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At least 1,783 records · Page 99

Clean and Secure Energy from Coal

The University of Utah, through their Institute for Clean and Secure Energy (ICSE), performed research to utilize the vast energy stored in our domestic coal resources and to do so in a manner that will capture CO 2 from combustion from stationary power generation. The research was organized around the theme of validation and uncertainty quantification (V/UQ) through tightly coupled simulation and experimental designs and through the integration of legal, environment, economics and policy issues.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

US public perspectives on security

We report findings from a national Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone in mid-2011 on public assessments of contemporary and emerging interstate nuclear threats, support for strategic arms control, and preferences for responding to limited nuclear attacks on the United States. Additionally, we analyze public views of the threat of terrorism, including cyber attacks, assessments of progress in the struggle against terrorism, and preferences for responding to an act of radiological terrorism against the United States. Also, we report findings from an Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone among the American public in mid-2011 on US energy and environmental security. Key areas of investigation include public views on energy requirements, preferences for energy sources, energy conservation versus development, energy independence, implications of events at Fukushima, Japan, for US public support of nuclear generation, preferences for managing used nuclear fuel, and trust in nuclear risk assessments from government and other public sources. Where possible, findings from each survey are compared with previous surveys in this series for analyses of trends.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A brief history of Sandia's National security missions.

To help members of the workforce understand what factors contribute to Sandia National Laboratories national security mission, the authors describe the evolution of Sandia s core mission and its other mission components. The mission of Sandia first as a division of Los Alamos and later as Sandia Corporation underlies our core nuclear weapon mission of today. Sandia s mission changed in 1963 and twice more in the 1970s. This report should help staff and management appreciate the need for mission evolution. A clear definition and communication of a consistent corporate mission statement is still needed.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

National Security Education Center

Information about the National Security Education Center is given. Information about the Center’s history and current practices, including its facilities and its practicality are outlined.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Determining Home Range and Preferred Habitat of Feral Horses on the Nevada National Security Site Using Geographic Information Systems

Feral horses (Equus caballus) are free-roaming descendants of domesticated horses and legally protected by the Wild and Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971, which mandates how feral horses and burros should be managed and protected on federal lands. Using a geographic information system to determine the home range and suitable habitat of feral horses on the federally managed Nevada National Security Site can enable wildlife biologists in making best management practice recommendations. Home range was estimated at 88.1 square kilometers. Site suitability was calculated for elevation, forage, slope, water presence and horse observations. These variables were combined in successive iterations into one polygon. Suitability rankings established that 85 square kilometers are most suitable habitat, with 2,052 square kilometers of good habitat 1,252 square kilometers of fair habitat and 122 square kilometers of least suitable habitat.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

United States Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Sandia Field Office NESHAP Annual Report CY2014 for Sandia National Laboratories New Mexico

This report provides a summary of the radionuclide releases from the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration facilities at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) during Calendar Year (CY) 2014, including the data, calculations, and supporting documentation for demonstrating compliance with 40 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 61, Subpart H--NATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS FOR EMISSIONS OF RADIONUCLIDES OTHER THAN RADON FROM DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FACILITIES. A description is given of the sources and their contributions to the overall dose assessment. In addition, the maximally exposed individual (MEI) radiological dose calculation and the population dose to local and regional residents are discussed.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Scintillator Optimization Study for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Safeguards, and Security Based Applications

The following report summarizes my overall research and experience in the Department of Homeland Security HS-STEM Summer Internship Program at the Idaho National Laboratory. First, I give an introduction to scintillators principles. This includes the basic physics and methodology for radiation detection. Secondly, an introduction to my work is presented which includes the problem and approach. Next, I summarize the skills I learned in the internship as well as interesting knowledge that I was exposed to. I finish with my future career plans as well as acknowledgements.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Underground Test Area Activity Quality Assurance Plan Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. Revision 1

This Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) provides the overall quality assurance (QA) requirements and general quality practices to be applied to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Underground Test Area (UGTA) activities. The requirements in this QAP are consistent with DOE Order 414.1C, Quality Assurance (DOE, 2005); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Guidance for Quality Assurance Project Plans for Modeling (EPA, 2002); and EPA Guidance on the Development, Evaluation, and Application of Environmental Models (EPA, 2009). NNSA/NSO, or designee, must review this QAP every two years. Changes that do not affect the overall scope or requirements will not require an immediate QAP revision but will be incorporated into the next revision cycle after identification. Section 1.0 describes UGTA objectives, participant responsibilities, and administrative and management quality requirements (i.e., training, records, procurement). Section 1.0 also details data management and computer software requirements. Section 2.0 establishes the requirements to ensure newly collected data are valid, existing data uses are appropriate, and environmental-modeling methods are reliable. Section 3.0 provides feedback loops through assessments and reports to management. Section 4.0 provides the framework for corrective actions. Section 5.0 provides references for this document.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Underground Test Area Activity Quality Assurance Plan Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. Revision 2

This Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) provides the overall quality assurance (QA) requirements and general quality practices to be applied to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) Underground Test Area (UGTA) activities. The requirements in this QAP are consistent with DOE Order 414.1D, Change 1, Quality Assurance (DOE, 2013a); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Guidance for Quality Assurance Project Plans for Modeling (EPA, 2002); and EPA Guidance on the Development, Evaluation, and Application of Environmental Models (EPA, 2009). If a participant’s requirement document differs from this QAP, the stricter requirement will take precedence. NNSA/NFO, or designee, must review this QAP every two years. Changes that do not affect the overall scope or requirements will not require an immediate QAP revision but will be incorporated into the next revision cycle after identification. Section 1.0 describes UGTA objectives, participant responsibilities, and administrative and management quality requirements (i.e., training, records, procurement). Section 1.0 also details data management and computer software requirements. Section 2.0 establishes the requirements to ensure newly collected data are valid, existing data uses are appropriate, and environmental-modeling methods are reliable. Section 3.0 provides feedback loops through assessments and reports to management. Section 4.0 provides the framework for corrective actions. Section 5.0 provides references for this document.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Statistical Analysis of the Worker Engagement Survey Administered at the Worker Safety and Security Team Festival

The Worker Safety and Security Team (WSST) at Los Alamos National Laboratory holds an annual festival, WSST-fest, to engage workers and inform them about safety- and securityrelated matters. As part of the 2015 WSST-fest, workers were given the opportunity to participate in a survey assessing their engagement in their organizations and work environments. A total of 789 workers participated in the 23-question survey where they were also invited, optionally, to identify themselves, their organization, and to give open-ended feedback. The survey consisted of 23 positive statements (i.e. “My organization is a good place to work.”) with which the respondent could express a level of agreement. The text of these statements are provided in Table 1. The level of agreement corresponds to a 5-level Likert scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.” In addition to assessing the overall positivity or negativity of the scores, the results were partitioned into several cohorts based on the response meta-data (self-identification, comments, etc.) to explore trends. Survey respondents were presented with the options to identify themselves, their organizations and to provide comments. These options suggested the following questions about the data set.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 568. Area 3 Plutonium Dispersion Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada Revision 0

The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document is to identify and provide the rationale for the recommendation of corrective action alternatives (CAAs) for the 14 CASs within CAU 568. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from April 2014 through May 2015, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 568: Area 3 Plutonium Dispersion Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada; and in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the DQO process. The CAU 568 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on a data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated that the dataset is complete and acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Based on the evaluation of analytical data from the CAI, review of future and current operations at the 14 CASs, and the detailed and comparative analysis of the potential CAAs, the following corrective actions are recommended for CAU 568: • No further action is the preferred corrective action for CASs 03-23-17, 03-23-22, 03-23-26. • Closure in place is the preferred corrective action for CAS 03-23-19; 03-45-01; the SE DCBs at CASs 03-23-20, 03-23-23, 03-23-31, 03-23-32, 03-23-33, and 03-23-34; and the Pascal-BHCA at CAS 03-23-31. • Clean closure is the preferred corrective action for CASs 03-08-04, 03-23-30, and 03-26-04; and the four well head covers at CASs 03-23-20, 03-23-23, 03-23-31, and 03-23-33.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Approximating Dose and Risk for Contaminants in Groundwater from the Underground Nuclear Test Areas of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS)

