Analytical laboratory (AL) at the INL Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) has supported a large range of various research projects. Each project brings its own challenge and analytical technique that, in turn, yields its own unique waste parameters. The AL Hot Cells at INL consist of 6 small cells that can support around 12 different fuel research projects at a time along with infrastructure and environmental samples. Each different project yields different levels of transuranic (TRU) material, RCRA constituents, dose, and contamination levels. The waste parameters from each project dictate a path forward for the waste as Low-Level Waste (LLW), Contact Handled TRU (CH-TRU), Mixed Contact Handled TRU (M-CH-TRU), Remote Handled TRU (RH-TRU), or Mixed Remote Handled TRU (M-RHTRU). With visual examination techniques and process knowledge as an aid, there have been waste handling methods developed that allow debris and sample material to be segregated. Unique characterization mechanisms have been applied for each debris and sample material that are generally more accurate than smear and surface contamination data. For debris found in the Hot Cells, analytical data is gathered and conservatively summarized for each fuel type and research method. This consists of data from Quadrupole Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry (Q-ICP-MS), Gamma Spectroscopy, and some data verification through Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry (TIMS) and Multi-Collector Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry (MC-ICP-MS). This data gives a range of TRU isotope concentrations. Fuel age is taken into account to determine the dominant TRU activity isotopes. Cesium concentrations are also gathered. Each parameter/fuel type then ties a measured Cesium number to TRU content based on historical analytical data. Debris in the hot cells is segregated by project and packaged in individual 2 gallon metal paint cans. Each can is counted by gamma spectroscopy in a calculated and measured geometry. Using process knowledge to determine the fuel or project type, newly counted cesium numbers can be applied to the historic analytical data and TRU content can be estimated. The TRU content allows waste debris to be segregated between CH-TRU and RH-TRU. Packaging techniques can allow for the minimization of RHTRU waste. Sample material received into the AL must be dissolved into a liquid matrix in order to be analyzed in most cases. When analysis is complete, these liquids go through a consolidation, complexation, neutralization, and solidification process where real time analytical data can be used to calculate TRU content and RCRA constitutes. These calculations allow for no further analytical data to be gathered. The waste matrix is considered stable and acceptable by all Acceptable Knowledge (AK) documents. The unique techniques used in characterizing and handling the Analytical Laboratories Hot Cell waste can be applied to various situations and various laboratories. They allow for more accurate data for waste constituents and also for the minimization of RH-TRU waste. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Understanding Nitrate Chemistry - The Key to Safer and More Efficient TRU Waste Acceptance - 19618

Investigations into the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) radiological release from a transuranic (TRU) waste drum concluded that the event was initiated by a thermal runaway, principally involving interactions between the polysaccharide-based kitty litter and nitric acid, which released radiological material along with hot gases and combustible materials from the drum. In this paper, the hazards of polysaccharides present as either starch based kitty litter or cellulose rags in a TRU waste drum exposed to nitric acid (and by extension metal nitrate salts) have been evaluated, based on considerations of how complex nitrogen redox cycles carry out the aqueous phase oxidation of alcohols and related organic functional groups. These exothermic reactions, coupled with a positive feedback loop inherent to nitrogen redox chemistry, can initiate an autocatalytic thermal runaway and explosive gas generation, which poses the most significant risk under ambient conditions where acidic solution may be present (in small quantities as free liquid or sorbed within a solid matrix). Nitric acid is an extremely potent oxidant but is itself remarkably inert, rarely interacting directly with oxidizable substrates and instead exerting its vast potential energy through lower oxidation state reactants such as nitrogen dioxide and nitrous acid that are generated from its slow self-decomposition. Nitrous acid is the reactant that carries out substrate oxidation, and systems that are not pre-loaded with nitrous acid will experience an induction period before significant reactivity commences. Under oxidizing fuel-lean conditions, nitrogen dioxide may induce autocatalytic nitrous acid formation, which may supplement additional side-reactions, potentially leading to thermal runaway. Therefore, the system is most vulnerable at the end of an induction period. Metal nitrate salts promote this ambient temperature solution chemistry (cf. traditional oxidizer properties of metal nitrate salts, which operate in the solid state at elevated temperatures) by releasing nitric acid into the system via hydrolysis. Unlike simple alcohols with a single hydroxyl functional group, the chemistry of polymeric carbohydrates (polysaccharides) such as starches and cellulose is more diverse. Therefore, the oxidation of the simple monomeric carbohydrate glucose is first examined to provide insight into the analogous reactivity with polysaccharides. Although less reactive than alcohols by virtue of extensive hydrogen bonding, carbohydrates are oxidized by nitric acid through the same fundamental mechanisms, complicated by a variety of competing side reactions including acid-catalyzed hydrolytic depolymerization to more reactive (ultimately monomeric) units, as well as other degradation reactions promoted by radical mechanisms. For this reason, polysaccharides such as starches that are more susceptible to hydrolysis are more reactive than cellulose, with the attendant microbial population in starch based kitty litter adding a special aspect of reactivity. From this safety evaluation, a bounding latency period has been developed beyond which a stored TRU waste drum that contains polysaccharides (starch based kitty litter excluded) commingled with nitric acid and/or metal nitrate salts may no longer present a hazard under ambient conditions, based on a compilation of induction periods and reaction times involving nitric acid with various oxidizable substrates under a variety of conditions from synthetic procedures, tests, and adverse incident scenarios. By obviating the need for costly treatment options or characterization, a better understanding of nitrate redox chemistry and the hazards it presents with polysaccharide oxidation thus provides a more efficient means to safely dispose of TRU waste generated within the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 36: Hot Topics in US Commercial Low-Level Waste Management

