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REPORT OF THE ISS OSI INVITED MEETING, VIENNA, 24-27 MARCH, 2009

The International Scientific Studies project (ISS) was initiated in early 2008 with the objective of creating a series of activities aimed at application of modern scientific methods to improve the efficiency of analysis and the quality of verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). The ISS On-Site Inspection (OSI) Invited Meeting convened on March 24, 2009 with the objectives of gaining a better understanding of the phenomenology of underground nuclear explosions (UNE) for OSI purposes and to identify areas of interest to OSI that could benefit significantly from contributions by the general scientific community. Fifteen invited experts from four countries, along with fifteen members of the OSI Division of the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) met for four days at the Vienna International Center in an informal setting to discuss the application of observational methods, geophysical techniques, radionuclide measurement methods, environmental sampling methods, drilling techniques, and information management in the context UNE phenomena and OSI implementation. The meeting began with the identification and description of two general OSI scenarios, a vertical borehole emplacement and a horizontal tunnel emplacement, that serve as general examples of past UNE testing activities that can be used as a reference to identify UNE phenomena relevant for OSI observations. A significant portion of the first day of the meeting was spent in the description of the details of these scenarios and their implications for OSI observables. This discussion then served as a foundation for the discussions of the following three days in which OSI methods and technologies were evaluated in the context of UNE phenomenology and signatures. The methods and technologies discussed included visual observation from air and ground, radiation detection from the air, ground, and subsurface, ground-based and airborne geophysical observations and analysis, collection strategies for air, water, and solid samples, drilling concepts, and aspects of data fusion, information management, and modeling and simulation. The informal setting of the meeting provided a 'brainstorming' atmosphere and participation was excellent. One important aspect of this particular group was the very wide breadth of experience and expertise represented, ranging from those sharing their knowledge of UNE testing practice, radiological measurements and sampling, and knowledge of the underground effects of UNEs, to those with extensive experience in scientific and commercial geophysical measurements and surveys, to others with rich experience gained from several OSI field exercises, including the recent OSI Integrated Field Exercise in held in Kazakhstan in September 2008. During the workshop a number of topic areas relevant to OSI, explained in the list below, were identified that will benefit from collaboration with the international scientific community. Most of the topics represent the potential for studies of long-term interest, but some topics were identified that could be addressed, either by workshop participants or others known to the participants, that could be included as abstracts for submission to the ISS meeting taking place in June 2009. Items with topics that could be covered in the June meeting are annotated in the list. The meeting ended with the general understanding that ISS will not be completed with the June 2009 Conference. Rather, the ISS is considered as a long term project sponsoring relevant ongoing international scientific initiatives to expand and improve the verification capabilities of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

OSI in the NASA science internet: An analysis

The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) protocol suite is a result of a world-wide effort to develop international standards for networking. OSI is formalized through the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). The goal of OSI is to provide interoperability between network products without relying on one particular vendor, and to do so on a multinational basis. The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) has developed a Government OSI Profile (GOSIP) that specified a subset of the OSI protocols as a Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS 146). GOSIP compatibility has been adopted as the direction for all U.S. government networks. OSI is extremely diverse, and therefore adherence to a profile will facilitate interoperability within OSI networks. All major computer vendors have indicated current or future support of GOSIP-compliant OSI protocols in their products. The NASA Science Internet (NSI) is an operational network, serving user requirements under NASA's Office of Space Science and Applications. NSI consists of the Space Physics Analysis Network (SPAN) that uses the DECnet protocols and the NASA Science Network (NSN) that uses TCP/IP protocols. The NSI Project Office is currently working on an OSI integration analysis and strategy. A long-term goal is to integrate SPAN and NSN into one unified network service, using a full OSI protocol suite, which will support the OSSA user community.