As part of the Environmental Management Program at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity investigates the potential impacts of radionuclides that were introduced into groundwater from the underground nuclear tests conducted near or below the NNSS water table between 1951 and 1992. Groundwater models are being used to simulate contaminant transport and forecast contaminant boundaries that encompass areas where the groundwater has a five percent or greater probability of containing contaminants above the Safe Drinking Water Act Maximum Contaminant Levels (SDWA MCLs) at any time during the next 1,000 years. Transport modeling conducted for the Frenchman Flat Corrective Action Unit (CAU) at the NNSS identified the beta/photon-emitting radionuclides tritium (3H), carbon-14 ( 14 C), chlorine-36 ( 36 Cl), technetium-99 ( 99 Tc), and iodine-129 ( 129 I) as having the greatest influence in defining the farthest extent of the modeled CAU contaminant boundary. These same radionuclides are assumed here as the contaminants of concern (COCs) for all underground nuclear tests at the NNSS because models are not yet complete for the other CAUs. Potential public exposure to the COCs will only occur and be of concern if the COCs migrate into the groundwater beneath public or private lands at levels that exceed either individual SDWA MCLs or dose and risk limits. Groundwater flow directions strongly suggest that any contaminant boundary predicted by contaminant fate and transport modeling to overlap public or private lands is more likely to occur to the west and/or southwest of the NNSS and the adjacent Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). Well-established, rural communities exist in these directions. Estimates of representative activity concentrations at the applicable SDWA MCL were developed for the five COCs. It is assumed that these COC concentrations may collectively occur at some public or private location in the future, but that situation does not exist today. These representative activity concentrations are evaluated with respect to conforming collectively to a modern annual committed effective dose (CED) and lifetime excess cancer morbidity risk for a hypothetical reasonably maximally exposed individual (RMEI). This approach goes beyond the SDWA MCL focus of the contaminant boundary because individual COC concentrations may comply with the SDWA MCL but not collectively meet the modern health-protection metrics and the SDWA language, especially if future modeling studies or monitoring activities show multiple radionuclides from different SDWA MCL categories to be COCs. For the drinking water exposure pathway alone, the annual committed effective dose (CED) for the RMEI from all five COCs that are collectively at estimated activity concentrations equal to their SDWA MCL is well below the U.S. Department of Energy health-protective CED limit of 100 millirem (mrem)/yr. This is consistent using both the NNSS unclassified, 1992 decay-corrected radionuclide atom inventory and the atom inventory based on radionuclides measured in groundwater obtained from the ALMENDRO cavity in 2009 to calculate the SDWA MCL activity concentrations in groundwater. The RMEI’s total lifetime excess cancer risk from the drinking water exposure pathway for both atom inventories is within the range of 1 × 10 -4 to ≤ 1 × 10 -6 , which is considered health protective according to modern SDWA MCL regulatory language. The biosphere exposure pathways are drinking water, garden produce, animal products, inadvertent soil ingestion, and indoor and outdoor air inhalation. The exposure parameters for communities west and southwest of the NNSS were developed when the Yucca Mountain high-level, nuclear-waste disposal facility was under consideration. For all biosphere exposure pathways, calculations of the annual CED and lifetime excess cancer morbidity risk for the RMEI revealed that: 1) The annual CED is well within health-protective guidance (<< 100 mrem CED /yr) for the COC activity concentrations at the SDWA MCL, regardless of the atom inventory used. 2) The calculated 70-year lifetime excess cancer morbidity risk (6 x 10 -5 ) is within the health-protective range when the five COC activity concentrations are derived using the NNSS 1992 atom inventory, but it is at the upper limit of the acceptable range (1 x 10 -4 ) using the ALMENDRO 2009 atom inventory. 3) Tritium (3H) is the principal COC for producing annual dose and lifetime excess cancer risk, regardless of the atom inventory used. 4) Overall, the drinking water ingestion pathway is the dominant exposure pathway contributing to the total annual CED and lifetime excess cancer risk, followed by eating locally grown produce and animal products. 5) When tritium completely decays (after about 100 years), the RMEI’s lifetime risk will fall well within the health-protective range (i.e., 1 × 10-4 to ≤ 1 × 10 -6 ) and 36Cl will then become the most important contributor to the RMEI’s total annual CED and lifetime excess cancer morbidity risk from eating local produce and animal products. In the event that radionuclide concentrations begin to approach SDWA MCLs, a reasonable risk-management strategy for keeping lifetime risk more in compliance with regulatory guidance would be to use local sources of groundwater that are below SDWA MCLs or to limit the consumption of local produce and animal products that have ingested COC-contaminated groundwater. The viability of the latter strategy increases where the annual CED due to 36Cl approaches that of 3H.The dose and risk values calculated here for an RMEI are specific to the assumption that the five COCs occur in groundwater beneath public or private lands at concentrations that are collectively at the SDWA MCL. Currently, these COCs are essentially absent from groundwater beneath public or private lands beyond the boundaries of the NNSS and NTTR other than at very low, naturally occurring concentrations. The analyses presented here can be readily applied to determine dose and risk for COC concentrations actually measured in future monitoring samples.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