This panel focused on emerging issues in commercial LLW management in the US from the perspective of active members of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Forum, Inc. State, compact, federal and industry officials shared their views on a variety of timely and significant topics related to low-level radioactive waste management, disposal and related issues. Session no. 36 Co-Chairs, Patricia Holahan and Daniel Shrum, introduced the panelists and provided a summary of the purpose of the session. This Panel Session focused on several current and emerging issues impacting the commercial Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW) management in the US from the perspective of active members of the Low-Level Waste Forum, Inc., States, Compact, as well as Federal and nuclear industries. The panelists provided different perspectives on number of key issues such as: LLW disposal facility status and updates (e.g.; in terms of disposal capacity, plans, and waste acceptance conditions). The panelists also addressed waste disposal rates and potential impacts of ongoing regulatory developments by the NRC and the concerned States. Other timely topics pertaining to the revision of 10CFR Part 61, the Greater-than-Class C (GTCC) and Transuranic (TRU) waste, and Very Low-Level Waste (VLLW) disposal issues were also addressed at this Session. Panelists with presentations: Hot Topics in US Commercial LLW Management (Joe Weismann); Texas LLRW Compact (David Carlson); Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact Commission (John Salsman); Barnwell LLRW Disposal Facility (Benjamin Smith, Bill Carver)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Retrieval of Transuranic Drums with Deflagration to Detonation Potential from a Vault at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory - 20207

During the final phase of a long-term project, a total of 80 TRU waste drums at ORNL have been retrieved from a below-grade storage vault in which they have remained untouched for about 25 years. The drums, which house material generated from past ORNL operations, are now stored and ready for eventual transfer to the Transuranic Waste Processing Center, located on Highway 95 in Oak Ridge. The Transuranic Waste Processing Center will process and ship the drums to WIPP in Carlsbad, New Mexico, for disposal. Workers lifted the drums one-by-one from the underground storage vault with a 110-ton crane over a one-week period in October 2017. Although the physical work was performed in one week, years of detailed planning preceded the fieldwork. A key obstacle needed to be overcome before the project could safely proceed. This obstacle involved the need to ensure controls were developed for the Deflagration to Detonation Transition (DDT) potential. DDT refers to a phenomenon in ignitable mixtures of a flammable gas and air (or oxygen) when a sudden transition takes place from a deflagration type of combustion to a detonation type of explosion. Basically, these drums, under certain circumstances, have a potential to detonate and overpressurize. Extensive analysis of the drums verified that detonation, while unlikely, was possible. Of the total 103 drums that were retrieved or moved in preparation for retrieval, 18 had DDT potential. Extensive security requirements were also necessary, due to the nature of the material, and this added another layer of complexity to the fieldwork. Prior to retrieving the drums from the underground storage vault, space needed to be made for them within the various above-grade facilities. Inventory and security requirements dictated what could be stored where, and the first step of the field work involved a number of drum movements in preparation for storage of the newly retrieved drums. This effort involved moving 21 drums already in the storage area to facilitate the addition of the newly retrieved ones. The retrieval project required a total of 107 critical lifts using the 110-ton crane, under 3 critical lift plans. The TRU waste storage facility is a Category 2 Nuclear Facility and is managed under an extensive Documented Safety Analysis. The TRU retrieval project was conducted in accordance with DOE Order 425.1D and included three Implementation Verification Reviews, two Management Assessments, one Readiness Assessment, and seven mock-ups in preparation for the field work. Despite being stored for 25 years, the drums were in good shape due to the integrity of the facilities where the drums were stored. Of the 80 drums that were retrieved, 12 were placed in special containers called 'overpacks' based on their content. The drums were removed safely and without incident, thanks to a lot of preparation and the efforts of a highly skilled team. Lessons learned through the DDT control development and the drum retrieval and overpacking process could be beneficial to others having to manage similar drums of TRU waste. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