Nitzan, Rebecca↗

Investigation of CTBT OSI Radionuclide Techniques at the DILUTED WATERS Nuclear Test Site

Under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), a verification regime that includes the ability to conduct an On-Site Inspection (OSI) will be established. The Treaty allows for an OSI to include many techniques, including the radionuclide techniques of gamma radiation surveying and spectrometry and environmental sampling and analysis. Such radioactivity detection techniques can provide the “smoking gun” evidence that a nuclear test has occurred through the detection and quantification of indicative recent fission products. An OSI faces restrictions in time and manpower, as dictated by the Treaty; not to mention possible logistics difficulties due to the location and climate of the suspected explosion site. It is thus necessary to have a good understanding of the possible source term an OSI will encounter and the proper techniques that will be necessary for an effective OSI regime. One of the challenges during an OSI is to locate radioactive debris that has escaped an underground nuclear explosion (UNE) and settled on the surface near and downwind of ground zero. To support the understanding and selection of sampling and survey techniques for use in an OSI, we are currently designing an experiment, the Particulate Release Experiment (PRex), to simulate a small-scale vent from an underground nuclear explosion. PRex will occur at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The project is conducted under the National Center for Nuclear Security (NCNS) funded by the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA). Prior to the release experiment, scheduled for Spring of 2013, the project scheduled a number of activities at the NNSS to prepare for the release experiment as well as to utilize the nuclear testing past of the NNSS for the development of OSI techniques for CTBT. One such activity—the focus of this report—was a survey and sampling campaign at the site of an old UNE that vented: DILUTED WATERS. Activities at DILUTED WATERS included vehicle-based survey, in situ measurements with high-purity germanium (HPGe) and hand-held LaBr 3 systems, soil sampling with a variety of tools, and laboratory gamma spectrometric analysis of those samples. A further benefit of the measurement campaign was to gain familiarity with the many logistical aspects of performing radiological field work at NNSS ahead of the PRex. Many practical lessons concerning the proper methodologies and logistics of using the surveying and sampling equipment were noted. These Lessons Learned are compiled together in Appendix A. The vehicle-based survey was successful in that it found a previously unknown hotspot (determined to be 232 Th) while it demonstrated that a better method for keeping a serpentine track without staking was needed. Some of the soil sampling equipment was found to be impractical for the application, though core sampling would not be the correct way to take soil samples for a fresh vent deposit (as opposed to an old site like DILUTED WATERS). Due to the site’s age, 137 Cs was the only fission radioisotope identified, though others were searched for. While not enough samples were taken and analyzed to definitively link the 137 Cs to DILUTED WATERS as opposed to other NNSS activities, results were consistent with the historical DILUTED WATERS plume. MDAs were compared for soil sampling and in situ measurements.

CTBT↗

Issues Involving The OSI Concept of Operation For Noble Gas Radionuclide Detection

The development of a technically sound protocol for detecting the subsurface release of noble gas radionuclides is critical to the successful operation of an on site inspection (OSI) under the CTBT and has broad ramifications for all aspects of the OSI regime including the setting of specifications for both sampling and analysis equipment used during an OSI. With NA-24 support, we are investigating a variety of issues and concerns that have significant bearing on policy development and technical guidance regarding the detection of noble gases and the creation of a technically justifiable OSI concept of operation. The work at LLNL focuses on optimizing the ability to capture radioactive noble gases subject to the constraints of possible OSI scenarios. This focus results from recognizing the difficulty of detecting gas releases in geologic environments - a lesson we learned previously from the LLNL Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE). Evaluation of a number of important noble gas detection issues, potentially affecting OSI policy, has awaited the US re-engagement with the OSI technical community. Thus, there have been numerous issues to address during the past 18 months. Most of our evaluations of a sampling or transport issue necessarily involve computer simulations. This is partly due to the lack of OSI-relevant field data, such as that provided by the NPE, and partly a result of the ability of LLNL computer-based models to test a range of geologic and atmospheric scenarios far beyond what could ever be studied in the field making this approach very highly cost effective. We review some highlights of the transport and sampling issues we have investigated during the past year. We complete the discussion of these issues with a description of a preliminary design for subsurface sampling that is intended to be a practical solution to most if not all the challenges addressed here.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