A Cultural Resources Inventory and Historical Evaluation of the Smoky Atmospheric Nuclear Test, Areas 8, 9, and 10, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This report presents the results of a National Historic Preservation Act Section 106 cultural resources inventory and historical evaluation of the 1957 Smoky atmospheric test location on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The Desert Research Institute (DRI) was tasked to conduct a cultural resources study of the Smoky test area as a result of a proposed undertaking by the Department of Energy Environmental Management. This undertaking involves investigating Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 550 for potential contaminants of concern as delineated in a Corrective Action Investigation Plan. CAU 550 is an area that spatially overlaps portions of the Smoky test location. Smoky, T-2c, was a 44 kt atmospheric nuclear test detonated at 5:30 am on August 31, 1957, on top of a 213.4 m (700 ft) 200 ton tower (T-2c) in Area 8 of the NNSS. Smoky was a weapons related test of the Plumbbob series (number 19) and part of the Department of Defense Exercise Desert Rock VII and VIII. The cultural resources effort involved the development of a historic context based on archival documents and engineering records, the inventory of the cultural resources in the Smoky test area and an associated military trench location in Areas 9 and 10, and an evaluation of the National Register eligibility of the cultural resources. The inventory of the Smoky test area resulted in the identification of structures, features, and artifacts related to the physical development of the test location and the post-test remains. The Smoky test area was designated historic district D104 and coincides with a historic archaeological site recorded as 26NY14794 and the military trenches designed for troop observation, site 26NY14795. Sites 26NY14794 and 26NY14795 are spatially discrete with the trenches located 4.3 km (2.7 mi) southeast of the Smoky ground zero. As a result, historic district D104 is discontiguous and in total it covers 151.4 hectares (374 acres). The Smoky test location, recorded as historic district D104 and historic sites 26NY14794 and 26NY14795, is the best preserved post-shot atmospheric nuclear tower test at the NNSS and possibly in the world. It is of local, national, and international importance due to nuclear testing’s pivotal role in the Cold War between the United States and the former Soviet Union. The district and sites are linked to the historic theme of atmospheric nuclear testing. D104 retains aspects of the engineering plan and design for the Smoky tower, instrument stations used to measure test effects, German and French personnel shelters, and military trenches. A total of 33 structures contribute to the significance of D104. Artifacts and features provide significant post-test information. Historic district D104 (discontiguous) and historic site 26NY14794 (the Smoky test area) are eligible for listing on the NRHP under Criteria A, B, C, and D. The historic site 26NY14795 (the Smoky military trenches) is eligible for listing under Criteria A, C, and D. Several items have been identified for removal by the CAU 550 investigation. However, none of them is associated with the Smoky atmospheric test, but with later activities in the area. The military trenches are not part of CAU 550 and no actions are planned there. A proposed closure of the Smoky test area with restrictions will limit access and contribute to the preservation of the cultural resources. It is recommended that the Smoky historic district and sites be included in the NNSS cultural resources monitoring program.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Climate Induced Spillover and Implications for U.S. Security.

Developing nations incur a greater risk to climate change than the developed world due to poorly managed human/natural resources, unreliable infrastructure and brittle governing/economic institutions. These vulnerabilities often give rise to a climate induced “domino effect” of reduced natural resource production-leading to economic hardship, social unrest, and humanitarian crises. Integral to this cascading set of events is increased human migration, leading to the “spillover” of impacts to adjoining areas with even broader impact on global markets and security. Given the complexity of factors influencing human migration and the resultant spill-over effect, quantitative tools are needed to aid policy analysis. Toward this need, a series of migration models were developed along with a system dynamics model of the spillover effect. The migration decision models were structured according to two interacting paths, one that captured long-term “chronic” impacts related to protracted deteriorating quality of life and a second focused on short-term “acute” impacts of disaster and/or conflict. Chronic migration dynamics were modeled for two different cases; one that looked only at emigration but at a national level for the entire world; and a second that looked at both emigration and immigration but focused on a single nation. Model parameterization for each of the migration models was accomplished through regression analysis using decadal data spanning the period 1960-2010. A similar approach was taken with acute migration dynamics except regression analysis utilized annual data sets limited to a shorter time horizon (2001-2013). The system dynamics spillover model was organized around two broad modules, one simulating the decision dynamics of migration and a second module that treats the changing environmental conditions that influence the migration decision. The environmental module informs the migration decision, endogenously simulating interactions/changes in the economy, labor, population, conflict, water, and food. A regional model focused on Mali in western Africa was used as a test case to demonstrate the efficacy of the model.

Tidwell, Vincent C.↗