In-situ Detection of Glovebox Glove Degradation Prior to Glove Failure; Effects on Safety, Waste, and Operational Costs - 20402

Glovebox glove pressure decay leak testing and analysis of the data can greatly improve glovebox safety, minimize Transuranic (TRU) glove waste, and minimize operational cost. It is well known, the weakest point of containment on a glovebox is the glove. Mitigating unplanned openings in gloves is critical to minimizing operational and safety costs in glovebox operations. Mitigating unplanned glove openings due to glove failures will be discussed in this paper. The lack of an engineered solution to determine a gloves operational life in nuclear operations, has lead to use of theoretical and manual subjective methods to determine the life and safety of a glovebox glove. Whether the glove is inspected visually prior to use, or gloves are changed regularly to theoretically avoid failure, both the operators PPE and the room are being exposed to contamination, or un-necessary amounts of TRU glove waste are being generated. Millions of dollars yearly in operational costs are spent on glove failures due to loss of production, incident analysis, regulatory audits, clean up, and paperwork. In a nuclear application, a glove failure could contaminate an operator and laboratory, shut down the operation for weeks, potentially create a regulatory audit, and potentially create a media frenzy; the damages to the organization can be astronomical. Elimination of glove failures is possible by tracking glove material degradation and setting limits to allow glove change when it becomes necessary, prior to glove failure. Analytical pressure decay leak testing allows the detection of material degradation, and in turn the ability to limit operational glove failures. A German based company called MK Versuchsanlagen, e.K., has developed an advanced Glove Integrity Testing System. The system, with its use of proprietary RFID and special software technology, is unique in its capabilities. The system is capable to perform highly accurate regular glove testing on any size glovebox line in minimal time. The system records and can analyze a tremendous amount of system data that in turn can determine, for example, a safe glove change time prior to a glove material failure. This paper will show how an advanced Glove Integrity Testing System can detect glove material degradation and help determine a safe change point prior to glove failure. Pressure decay curves of new gloves and recorded effects of accelerated aging on the glove over time will be shown. The use of this technology in nuclear facilities can greatly improve glovebox operational safety, minimize glovebox glove TRU waste, and save organizations tremendous costs in downtime, clean up, documentation, and potential regulatory review. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Influence of Aqueous Dispersivity on Transport of Radiological Material at LANL MDA G - 20450

Aqueous dispersivity is a phenomenon by which a solute moving in groundwater mixes with water that does not contain the solute and becomes diluted. Solutes take paths of varying lengths through pore networks or experience slower velocities due to interactions with pore walls. Aqueous dispersivity leads to breakthrough curves with earlier arrival than expected in purely advective systems and persistent 'tails,' or late-arriving, dilute concentrations of the solute. Dispersivity can be longitudinal (in the direction of flow) or transverse (orthogonal to flow). LANL has disposed of radioactive material at Material Disposal Area (MDA) G since the late 1950's. Most of the disposed materials at MDA G are low-level waste (LLW), but other types of radioactive wastes are disposed or stored at the site. For example, there is a collection of remote-handled transuranic waste (RH-TRU) waste in 33 shafts, which were intended to be stored retrievably. Aqueous-phase radionuclides included in models of contaminant transport at MDA G are subject to dispersive processes in porous media of the vadose zone and saturated zone. To model dispersivity at MDA G probabilistically, we created site-specific distributions of aqueous dispersivity. First, we performed a comprehensive review of peer-reviewed publications, reports from other performance assessments of MDA G, and documentation from sites that were considered similar based on expert opinion, such as Yucca Mountain. Data were included from a wide range of sources, so that distributions developed based on the data reflect the current state of knowledge in properties of the subsurface environment. Data were grouped based on value type (e.g., determined via experiment or used in a different model), rock type, zone type (saturated or unsaturated), and site, and were weighted in the distributions according to their relevance to the site and zone type. We combined Monte Carlo simulation and bootstrapping techniques to produce approximate distributions of mean aqueous dispersivity. Distributions of dispersivity for saturated and unsaturated zone transport are differentiated by data weight and the length scales over which transport occurs. We find that underestimating or disregarding transverse dispersivity may lead to overstating simulated well capture in the saturated zone at MDA G. Neglecting transverse dispersivity is a common assumption due in part to use of one-dimensional transport models that do not consider solute spreading orthogonal to flow. Also, we find that variability in longitudinal dispersivity is associated with substantial travel time alterations in the MDA G unsaturated zone and in simulated contaminant breakthrough times at a downstream observation plane in the MDA G saturated zone. Finally, at large scales (>1000 m), a linear trend between the dispersivity coefficient and length over which transport occurs may overestimate the dispersivity coefficient. Future modeling work with application to solute spreading could include interacting advective and diffusive zones in the highly fractured basalt below MDA G. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