OSI Passive Seismic Experiment at the Former Nevada Test Site

On-site inspection (OSI) is one of the four verification provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Under the provisions of the CTBT, once the Treaty has entered into force, any signatory party can request an on-site inspection, which can then be carried out after approval (by majority voting) of the Executive Council. Once an OSI is approved, a team of 40 inspectors will be assembled to carry out an inspection to ''clarify whether a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of Article I''. One challenging aspect of carrying out an on-site inspection (OSI) in the case of a purported underground nuclear explosion is to detect and locate the underground effects of an explosion, which may include an explosion cavity, a zone of damaged rock, and/or a rubble zone associated with an underground collapsed cavity. The CTBT (Protocol, Section II part D, paragraph 69) prescribes several types of geophysical investigations that can be carried out for this purpose. One of the methods allowed by the CTBT for geophysical investigation is referred to in the Treaty Protocol as ''resonance seismometry''. This method, which was proposed and strongly promoted by Russia during the Treaty negotiations, is not described in the Treaty. Some clarification about the nature of the resonance method can be gained from OSI workshop presentations by Russian experts in the late 1990s. Our understanding is that resonance seismometry is a passive method that relies on seismic reverberations set up in an underground cavity by the passage of waves from regional and teleseismic sources. Only a few examples of the use of this method for detection of underground cavities have been presented, and those were done in cases where the existence and precise location of an underground cavity was known. As is the case with many of the geophysical methods allowed during an OSI under the Treaty, how resonance seismology really works and its effectiveness for OSI purposes has yet to be determined. For this experiment, we took a broad approach to the definition of ''resonance seismometry''; stretching it to include any means that employs passive seismic methods to infer the character of underground materials. In recent years there have been a number of advances in the use of correlation and noise analysis methods in seismology to obtain information about the subsurface. Our objective in this experiment was to use noise analysis and correlation analysis to evaluate these techniques for detecting and characterizing the underground damage zone from a nuclear explosion. The site that was chosen for the experiment was the Mackerel test in Area 4 of the former Nevada Test Site (now named the Nevada National Security Site, or NNSS). Mackerel was an underground nuclear test of less than 20 kT conducted in February of 1964 (DOENV-209-REV 15). The reason we chose this site is because there was a known apical cavity occurring at about 50 m depth above a rubble zone, and that the site had been investigated by the US Geological Survey with active seismic methods in 1965 (Watkins et al., 1967). Note that the time delay between detonation of the explosion (1964) and the time of the present survey (2010) is nearly 46 years - this would not be typical of an expected OSI under the CTBT.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Report of On-Site Inspection Workshop-20: Debriefing on OSI Build-Up Exercises (BUE) I and II/IV and Preparations for BUE III

OSI Workshop-20, “Debriefing on OSI Build-Up Exercises (BUE) I and II/IV and Preparations for BUE III”, took place on 29 October – 2 November 2012 at the Vienna International Centre. There were a total of 83 participants from both the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) and 19 States Signatories. This workshop is part of the planning and preparation process leading up to the 2014 Integrated Field Exercise (IFE14). The opening plenary session provided an overview of the build-up exercises (BUEs) and the overall planning process for IFE14 and preparations for BUE I and BUE II/IV, and the closing session provided a summary of findings. Other sessions consisted of a summary of the preparations for BUE I (launch phase), review and discussion of the execution of BUE I, review and discussion of BUE II/IV (pre-inspection and post-inspection phases), and review and planning of elements of BUE III (inspection phase) and IFE14. BUE I was conducted in mid-April and BUE II/IV in mid-September 2012. BUE III is planned for 26 May – 7 June 2013 and IFE14 for November-December 2014. The purpose of this workshop was to give the participants who took part in the exercises and participants at the workshop a chance to review the preparation and execution of BUE I and BUE II/IV, assess them as to their value to the exercise build-up process, determine what went well and what did not go well, and provide recommendations to help the planning for BUE III and IFE14. This was accomplished by means of presentations by PTS staff and other participants, discussions following the presentations and separate expert working group discussions. The consensus of the participants was that BUE I and BUE II/IV validated the exercise concept contained in CTBT/PTS/INF.1105 (Concept for Preparation and Conduct of the Next Integrated Field Exercise). The many details dealt with in the launch, pre-inspection and post inspection exercises provided an opportunity to test a host of issues prior to IFE14. The exercises showed that the PTS has made considerable progress in developing capabilities in logistics, administration and planning of an OSI since IFE08, and pointed as well to a number of areas where more attention is needed – most notably in the areas of health and safety and equipment checking at the base of operations. A number of areas for which results from the two initial exercises can be applied to BUE III and IFE14 were identified. Also, the review of plans and preparations for BUE III and IFE14 provided the participants with an excellent baseline of information on these two exercises. Probably the most significant impressions that resulted from this workshop are the significant level of complexity involved with preparing the OSI verification regime, the extent of planning involved in the preparation of exercises, and the great value of these types of BUE for assessing and building OSI capabilities. The recommendations section at the end of this report contains the findings of the workshop, grouped into lessons learned from the first two BUEs, proposals relevant to BUE III and IFE14 and issues for the attention of Working Group B.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

