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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2015

A defense in depth approach for nuclear power plant accident management

An initiating event may lead to a severe accident if the plant safety functions have been challenged or operators do not follow the appropriate accident management procedures. Beyond design basis accidents are those corresponding to events of very low occurrence probability but such an accident may lead to significant consequences. The defense in depth approach is important to assure nuclear safety even in a severe accident. Plant Damage States (PDS) can be defined by the combination of the possible values for each of the PDS parameters which are showed on the nuclear power plant simulator. PDS is used to identify what the initiating event is, and can also give the information of safety system's status whether they are bypassed, inoperable or not. Initiating event and safety system's status are used in the construction of Containment Event Tree (CET) to determine containment failure modes by using probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) technique. Different initiating events will correspond to different CETs. With these CETs, the core melt frequency of an initiating event can be found. The use of Plant Damage States (PDS) is a symptom-oriented approach. On the other hand, the use of Containment Event Tree (CET) is an event-oriented approach. In this study, the Taiwan's fourth nuclear power plants, the Lungmen nuclear power station (LNPS), which is an advanced boiling water reactor (ABWR) with fully digitized instrumentation and control (I and C) system is chosen as the target plant. The LNPS full scope engineering simulator is used to generate the testing data for method development. The following common initiating events are considered in this study: loss of coolant accidents (LOCA), total loss of feedwater (TLOFW), loss of offsite power (LOOP), station blackout (SBO). Studies have indicated that the combination of the symptom-oriented approach and the event-oriented approach can be helpful to find mitigation strategies and is useful for the accident management. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

New intrinsically smart severe accident instrumentation saves costs and enhances severe accident management - 302

The Severe Accidents (SA) at Fukushima in 2011, identified the need for enhanced I and C to follow the progress of SA. Since SA environments are significantly Beyond DBA conditions, some new advanced Inherently Smart sensors had to be developed and tested. Nuclear plant designers and operators have helped focus the I and C enhancement based upon lessons learned from the Fukushima accidents. The result has been the addition of I and C for direct measurement of SA conditions hydrogen concentration, oxygen concentration, temperature, and pressure that provide unambiguous information for management of Severe Accident scenarios. The benefits are immediate from three important aspects. First, they deliver on the nuclear promise for enhanced safety at reduced costs. These Inherently Smart sensors have no maintenance and replace equipment that has high maintenance costs. Secondly, these sensors provide multiple benefits, such as condition monitoring information all the time and direct measurement of SA conditions if they are needed. Thirdly, and most importantly, simplify operator actions and training for SA. SA scenarios and SA Management can now rely on direct measurements to know such things as, the extent of fuel damage, integrity of the reactor pressure vessel, when corium is on the floor of containment, and conditions upon which to activate the hardened vent. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Verification of severe accident management guideline (SAMG) entry condition for OPR1000 - 367

The current severe accident prevention and mitigation strategies for OPR 1000 have emergency operating procedures (EOPs) and severe accident management guidelines (SAMGs), respectively. The main objective of SAMG is to prevent a release of radioactive materials from releasing into environment and mitigate severe accident phenomena during severe accident. The current SAMG entry condition is met when the core exit temperature (CET) reaches 650 deg. C in OPR 1000. Peak cladding temperature (PCT), which represents core integrity more precisely than CET does, cannot be used since it is not measurable in the main control room (MCR). Current SAMG entry condition for every kind of accident scenarios is not reasonable, since entry condition is determined without considering operator action time. Therefore, SAMG entry condition need to be verified with consider operator action time. Thus, an analysis methodology for SAMG entry condition was developed to verify the SAMG entry condition. A severe accident DB were also developed in order to analyze the SAMG entry condition. The analysis results of DB show that available operator action time from the SAMG entrance to RV fail is shorter than the required time in most cases. As a result, the proper SAMG entry condition was suggested through the results of DB analysis. When the SAMG entry condition is changed from CET to suggested condition, the available action time is increased about 350 to 4300 sec. Also, the suggested entry condition was verified through the simulation which considered operation action time and reflecting the suggested entry condition. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2018