In-Can Incineration and Vitrification Process for the Treatment of Transuranic Wastes - 20035

Technological alpha contaminated wastes are produced by the nuclear fuel cycle management industry, essentially from MOX fuel production units. These Plutonium Contaminated Materials (PCM) contain a mixture of organic, metal and mineral materials, contaminated with uranium, plutonium and americium. One treatment scenario under study is to incinerate the organic materials, melt the metallic fraction and incorporate the mineral fraction (including ashes from organics incineration) into a glass matrix without sorting or pretreatment (grinding for instance). A scale 1 pilot of this PIVIC process (Process for Incineration and Vitrification In Can) has been commissioned in 2018 at the CEA R and D vitrification facility in Marcoule site. A R and D program aiming to demonstrate the feasibility of this process is currently on going. This paper starts with a description of PIVIC process with explanation of the technologies involved. Then, main results of the first year of operation with the technological demonstration goal are presented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

A Preliminary Radiological Risk Assessment Model for Disposition of Remote-Handled Transuranic Wastes at Los Alamos National Laboratory Area G - 20116

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) operates a low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal site at Material Disposal Area G, in Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA. Area G has been the primary LLW disposal site for Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) since the 1960's. In addition to LLW, Area G is host to a variety of other wastes, the disposition of which must be determined before closure of the site. A probabilistic Radiological Risk Assessment (RRA) for Area G is used in order to support decision making regarding some wastes that are not addressed in the extant Area G Performance Assessment (PA) and Composite Analysis (CA). Between 1979 and 1987, 33 special shafts were augered into the Bandelier Tuff at Area G. This volcanic tuff is present across Pajarito Plateau on the eastern slopes of the Jemez Mountains, and varies widely in its consistency, from weakly indurated non-welded layers to welded layers that uphold the mesa cliffs of the Plateau. These mesas are home to LANL, Area G, and the townsites of Los Alamos and White Rock, with residences about 1400 m from Area G. The 33 Shafts were lined with steel casing, and contain remote-handled (RH) transuranic wastes (TRU) resulting from experiments and analysis performed in special glove boxes at the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) facility at LANL. Some of these wastes originated as used nuclear fuel. The purpose of the Area G RRA is to evaluate the potential future risk to humans and the environment from the RH TRU in the 33 Shafts in the context of the risk associated with the surrounding wastes at Area G. The analysis is responsive to expectations outlined in DOE Order 458.1, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, and is informed by the Manual and Guidance accompanying DOE O 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. Because the waste meets the definition of TRU, the regulatory context necessarily takes into consideration the regulation governing the disposal of TRU from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): 40 CFR 191, Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes. Given the broader regulatory context for the RRA, the analysis is subject to different assumptions from those made in the existing DOE O 435.1 PA and CA, such as allowing for future occupation of the site. The analysis begins with a comprehensive evaluation of features, events, processes, and exposure scenarios (FEPS) for Area G and the wastes it contains. These FEPSs are screened to eliminate from further consideration those of extremely low probability and/or consequence, and a conceptual site model (CSM) is subsequently developed. The scope and structure of the Area G RRA Model is informed by this CSM, and the Area G RRA Model is developed using the GoldSim systems analysis modeling platform. This paper presents the initial version of a defensible, transparent, and reasonably realistic model, which is based on the state of knowledge of the wastes, the site, and the FEPSs that govern contaminant transport from wastes into the environment and subsequent exposures to humans and other biota. Probabilistic model input distributions represent uncertainties inherent in the real and modeled systems. The results of the Area G RRA Model inform decisions regarding the disposition of the RH TRU in the 33 Shafts. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Requalification and Declaration of High-alpha Cemented TRU-waste from the Late 70's and Early 80's - 20499