An OSI Architecture for the Deep Space Network

The flexibility and robustness of a monitor and control system are a direct result of the underlying inter-processor communications architecture. A new architecture for monitor & control at the Deep Space Network Communications Complexes has been developed based on the Open System Interconnection (OSI) standards. The suitability of OSI standards for DSN M&C has been proven in the laboratory. The laboratory success has resulted in choosing an OSI-based architecture for DSS-13 M&C. DSS-13 is the DSN experimental station and is not part of the "operational" DSN; it's role is to provide an environment to test new communications concepts can be tested and conduct unique science experiments. Therefore, DSS-13 must be robust enough to support operational activities, while also being flexible enough to enable experimentation. This paper describes the M&C architecture developed for DSS-13 and the results from system and operational testing.

OSI↗

An OSI architecture for the deep space network

The flexibility and robustness of a monitor and control system are a direct result of the underlying inter-processor communications architecture. A new architecture for monitor & Control at the Deep Space Network Communications Complexes has been developed based on the Open System Interconnection (OSI) standards. The suitability of OSI standards for DSN M&C has been proven in the laboratory. The laboratory success has resulted in choosing an OSI-based architecture for DSS-13 M&C. DSS-13 is the DSN experimental station and is not part of the 'operational' DSN; it's role is to provide an environment to test new communications concepts can be tested and conduct unique science experiments. Therefore, DSS-13 must be robust enough to support operational activities, while also being flexible enough to enable experimentation. This paper describes the M&C architecture developed for DSS-13 and the results from system and operational testing.

Heuser, W. Randy↗

An OSI architecture for the Deep Space Network

This article presents an Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) architecture developed for the Deep Space Network. An historical review is provided to establish the context for current United States Government policy on interprocessor communication standards. An introduction to the OSI architecture, its seven-layer approach, and an overview of application service entities are furnished as a tutorial. Finally, the results of a prototype system developed for monitor and control of a Deep Space Station are also presented.

Heuser, W. R.↗

Orbiting Space Interferometer (OSI): A first generation space interferometer

The technical requirements and performance of a first generation space interferometer is discussed. The performance of an interferometer, sensitivity, field of view, dynamic range, astrometric accuracy, etc, in space is set by what cannot be achieved for a ground-based instrument. For the Orbiting Space Interferometer (OSI), the nominal performance parameters are 20 mag sensitivity, field of view of approximately 500*500 pixels, a 1000:1 dynamic range in the image with one milliarcsec resolution, and an astrometric accuracy of 0.1 milliarcsec for wide angle astrometry and 10 microarcsec accuracy for narrow field astrometry (few degrees). OSI is a fully phased interferometer where all critical optical paths are controlled to 0.05 wavelengths. The instrument uses two guide interferometers locked on bright stars several degrees away to provide the spacecraft attitude information needed to keep the fringes from the faint science object stable on the detector.

Shao, Michael↗

DSS-13 - Using an OSI process control standard for monitor and control

The flexibility and robustness of a monitor and control (M&C) system are a direct result of the underlying inter-processor communications architecture. A new architecture for M&C at the Deep Space Communications Complexes has been developed based on the manufacturing message specification (MMS) process control standard of the open system interconnection (OSI) suite of protocols. This architecture has been tested both in a laboratory environment and under operational conditions at the Deep Space Network experimental station (DSS-13). The DSS-13 experience in the application of OSI standards to support M&C has been extremely successful. MMS meets the functional needs of the station and provides a level of flexibility and responsiveness previously unknown in that environment. The architecture is robust enough to meet current operational needs and flexible enough to provide a migration path for new subsystems. This paper describes the architecture of the DSS-13 M&C system, discuss how MMS was used and the requirements this imposed on other parts of the system, and provides results from systems and operational testing at DSS-13.