Intelligent Modeling for Nuclear Power Plant Accident Management

This study explores the viability of using counterfactual reasoning for impact analyses when understanding and responding to “beyond-design-basis” nuclear power plant accidents. Currently, when a severe nuclear power plant accident occurs, plant operators rely on Severe Accident Management Guidelines. However, the current guidelines are limited in scope and depth: for certain types of accidents, plant operators would have to work to mitigate the damage with limited experience and guidance for the particular situation. We aim to fill the need for comprehensive accident support by using a dynamic Bayesian network to aid in the diagnosis of a nuclear reactor’s state and to analyze the impact of possible response measures.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Interim Status Report for Risk Management for SFRs

Accident management is an important component to maintaining risk at acceptable levels for all complex systems, such as nuclear power plants. With the introduction of passive, or inherently safe, reactor designs the focus has shifted from management by operators to allowing the system's design to take advantage of natural phenomena to manage the accident. Inherently and passively safe designs are laudable, but nonetheless extreme boundary conditions can interfere with the design attributes which facilitate inherent safety, thus resulting in unanticipated and undesirable end states. This report examines an inherently safe and small sodium fast reactor experiencing a variety of beyond design basis events with the intent of exploring the utility of a Dynamic Bayesian Network to infer the state of the reactor to inform the operator's corrective actions. These inferences also serve to identify the instruments most critical to informing an operator's actions as candidates for hardening against radiation and other extreme environmental conditions that may exist in an accident. This reduction in uncertainty serves to inform ongoing discussions of how small sodium reactors would be licensed and may serve to reduce regulatory risk and cost for such reactors.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Risk Management for Sodium Fast Reactors.

Accident management is an important component to maintaining risk at acceptable levels for all complex systems, such as nuclear power plants. With the introduction of self - correcting, or inherently safe, reactor designs the focus has shifted from management by operators to allowing the syste m's design to manage the accident. While inherently and passively safe designs are laudable, extreme boundary conditions can interfere with the design attributes which facilitate inherent safety , thus resulting in unanticipated and undesirable end states. This report examines an inherently safe and small sodium fast reactor experiencing a beyond design basis seismic event with the intend of exploring two issues : (1) can human intervention either improve or worsen the potential end states and (2) can a Bayes ian Network be constructed to infer the state of the reactor to inform (1). ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author s would like to acknowledge the U.S. Department of E nergy's Office of Nuclear Energy for funding this research through Work Package SR - 14SN100303 under the Advanced Reactor Concepts program. The authors also acknowledge the PRA teams at A rgonne N ational L aborator y , O ak R idge N ational L aborator y , and I daho N ational L aborator y for their continue d contributions to the advanced reactor PRA mission area.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Advance Liquid Metal Reactor Discrete Dynamic Event Tree/Bayesian Network Analysis and Incident Management Guidelines (Risk Management for Sodium Fast Reactors)

Accident management is an important component to maintaining risk at acceptable levels for all complex systems, such as nuclear power plants. With the introduction of self-correcting, or inherently safe, reactor designs the focus has shifted from management by operators to allowing the system's design to manage the accident. Inherently and passively safe designs are laudable, but nonetheless extreme boundary conditions can interfere with the design attributes which facilitate inherent safety, thus resulting in unanticipated and undesirable end states. This report examines an inherently safe and small sodium fast reactor experiencing a beyond design basis seismic event with the intent of exploring two issues: (1) can human intervention either improve or worsen the potential end states and (2) can a Bayesian Network be constructed to infer the state of the reactor to inform.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Status Report on Ex-Vessel Coolability and Water Management

Specific to BWR plants, current accident management guidance calls for flooding the drywell to a level of approximately 1.2 m (4 feet) above the drywell floor once vessel breach has been determined. While this action can help to submerge ex-vessel core debris, it can also result in flooding the wetwell and thereby rendering the wetwell vent path unavailable. An alternate strategy is being developed in the industry guidance for responding to the severe accident capable vent Order, EA-13-109. The alternate strategy being proposed would throttle the flooding rate to achieve a stable wetwell water level while preserving the wetwell vent path. The overall objective of this work is to upgrade existing analytical tools (i.e. MELTSPREAD and CORQUENCH - which have been used as part of the DOE-sponsored Fukushima accident analyses) in order to provide flexible, analytically capable, and validated models to support the development of water throttling strategies for BWRs that are aimed at keeping ex-vessel core debris covered with water while preserving the wetwell vent path.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Reactor Safety for Beyond Design Basis Events