KTE and Siemens launched a project to qualify a series of 391 waste drums and 115 concrete containers produced from 1979 to 1984. The waste is characterized by a high content of long-lived alpha-nuclides (TRU-waste - Pu, U, Am in the range of 1 E+11-1 E+12 Bq/ drum. This high radionuclide inventory requires a special packaging according to the waste acceptance criteria (WAC) of the repository Konrad [1] despite the fact, that the waste was treated manually. The raw waste originally was delivered in nitric acid solution and was solidified using ordinary Portland cement. The existing documentation comprises analyses, transfer documentation for the nuclear fuel nuclides and waste treatment documentation yielding information, which waste was treated together in a batch. Additionally all drums were subjected to non-destructive gamma-spectrometry assay. A small number of 7 drums were opened and sampled to support the existing declaration. For the entire series the waste products were attributed to defined batches using the accountancy data supported by the analyses and the gamma-spectrometry. Each batch was produced from a homogeneous stock of waste solution and can therefore be declared and documented together. The declaration concept is based on the gamma spectrometry results performed on the entire drums, which were corrected and extended for the uncertainty of the analyses. The declaration concept is verified by the regulator and its independent expert. The state of the project is in the documentation of the solidification campaigns followed by the planning of the container configuration. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Spatiotemporal Distribution of {sup 241}Am in the Vicinity of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - 19543

Environmental monitoring around nuclear facilities is essential for characterizing the baseline conditions that are critical for identifying releases and quantifying their effects, should they occur, and for assessing post-closure performance. The spatiotemporal distribution and transport behavior of {sup 241}Am in the vicinity of a deep geologic repository for transuranic waste were assessed using data spanning the pre-operational phase to the present, including an accidental radionuclide release in 2014. The {sup 241}Am background values of 0.027±0.109 μBq/m{sup 3} (aerosols), and 0.061±0.065 Bq/kg (soil), as well as the {sup 241}Am/{sup 239+240}Pu ratios of 0.41±0.06 (aerosols) and 0.38±0.04 (soil), are similar to global fallout values. Pre-operations concentrations of {sup 241}Am show a strong seasonal dependence, attributed to resuspension of soils contaminated by global fallout, with no contribution from the upwind Project Gnome site ({sup 241}Am/{sup 239+240}Pu =0.24±0.08). During the 2014 accidental release, aerosol concentrations of {sup 241}Am briefly increased to 115.2 μBq/m{sup 3} at an onsite monitoring station, and 81.4 μBq/m{sup 3} at a station ∼1 km downwind of the exhaust shaft, changing the {sup 241}Am/{sup 239+240}Pu from ∼0.37 to ∼10. However, some four years later, conditions have returned to background. Almost 90% of the {sup 241}Am inventory is the 0-5 cm soil layer and there is no evidence of concentrations above regulatory standards, or that can be attributed to waste disposal operations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Transporting Non-Compliant TRU Wastes in the OPTIMUS{sup TM} Packages - 20493

The OPTIMUS{sup TM} product line of packages was developed with the purpose of providing a versatile and modular packaging option for shipping problematic wastes and fissile material contents. The product line includes a high-activity design in the OPTIMUS-H and a low activity design in the OPTIMUS-L. The two variants utilize a singular containment vessel design, that is enclosed in different protective components that offer different levels of shielding along with thermal and impact protection. The thick shielding provided by the OPTIMUS-H packaging allows for higher activity contents than the OPTIMUS-L to be transported. But the lightweight design of the OPTIMUS-L packaging allows for more packages to be transported in a single shipment. The containment vessel design shared between the two packages provides leak-tight containment of all radioactive contents along with the capabilities to easily leak test and the option to inert and backfill the contents, as necessary, prior to each shipment of the package. Together the OPTIMUS package designs offer significant flexibility and are capable of handling a wide variety of waste materials and other radioactive contents. One of the primary contents covered in the initial design effort for these packages is TRU waste contents beyond the standard waste materials that are compliant with the WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria. More specifically, the initial content of interest is TRU Waste drums containing sealed containers with potentially flammable gases. While there are multiple other packaging options available for transporting standard WIPP compliant TRU wastes, the goal of the OPTIMUS packages is to offer a superior option for transporting both standard TRU wastes as well as the more problematic non-compliant wastes, among other contents. The non-compliant TRU waste contents explicitly included for the OPTIMUS packages are standard aerosol cans and DOT 3E lecture bottles. However, the methods applied for the package containment can be easily adjusted to cover other sealed container types with potentially flammable gases. The primary challenges with including these items are both the obvious issue of potential for flammable gases (e.g. aerosol propellants) in the package, but also the uncertainty in the exact state of the contents. Because these desired contents are waste materials, the characterization of the materials present in the waste may include some uncertainties. For example, though it may be known that there are one or more aerosol cans in a TRU waste drum, it may not be known if this can is full, spent, or anywhere in between. Also there may be equal uncertainty in the contents of the aerosol can, specifically in the potentially flammable propellant remaining in the can. To include these types of non-compliant items as acceptable contents for the package, the methods utilized in the safety analyses of the OPTIMUS packages must consider all of the uncertainties in the characterization of the waste. The methods utilized cover a range of concerns with transporting contents of this nature including pressure buildup, gas generation, and gaseous combustion for demonstrating the containment of the package. The ability to transport these problematic contents in the OPTIMUS packages gives TRU waste generating sites the option to relocate these drums to an offsite location where the non-compliant items can be properly managed through removal or destruction. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Expanded Use of ISOCS Characterization Techniques for WIPP Certification at the Idaho Clean-up Project - 19623

The Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP) has been retrieving, treating, characterizing, and shipping legacy Transuranic (TRU) waste for disposal since 2003 as part of the overall Idaho Cleanup Project (ICP) in support of the US Department of Energy. As the ICP has progressed, over 700 containers have been identified that cannot be successfully assayed using the current suite of non-destructive assay (NDA) instruments. To meet this challenge, Fluor Idaho, LLC, and Mirion Technologies (formerly Canberra Industries) have teamed to deploy the In-Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS) to supplement the current NDA capabilities. ISOCS has long been used in various radioactive waste management applications, but never has the ISOCS ability to perform intrinsic efficiency modeling of discrete waste containers been employed to characterize and certify TRU waste for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), near Carlsbad, New Mexico. Since the primary disposal facility for this waste is the WIPP, the characterization processes for determining the quantity of radioactive material entrained in the waste are subject to WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) quality requirements and associated performance criteria. Until now, the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) WIPP-certified NDA equipment has utilized pre-defined efficiency calibrations for fixed geometries. However, due to the radioactive material content, activity levels, waste stream matrix, and/or the geometries of various size drums, boxes and other-odd-shaped containers or container integrity issues, it may not be suitable to characterize these containers with any of the existing WIPP-certified NDA equipment located at the AMWTP. Therefore, advanced technologies are needed to complete characterization of these problematic waste containers. The July 5, 2016 release of the WIPP WAC, DOE/WIPP-02-3122, Revision 8.0, Appendix A, 'Radioassay Requirements for Transuranic Waste,' was expanded to include several newer concepts such as American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) approved methods for efficiency-based calibrations and the use of mathematical computer modeling techniques for calibration. This change prompted AMWTP to pursue obtaining WIPP certification authority for expanded ISOCS techniques to deal with the remaining challenging waste containers and the development and implementation of Mirion's Figures of Merit (FOM) evaluations. These vital FOM evaluations enhance the ISOCS's modeling capabilities by optimizing the dynamic efficiency calibration for each object and reducing the assay's Total Measurement Uncertainty (TMU) budget. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Evaluation of Techniques for Vegetation Removal from UAV-Based Photogrammetric DSM near WIPP Land Withdrawal Act Boundary, NM

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant is located within New Mexico's karst landscape and is the United States' only deep geologic radioactive waste repository which isolates transuranic waste from defense activities underground in a bedded salt formation. Characteristic karst topography in this region is made up of material (such as limestone) that can be dissolved by water over a long period of time, and includes features such as springs, surface streams, sinking streams, caves, and sinkholes. Karst features can potentially impact the integrity of the waste repository in the future and compromise WIPP's performance, particularly when coupled with incompatible land-use activities within the Land Withdrawal Act (LWA) boundary as well as increased water withdrawals outside the LWA. In order to better capture the ground surface topography to support hydrology modeling efforts, the U.S. DOE has enlisted FIU to develop a high-resolution digital elevation model (DEM). In a previous field study, a high-resolution digital surface model (DSM) of an adjacent representative site, Basin 6, was developed by photogrammetry using aerial images captured with unmanned aerial vehicles. The DSM generated was based on point clouds representing the entire landscapes, including points of terrain, vegetation and infrastructure. These above-ground features need to be removed to create a DSM/DEM with good representation of the bare ground. In recent years, many techniques including both pre- and post-processing of DSMs, were developed for vegetation removal with varied success. This research focuses on applying and comparing various vegetation removal methods using point clouds generated of the Basin 6 pilot study area. The 3D RGB-based point cloud classification using Python scripts was a modification of the procedure by Themistocleous (2019). The method using Liblas classifies the point cloud three-dimensionally, whereas the method by Themistocleous (2019) is two-dimensional. The preliminary result of the method using Liblas, however, still had a large amount of vegetation remaining compared to the Pix4D Machine Learning method. The vegetation layer remains highly visible in the DEMs processed using the vegetation indices as opposed to the Pix4D Machine Learning method, which produces a DEM where mostly bare ground is seen. Further modifications to the input parameters are required to improve the vegetation vs. bare ground classification using this approach. The next step will be to improve the method using Liblas and to also test other vegetation removal methods found in the literature review to compare them against the two described here.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Minimizing Transuranic Waste Generated in Hot Cells at Oak Ridge National Laboratory Through Use of a Non-Destructive CO{sub 2} Pellet Cleaning System - 19577