Heuser, W. R.↗

DSS-13: Using an OSI Process Control Standard for Monitor and Control

The flexibility and robustness of a monitor and control (M&C) system are a direct result of the underlying inter-processor communications architecture. A new architecture for M&C at the Deep Space Communications Complexes (DSCCs) has been developed based on the Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) process control standard of the Open System Interconnection (OSI) suite of protocols. This architecture has been tested both in a laboratory environment and under operational conditions at the Deep Space Network (DSN) experimental station (DSS-13). The DSS-13 experience in the application of OSI standards to support M&C has been extremely successful. MMS meets the functional needs of the station and provides a level of flexibility and responsiveness previously unknown in that environment.

Stockett, Michael H.↗

Ga[OSi(O t Bu) 3 ] 3 ·THF, a thermolytic molecular precursor for high surface area gallium-containing silica materials of controlled dispersion and stoichiometry

The molecular precursor tris[(tri-tert-butoxy)siloxy]gallium, as the tetrahydrofuran adduct Ga[OSi(OtBu) 3 ] 3 ·THF (1), was synthesized via the salt metathesis reaction of gallium trichloride with NaOSi(OtBu) 3 . This complex serves as a model for isolated gallium in a silica framework. Complex 1 decomposes thermally in hydrocarbon solvent, eliminating isobutylene, water, and tert-butanol to generate high surface area gallium-containing silica at low temperatures. When thermal decomposition was performed in the presence of P-123 Pluronic as a templating agent the generated material displayed uniform vermicular pores. Textural mesoporosity was evident in untemplated material. Co-thermolysis of 1 with HOSi(OtBu) 3 in the presence of P-123 Pluronic led to materials with Ga:Si ratios ranging from 1:3 to 1:50, denoted UCB1-GaSi 3 , UCB1-GaSi 10 , UCB1-GaSi 20 and UCB1-GaSi 50 . After calcination at 500 °C these materials exhibited decreasing surface areas and broadening pore distributions with increasing silicon content, indicating a loss of template effects. The position and dispersion of the gallium in UCB1-GaSi materials was investigated using 71 Ga MAS-NMR, powder XRD, and STEM/EDS elemental mapping. The results indicate a high degree of gallium dispersion in all samples, with gallium oxide clusters or oligomers present at higher gallium content.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

EP-DRAFT-1.1 2014-01-19 OSI-GAM-SOP-00x In Situ High-resolution Gamma Spectroscopy

The standard operating procedure is described for in situ high-resolution gamma spectroscopy, including operational readiness, planning, preparation, conduct, and reporting. Data analysis of in situ gamma spectrum files will be performed together with those of other gamma assay methods by a dedicated Data Analysis process, documented in companion OSI procedures.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

White paper on timelines for OSI

This white paper on OSI timelines answer the following questions: what time limits should there be, if any; does the IT have to say immediately or before inspections start if it needs to take a sample off-site; and if a sample goes off-site, how long can it stay off-site.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

White paper on OSI reporting requirements

This white paper on OSI reporting requirements answers the following questions: How would results of the off-site analysis be reported; and Does the ISP get a chance to censor this type of data if they argue it is not relevant.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Simulating Aftershocks for an On Site Inspection (OSI) Exercise

The experience of IFE14 emphasizes the need for a better way to simulate aftershocks during an OSI exercise. The obvious approach is to develop a digital model of aftershocks that can be used either for a real field exercise or for a computer simulation that can be done in an office, for training for example. However, this approach involves consideration of several aspects, such as how and when to introduce waveforms in a way that maximizes the realism of the data and that will be convincing to a savvy, experienced seismic analyst. The purpose of this report is to outline a plan for how this approach can be implemented.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

OSI and TCP/IP

The Open Systems Interconnection Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (OSI TCP/IP) and the Government Open Systems Interconnection Profile (GOSIP) are compared and described in terms of Federal internetworking. The organization and functions of the Federal Internetworking Requirements Panel (FIRP) are discussed and the panel's conclusions and recommendations with respect to the standards and implementation of the National Information Infrastructure (NII) are presented.

Randolph, Lynwood P.↗