In the aftermath of the March 2011 multi-unit accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (Fukushima), the nuclear community has been reassessing certain safety assumptions about nuclear reactor plant design, operations and emergency actions, particularly with respect to extreme events that might occur and that are beyond each plant's current design basis. The DOE has played a major role in the U.S. response to the Fukushima accident. Initially, DOE worked with the Japanese and the international community to help develop a more complete understanding of the Fukushima accident progression and its consequences, and to respond to various safety concerns emerging from uncertainties about the nature of and the effects from the accident. DOE R and D activities are focused on providing scientific and technical insights, data, analyses methods that ultimately support industry efforts to enhance safety. These activities are expected to further enhance the safety performance of currently operating as well as better characterize the safety performance of future U.S. nuclear power plants. In pursuing this area of R and D, DOE recognizes that the commercial nuclear industry is ultimately responsible for the safe operation of licensed nuclear facilities. As such, industry is considered the primary end user of the results from this DOE-sponsored work. The purpose of the Reactor Safety Technology R and D is to improve understanding of beyond design basis events and reduce uncertainty in severe accident progression, phenomenology, and outcomes using existing analytical codes and information gleaned from severe accidents, in particular the Fukushima Daiichi events. This information will be used to aid in developing mitigating strategies and improving severe accident management guidelines for the current light water reactor fleet. The RST R and D activities have evolved from an initial coordinated international effort to assist in the analysis of the Fukushima accident progression and accident response into the following three areas of current work. Fukushima Forensics and Examination Plans: This R and D is focused on providing insights into the actual severe accident progression at Fukushima through planning and interpretation of visual examinations and data collection of in-situ conditions of the damaged units as well as collection and analysis of samples from the damaged reactors. Severe Accident Analyses: This R and D is focused on analyses using existing computer models and their ability to provide information and insights into severe accident progression that aid in the development of severe accident management guidelines (SAMG) and/or training operators on these SAMGs; an auxiliary benefit can be informing improvements in these models. Accident Tolerant Components: This R and D work is focused on analysis or experimental efforts for hardware-related issues, including systems, structures and components with the potential to prevent core degradation or mitigate the effects of beyond-design basis events. This presentation will review current and future R and D activities in this reactor safety area. (author)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Operator Action Time Evaluation of Emergency Water Injection Strategy for Extreme SGTR Accidents

In terms of severe accidents caused by earthquakes or tsunamis that are beyond expectation, a special safety inspection for operating plants, following the Fukushima accident, has been conducted by the government of Korea to verify that nation's nuclear power plants have been adequately designed to respond to extreme accidents. The inspection results show that Korean nuclear power plants in operation have no imminent risk for an expected maximum potential earthquake or coastal flooding based on the up-to-date investigation. However, there is a need to implement long- and short-term safety improvements in order to secure the level of safety for natural beyond-design-basis events. One of the measures to increase the mitigation capability during extreme accidents is installing the injection flow paths to provide emergency cooling water of extemal sources using fire engines to the steam generators (SGs) or reactor cooling system (RCS). An emergency cooling water system consists of a fixed pipe connected from the RCS or SGs to the outside of the containment. A standby valve is installed on the pipe. Following the occurrence of an extreme accident, movable equipment (for example, a fire truck hose) can be connected to the pipe hole at the opening of the isolation valve. The emergency cooling water injection strategy was not taken into account for the steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) accident management strategy of the OPR-1000. Therefore, it is necessary to develop some guidelines or strategies to cope with an extreme SGTR scenarios using the newly installed injection flow paths and fire engines. As long as the fission products released from the core during severe accidents are kept inside the containment, there may be several ways to reduce the radionuclide release into the environment, for example, by using plant safety features. The containment bypass sequences, however, allow the fission products to be released into the environment or directly to the auxiliary building. The SGTR accidents, which are one of the containment bypass sequences, have shown during various probabilistic safety assessments (PSAs) to be contributors to plant risk, mainly because of their potential for causing a release outside containment. This paper is intended to be an investigation of the characteristics of accident progressions and assessments for the mitigative effectiveness of the external cooling water injection strategies during extreme SGTR accidents in a typical OPR-1000 plant. Analyses were performed using a MAAP computer code version 5.03. The MAAP code is a system-level computer code capable of conducting integral analyses of potential severe accident progressions in nuclear power plants, whose main purpose is to support a level 2 PSA or severe accident management strategy developments.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