Wastes generated in shielded hot cells containing materials contaminated with transuranic (TRU) waste present unique problems in waste disposal at Department of Energy (DOE) sites. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) routinely processes materials contaminated with TRU waste from the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) and from other sources (both on and off-site) in their hot cell facilities, generating wastes that require eventual disposal. The waste streams generated by these processes are often high activity and exhibit high dose rates, driving them into the remote-handled (RH) category at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Reduction of the TRU waste footprint is desirable from a disposal cost perspective due to constraints with RH waste processing and a lack of space availability at the WIPP. Historically TRU waste generated at ORNL has been processed by the TRU Waste Processing Center (TWPC), which belongs to the Department of Energy's Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM). Now that Oak Ridge legacy TRU waste is reaching its final stage, DOE-EM has turned over the mission of processing newly-generated TRU waste streams to the DOE Office of Science at ORNL. To reduce the volume of potential TRU waste occupying valuable space in the ORNL Hot Cells, a non-destructive CO{sub 2} pellet cleaning system will be used to capture particulate contaminants removed from the surfaces of waste inside the ORNL Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities (NNFD) Hot Cells at the Irradiated Fuels Examination Laboratories (IFEL). The particulate will be segregated by particle size and captured for disposal later. This action will separate some of the TRU isotopes (particulate) from the larger waste volume (debris waste items), resulting in both lower waste disposal costs and reduced TRU waste volumes. This will be accomplished through a specialized cyclone separator. Secondary wastes are usually generated through other methods of decontamination, such as water jets and abrasive agents. These secondary wastes are absent with the CO{sub 2} pelletized system, due to sublimation of the dry ice upon impact. This is an important consideration with IFEL, a facility whose primary mission is to perform a series of R and D testing on nuclear fuel rods. Liquid is not a feasible method of decontamination as the IFEL's drains in the Hot Cells were plugged years ago due to Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulations. Constraints at IFEL, such as criticality safety concerns with use of hydrogenous materials, are also alleviated with the non-destructive CO{sub 2} pellet cleaning system. These are a couple of the considerations why this method of decontamination is preferred. Due to concerns with oxidizers at WIPP grouting will be performed on the contaminated particulate produced during the trapping by the cyclone separation phase. This method will comply with mitigating oxidizing properties in TRU waste, required by the recently published Basis of Knowledge (BoK) document as part of Acceptable Knowledge (AK) by WIPP. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Investigation and Analysis of Dolomite Dissolution in Variable Strength Systems Relevant to the WIPP

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) was opened in 1999 as a solution to the long-term disposal of the nation's nuclear defense-generated transuranic (TRU) waste. The salt beds were recommended as the ideal location because they are free from flowing fresh water, easily mined, impermeable, and geologically stable. However, for performance assessment modeling, release scenarios must be considered. The most likely release scenario was determined to be human intrusion leading to direct and/or long-term brine release (US DOE 1995, US DOE 1996, Perkins et al., 1999). The focus of this research is the Rustler formation because it is located above the WIPP and is the most transmissive layer (Perkins et al., 1999). Objective: To determine the effect of chelating ligands ( e.g. EDTA) on dissolution of dolomite in high ionic strength systems. Do brines impact dolomite dissolution and how is it affected by EDTA binding with cations? By varying the ionic strengths, different brine conditions can be simulated similar to those in and around the Culebra member and evaluate trends of dissolved Ca and Mg in the aqueous phase from the quantified data. Conclusions: <2% of dolomite dissolved over one week at pH 8.5. Greater dissolution occurred at higher ionic strength and in the presence of NaCl with approximately 0.4 vs. 0.9% of Mg removed from dolomite in 0.1 and 1.0 M Na. Further, 0.3 vs. 0.9% of Mg was removed from dolomite in 1.0 M IS CaCl{sub 2} versus NaCl. EDTA increased dissolution of dolomite at low ionic strength due to its strong complexation affinity for Ca/Mg with slightly greater removal of Ca than Mg. Significant differences were not observed at high ionic strength due to the presence of large concentrations of competing cations (Na, Ca, Mg). Slightly higher concentrations of Ca were removed from dolomite than Mg after one week, suggesting either incongruent dissolution or release through ion exchange of Ca from trace mineral impurities. Further, when EDTA was present, it may have increased Ca removal due to its greater complexation for Ca than Mg. Environmental Implications: High ionic strength brines and low ionic strength solutions with organic ligands increase dissolution of dolomite. Due to the long half-lives of radionuclides in the TRU waste, it may be important to consider the long term impact of dolomite dissolution for potential release scenarios.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Disposition of Newly Generated Transuranic Waste at ORNL - 20107

ORNL operates the High Flux Isotope Reactor, which provides a high neutron source for production of isotopes for medical, industrial, and nuclear research programs and is the US DoE's center for production, storage, and distribution for TRU isotopes (plutonium through californium). Operation of these facilities results in the generation of CH-TRU and RH-TRU waste for disposal at the WIPP. This paper describes the program ORNL is implementing in collaboration with the Carlsbad Field Office National TRU Program Difficult Waste Team to disposition newly generated TRU waste. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Flammable Gas Generation and Control at the Idaho Completion Project Legacy Combustible Gas Generation - 20191

On April 11, 2018, four drums containing transuranic waste at the Idaho National Laboratory underwent over-pressurization, ejecting their lids and spreading radiological waste within a facility. An investigation has found that waste in the drums generated methane gas, which contributed to the event. Subsequent to the investigation, the potential for drums to have methane and other flammable analytes whose concentrations could approach or exceed the lower flammability limit (LFL) and the adequacy of the controls to prevent or mitigate a possible deflagration was evaluated. An extensive review of the historical records was performed to determine how many drums exceed the LFL. The historical record identified a small quantity of drums that exceeded the LFL for xylene, hydrogen, and methane. The primary codified applicable code or standard for handling drums is 29 CFR 1910.120 (j) 'Handling Drums and Containers.' It is used throughout the commercial and government sector. This code is integrated throughout the Fluor Idaho safety management programs and procedures to control the Standard Industrial Hazards (SIHs) associated with drum and container handling. Example requirements include: - Drums and containers are inspected, and their integrity assured prior to being moved. - Site operations are organized to minimize the amount of drum or container movement. - When there is a reasonable possibility of flammable atmospheres being present, material handling equipment and hand tools are of the type to prevent sources of ignition. Drums and containers under pressure, as evidenced by bulging or swelling, are not moved until the cause for excess pressure is determined and appropriate containment procedures have been implemented to protect employees from explosive relief of the drum. Drums which exceed the WIPP FGA limit have NCRs associated with them. Once a drum fails flammable gas sampling, an NCR is initiated. The NCR drives placement into NCR dense pack rows. A standing order drives placement of the FGA failures to a single planer segregation location. These drums are not allowed for further processing or shipment until the NCR has been cleared. Once in the single planer rows, follow-up FGA testing is performed by CCP. The NCR is dispositioned by follow-up sampling occurring after adequate time has been provided for the gas to diffuse through the filter assembly, or, in some cases, the drums are repackaged into additional drums to reduce the source term. To date, the ICP project has performed approximately 1.5 million drums moves without a deflagration event due to combustible gas generation. Flammable gas generation in a transuranic waste drum is not unique to the ICP but is common across the DOE complex. Based on the experience at Idaho, application of industry standards is sufficient to control the risk of drum deflagration due to drum movements. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Viability of In-Drum Treatment for Transuranic Wastes Containing Nitrates and Organics - 20406

In February of 2014, a breach in a waste drum stored at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant resulted in the release of radioactive material into the immediate surroundings and outside of the plant. The waste drum contained a mixture of an organic absorbent and nitrate salts that pressurized the drum, eventually causing the drum lid to fail, leading to the adverse event. Other waste drums with similar contents exist posing both storage and treatment risks. These drums may successfully be treated by an in-drum treatment system. This paper considers the design and operation of an in-drum treatment system and the characteristics of waste containing organics and nitrates to evaluate the viability of treatment. A description of the system, how it is operated, and a summary of previous testing performed is provided. Treatment of both liquids and absorbed liquids comprised of organics and nitrates is addressed. Viability of treatment is demonstrated by presenting operational methods and design strategies to ensure successful treatment of the waste drums. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